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Housing in the United States has come to be known as a panacea problem. Gone are the days when tossing the graduation cap meant picking up the keys to a front door, and the ripple effects of unaffordable housing stretch across society: poor social mobility, smaller families, worse retirement-readiness, just to name a few.
Today on Faster, Please — The Podcast, I talk to Bryan Caplan about the seemingly obvious culprit, government regulation, and the growing movement to combat it.
Caplan is a professor of economics atGeorge Mason University. His essays have been featured in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, and TIME Magazine. He is editor and chief writer of theBet On It Substack, and is the author of several books, including Build, Baby, Build: The Science and Ethics of Housing Regulation.
In This Episode
* America’s evolving relationship with housing (1:31)
* The impact of regulation (3:53)
* Different regulations for different folks (8:47)
* The YIMBY movement (11:01)
* Homeowners and public opinion (13:56)
* Generating momentum (17:15)
* Building new cities (23:10)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation.
(Note: This was recorded just before the presidential election.)
America’s evolving relationship with housing (1:31)
The main thing that changed is that we've seen a long-run runup of housing prices.
Pethokoukis: What was going on with housing prices and housing affordability from the war to the 1970s? Was it kind of flattish? People were recovering from the Great Depression; what was going on then?
Caplan: Yeah, it was quite flat, so there were decades where we had rapidly expanding population, the Baby Boom, and markets were working the way that markets normally do: You get demand going up, raises prices in the short run, but then that means the prices are above the cost of production, and so you get entry, and you build more until prices come back down to the cost of production. That's the way markets are supposed to work!
I don't know how people thought about their homes in the late ’40s, ’50s, and ’60s, but did they view them as, “This is our primary investment,” or did they view them more as a place to live? Were there any expectations that this was their retirement plan?
I honestly don't know. I don't remember reading anything about that. I grew up in Los Angeles where in the ’70s and ’80s people already had some sense of, “Your home is an important retirement vessel,” but it is plausible that when you are going back to earlier decades, people did have a different view.
I've often heard Americans say that Japanese don't think about their homes as retirement vessels, but I've never talked to anyone in Japan to assure me this is so, so I don't know.
But that scenario changed.
It did.
How did it change and are we confident we know why it changed?
The main thing that changed is that we've seen a long-run runup of housing prices. Depending upon what series you're looking at, the runup might be starting in the early ’70s or the early ’80s, but in any case, there was what economists would call a structural break where a series that was generally flat over the long term started rising over the long term. There have been a few times when prices fell back down, like after the Great Recession, but now, inflation adjusted, we are higher than the peak right before the Great Recession.
Now, is that the same as affordability? Because I assume incomes could be going up, so has it outpaced median income over that period?
Probably not, although it's in the right ballpark, and maybe.
One thing you can say is, well, there's regulation before, there's regulation after, so how can you go and blame the rise on the regulation?
The impact of regulation (3:53)
I would like to blame regulation. Intuitively, that makes sense to me, but I suppose we need more than intuition here.
. . . there's a lot of regulation almost everywhere a lot of people live.
I would say that we do have very good evidence that regulation is indeed to blame. If you look at it very quickly, you might say, “Well, there was regulation before; it didn't seem to matter that much.” The answer to this really was death by a thousand cuts, where we just piled regulation on regulation, but also where regulations that have been interpreted mildly before started being interpreted strictly afterwards.
How do we know that it really is regulation? The easiest thing to do is just to look at the strictness of regulation in different parts of the country, and you can see that there are some places that are crazy strict and the prices are crazy high. There's other places where the regulation is a lot lighter and even though they're getting plenty of population increase, they nevertheless do not have these long-run rises.
So the contrast between the Bay Area and the Texas Triangle is very strong. So these are both areas that, in some sense, they are growth areas, a lot of tech there, but the Bay Area has seen very little rise in the amount of housing and massive increase in prices, whereas Texas has, in contrast, seen a large rise in the number of houses and very low rises in the price of housing.
The main method that economists have used in order to disentangle all this is it really starts with trying to figure out: What is land that you are not allowed to build anything on worth? So just think about whatever your excess land is in a single-family area, you're not allowed to put another structure there, you can put a volleyball court or something like that. So you just find out, well, what is land where you can't build anything worth? And usually, even in a good area, that land is not worth much. If you can't build on it, it's like, I guess we can put some grass, but that's not that good. Then the next step is to just go to a construction manual and to see what the cost of construction is in a given area and then compare it to the price. This is a quite reasonable approach and it has gotten better over time because data has gotten better.
The main thing is that Joe Gyourko, who's been working on this for about 20 years, in his last big paper, he got data on actual vacant lots, and so you can see, this is a vacant lot, usually because you just can't build anything on it, can't get the permission, and as a result of this, he's also able to find out, how bad does the regulation get as you move away from the city center. We've got details like Los Angeles looks like it's regulated out to the horizon. You’ve got 50 miles away from downtown LA and it's still pretty bad regulation. On the other end, a city like Chicago is very regulated in the downtown, but 30 miles out, then there's not that much effect anymore.
The punchline of all this work is that there's a lot of regulation almost everywhere a lot of people live. If you want to go and build a skyscraper in the middle of nowhere in Kansas, you could probably do it, but you wouldn't want to build a skyscraper in the middle of nowhere in Kansas, that defeats the whole purpose of building a skyscraper.
That leads to two questions: The first question is, just to be clear, when we're talking about regulation, is it single-family homes versus multifamily? Is it also the coding, what the home has to be made out of? Do the walls have to be so thick, or the windows? What are we talking about?
The honest answer is that most economists’ estimates are just giving you an estimate of all regulation combined with a considerable agnosticism about what actually are the specific regulations that matter. There are other papers that look at specific kinds of regulation and come up with at least very credible claims that this is a big part of the puzzle.
The main things that matter a lot in the US: We've got height restrictions — those matter in your biggest, most expensive cities; you can just look at a place like Central Park or get a helicopter shot of San Francisco and say, don't tell me you can't build more stuff here. There's endless room to build more stuff here as long as you can go vertically.
It's also very standard to say that you are only allowed to have single-family homes in most residential land in the US, it's just zoned single family only, so you just are not legally allowed to squeeze in a larger number of dwellings.
Then you've got, even with single-family regulation, it's very standard to have minimum lot sizes, which just says that you've got to have at least like an acre of land per house, which, whenever I'm speaking in metric countries, I'm always telling, what is that . . .? It's a lot. It's a lot of land, and the amount of land that's normally required has gone up a lot. One-acre zoning in the past would've seemed crazy. Now plenty of places have five-acre zoning. You could obviously just squeeze way more houses in that space. And what is clear is that builders normally build the absolute maximum number they're allowed to build. Anytime someone is going up to the very border of a rule, that is a strong sign the rule is changing behavior.
Different regulations for different folks (8:47)
Very rarely did someone sit around saying, “You know what's great about Texas? Our lack of housing regulation.”
Why are these rules different in different places? That may be a dumb question. Obviously San Francisco is very different from Texas. Is the answer just: different places, different people, different preferences? Do we have any idea why that is?
Matt Kahn, who is based in Los Angeles, he's been I think at UCLA and USC, he's got a very good paper showing, at least in California, it's the most progressive left-wing places that have the worst regulation, and it just seemed to be very philosophical. On the other hand, I spent a lot of time during Covid in Texas. Very rarely did someone sit around saying, “You know what's great about Texas? Our lack of housing regulation.” It’s not so much that they are opposed to what's going on in California, it just doesn't occur to them they could be California.
In a way, you might actually get them to be proud about what they're doing if you could remind them, “Oh, it's really different in California,” and just take them on a tour, then they might come back and say, “God bless Texas.” But it's more of, there's the places where people have an ideological commitment to regulation, and then the rest of the country is more pragmatic and so builders are able to get a lot more done because there just aren't fanatics that are trying to stop them from providing the second most basic necessity for human beings.
Now, this is all striking because the YIMBY [Yes In My Backyard] movement, and my book Build, Baby, Build — I definitely think of that as a YIMBY book. My goal is to make it the Bible of YIMBY, and it's in comic book form, so it's a Bible that can be read by people starting at age five.
In any case, the YIMBY movement is definitely left-coded. People that are in that movement, they think of themselves as progressives, usually, and yet they are just a small piece of a much broader progressive coalition that is generally totally hostile to what they're doing. They are punching above weight and I want to give them a lot of credit for what they've been able to accomplish, and yet, the idea that YIMBYs tend to be left-wing and therefore they are the main people that are responsible for allowing housing is just not true. Most places in the country basically don't have a lot of pro- or anti-housing activism. They just have apathy combined with a construction industry that tries to go and build stuff, and if no one stops them, they do their job.
The YIMBY movement (11:01)
Who the hell decided that was a good idea that everybody should have an acre of land?
I want to talk a bit more about the economic harms and benefits of deregulation, but if I was a center-left YIMBY, I would think, “Oh, I have all kinds of potential allies on the right. Conservatives, they hate regulation.” I wonder how true that is, at least recently, it seems to me that when I hear a lot of conservatives talking about this issue of density, they don't like density either. It sounds like they're very worried that someone's going to put up an apartment building next to their suburban home, YIMBY people want every place to look [the same] — What's the home planet in Star Wars?
Yeah Coruscant, that that's what the YIMBYs want, they want an entire planet to look like a city where there's hundreds of levels, and I'm not sure there's the level of potential allyship on the right that center-left YIMBYs would want. Is that a phenomenon that you've noticed?
I actually I have a whole chapter in Build, Baby, Build where I try to go and say we can sell these policies to very different people in their own language, and if they actually believe their official philosophy, then they should all be coming down to very similar conclusions.
I think the main issue of center-left YIMBYs talking to people who are right wing or conservative, it's much more about polarization and mutual antipathy than it is about the people on the right would actually object to what they're hearing. What I say there is there are certain kinds of housing regulation that I think the conservatives are going to be sympathetic to. In particular, not liking multifamily housing in suburbs, but I don't really think there is any conservative objection to just allowing a lot more skyscrapers in cities where they don't even go. There's not going to be much objection there and it's like, “Yeah, why don't we go and allow lots of multifamily in the left-wing parts of the country?”
But I think the other thing is I don't think it's really that hard to convince conservatives that you shouldn't need to have an acre of land to go and have a house. That one, I think, is just so crazy, and just unfair, and anti-family, you just go and list all the negative adjectives about it. Did you grow up in a house on a one-acre lot? I didn't! Who the hell decided that was a good idea that everybody should have an acre of land? Wouldn't you like your kids to be able to walk to their friends' houses?
A lot of it seems to be that government is just preventing the development of something that people would actually want to live in. I remember when my daughter finally made a friend within walking distance, I wanted to light a candle, hallelujah! A child can walk to be friends with a child! This has not happened in all my years! But that was the normal way things were when you'd be on a quarter-acre or a third of acre when I was growing up.
Homeowners and public opinion (13:56)
People generally favor government policies because they believe . . . the policies are good for society.
If someone owns a house, they like when that price goes up, and they might see what you're saying as lowering the price of homes. If we were to have sort of nationwide deregulation, maybe deregulation where the whole country kind of looks like wherever the lightest-regulated place is. People are going to say, “That's bad for me! I own a home. Why would I want that?”
Lots of people think this, and especially economists like this idea of, of course we have all this regulation because it's great for homeowners; homeowners are the main wants to participate in local government. Sounds likely, but when we actually look at public opinion, we see that tenants are strong advocates regulation too, and it's like, gee, that really doesn't make any sense at all. They're the ones that are paying for all this stuff.
But it does make sense if you switch to a much simpler theory of what's going on, which fits the facts, and that is: People generally favor government policies because they believe —underscore believe — the policies are good for society. So many people from the earlier decades say, “Oh, all those Republicans, they just want tax cuts.” Now we're finally at the level where Republicans are poorer than Democrats. It's like, “Yeah, I guess it's getting a little bit hard to say that people become Republicans to get tax cuts when they're the ones paying lower taxes.” How about there's an actual disagreement about what policies are good for society, which explains why people belong to different parties, support different policies.
So most of what I'm doing in Build, Baby, Build is trying to convince people, look, I'm not impugning your motives, I don't think that you're just favoring whatever policies are selfishly best for you. I think that whatever policies you're into are ones that you think are genuinely good for your community, or your area, or your country, but we are not thinking very well about everything that's going on.
So part of it is that a lot of the complaints are just overblown or wrong, but another thing is that generally we base a regulation purely on complaints without any thought of any good thing that we might be losing. I make a big deal in the book about how, if you don't want to have noise, and traffic, and pollution, it's really easy — just move to some remote part of the country and you solve all those problems; yet hardly anybody wants to do that.
Why are people staying in congested areas with all these problems and paying a lot of extra money for them? Many of these people now have telework jobs, they don't even have a job reason to stay there. And the answer's got to be, there's just a bunch of really good things about living near other people that we hardly ever talk about and which have no political voice. There's almost no one's going to show up in a meeting and [say], “I favor this because I want there to be more commercial opportunities. I favor this because I want there to be more social opportunities, more cultural opportunities, more economic opportunities,” and yet these are all the reasons why people want to live near other people. So we have a set of regulation just based upon complaints: complaints which are generally out of context, not quantified. So we just see that people are willing to pay a lot of money for the package of living in an area with a bunch of other people, so that's got to mean that the good of other people exceeds the bad of the other people; otherwise, why aren't you living out in the middle of nowhere?
Generating momentum (17:15)
The sad truth is that symbolic issues are much more likely to get people excited, but this is something that determines the quality of life for most people in this country.
When I read the book, and I read a really good New York Times essay —
Would that be my essay, Jim?
I think it is your essay! In fact, it was, I should have been clearer on the author of that essay. The brilliant Bryan Caplan was the author of that essay.
If you look at the potential benefits on inequality, there's environmental impact, maybe people are really worried about birth rates, it really seems like housing really is sort of the “everything problem.”
Panacea problem, or the “housing theory of everything.”
It really does. I think the current election season, it's probably the most I've heard it talked about, and not really talked about very much.
And thoughtlessly. Spoken of thoughtlessly.
To me there seems to be a lot more — I'll use a nice think tank word — there's been a lot more ideation about the issue in recent years, and maybe it's only now kind of breaking through that filter where politicians start talking about it, but boy, when you look through what you've written about it, it seems like it should be a top three issue that politicians talk about.
The sad truth is that symbolic issues are much more likely to get people excited, but this is something that determines the quality of life for most people in this country. It's the difference between: Are you going to keep living with your parents until you're 30, or are you going to be able to afford to get your own place, start your own family? And again, it's one where older people remember how things used to be, and the idea of, well, why can't things just be like that? Why can't it be that a person who gets out of college can go and immediately afford to get a pretty good house?
At AEI, Mark Perry, for example, who is one of your colleagues, I think probably a remote colleague, he has done stuff on how new houses are better and so on, and that's also true, so I don't want to go and act like there's been no progress at all. But still, of course a lot of people are not moving into those new houses, they’re moving into old houses, which are the same as they were in the past, but just way more expensive if you want to go and live in that area
The other thing that is worth pointing out is that it's really temping to say, well, of course housing naturally gets more expensive as population rises. The period after World War II that we were mentioning, that's the Baby Boom era, population was rising at a much faster rate then than it did now, even counting immigration, and yet prices were much flatter because we were able to just go and legally build way more stuff.
I feel like you feel like you need to drive home the point about demand not being met by supply for this artificial reason: regulation. Even though, to me, it seems utterly natural and a classic case, people struggle to come up with alternative reasons that it's really not that. That it's because of . . . there’s private equity firms buying up all the homes, or the reason apartment rents go up is because there’s a cabal of apartment owners . . . They look for these other reasons, and I don’t quite get that when there seems to be a pretty obvious reason that we theoretically know how to fix.
Some of these other stories, they are half-truths, but they're not helpful. So the thing of, “Gee, if we just shut down tourism and letting foreign buyers buy stuff here, then demand will be lower, and prices will be lower, and we won't need to build anything new.” And it's like, do you realize what you're saying? You're basically saying that you want to destroy one of your best export industries.
If people around the world want to go and buy houses in your area, why do you want to turn them away instead of saying, cha-ching, let's capitalize on this by building a ton of housing for them? If there's a lot of tourists that want to go and rent a place in your area, why is it you want to go and strangle the market, which obviously it's a great industry — Build stuff and rent it to people, and it's not like there's some fixed amount unless the law says it must be fixed.
One benefit I didn't mention was social mobility where we need people, if they want to be able to move towards high-wage, high-productivity cities, to find good jobs, and then not have the wages of those good jobs mostly gobbled up by housing costs. That kind of circulation system, if that's the right phrase.
Certainly in some parts of the country, that has just been stopped and that has been a traditional way people move up the ladder.
We’ve got very good data on this. In earlier periods of US history, there was basically a foolproof way for someone in a low-income part of the country to get a big raise, and that was just to move. Steinbeck’s Grapes of Wrath not withstanding, this almost always works. It wasn't normally the case that you starve to death on your way to California from Oklahoma. Instead, normally, it's just a simple thing: You move from a low-wage area to a high-wage area and you get a lot more money, and you get a much higher take-home salary. But then in those days, there was not much difference in housing prices between different areas of the country, and therefore you would actually have a rise in not just your paycheck, but your standard living.
Now it's still true that you can get a rise in your paycheck by moving to the Bay Area. The problem is your standard of living, if you're coming from Mississippi, will generally crash because the housing cost eats up much more than 100 percent of the raise.
I remember I had a colleague who had a son who was an investment banker in the Bay Area. He and his wife were sharing a small apartment with two roommates, and it's like investment bankers can't afford apartments! Things have gotten out of hand, I think we can say with great confidence now.
Building new cities (23:10)
. . . politics is an area where there's a lot of ideas where it's like no one's trying it, it must be because it wouldn't work if tried, and then someone tries it with a little panache, or a little twist, and it catches on, and you're like, alright, maybe that's the real story.
Should we be building new cities somewhere? I think former President Trump has talked about this idea that we, is that something you've thought about at all?
Yes. I didn't put it into the book, but when I was writing up some follow-up posts on things that I wished I would've talked about, or just more speculative things, I do have some friends who are involved in that project to go and build a new city in the Bay Area. I hope it works.
There is always the problem of there's almost always going to be some existing people where you want to build your new city, and then what do you do about them? You can try buying them out. There is this holdout problem, a few people are going to stay there and say, “I'm not going to sell.” Or you could just go and do what happened in the movie Up: We'll buy everybody around you, and if you don't like it, too bad.
But on the other hand, it may be that activists will put a stop to your plan before you can get it off the ground. So in that case, it was going and selling off empty federal or state land, which we have in abundance. If I remember, I think that 23 percent of the land of the United States is owned by the federal government. Another 10 percent is owned by state governments. And even if you subtract out Alaska, there's still a ton. If you look at the map, it's really cool because you might think, “Oh, it's just that the government owns land no one in the right mind would want.” Not true.
Desert land in Nevada next to Area 51 or something.
Virtually all of Texas, even those western deserts, are privately owned. I've driven through them. Have you ever driven through West Texas?
I have.
Alright, so you're there and you're like, “Who wants to own this stuff?” And it's like, well, somebody at whatever the market price is considers this worth owning, and as to whether it's for mineral extraction, or for speculation on one day it'll be worth something when the population of Texas is greater, or they're going to do ranching there, I don't know. But it is at a price someone is willing to go and own almost every piece of land.
What the map really shows is it was ideology that led all this land to be held by the government. It's basically the ideology of conservation that we hear about. You get John Muir and Teddy Roosevelt, and as a result, they didn't just wind up protecting a few really beautiful national parks, they wind up putting millions of square miles of land off-limits for most human use.
Again, when the population of the country is lower, maybe it didn't even matter that much, but now it's like, “Hey, how about you go and sell me a hundred square miles so I can put a new city here?” The idea that an Elon or Zuckerberg couldn't go and just say, “I'm putting a pile of money into this. I'm going to build a new city and have a decent chance of it working.” Maybe it would be just a disaster and they waste their money. Then more likely I think it's going to be like Seward’s Folly where it's like, “What's the point of buying Alaska?” Oh, actually it was fantastic. We got a great bargain on Alaska and now it is an incredible, in hindsight, investment.
As we were talking, I started thinking about Andrew Yang who ran for president, I think that was in 2020, and he had one issue, really: Universal Basic Income. He thought that he had found an issue that was going to take him to the White House. It did not.
I kind of think if you were going to have a candidate focus a lot on one issue, this would not be a bad issue, given how it touches all these concerns of modern American society.
As an economist, I always hesitate to say that anyone who is a specialist in an area and is putting all their resources into it is just royally screwing up. At the same time, politics is an area where there's a lot of ideas where it's like no one's trying it, it must be because it wouldn't work if tried, and then someone tries it with a little panache, or a little twist, and it catches on, and you're like, alright, maybe that's the real story.
Just to give Trump credit where credit is due, there's just a lot of things that he said that you would think would've just destroyed his candidacy, and instead it seemed like he came out and he was more popular than ever. Maybe he just saw that there were some ideas that are popular that other people didn't realize would be popular.
Now I'm not optimistic about what he's going to do about housing, although anytime he says one good thing, it's like, I don’t know, maybe he'll just get fixated on that, but more likely ADHD will kick in, unfortunately.
But just to go and allow one new laissez-faire city to be built on federal land in some non-crummy area of the country — just as a demonstration project, the value of that would be enormous, just to see, hey, there's no reason why you can't have spacious, cheap homes in a really nice area that is not that remote from the rest of the country. Just imagine the airport you could build there, too — before all the noise complaints. You probably know about the noise complaints against Reagan Airport and how one single guy filed over half the complaints. It's like, how are we going to build anything? Let's build it all before that guy shows up!
On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were Promised
Micro Reads
▶ Economics
* Trump Could Win the Contest With China Once and for All - NYT Opinion
▶ Business
* Nvidia’s message to global chipmakers - FT Opinion
* The Great American Microchip Mobilization - Wired
* ASML Sticks to Long-Term Growth Targets Amid AI Frenzy - WSJ
▶ Policy/Politics
* Trump and the future of AI regulation - FT
* Silicon Valley eyes a windfall from Trump’s plans to gut regulation - Wapo
* Environmental Policy Act Ruling Casts Doubt On White House Authority - Forbes
* How Elon Musk could disrupt Washington - Politico
* Semiconductors and Modern Industrial Policy - Journal of Economic Perspectives
▶ AI/Digital
* Google DeepMind has a new way to look inside an AI’s “mind” - MIT
▶ Biotech/Health
* Why we now think the myopia epidemic can be slowed – or even reversed - NS
* Canada Detects Its First Human Case of Bird Flu - NYT
▶ Clean Energy/Climate
* Climate Summit, in Early Days, Is Already on a ‘Knife Edge’ - NYT
▶ Robotics/AVs
* Nvidia Readies Jetson Thor Computers for Humanoid Robots in 2025 - WSJ
▶ Space/Transportation
* Former Officials Warn Lawmakers of Alleged Secret UAP Programs Operating Beyond Congressional Oversight - The Debrief
▶ Up Wing/Down Wing
* Stand-Up, Drama and Spambots: The Creative World Takes On A.I. - NYT
* Is Europe running out of chemistry teachers? - C&EN
▶ Substacks/Newsletters
* Here's What I Think We Should Do - Hyperdimensional
* What is OpenAI's Operator and Blueprint? History and Tips of Prompt Engineering from 2020 to 2025 - AI Supremacy
* People want competence, seemingly over everything else - Strange Loop Canon
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In this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with economist Robin Hanson about a) how much technological change our society will undergo in the foreseeable future, b) what form we want that change to take, and c) how much we can ever reasonably predict.
Hanson is an associate professor of economics at George Mason University. He was formerly a research associate at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford, and is the author of the Overcoming Bias Substack. In addition, he is the author of the 2017 book, The Elephant in the Brain: Hidden Motives in Everyday Life, as well as the 2016 book, The Age of Em: Work, Love, and Life When Robots Rule the Earth.
In This Episode
* Innovation is clumpy (1:21)
* A history of AI advancement (3:25)
* The tendency to control new tech (9:28)
* The fallibility of forecasts (11:52)
* The risks of fertility-rate decline (14:54)
* Window of opportunity for space (18:49)
* Public prediction markets (21:22)
* A culture of calculated risk (23:39)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
Innovation is Clumpy (1:21)
Do you think that the tech advances of recent years — obviously in AI, and what we're seeing with reusable rockets, or CRISPR, or different energy advances, fusion, perhaps, even Ozempic — do you think that the collective cluster of these technologies has put humanity on a different path than perhaps it was on 10 years ago?
. . . most people don't notice just how much stuff is changing behind the scenes in order for the economy to double every 15 or 20 years.
That’s a pretty big standard. As you know, the world has been growing exponentially for a very long time, and new technologies have been appearing for a very long time, and the economy doubles roughly every 15 or 20 years, and that can't happen without a whole lot of technological change, so most people don't notice just how much stuff is changing behind the scenes in order for the economy to double every 15 or 20 years. So to say that we're going more than that is really a high standard here. I don't think it meets that standard. Maybe the standard it meets is to say people were worried about maybe a stagnation or slowdown a decade or two ago, and I think this might weaken your concerns about that. I think you might say, well, we're still on target.
Innovation's clumpy. It doesn't just out an entirely smooth . . . There are some lumpy ones once in a while, lumpier innovations than usual, and those boost higher than expected, sometimes lower than expected sometimes, and maybe in the last ten years we've had a higher-than-expected clump. The main thing that does is make you not doubt as much as you did when you had the lower-than-expected clump in the previous 10 years or 20 years because people had seen this long-term history and they thought, “Lately we're not seeing so much. I wonder if this is done. I wonder if we're running out.” I think the last 10 years tells you: well, no, we're kind of still on target. We're still having big important advances, as we have for two centuries.
A history of AI advancement (3:25)
People who are especially enthusiastic about the recent advances with AI, would you tell them their baseline should probably be informed by economic history rather than science fiction?
[Y]es, if you're young, and you haven't seen the world for decades, you might well believe that we are almost there, we're just about to automate everything — but we're not.
By technical history! We have 70-odd years of history of AI. I was an AI researcher full-time from ’84 to ’93. If you look at the long sweep of AI history, we've had some pretty big advances. We couldn't be where we are now without a lot of pretty big advances all along the way. You just think about the very first digital computer in 1950 or something and all the things we've seen, we have made large advances — and they haven't been completely smooth, they've come in a bit of clumps.
I was enticed into the field in 1984 because of a recent set of clumps then, and for a century, roughly every 30 years, we've had a burst of concern about automation and AI, and we've had big concern in the sense people said, “Are we almost there? Are we about to have pretty much all jobs automated?” They said that in the 1930s, they said it in the 1960s — there was a presidential commission in the 1960s: “What if all the jobs get automated?” I jumped in in the late ’80s when there was a big burst there, and I as a young graduate student said, “Gee, if I don't get in now, it'll all be over soon,” because I heard, “All the jobs are going to be automated soon!”
And now, in the last decade or so, we've had another big burst, and I think people who haven't seen that history, it feels to them like it felt to me in 1984: “Wow, unprecedented advances! Everybody's really excited! Maybe we're almost there. Maybe if I jump in now, I'll be part of the big push over the line to just automate everything.” That was exciting, it was tempting, I was naïve, and I was sucked in, and we're now in another era like that. Yes, if you're young, and you haven't seen the world for decades, you might well believe that we are almost there, we're just about to automate everything — but we're not.
I like that you mentioned the automation scare of the ’60s. Just going back and looking at that, it really surprised me how prevalent and widespread and how serious people took that. I mean, you can find speeches by Martin Luther King talking about how our society is going to deal with the computerization of everything. So it does seem to be a recurrent fear. What would you need to see to think it is different this time?
The obvious relevant parameter to be tracking is the percentage of world income that goes to automation, and that has been creeping up over the decades, but it's still less than five percent.
What is that statistic?
If you look at the percentage of the economy that goes to computer hardware and software, or other mechanisms of automation, you're still looking at less than five percent of the world economy. So it's been creeping up, maybe decades ago it was three percent, even one percent in 1960, but it's creeping up slowly, and obviously, when that gets to be 80 percent, game over, the economy has been replaced — but that number is creeping up slowly, and you can track it, so when you start seeing that number going up much faster or becoming a large number, then that's the time to say, “Okay, looks like we're close. Maybe automation will, in fact, take over most jobs, when it's getting most of world income.”
If you're looking at economic statistics, and you're looking at different forecasts, whether by the Fed or CBO or Wall Street banks and the forecasts are, “Well, we expect, maybe because of AI, productivity growth to be 0.4 percentage points higher over this kind of time. . .” Those kinds of numbers where we're talking about a tenth of a point here, that's not the kind of singularity-emergent world that some people think or hope or expect that we're on.
Absolutely. If you've got young enthusiastic tech people, et cetera — and they're exaggerating. The AI companies, even they're trying to push as big a dramatic images they can. And then all the stodgy conservative old folks, they're afraid of seeming behind the times, and not up with things, and not getting it — that was the big phrase in the Internet Boom: Who “gets it” that this is a new thing?
I'm proud to be a human, to have been part of the civilization to have done this . . . but we've seen that for 70 years: new technologies, we get excited, we try them out, we try to apply them, and that's part of what progress is.
Now it would be #teamgetsit.
Exactly, something like that. They're trying to lean into it, they're trying to give it the best spin they can, but they have some self-respect, so they're going to give you, “Wow 0.4 percent!” They'll say, “That's huge! Wow, this is a really big thing, everybody should be into this!” But they can't go above 0.4 percent because they've got some common sense here. But we've even seen management consulting firms over the last decade or so make predictions that 10 years in the future, half all jobs would be automated. So we've seen this long history of these really crazy extreme predictions into a decade, and none of those remotely happened, of course. But people do want to be in with the latest thing, and this is obviously the latest round of technology, it's impressive. I'm proud to be a human, to have been part of the civilization to have done this, and I’d like to try them out, and see what I can do with them, and think of where they could go. That's all exciting and fun, but we've seen that for 70 years: new technologies, we get excited, we try them out, we try to apply them, and that's part of what progress is.
The tendency to control new tech (9:28)
Not to talk just about AI, but do you think AI is important enough that policymakers need to somehow guide the technology to a certain outcome? Daron Acemoglu, one of the Nobel Prize winners, has for quite some time, and certainly recently, said that this technology needs to be guided by policymakers so that it helps people, it helps workers, it creates new tasks, it creates new things for them to do, not automate away their jobs or automate a bunch of tasks.
Do you think that there's something special about this technology that we need to guide it to some sort of outcome?
I think those sort of people would say that about any new technology that seemed like it was going to be important. They are not actually distinguishing AI from other technologies. This is just what they say about everything.
It could be “technology X,” we must guide it to the outcome that I have already determined.
As long as you've said, “X is new, X is exciting, a lot of things seem to depend on X,” then their answer would be, “We need to guide it.” It wouldn't really matter what the details of X were. That's just how they think about society and technology. I don't see anything distinctive about this, per se, in that sense, other than the fact that — look, in the long run, it's huge.
Space, in the long run, is huge, because obviously in the long run almost everything will be in space, so clearly, eventually, space will be the vast majority of everything. That doesn't mean we need to guide space now or to do anything different about it, per se. At the moment, space is pretty small, and it's pretty pedestrian, but it's exciting, and the same for AI. At the moment, AI is pretty small, minor, AI is not remotely threatening to cause harm in our world today. If you look about harmful technologies, this is way down the scale. Demonstrated harms of AI in the last 10 years are minuscule compared to things like construction equipment, or drugs, or even television, really. This is small.
Ladders for climbing up on your roof to clean out the gutters, that's a very dangerous technology.
Yeah, somebody should be looking into that. We should be guiding the ladder industry to make sure they don't cause harm in the world.
The fallibility of forecasts (11:52)
I'm not sure how much confidence we should ever have on long-term economic forecasts, but have you seen any reason to think that they might be less reliable than they always have been? That we might be approaching some sort of change? That those 50-year forecasts of entitlement spending might be all wrong because the economy's going to be growing so much faster, or the longevity is going to be increasing so much faster?
Previously, the world had been doubling roughly every thousand years, and that had been going on for maybe 10,000 years, and then, within the space of a century, we switched to doubling roughly every 15 or 20 years. That's a factor of 60 increase in the growth rate, and it happened after a previous transition from forging to farming, roughly 10 doublings before.
It was just a little over two centuries ago when the world saw this enormous revolution. Previously, the world had been doubling roughly every thousand years, and that had been going on for maybe 10,000 years, and then, within the space of a century, we switched to doubling roughly every 15 or 20 years. That's a factor of 60 increase in the growth rate, and it happened after a previous transition from forging to farming, roughly 10 doublings before.
So you might say we can't trust these trends to continue maybe more than 10 doublings, and then who knows what might happen? You could just say — that's 200 years, say, if you double every 20 years — we just can't trust these forecasts more than 200 years out. Look at what's happened in the past after that many doublings, big changes happened, and you might say, therefore, expect, on that sort of timescale, something else big to happen. That's not crazy to say. That's not very specific.
And then if you say, well, what is the thing people most often speculate could be the cause of a big change? They do say AI, and then we actually have a concrete reason to think AI would change the growth rate of the economy: That is the fact that, at the moment, we make most stuff in factories, and factories typically push out from the factory as much value as the factory itself embodies, in economic terms, in a few months.
If you could have factories make factories, the economy could double every few months. The reason we can't now is we have humans in the factories, and factories don't double them. But if you could make AIs in factories, and the AIs made factories, that made more AIs, that could double every few months. So the world economy could plausibly double every few months when AI has dominated the economy.
That's of the magnitude doubling every few months versus doubling every 20 years. That's a magnitude similar to the magnitude we saw before from farming to industry, and so that fits together as saying, sometime in the next few centuries, expect a transition that might increase the growth rate of the economy by a factor of 100. Now that's an abstract thing in the long frame, it's not in the next 10 years, or 20 years, or something. It's saying that economic modes only last so long, something should come up eventually, and this is our best guess of a thing that could come up, so it's not crazy.
The risks of fertility-rate decline (14:54)
Are you a fertility-rate worrier?
If the population falls, the best models say innovation rates would fall even faster.
I am, and in fact, I think we have a limited deadline to develop human-level AI, before which we won't for a long pause, because falling fertility really threatens innovation rates. This is something we economists understand that I think most other people don't: You might've thought that a falling population could be easily compensated by a growing economy and that we would still have rapid and fast innovation because we would just have a bigger economy with a lower population, but apparently that's not true.
If the population falls, the best models say innovation rates would fall even faster. So say the population is roughly predicted to peak in three decades and then start to fall, and if it's falls, it would fall roughly a factor of two every generation or two, depending on which populations dominate, and then if it fell by a factor of 10, the innovation rate would fall by more than a factor of 10, and that means just a slower rate of new technologies, and, of course, also a reduction in the scale of the world economy.
And I think that plausibly also has the side effect of a loss in liberality. I don't think people realize how much it was innovation and competition that drove much of the world to become liberal because the winning nations in the world were liberal and the rest were afraid of falling too far behind. But when innovation goes away, they won't be so eager to be liberal to be innovative because innovation just won't be a thing, and so much of the world will just become a lot less liberal.
There's also the risk that — basically, computers are a very durable technology, in principle. Typically we don't make them that durable because every two years they get twice as good, but when innovation goes away, they won't get good very fast, and then you'll be much more tempted to just make very durable computers, and the first generation that makes very durable computers that last hundreds of years, the next generation won't want to buy new computers, they'll just use the old durable ones as the economy is shrinking and then the industry that commuters might just go away. And then it could be a long time before people felt a need to rediscover those technologies.
I think the larger-scale story is there's no obvious process that would prevent this continued decline because there's no level at which, when you get that, some process kicks in and it makes us say, “Oh, we need to increase the population.” But the most likely scenario is just that the Amish and [Hutterites] and other insular, fertile subgroups who have been doubling every 20 years for a century will just keep doing that and then come to dominate the world, much like Christians took over the Roman Empire: They took it over by doubling every 20 years for three centuries. That's my default future, and then if we don't get AI or colonize space before this decline, which I've estimated would be roughly 70 years’ worth more of progress at previous rates, then we don't get it again until the Amish not only just take over the world, but rediscover a taste for technology and economic growth, and then eventually all of the great stuff could happen, but that could be many centuries later.
This does not sound like an issue that can be fundamentally altered by tweaking the tax code.
You would have to make a large —
— Large turn of the dial, really turn that dial.
People are uncomfortable with larger-than-small tweaks, of course, but we're not in an era that's at all eager for vast changes in policy, we are in a pretty conservative era that just wants to tweak things. Tweaks won't do it.
Window of opportunity for space (18:49)
We can't do things like Daylight Savings Time, which some people want to change. You mentioned this window — Elon Musk has talked about a window for expansion into space, and this is a couple of years ago, he said, “The window has closed before. It's open now. Don't assume it will always be open.”
Is that right? Why would it close? Is it because of higher interest rates? Because the Amish don't want to go to space? Why would the window close?
I think, unfortunately, we've got a limited window to try to jumpstart a space economy before the earth economy shrinks and isn't getting much value from a space economy.
There's a demand for space stuff, mostly at the moment, to service Earth, like the internet circling the earth, say, as Elon's big project to fund his spaceships. And there's also demand for satellites to do surveillance of the earth, et cetera. As the earth economy shrinks, the demand for that stuff will shrink. At some point, they won't be able to afford fixed costs.
A big question is about marginal cost versus fixed costs. How much is the fixed cost just to have this capacity to send stuff into space, versus the marginal cost of adding each new rocket? If it's dominated by marginal costs and they make the rockets cheaper, okay, they can just do fewer rockets less often, and they can still send satellites up into space. But if you're thinking of something where there's a key scale that you need to get past even to support this industry, then there's a different thing.
So thinking about a Mars economy, or even a moon economy, or a solar system economy, you're looking at a scale thing. That thing needs to be big enough to be self-sustaining and economically cost-effective, or it's just not going to work. So I think, unfortunately, we've got a limited window to try to jumpstart a space economy before the earth economy shrinks and isn't getting much value from a space economy. Space economy needs to be big enough just to support itself, et cetera, and that's a problem because it's the same humans in space who are down here on earth, who are going to have the same fertility problems up there unless they somehow figure out a way to make a very different culture.
A lot of people just assume, “Oh, you could have a very different culture on Mars, and so they could solve our cultural problems just by being different,” but I'm not seeing that. I think they would just have a very strong interconnection with earth culture because they're going to have just a rapid bandwidth stuff back and forth, and their fertility culture and all sorts of other culture will be tied closely to earth culture, so I'm not seeing how a Mars colony really solves earth cultural problems.
Public prediction markets (21:22)
The average person is aware that these things, whether it's betting markets or these online consensus prediction markets, that they exist, that you can bet on presidential races, and you can make predictions about a superconductor breakthrough, or something like that, or about when we're going to get AGI.
To me, it seems like they have, to some degree, broken through the filter, and people are aware that they're out there. Have they come of age?
. . . the big value here isn't going to be betting on elections, it's going to be organizations using them to make organization decisions, and that process is being explored.
In this presidential election, there's a lot of discussion that points to them. And people were pretty open to that until Trump started to be favored, and people said, “No, no, that can't be right. There must be a lot of whales out there manipulating, because it couldn't be Trump's winning.” So the openness to these things often depends on what their message is.
But honestly, the big value here isn't going to be betting on elections, it's going to be organizations using them to make organization decisions, and that process is being explored. Twenty-five years ago, I invented this concept of decision markets using in organizations, and now in the last year, I've actually seen substantial experimentation with them and so I'm excited to see where that goes, and I'm hopeful there, but that's not so much about the presidential markets.
Roughly a century ago there was more money bet in presidential betting markets than in stock markets at the time. Betting markets were very big then, and then they declined, primarily because scientific polling was declared a more scientific approach to estimating elections than betting markets, and all the respectable people wanted to report on scientific polls. And then of course the stock market became much, much bigger. The interest in presidential markets will wax and wane, but there's actually not that much social value in having a better estimate of who's going to win an election. That doesn't really tell you who to vote for, so there are other markets that would be much more socially valuable, like predicting the consequences of who's elected as president. We don't really have much markets on those, but maybe we will next time around. But there is a lot of experimentation going in organizational prediction markets at the moment, compared to, say, 10 years ago, and I'm excited about those experiments.
A culture of calculated risk (23:39)
I want a culture that, when one of these new nuclear reactors, or these nuclear reactors that are restarting, or these new small modular reactors, when there's some sort of leak, or when a new SpaceX Starship, when some astronaut gets killed, that we just don't collapse as a society. That we're like, well, things happen, we're going to keep moving forward.
Do you think we have that kind of culture? And if not, how do we get it, if at all? Is that possible?
That's the question: Why has our society become so much more safety-oriented in the last half-century? Certainly one huge sign of it is the way we way overregulated nuclear energy, but we've also now been overregulating even kids going to school. Apparently they can't just take their bikes to school anymore, they have to go on a bus because that's safer, and in a whole bunch of ways, we are just vastly more safety-oriented, and that seems to be a pretty broad cultural trend. It's not just in particular areas and it's not just in particular countries.
I've been thinking a lot about long-term cultural trends and trying to understand them. The basic story, I think, is we don't have a good reason to believe long-term cultural trends are actually healthy when they are shared trends of norms and status markers that everybody shares. Cultural things that can vary within the cultures, like different technologies and firm cultures, those we're doing great. We have great evolution of those things, and that's why we're having all these great technologies. But things like safetyism is more of a shared cultural norm, and we just don't have good reasons to think those changes are healthy, and they don't fix themselves, so this is just another example of something that’s going wrong.
They don't fix themselves because if you have a strong, very widely shared cultural norm, and someone has a different idea, they need to be prepared to pay a price, and most of us aren’t prepared to pay that price.
If we had a healthy cultural evolution competition among even nations, this would be fine. The problem is we have this global culture, a monoculture, really, that enforces everybody.
Right. If, for example, we have 200 countries, if they were actually independent experiments and had just had different cultures going different directions, then I'd feel great; that okay, the cultures that choose too much safety, they'll lose out to the others and eventually it'll be worn out. If we had a healthy cultural evolution competition among even nations, this would be fine. The problem is we have this global culture, a monoculture, really, that enforces everybody.
At the beginning of Covid, all the usual public health efforts said all the usual things, and then world elites got together and talked about it, and a month later they said, “No, that's all wrong. We have a whole different thing to do. Travel restrictions are good, masks are good, distancing is good.” And then the entire world did it the same way, and there was strong pressure on any deviation, even Sweden, that would dare to deviate from the global consensus.
If you look about many kinds of regulation, it's very little deviation worldwide. We don't have 200, or even 100, independent policy experiments, we basically have a main global civilization that does it the same, and maybe one or two deviants that are allowed to have somewhat different behavior, but pay a price for it.
On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were Promised
Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
Micro Reads
▶ Economics
* The Next President Inherits a Remarkable Economy - WSJ
* The surprising barrier that keeps us from building the housing we need - MIT
* Trump’s tariffs, explained - Wapo
* Watts and Bots: The Energy Implications of AI Adoption - SSRN
* The Changing Nature of Technology Shocks - SSRN
* AI Regulation and Entrepreneurship - SSRN
▶ Business
* Microsoft reports big profits amid massive AI investments - Ars
* Meta’s Next Llama AI Models Are Training on a GPU Cluster ‘Bigger Than Anything’ Else - Wired
* Apple’s AI and Vision Pro Products Don’t Meet Its Standards - Bberg Opinion
* Uber revenues surge amid robust US consumer spending - FT
* Elon Musk in funding talks with Middle East investors to value xAI at $45bn - FT
▶ Policy/Politics
* Researchers ‘in a state of panic’ after Robert F. Kennedy Jr. says Trump will hand him health agencies - Science
* Elon Musk’s Criticism of ‘Woke AI’ Suggests ChatGPT Could Be a Trump Administration Target - Wired
* US Efforts to Contain Xi’s Push for Tech Supremacy Are Faltering - Bberg
* The Politics of Debt in the Era of Rising Rates - SSRN
▶ AI/Digital
* Alexa, where’s my Star Trek Computer? - The Verge
* Toyota, NTT to Invest $3.3 Billion in AI, Autonomous Driving - Bberg
* Are we really ready for genuine communication with animals through AI? - NS
* Alexa’s New AI Brain Is Stuck in the Lab - Bberg
* This AI system makes human tutors better at teaching children math - MIT
* Can Machines Think Like Humans? A Behavioral Evaluation of LLM-Agents in Dictator Games - Arxiv
▶ Biotech/Health
* Obesity Drug Shows Promise in Easing Knee Osteoarthritis Pain - NYT
* Peak Beef Could Already Be Here - Bberg Opinion
▶ Clean Energy/Climate
* Chinese EVs leave other carmakers with only bad options - FT Opinion
* Inside a fusion energy facility - MIT
* Why aren't we driving hydrogen powered cars yet? There's a reason EVs won. - Popular Science
* America Can’t Do Without Fracking - WSJ Opinion
▶ Robotics/AVs
* American Drone Startup Notches Rare Victory in Ukraine - WSJ
* How Wayve’s driverless cars will meet one of their biggest challenges yet - MIT
▶ Space/Transportation
* Mars could have lived, even without a magnetic field - Big Think
▶ Up Wing/Down Wing
* The new face of European illiberalism - FT
* How to recover when a climate disaster destroys your city - Nature
▶ Substacks/Newsletters
* Thinking about "temporary hardship" - Noahpinion
* Hold My Beer, California - Hyperdimensional
* Robert Moses's ideas were weird and bad - Slow Boring
* Trading Places? No Thanks. - The Dispatch
* The Case For Small Reactors - Breakthrough Journal
* The Fourth Industrial Revolution and the Future of Work - Conversable Economist
Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
On October 13, SpaceX and Elon Musk successfully launched their Starship rocket into low-Earth orbit. Then, in a milestone moment for space technology, they successfully captured the rocket’s Super Heavy booster with “chopstick” arms on the launch tower upon reentry, marking the first time a booster was ever caught in mid-air.
The achievement is a mind-blowing feat of human engineering — one that hasn’t gotten nearly the recognition that it deserves. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with must-read space journalist Eric Berger about the role of SpaceX in the new, 21st-century Space Race, the significance of the company’s achievements, and our potential to become a spacefaring, inter-planetary species.
Berger is the senior space editor at Ars Techica, and is the author of both Liftoff: Elon Musk and the Desperate Early Days that Launched SpaceX and his most recent excellent book, Reentry: SpaceX, Elon Musk, and the Reusable Rockets that Launched a Second Space Age.
In This Episode
* Starship’s big reentry (1:43)
* Race (back) to the moon (8:54)
* Why Starship? (11:48)
* The Mars-shot (18:37)
* Elon in the political area (22:10)
* Understanding SpaceX (24:06)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
Starship’s big reentry (1:43)
James Pethokoukis: After the launch tower caught that booster stage of the rocket, I saw someone on Twitter a day later say, “Hey, do you guys remember over the weekend when SpaceX sent a Statue-of-Liberty-sized object to space and then caught it when it came back down? That was amazing!”
So two things: First, as a space guy, what was your reaction? Two, beyond the sheer coolness of it, why was this an important thing to happen?
It seemed inconceivable a few years ago, but now, all of a sudden, it's the future of rocketry, just like that.
Eric Berger: Just from a space perspective, it’s epic to see, to use your adjectives, the Statue of Liberty comparison. I mean, it's a small skyscraper, but they essentially launch that thing to space at thousands of miles per hour, then it slows down, it comes back right where it took off from, hovers, and it falls precisely into these two arms that are designed to catch it. The cool thing is that we'd never seen anything like that before. It seemed inconceivable a few years ago, but now, all of a sudden, it's the future of rocketry, just like that.
the significance of this, of course, is SpaceX has shown that with the reusability of the Falcon 9 rocket, it can really change the economics of launch. This year they've launched 101 times. No country had ever done that many launches before in a year. They're going to launch 95 percent of all the mass into orbit this year with primarily the Falcon 9 Rocket, and all that's because the first stage is entirely reusable, they're flying them more than 20 times now, and so they're just taking that and scaling it.
What was amazing about the tower catch this weekend was the fact that it really removes the need for landing legs. You may think, “Well, what's the big deal about that?” Well, there's a lot of mass involved with those landing legs: You need powerful actuators to drive them, you need hydraulic fluid, and that's a lot of dead mass in the vehicle. Also, it's not insignificant to transport the rocket from wherever it lands, either on a boat or on land, to the factory and to refurbish the rocket and launch again. Ideally, with this step, they're eliminating days from that process of reuse and ideally, in the future, they're literally going to be catching the rocket, setting it back on the launch mount and then potentially flying again.
So it's not just the Starship, right? So for the other launches, is this is going to become the landing procedure?
No, it will be just for Starship. They will continue to fly Falcon 9 as is. That's a mature product, everyone's pretty comfortable with that vehicle. But, look, other companies have tried different things. When Rocket Lab was trying to reuse its small Electron vehicle, its plan was to have the first stage come back under a parachute and then basically swoop in with a helicopter and catch it so that the rocket didn't fall into the ocean. That ended up not working.
It seems very whimsical.
Well, it made sense from an engineering standpoint, but it was a lot more difficult to snag the rocket than they ended up finding out. So, up until now, the only way to get a rocket back vertically was on a drone ship or landing straight up, and so this is a brand new thing, and it just creates more efficiencies in the launch system.
What is the direction now, as far as launch costs and the continued decline of launch costs if this will be the new landing procedure for Starship?
It's impossible to say that, of course. We can look to a Falcon 9 for an analog. SpaceX sales started out selling Falcon 9 for $60 million, it's upped that price to about $67 or $68 million — still the lowest-cost medium-lift launch vehicle in the world, but that's the price you or I or NASA would pay for a rocket. Internally, the estimate is that they're re-flying those vehicles for about $15 million. So, in effect, SpaceX has taken the cost of the lowest-price vehicle on the market and divided it by four, basically.
Starship, of course, can lift much more payload to orbit than Falcon 9. By some measures, five to 10 times as much, eventually. And so if they can get the cost down, if they can make the first and second stage reusable, I think you're talking about them bringing the cost down potentially another order of magnitude, but they've got a lot of work to get there.
I think the second most common comment I saw on social media — the first one being like, “This is amazing, I'm crying, this is so cool” — the second one is, “Why is NASA not using this Starship to get to the moon?” It seems like progress is being made quickly, and you mentioned the costs, I think people are just befuddled. It's a question you must get a lot.
The reality is that if we want to go to the moon before 2030, we probably need to do it with a combination of NASA's Space Launch System rocket and Starship.
It's a complicated answer, but the reality is that NASA, in conjunction with Congress, has basically, over the last quarter of a century, pivoted away from reusable launch vehicles, and at one point in the early 2000s, they were actually funding three different reusable launch vehicles. The most famous of those, of course, was the Space Shuttle. It stopped funding the Space Shuttle in 2011 and it went back to developing this large, expendable rocket called the Space Launch System. That was the tried and true pathway, and no one really had faith in what SpaceX is doing. And so now here we are, almost 15 years later, and SpaceX has gone out and proved it with the Falcon 9, the Falcon Heavy, and now Starship.
The reality is that if we want to go to the moon before 2030, we probably need to do it with a combination of NASA's Space Launch System rocket and Starship. In 2021, NASA did select Starship as its lunar lander. So Starship is a critical part of the architecture. Probably the most challenging part, actually, is getting down to the lunar surface and then getting back up reliably. And so Starship plays a key role, and I just really think that it's inevitable that Starship and potentially Blue Origin’s architecture will be how humans get to the moon and back, but we're kind of in an interim period right now.
Is it just sort of too late to switch?
Yeah, it is. It's too late to switch. You could conceive of scenarios in which humans launch in Crew Dragon, transfer over to a Starship, and then come back in Crew Dragon, but even then you've got some challenges. And the problem — problem is the wrong word, but one of the major issues with Starship is that it has no redundancy when you come back and land. It has got to nail the landing or people inside of it die. So you're going to want to see hundreds of Starship launches and many, many successful landings in a row before you put people on the vehicle. And to have the idea of launching humans from Earth to the moon at this point, we're pretty far from that. I would think a decade from now, at least, and by then China will be on the moon. And so it's really a matter of, do you want to sort of continue to delay the human return of the moon, or do you want to take the tools that you have now and make your best run for it?
Race (back) to the moon (8:54)
Since you brought it up, are we going to beat China to the moon with the SLS?
Very much an open question. The SLS Rocket is basically ready. In its current form, it performed very well during Artemis I. It's obviously super expensive. You may have seen the Europa Clipper launch on Monday of this week, that launched on a Falcon Heavy. For almost a decade, Congress mandated NASA that it launched on the SLS rocket, and that would've cost 10 times as much. NASA paid about $200 million for the Clipper launch on Falcon Heavy, SLS would've been in excess of $2 billion, so it's a very expensive rocket, but it does work, it worked well during Artemis I. The best way we have right now, Jim, to get astronauts from Earth out to lunar orbit is SLS and the Orion deep spacecraft vehicle. That will change over time, but I think if we want to put humans on the moon this decade, that's probably the best way to do it.
Is it going to be a close call? I don't want to overemphasize the competition aspect, but I guess I would like to see America do it first.
It's going to be close. NASA's current date is 2026 for the Artemis III moon landing. There's no way that happens. I think 2028 is a realistic no-earlier-than date, and the reality is SpaceX has to make a lot of progress on Starship. What they did this past weekend was a great step. I think the key thing about the fact of this weekend's launch is that it was a success. There were no anomalies, there's going to be no investigation, so SpaceX is going to launch again. As long as they continue to have success, then they can start popping these off and get to some of the really key tests like the in-space propellant transfer tests, which they hope to do sometime next year.
[W]hen you're on the moon, there's no launch tower, there's no launch crew, you’ve just got the astronauts inside Starship, and if that vehicle doesn't take off on the moon, the crew's going to die. So it's got to work.
What Starship will do is it'll launch into low-earth orbit, and then it'll be refueled, and it'll go to the moon, and you need lots of launches to refuel it. And then really the key test, I think, is landing on the moon, because the South Pole is pretty craterous, you've got to have high confidence in where you land, and then the big challenge is getting back up to lunar orbit safely.
Think about it: When you watch any rocket launch, you see this very detailed, very intricate launch tower with all these umbilicals, and all of these cables, and power, and telemetry, and stuff, and humans are looking at all this data, and if there's any problem, they abort, right? Well, when you're on the moon, there's no launch tower, there's no launch crew, you’ve just got the astronauts inside Starship, and if that vehicle doesn't take off on the moon, the crew's going to die. So it's got to work. And so that's really a big part of the challenge, as well, is getting all that to work. So I think 2028, for all that to come together, is a realistic no-earlier-than date, and China's pretty consistently said 2030, and they're starting to show off some hardware, they recently demonstrated that suggests they have a chance to make 2030.
On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were Promised
Why Starship? (11:48)
What is the commercial case for Starship, assuming that these next launches continue to go off well? What is it supposed to be doing here on Earth and in Earth orbit?
The next big race is to deliver internet, not to a dish that you set up, but actually to your mobile phone. It's called direct-to-cell, and you need much bigger satellites for this. And so SpaceX needs the Starship to launch these satellites, so that will really be the commercial use case for Starship in the near term.
Its primary function, and I think the most important function for SpaceX in the near term, is launching these much larger Starlink satellites. I think it's been pretty well proven that there's a large demand for broadband internet from low-earth orbit. Starlink has now up to four million customers and they're actually signing almost at an exponential rate. Then growth, the business is profitable. So that's been super impressive. The next big race is to deliver internet, not to a dish that you set up, but actually to your mobile phone. It's called direct-to-cell, and you need much bigger satellites for this. So SpaceX needs the Starship to launch these satellites, so that will really be the commercial use case for Starship in the near term.
I think once the vehicle starts flying reliably, we're going to see where the commercial customers go because we've never really been in a launch environment where you're not really constrained by mass and, more importantly, by volume. You can just build bigger, less-efficient things. Instead of hyper-managing your satellite to be small, and light, and compact, you can kind of make trades where maybe you have a lower-cost vehicle that's bigger. The capability of Starship with its voluminous payload fairing and being able to lift a hundred or more tons to low-earth orbit for low cost — entirely new regime. And so I think it's a case of Field of Dreams, “If you build it, they will come,” and in the near term, Starship will be the business case, and longer-term we'll see some unique opportunities.
You've been covering this for quite a while, documenting, books, including your most recent book. Really an amazing ride as a space journalist for you here.
I've been covering space now for two decades, and really with a focus on commercial space over the last decade because I think that's where a lot of the excitement and innovation is coming from. But the reality is that you've got this whole ecosystem of companies, but the 800-pound gorilla is SpaceX. They're the company that has consistently had success. They are the only provider of crew transportation services for NASA, still, even five years after their initial success, and they're the only provider right now that's launching cargo missions to the space station. They've got huge Starlink satellites, constellation. As a journalist, you really want to understand the biggest, most dominating force in the industry, and that's clearly SpaceX, and so that's why I've chosen to dedicate a lot of time to really understand where they started out and how they got to where they are, which is at the top of the heap.
The story that you lay out in your book, which came out last month — Reentry: SpaceX, Elon Musk, and the Reusable Rockets that Launched a Second Space Age — to me, it’s still a story people mostly don’t know, and one that I think a lot of non-space reporters don’t understand. What are some common misunderstandings that you come across that make you feel like you need to tell this story?
I think, until recently, one of the things that people might say about SpaceX is, “Well, what's the big deal? NASA's launched humans to orbit in the past, NASA's launched cargo, they had a reusable space vehicle in the Space Shuttle.” What's different is that SpaceX is doing this at scale, and they're building for a long-term plan that is sustainable.
I'll give you an example: The Space Shuttle was reusable. Everything was reusable except the external tank. However, you needed a standing army of thousands of people to pour over the Space Shuttle after it came back from space to make sure that all of its tiles and every piece of equipment was safe. Now, when it was originally sold to Congress back in the 1970s, the program manager for the space shuttle, George Mueller said that the goal was to get the cost of payload-to-orbit for the Space Shuttle down to $25 a pound, which sounded great because then they were saying dozens of people could fly on the vehicle at a time. Well, of course, at the end of the day, it only ever flew at a maximum of seven people, and the cost of payload-to-orbit was $25,000. So yes, it was reusable, but it was the kind of thing that was super expensive and you couldn't fly very often. You could do limited things.
It's really the first vehicle we ever developed to go to Mars. SpaceX is doing some of the same things that NASA did, but it's doing them better, faster, and a lot cheaper.
SpaceX is proposing kind of an order-of-magnitude change. We went to the moon in the 1960s with the Lunar Module, and everyone remembers it carried two astronauts down to the lunar surface. And that whole thing launched on a giant stack, the Saturn V rocket. So if you were to take the Lunar Module and replace the astronauts and just use it to deliver cargo to the moon, it could take five tons down to the lunar surface. Starship, in a reusable mode, can take a hundred tons. If you send an expendable version of Starship, it's 200 tons. And oh, by the way, even if you're not bringing that Starship back, you're getting the whole first stage back anyway.
And so that's really the promise here, is you're building a sustainable system in space where it doesn't cost you $6 billion to go to the moon, it costs you half a billion dollars or to go to the moon, and you can then go on and do other things, you can fill your Starship up with methane repellent and go further. It's really the first vehicle we ever developed to go to Mars. SpaceX is doing some of the same things that NASA did, but it's doing them better, faster, and a lot cheaper.
That $25-a-pound number you gave for Space Shuttle, where are we with SpaceX? Where is SpaceX, or where are they and what's their goal in that context?
They're getting down in a couple of thousand dollars a pound with a Falcon 9, and the idea is, potentially, with Starship, you get down to hundreds of dollars a pound or less. They have a big challenge too, right? They're using tiles on Starship as well. They showed some of them off during the webcast this weekend, and I think we have yet to have any kind of information on how reusable, or how rapidly reusable Starship will be, and we'll have to see.
The Mars-shot (18:37)
To the extent the public understands this company — this is my understanding — the point here is to build Starship, to further this satellite business, and then that satellite business will fund the eventual Mars mission and the Mars colonization. I think that's the public perception of what is happening with this business. How accurate is that? Is that how you look at it? I mean, that's how I look at it from my uninformed or less-informed view, but is that really what we're talking about here?
Yeah, fundamentally, I think that is accurate. There is no business case right now to go to Mars. AT&T is not going to pay $5 billion to put an AT&T logo on a Starship and send a crew to Mars. There are no resources right now that we really can conceive of on Mars that would be profitable for humans to go get and bring back to Earth. So then the question is: How do you pay for it?
Financially, the business case for Mars is not entirely clear, so you’ve got to figure out some way to pay for it. That was one reason why Elon Musk ultimately went with Starlink. That would pay for the Mars vision.
Even when settlers went to the New World in the 1500s, 1600s, in United States, they were exporting tobacco and other products back to Europe, and there's no tobacco that we know of on Mars, right? Financially, the business case for Mars is not entirely clear, so you’ve got to figure out some way to pay for it. That was one reason why Elon Musk ultimately went with Starlink. That would pay for the Mars vision.
I think that's still fundamentally the case. It's effectively going to be paying for the entire development of Starship, and then if it becomes highly profitable, SpaceX is not a public company, so they can take those revenues and do whatever they want with them, and Elon has said again and again that his vision is to settle Mars, and he's building the rockets to do it, and he's trying to find the funding through Starlink to accomplish it. That is the vision. We don't know how it's all going to play out, but I think you're fundamentally correct with that.
I think when he mentions Mars, there are some people that just give it a roll of the eye. It just sounds too science fictional, despite the progress being made toward accomplishing that. It sounds like you do not roll your eyes at that.
Well, it's interesting. He first really talked publicly about this in 2016, eight years ago, back when there was no Starship, back when they just were coming off their second Falcon 9 failure in about a year, and you kind of did roll your eyes at it then . . . And then they got the Falcon 9 flying and they started re-flying it and re-flying it. They did Falcon Heavy, and then they started building Starship hardware, and then they started launching Starship, and now they're starting to land Starship, and this is real hardware.
And yes, to be clear, they have a long, long way to go and a lot of technical challenges to overcome, and you need more than just a rocket in a spaceship to get to Mars, you need a lot of other stuff, too: biological, regulatory, there's a lot of work to go, but they are putting down the railroad tracks that will eventually open that up to settlement.
So I would not roll my eyes. This is certainly the only credible chance, I think, for humans to go to Mars in our lifetimes, and if those early missions are successful, you could envision settlements being built there.
Elon in the political arena (22:10)
Given SpaceX's accomplishments and their lead, is that company politics-proof? Obviously there's always going to be controversy about Elon, and Twitter, and who he gives money to, and things he says, but does any of that really matter for SpaceX?
I think it does. We've already seen a couple examples of it, especially with Elon's very public entree into presidential politics over the last several months. I think that does matter. In his fight with Brazil over what he termed as free speech, they were confiscating Starlink, and so they were trying to shut Starlink down in their country, and that directly affects SpaceX. In California, over the last week we have seen a commission vote to try to limit the number of launches Falcon 9 launches from Vandenberg Space Force Base, and they clearly did that because they were uncomfortable with Elon's behavior publicly. So yeah, this is going to bleed over.
Now, in the near term, there will be limited impacts because the US Department of Defense clearly needs SpaceX rockets. They need SpaceX’s Starlink, they use a branded version of it called Starshield for military communications. The launch and Starlink capabilities are essential for the military. NASA is even more reliant on SpaceX for the International Space Station and beyond; the entire moon program runs through Starship, so it's not going to change in the near term, but longer term you could see this having impacts, and it's not clear to me exactly what those would be — I don't think you could really nationalize SpaceX, and I think if you did try to nationalize SpaceX, you would sort of destroy its magic, but I do think there will ultimately be consequences for the Elon's political activity.
Understanding SpaceX (24:06)
About Reentry, is there a particular story in there that you think just really encapsulates, if you want to understand SpaceX, and what it's doing, and where it's come from, this story kind of gets at it?
The point of the book was to tell the story behind the story. A lot of people knew, generally, what SpaceX has accomplished over the last decade, or the last 15 years, but this really takes you behind the scenes and tells the stories of the people who actually did it.
It's a company that's moving so fast forward that, like I said, there are all these challenges they're facing and they're just tackling them one-by-one as they go along.
I think one of the best stories of the book is just how they were making this up as they went along. The very first time they were going to try to land on the barge was in January of 2015, the drone ship landing, and the night before that barge was going to set out to sea, the guy who had developed the barge realized that, wait a minute, if we come back with a rocket this week, we have nowhere to put it in the port of Jacksonville, because they were staging out of Jacksonville at the time. And there had been this whole discussion at SpaceX about where to put these pedestals, but no one had actually done it. That night, he and another engineer stayed up all night drinking red wine and CADing out designs for the pedestals, and they met the concrete pores the next morning and just built these pedestals within 24 hours. It's a company that's moving so fast forward that, like I said, there are all these challenges they're facing and they're just tackling them one-by-one as they go along.
Elon has spoken about there's sort of this window of opportunity open for space. In the United States, at least, it was open and then it kind of closed. We stopped leaving Earth orbit for a while, we couldn't even get our people into Earth orbit; we had to use another country's rockets.
Is this window — whether for space commerce, space exploration — is it sort of permanently open? Are we beyond the point where things can close — because satellites are so important, and because of geopolitics, that window is open and it's staying open for us to go through.
I think he's talking about the window for settlement of Mars and making humans a multi-planetary species. And when he talks about the window closing, I think he means a lot of different things: One, the era of cheaper money could end — and that clearly did happen, right? We've seen interest rates go way up and it's been much more difficult to raise money, although SpaceX has been able to still do that because of their success. I think he's thinking about his own mortality. I believe he's thinking about a major global war that would focus all of our technological efforts here on planet Earth trying to destroy one another. I think he's thinking about nuclear weapons — just all the things that could bring human progress to a screeching halt, and he’s saying, “Look, the window may be 100 years or it may be 20 years.” So he's like, “We should seize the opportunity right now when we have it.”
Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
Micro Reads
▶ Economics
* Larry Summers on the Economics of AI - Conversable Economist
* Landing Softly Is Just the Beginning - San Francisco Fed
* More Babies Aren’t the Only Solution to Falling Birthrates - NYT Opinion
* Generative AI at work: Survey evidence from three Central Banks - SSRN
▶ Business
* Nvidia Chief Makes Case for AI-First Companies - WSJ
* Apple Intelligence Isn’t Very Smart Yet—and Apple’s OK With That - WSJ
* Andreessen Horowitz Backs Infinitus to Bring AI to Medical Calls - Bberg
* Breaking Up Google Is a Fool’s Game - WSJ Opinion
▶ Policy/Politics
* The US is the world’s science superpower — but for how long? - Nature
* Can A.I. Be Blamed for a Teen’s Suicide? - NYT
* Former OpenAI Researcher Says Company Broke Copyright Law - NYT
* The tragedy of a 50-50 America - FT Opinion
* Both Harris and Trump pose problems for U.S. energy producers. - AEI
* Why Harris and Trump Are Pandering to Crypto Plutocrats - NYT Opinion
* Trump’s Tariffs and Economic Risk - WSJ Opinion
* China asks: what is an e-bike? - FT Opinion
* This Startup Shows Why the U.S. CHIPS Act Is Needed - Spectrum
▶ AI/Digital
* Big frontier AI systems will emerge from global, distributed efforts, not just big tech: Meta’s Yann LeCun - Techcircle
* Does ChatGPT Have a Poetic Style? - arXiv
▶ Biotech/Health
* Danes to Use New Nvidia AI Supercomputer for Drug Discovery - Bberg
▶ Clean Energy/Climate
* Averting Climate Catastrophe Requires Economic Growth - PS
* The Energy Transition We Really Should Be Focusing On - RealClearScience
* To Fight Climate Change, Clean Up Carbon Markets - Bberg Opinion
* A Mexican Electric Car? Only If Private Firms Lead the Way - Bberg Opinion
▶ Robotics/AVs
* Crop-spraying robot is designed to reduce emissions and use less herbicide - Atlas
▶ Space/Transportation
* Beetlejuice, Betelgeuse, Betelbuddy? Astronomers Find Something Unexpected Orbiting Infamous “Doomed Star” - Debrief
▶ Up Wing/Down Wing
* Meet Hollywood’s AI Doomsayer: Joseph Gordon-Levitt - WSJ
* Here’s What the Regenerative Cities of Tomorrow Could Look Like - Wired
* Archimedes Rediscovered: Technology and Ancient History - JSTOR Daily
* Energy expert Vaclav Smil on how to feed the world without trashing it - NS
▶ Substacks/Newsletters
* Yes, You’re Still Imagining a Migrant Crime Spree - Alex Nowrasteh's Immigration Insights and Other Deep Dives
* How long can we sustain economic growth? - Noahpinion
* What is Anthropic's AI Computer Use? - AI Supremacy
* An AI intern in your pocket - Exponential View
* Industrial Policy’s Inescapable Uncertainty Problem - The Dispatch
* NEPA Nightmares IV: Tule Wind - Breakthrough Journal
* When you give a Claude a mouse - One Useful Thing
* Larry Summers on the Economics of AI - Conversable Economist
Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
Eli Dourado is on a mission to end the Great Stagnation, that half-century period of economic and technological disappointment that began in the 1970s (what I refer to in my 2023 book, The Conservative Futurist, as the Great Downshift). If we want to turn the page on this chapter of slow progress and deserved skepticism, we’re going to have to accept some creative destruction.
Dourado believes that the courage to embrace major change is key to meeting our potential. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Dourado about the future of the US job market and energy production in a world of AI.
Dourado is chief economist at the Abundance Institute, and author of his own Substack newsletter.
In This Episode
* The dawn of a productivity boom? (1:26)
* Growing pains of job market disruption (7:26)
* The politics of productivity growth (15:20)
* The future of clean energy (23:35)
* The road to a breakthrough (30:25)
* Reforming NEPA (35:19)
* The state of pro-abundance (37:08)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
The dawn of a productivity boom? (1:26)
Pethokoukis: Eli, welcome to the podcast.
Dourado: Thanks for having me on, Jim.
I would like to think that what we are experiencing here in the 2020s is the beginnings of an extended productivity boom. We have some good economic data over the past year and a half. I know this is something that you care about, as I do . . . What's your best guess?
I think the seeds of a boom are there. There's plenty of low-hanging fruit, but I'd say the last few quarters have not been that great for TFP growth, which is what I followed most closely. So we actually peaked in TFP in the US in Q4, 2021.
Now what is that, what is TFP?
Total factor productivity. So that's like if you look at inputs and how they translate into outputs.
Capital, labor . . .
Capital and labor, adjusting for quality, ideally. We've gotten less output for the amount of inputs in the last quarter than we did at the end of 2021. So slight negative growth over the last three years or so, but I think that you're right that there is room for optimism. Self-driving cars are coming. AI has immense potential.
My worry with AI is other sociopolitical limits in the economy will hold us back, and you kind of see the news breaking today as we're recording this, is there's a strike at the ports on east coast, and what's at issue there is are we allowed to automate those jobs? Are the owners of the ports allowed to automate those jobs? And if the answer ends up being “no,” then you can say goodbye to productivity gains there. And so I really think the technology is there to do a lot more to kick off a productivity boom, but it's the sociopolitical factors that are slowing us down.
And I definitely want to talk about those sociopolitical factors, and the port strike is hopefully not a harbinger. But before I leave this topic, I suppose the super bullish case for productivity is that AI will be so transformative, and so transformative throughout the economy, both automating some things, helping us do other things more efficiently, and creating brand new high-productivity things for us to do that we will have maybe an extended 1990s, maybe more, I might hope?
What is your bullish case, and does that bullish case require what they call artificial general intelligence, or human-level, or human-level plus intelligence? Is that key? Because obviously some people are talking about that.
Can we have an important productivity boom from AI without actually reaching that kind of science-fictional technology?
I don't actually think that you need one-to-one replacement for humans, but you do need to get humans out of the loop in many, many more places. So if you think about the Baumol effect, the idea here is if there are parts of the economy that are unevenly growing in productivity, then that means that the parts of the economy where there is slow productivity growth, perhaps because you have human labor still being the bottleneck, those parts are going to end up being massive shares of the economy. They're going to be the healthcares, the educations, the parts of the economy where we have lots of inflation and increased costs. So the real boom here, to me, is can you replace as many humans as possible? Over the short run, you want to destroy jobs so that you can create a booming economy in which the jobs are still available, but living standards are much higher.
If you think about these big chunks of GDP like health, housing, energy, transportation, that's what you need to revolutionize, and so I can think of lots of ways in health that we could use AI to increase productivity. And I also have very little doubt that even current levels of AI could massively increase productivity in health. I think the big question is whether we will be allowed to do it.
So you don't need AGI that is as good as a human in every single thing that a human might do to limit the number of humans that are involved in providing healthcare. Housing, I think there's construction robots that maybe could do it, but I think the main limits are, like land use regulation, more sociopolitical. In energy, it's kind of the same thing, NIMBYism is kind of the biggest thing. Maybe there's an R&D component that AI could contribute to. And then in transportation, again, we could automate a lot of transportation. Some of that's happening with autonomous cars, but we are having trouble automating our ports, for example, we're having trouble automating cargo railroads for similar make-work reasons.
I think the bull case is you don't need AGI, really, really sophisticated AI that can do everything, but you do need to be able to swap out human workers for even simpler AI functions.
I don't actually think that you need one-to-one replacement for humans, but you do need to get humans out of the loop in many, many more places.
Growing pains of job market disruption (7:26)
I'm sure that some people are hearing you talk about swapping out human workers, replacing human workers. They're thinking, this is a world of vast technologically-driven unemployment; that is what you are describing. Is that what you're describing?
Not at all. If we had the kind of productivity boom we're talking about, the economy would be so incredibly hot, and you need that hot market. People have all kinds of fantasies about how good AI could get. Can it substitute for a human in every single thing? And I'm not even positing that. I'm saying if we could just get it good enough to substitute in some things, the economy's going to be booming, it's going to be hot, there will still be things that humans can do that AIs can’t. There's lots of things that maybe we want a human to do, even if the AI can do it, and we will be able to afford that a lot better.
I think that the world I'm thinking about is one where living standards are way higher for everybody — and higher levels of equality, even. If you have the sort of uneven productivity gains that we've had for the last several decades, where tech does really well, but every other part of the economy does badly, well, that drives a lot of regional inequality, that drives a lot of different kinds of demographic inequality, and if we had broad-base productivity growth, that means better living standards for everybody, and I think that's what we should aim for.
When I talk about what you've been referring to as these sociopolitical factors or how we might slow down progress, slow down automation, the whimsical example I use is there being a law saying that yes, you can have kiosks in every McDonald's, but you have to have an employee standing next to the kiosk to actually punch the buttons.
As you mentioned with this port worker strike, we don't need my scenario. That is kind of what's happening on these ports, where there could be a lot more automation, but because of both unions and our acquiescence to these unions, we don't have the kind of automation — forget about sci-fi — that doesn't exist in other places in the world. And I wonder if that doesn't sort of encapsulate, at least in this country, the challenge: Can we get our heads around the idea that it's okay in the long run, that there will be some downsides, and some people might be worse off, and we need to take care of those people, but that's the disruption we need to tolerate to move forward?
You can't have a growing economy where there's no churn, where there's no displacement, where it's complete, where there's no dynamism. You need to be able to accept some level of change. I sympathize with people whose jobs get destroyed by automation. It is hard, but it's much less hard if the economy is super hot because we've been prioritizing productivity growth, and if that were the case, I think we'd find new jobs for those people very quickly. The process is not automatic, but it's much slower when you have low productivity growth and a stagnant economy than it is when you have high productivity growth and a booming economy.
The question I always get is, what about the 60-year-old guy? What's he going to do? And I'm not sure I have a much better answer. Maybe there's other jobs, but it's tough to transition, so maybe the answer there is you cut him a check, you cut that 60-year-old a check, and if you have a high-productivity economy, you have the resources for that to be an option.
Right! So that's the other thing is that we can afford to be generous with people if we have a really rapidly growing economy. It’s that we don't have the resources if we're stagnating, if we're already overextended fiscally, that's a terrible position to be in because you can't actually afford to be generous. And if there are people that truly, like you said, maybe they're very old and it doesn't make sense to retrain, or something like that, they’re near retirement, yeah, absolutely, we can afford that much better when GDP is much higher.
Where do you think, as a nation, our head is at as far as embracing or not being fearful of disruption from technological change? If I only looked at where our head was at with trade, I would be very, very worried about entering a period of significant technological disruption, and I would assume that we will see lots and lots of pushback if AI, for instance, is the kind of important, transformative, general purpose technology that I hope it is.
Again, if I look at trade, I think, “Boy, there's going to be a lot of pushback.” Then again, when I think about risk broadly, and maybe it's not quite the same thing, I think, “Well, then again, we seem to be more embracing of nuclear energy, which shows maybe — it's not the same thing, but it shows a greater risk tolerance.” And I'm always thinking, what's our societal risk tolerance? Where do you think we're at right now?
I think most people, most Americans, don't actually think in those terms. I think most Americans just think about, “How are things going for me?” They kind of evaluate their own life, and if their communities, or whatever, have been struggling due to trade stuff, or something like that, they'll be against it. So I think the people who think in these more high-level terms, it’s like societal elites, and I think normal people who have just lived under 50 years of stagnation, they're kind of distrustful of the elites right now: “I don't pay attention to policy that closely, and my life is bad, at least in some dimensions is not as good as I wanted it to be, it's hasn't had the increase that my parents' generation had,” or something like that. And they're very distrustful of elites, and they're very mad, and you see this nihilistic populism popping up.
You see kind of a diverse array of responses to this nihilistic populism. Some people might say, “Well yeah, elites really have messed up and we need to do what the common people want.” And then the other people are like, “No, we can't do that. We need to stay the course.” But I think that there's a hybrid response, where it's like, the elites really have done bad, but we don't just want to do what the populists want, we want to just have better elite-led policies, which include things like, we have to take productivity growth seriously, we can't just paper over a lot of the tensions and the conflicts that arise from that, we need to embrace them head-on and do everything we can to produce an economy that is productive, that works for everybody, but maybe not in the way that the populists think it will work.
You can't have a growing economy where there's no churn, where there's no displacement, where it's complete, where there's no dynamism. You need to be able to accept some level of change.
The politics of productivity growth (15:20)
I would love to see what American politics looks like if the rest of this decade we saw the kind of economic productivity and wage growth that we saw in the fat part of the 1990s. We act like the current environment, that's our reality, and that's our reality as far as the eye can see, but I'll tell you, in the early ’90s, there was a lot of gloom and doom about the economy, about productivity, how fast we could grow, the rise and fall of great powers, and America was overstretched, and after really three or four years of strong growth, it's like America Triumphant. And I’m wondering if that would be the politics of 2030 if we were able to generate that kind of boom.
Yeah, I think that's totally right. And if you look at total factor productivity, which is my KPI [key performance indicator] or whatever, if you look at 1995 to 2005, you were back to almost two percent growth, which is what we had from 1920 to 1973. So you had a slow period from 1973 to 1995, and an even slower period since 2005, and you get back to that two percent. That's the magic number. I think if we had TFP at two percent, that changes everything. That's a game-changer for politics, for civility, for social stability, we'd really be going places if we had that.
I was mentioning our reaction to trade and nuclear power. The obvious one, which I should have mentioned, is how we are reacting to AI right now. I think it's a good sign that Congress has not produced some sort of mega regulation bill, that this recent bill in California was not signed by Governor Newsom. Congress has spent time meeting with technologists and economists trying to learn something about AI, both the benefits and risks.
And I think the fact that it seems like, even though there was this rush at some point where we needed to have a pause, we needed to quickly regulate it, that seems to have slowed down, and I think that's a good sign that perhaps we're able to hit a good balance here between wanting to embrace the upside and not utterly panicking that we're producing the Terminator.
Absolutely. I think AI is something where the benefits are very clear, we're starting to see them already. The harms are extremely hypothetical, it's not evidence-based, it’s really a lot of sci-fi scenarios. I think the right attitude in that kind of world is to let things ride for a while. If there are harms that arise, we can address them in narrowly tailored ways.
I think government is sometimes criticized for being reactive, but reactive is the right approach for a lot of issues. You don't want to slow things down preemptively. You want to react to real facts on the ground. And if we need to react quickly, okay, we'll react quickly, but in a narrowly tailored way that addresses real harms, not just hypothetical stuff.
I love what you're saying there about reaction. I'm a big preparer. I love preparation. If I'm going to go anywhere, I over-prepare for all eventualities, I will bring a messenger bag so if the world should end while I'm out, I'll be okay. I love to prepare. But one lesson I draw from the pandemic is that only gets you so far, preparation, because before the pandemic, there were a gazillion white papers about the possibility of a pandemic, all kinds of plans as a culture, we were sort of marinating in pandemic apocalypse films, maybe about turning us into zombies rather than giving us a disease.
And then when we finally have a pandemic, it's like, “Where's the respirators? Where's this, where's that? We didn't have enough of this.” And so, while I'm sure preparation is great, what really helped us is we reacted. We reacted in real time because we're a rich country, we're a technologically advanced country, and we came up with a technological fix in a vaccine. To me — and again, I'm not sure how this is you meant it — but the power of being able to react effectively, boy, that's a pretty good capability of a well-functioning country.
Yeah, and a slight difference between the pandemic and AI is it was not the first pandemic. AI is just such a unique set of theorized risks that people are like, nothing like this has ever happened before. This is like the introduction of a brand new super-intelligent species to the planet. This is the first time two intelligent species — if you want to count humans as an intelligent species — two intelligent species will the planet at the same time. And the theorization here is just so far out of the spectrum of our experience that it is hard to even see how you could prepare if those risk materialize. The only intelligent thing that is likely to do any good is to have our eyes open, and let's see what the harms are as they materialize.
The problem with coming up with remedies for theorized harms is that the remedies never go away once they're implemented. Safety regulation never gets laxer over time. And so if you're implementing safety regulations because of real safety problems, okay, fair play, to some extent. I think in some dimensions we're too safe, but it kind of makes sense. But if you're doing it to just theorized harms that have never materialized, I think that's a big mistake.
And you've written about this fairly recently. To me, there's a good kind of complexity with an economy that you have a high-functioning economy where people can connect, and colleges and universities, and businesses, and entrepreneurs, these networks work together to produce computer chips or large language models. That's a good kind of complexity.
But then there's the other kind of complexity, in which you just have layer after layer of bureaucracy, and programs meant to solve a problem that was a problem 20 years ago and is no longer a problem, and that kind of complexity, that's not the kind we want, right?
Yeah, I think you want the sophistication in the economy, but in a way that works for everybody. There have to be benefits to it. If you increase the burden of complexity without producing any net benefits, then people start to rebel against it, they start to be indifferent to or apathetic about the health of society. And there's an anthropologist, Joseph Tainter, who wrote this book, The Collapse of Complex Societies, and his theory is that once you have complexity without the marginal benefits of complexity, you're in for a shock, at some point, when people start becoming apathetic or hostile to the current order. And the complexity grows and shrinks as a system, you can't ever just control like, “Oh, let's do more, or let's do one percent less complexity.” Once people start to rebel against it, it snowballs and you could end up with a very bad situation.
The problem with coming up with remedies for theorized harms is that the remedies never go away once they're implemented. Safety regulation never gets laxer over time.
The future of clean energy (23:35)
Nuclear versus solar versus geothermal: What do you like there?
Solar panels have massively come down in cost, and we're not that far away from — in sort of number of doublings of deployment, and sort of long-deployment space — we're not that far away from the cost being so low that . . . you could almost round the panels cost to free. It almost makes sense. And the problem is, if you look at the solar electricity costs on utility-scale farms, they have not really moved in the last few years. And I think this is in large part because we're designing the solar farms wrong, we're not designing them for the era of cheap panels, we're designing them, still, to track the sun, and complex mechanisms, and too much space between the panels, and too much mowing required, and all that. So as we adapt to the new paradigm of very, very cheap panels, I think that you'll get lower solar costs.
I think the other thing that is obviously complimentary to all of these sources actually is battery innovation. I'm very excited about one particular new cathode chemistry that maybe could drive the cost way, way down for lithium ion batteries. And so you're in a world where solar and batteries is potentially very, very cheap. And so for nuclear and geothermal, they have some advantages over solar.
If batteries get cheap, the advantage of not the firmness . . . I think people think that the advantage of these sources versus solar is just that solar is variable and the other sources are constant, but that's less of an advantage if batteries are cheap, and I think you also want batteries to be able to respond to the fluctuations in demand. If we had an entirely nuclear-powered economy, the nuclear plants actually want to run at constant speed. You don't want to ramp them up and down very quickly, but demand fluctuates. And so you still want batteries to be a buffer there and be the lowest-cost way to balance the network.
So the things that nuclear and geothermal can really compete on is land density — even gigawatt-scale nuclear where you have these giant exclusion zones and tons of land around them and so on, they're still more dense per acre than solar, and geothermal is maybe even denser because you don't need that exclusion zone, and so they could be much, much better in terms of density.
There's an advantage — if you want a lot of power in a city, you probably want that to be supplied by nuclear. If you're more rural, you could do solar. Another possibility is portability. So there's future versions of nuclear that are more mobile. People have talked about space-based nuclear for being able to go to Mars or something like that, you want thermonuclear propulsion and you can't do that with solar. Or powering submarines and stuff. So I think there's always a place for nuclear.
And then the other advantage for both nuclear and geothermal is if you don't need to produce electricity. So if you're producing just the heat — it turns out a big part of the cost of any sort of thermal source is converting it to electricity. You have to have these giant steam turbines that are very capital intensive. And so, if you just need heat, say up to 600 degrees C heat for nuclear and maybe 400 degrees C heat for deep geothermal, those are really good sources for doing that, and maybe if we had continued advances in drilling technology for geothermal or if we could figure out the regulatory stuff for nuclear, I think you could have very cheap industrial thermal energy from either of those sources.
Nuclear and geothermal are competing against a backdrop where we'll probably have pretty cheap solar, but there's still some advantages and these sources still have some utility and we should get good at both of them.
What do you think that energy mix looks like in 25 years, the electrical generation mix for this country?
It would be surprising if it wasn't a lot of solar. My friend Casey Handmer thinks it's going to be 90-plus percent solar, and I think that's a little crazy.
Do you happen to know what the percent is now?
Oh, I don't know. It's probably like three or four or something like that, off the top of my head, maybe less. The other question is, what's the base? I think a lot of people just want to replace the energy we have now with clean energy, and much more we need to be thinking about growing the energy supply. And so I think there's a question of how much solar we could deploy, but then also how much other stuff are we deploying? Let's do a lot of everything. You do have to drive the cost of some of these sources down a bit for it to make sense, but I think we can.
And then the real gains happen when maybe some of these . . . what if you could do some sort of conversion without steam turbines? What if you had ways to convert the thermal energy to electricity without running a steam cycle, which is hundreds-of-year-old technology? Essentially
You're just finding a new way to heat it up.
Yeah, so you look at why has solar come down so much? It's because it’s solid-state, easy to manufacture, any manufacturing process improvements just move forward to all future solar panels. If we had thermoelectric generators or other ways of converting the heat to electricity, that could be really great, and then there's other kinds of nuclear that are like solid-state conversion, like alpha voltaics and things like that. So you could have a box with cobalt 60 in it that's decaying and producing particles that you're converting to electricity, and that would be solid state. It's sometimes called a “nuclear battery,” it's not really a battery, but that would be a way to power cars maybe with something like that. That would be awesome.
Nuclear and geothermal are competing against a backdrop where we'll probably have pretty cheap solar, but there's still some advantages and these sources still have some utility and we should get good at both of them.
The road to a breakthrough (30:25)
When, if ever, this century, do you think we get AGI, and when, if ever, this century, do you think we get a commercial fusion reactor?
AGI, I'm still not really a 100 percent clear on how it's defined. I think that AI will get increasingly more capable, and I think that's an exciting future. Do we even need to emulate every part of the human brain in silicon? I don't think so. Do we need it to have emotions? Do we need it to have its own independent drive? We definitely don't need it to be a perfect replica of a human brain in terms of every capability, but I think it will get more capable over time. I think there's going to be a lot of hidden ways in which AGI, or powerful AI, or highly capable AI is going to happen slower than we think.
I think my base reasoning behind this is, if you look at neurons versus transistors, neurons are about a million times more energy efficient. So six orders of magnitude is kind of what we have to traverse to get something that is equally capable. And maybe there's some tricks or whatever that you can do that means you don't have to be equally capable on an energy basis, but you still need to get four orders of magnitude better. And then the other thing about it is that, if you look at current margins that people are working on, things like the ChatGPT o1 model, it's a lot slower, it does a lot of token generation behind the scenes to get the answer, and I think that that's the kind of stuff that could maybe drive progress.
Let's say we have a world where you ask an AI for a cure for cancer, and you run it on a big data center, and it runs for six months or a year, and then it spits out the answer, here's the cure for cancer, that's still a world where we have very, very powerful AI, but it's slow and consumes a lot of resources, but still ultimately worth it. I think that might be where we're headed, in a way, is that kind of setup. And so is that AGI? Kind of. It's not operating the same way as humans are. So this is different.
You're not going to fall in love with it. It's nothing like that.
I’m pretty uncertain about AGI: A) what it means, but what does it even look like in the end?
Fusion, I'll give you a hot take here, which is, I think there will be net energy gain fusion developed in this decade. I think that someone will have it. I think that probably the first people to get it will be doing it in a completely uneconomical way that will never work economically. Most of the people that are working on fusion are working on DT fusion, which is another one of these sources that basically produces heat, and then you use a steam turbine, and then that produces electricity. I think that the steam turbine is just a killer in terms of the added costs.
So all these sources are basically fancy ways of boiling water and then running a steam turbine. So what you want to look at is: What is the cheapest way to boil water? With fission, you just hold two magic rocks together and they boil water. With geothermal, you drill a hole in the ground and send water down there and it boils. With these DT fusion reactors, you build the most complex machine mankind has ever seen, and you use that to boil water — that's not going to be as cheap as fission should be. So I think that we'll struggle to compete with fission if we can ever get our act together.
There's other kinds of fusion called aneutronic fusion. That's harder to do. I think it’s still possible, maybe this decade, that someone will crack it, but that's harder to do. But the nice thing about that is that you can harvest electricity from those plasmas without a steam turbine. So if it's going to be economical fusion, I think it's plausible by 2030 somebody could crack it, but it would be that aneutronic version, and it is just technically a bit harder. You'll see some reports in a couple of years, like, “Oh, these people, they got net energy out of a fusion reactor.” It's like, okay, it's a scientific breakthrough, but look for the cost. Is it going to be competitive with these other sources?
Do we even need to emulate every part of the human brain in silicon? I don't think so . . . We definitely don't need it to be a perfect replica of a human brain in terms of every capability, but I think it will get more capable over time.
Reforming NEPA (35:19)
Do you think we've sort of got a handle, and we've begun to wrangle the National Environmental Policy Act [NEPA] to the ground? Where are we on reforming it so that it is not the kind of obstacle to progress that you've written so much about and been a real leader on?
My base scenario is we're going to get reforms on it every two years. So we had some a year and a half ago with the Fiscal Responsibility Act, I think we were possibly going to get some in the lame duck session this year in Congress. None of these reforms are going to go far enough, is the bottom line. I think that the problem isn't going to go away, and so the pressure is going to continue to be there, and we're just going to keep having reforms every two years.
And a lot of this is driven by the climate movement. So say what you will about the climate movement, they're the only mainstream movement in America right now that's not complacent, and they're going to keep pushing for, we’ve got to do something that lets us build. If we want to transform American industry, that means we've got to build, and NEPA gets in the way of building, so it's going to have to go.
So I think my baseline case is we get some reforms this year in the lame duck, probably again two years later, probably again two years later, and then maybe like 2030, people have kind of had enough and they just say, “Oh, let's just repeal this thing. We keep trying to reform it, it doesn't work.” And I think you could repeal NEPA and the environment would be fine. I am pro-environment, but you don't need NEPA to protect the environment. I think it's just a matter of coming to terms with, this is a bad law and probably shouldn't exist.
I am pro-environment, but you don't need NEPA to protect the environment. I think it's just a matter of coming to terms with, this is a bad law and probably shouldn't exist.
The state of pro-abundance (37:08)
What is the state of, broadly, a pro-abundance worldview? What is the state of that worldview in both parties right now?
I think there's a growing, but very small, part of each party that is thinking in these terms, and I think the vision is not really concrete yet. I think they don't actually know what they're trying to achieve, but they kind of understand that it's something in this general direction that we've been talking about. My hope is that, obviously, the faction in both parties that is thinking this way grows, but then it also develops a little bit more of a concrete understanding of the future that we're trying to build, because I think without that more-concrete vision, you're not actually necessarily tackling the right obstacles, and you need to know where you're trying to go for you to be able to figure out what the obstacles are and what the problems you need to address are.
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Some signs of tech progress are obvious: the moon landing, the internet, the smartphone, and now generative AI. For most of us who live in rich countries, improvements to our day-to-day lives seem to come gradually. We might (might), then, forgive some of those who claim that our society has not progressed, that our lives have not improved, and that a tech-optimist outlook is even naïve.
Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with economist Noah Smith about pushing the limits in areas like energy technology, how geopolitical threats spur innovation, and why a more fragmented industrial policy might actually be an advantage.
Smith is the author of the popular Noahpinion Substack. He was previously an assistant finance professor at Stony Brook University and an economics columnist for Bloomberg Opinion.
In This Episode
* Recognizing progress (1:43)
* Redrawing the boundaries of energy tech (12:39)
* Racing China in research (15:59)
* Recalling Japanese economic history (20:32)
* Regulating AI well (23:49)
* Rethinking growth strategy in the EU (26:46)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
Recognizing progress (1:43)
Pethokoukis: Noah, welcome to the podcast.
Smith: Great to be here!
Not to talk about other podcast guests, but I will very briefly — Last year I did one with Marc Andreessen and I asked him just how tech optimistic he was, and he said, “I'm not sure I'm an optimist at all,” that the most reasonable expectation is to expect the future to be like the past, where we have a problem building things in the real world, that some of our best ideas don't necessarily become everything they could be, and I think a perfectly reasonable baseline forecast is that, for all our talk about optimism, and “let's go,” and “let's accelerate,” that none of that happens. Does that sound reasonable to you or are you more optimistic?
I'm optimistic. You know, a few years ago we didn't have mRNA vaccines. Now we do. And now we have a magical weight loss drug that will not only make you lose weight, but will solve half your other health problems for reasons we don't even understand yet.
So much inflammation.
Right. We didn't even have that a few years ago. That did not exist. If you told someone that would exist, they would laugh at you. A magic pill that not only makes you thin, but also just solves all these other health issues: They would laugh at you, Scott Alexander would laugh at you, everyone would laugh at you. Now it's real. That's cool.
If you had told someone a few years ago that batteries would be as insanely cheap as they are, they would've been like, “What? No. There's all these reasons why they can't be,” but none of those reasons were true. I remember because they did actually say that, and then batteries got insanely cheap, to the point where now Texas is adding ridiculous amounts of batteries for grid storage. Did I predict that was going to happen? No, that surprised me on the upside. The forecasters keep forecasting sort of a leveling off for things like solar and battery, and they keep being wrong.
There's a lot of other things like reusable rockets. Did you think they'd get this good? Did you think we'd have this many satellites in the low-earth orbit?
AI just came out of nowhere. Now everyone has this little personal assistant that's intelligent and can tell them stuff. That didn't exist three years ago.
So is that, perhaps, growing cluster of technologies, that's not just a short-term thing. Do you think all these technologies — and let's say particularly AI, but the healthcare-related stuff as well — that these taken together are a game-changer? Because people always say, “Boy, our lives 30 years ago didn't look much different than our lives today,” and some people say 40 years ago.
But that’s wrong!
Yes, I do think that is wrong, but that people's perception.
When I was a kid, people didn't spend all day looking at a little screen and talking to people around the world through a little screen. Now they do. That's like all they do all day.
But they say that those aren't significant, for some reason, they treat that as a kind of a triviality.
Like me, you're old enough to remember a thing called “getting bored.” Do you remember that? You’d just sit around and you're like, “Man, I’ve got nothing to do. I’m bored.” That emotion just doesn't exist anymore — I mean, very fleetingly for some people, but we've banished boredom from the world.
Remember “getting lost?” If you walk into that forest, you might get lost? That doesn't happen unless you want to get lost, unless you don't take your phone. But the idea that, “Oh my God, I'm lost! I'm lost!” No, just look at Google Maps and navigate your way back.
Being lost and being bored are fundamental human experiences that have been with us for literally millions of years, and now they're just gone in a few years, just gone!
Remember when you didn't know what other places looked like? You would think, “Oh, the Matterhorn, that’s some mountain in Switzerland, I can only imagine what that looks like.” And then maybe you'd look it up in an encyclopedia and see a picture of it or something. Now you just type it into Google Images, or Street View, or look at YouTube, look at a walking tour or something.
Remember not knowing how to fix things? You just had no idea how to fix it. You could try to make it up, but really what you'd do is you'd call someone who was handy with stuff who had this arcane knowledge, and this wizard would fix your cabinet, or your dresser, or whatever, your stereo.
Being lost and being bored are fundamental human experiences that have been with us for literally millions of years, and now they're just gone in a few years, just gone!
So why does that perception persist? I mean, it's not hard to find people — both of us are probably online too much — who just will say that we've had complete and utter stagnation. I don't believe that, yet that still seems to be the perception, and I don't know if things haven't moved fast enough, if there are particular visions of what today should look like that haven’t happened, and people got hung up on the flying-car, space-colony vision, so compared to that, GPS isn’t significant, but I think what you have just described, not everybody gets that.
Because I think they don't often stop to think about it. People don't often stop to think about how much the world has changed since they were young. It's like a gradual change that you don't notice day-to-day, but that adds up over years. It's like boiling the frog: You don't notice things getting better, just like the frog doesn't notice the water getting hotter.
Do you think it's going to get hotter going forward, though? Do you think it's going to boil faster? Do you think that AI is such a powerful technology that it'll be indisputable to everybody that something is happening in the economy, in their everyday lives, and they look a lot different now than they did 10 years ago, and they're going to look a whole lot different 10 years from now?
Utility, remember — back to econ class — utility is concave. A utility of wealth, utility of consumption, is concave, which means that if you get 10,000 more dollars of annual income and you're poor, that makes a hell of a lot of difference. That makes a world of difference to you. But if you're rich, it makes no difference to you. And I think that Americans are getting rich to the point where the new things that happen don't necessarily increase our utility as much, simply because utility is concave. That's how things work.
In the 20th century, people escaped material poverty. They started out the century with horses and buggies, and wood-burning stoves, and freezing in the winter, and having to repair their own clothes, and having food be super expensive, and having to work 60-hour weeks, 80-hour weeks at some sweatshop, or just some horrible thing, and horrible conditions with coal smoke blackening the skies; and then they ended in nice, clean suburbia with computers and HDTVs —I guess maybe we didn't get those till the 2000s — but anyway, we ended the 20th century so much richer.
Basically, material poverty in rich countries was banished except for a very few people with extreme mental health or drug problems. But then for regular people, material want was just banished. That was a huge increment. But if you took the same increment of wealth and did that again in the next century, people wouldn't notice as much. They'd notice a little bit, but they wouldn't notice as much, and I think that it's the concavity of utility that we're really working against here.
In the 20th century, people escaped material poverty. They started out the century. . . having to work 60-hour weeks, 80-hour weeks at some sweatshop. . . and then they ended in nice, clean suburbia with computers and HDTVs . . .
So is economic growth overrated then? That kind of sounds like economic growth is overrated.
Well, no. I don't know that it's overrated. It's good, but I don't know who overrates it. Obviously it's more important for poor countries to grow than for rich countries to grow. Growth is going to make a huge difference to the people of Bangladesh. It's going to be life-changing, just as it was life-changing for us in the 20th century. They're going to have their 20th century now, and that's amazing.
And, to some extent, our growth sustains their growth by buying their products; so that helps, and contributing to innovations that help them, those countries will be able to get energy more easily than we were because they're going to have this super-cheap solar power, and batteries, and all this stuff that we didn't have back in the day. They're going to have protections against diseases, against malaria, and dengue fever, and everything. We didn't have those when we were developing, we had to hack our way through the jungle.
So growth is great. Growth is great, and it's better for the people in the poor countries than for us because of concavity of utility, but it's still good for us. It's better to be advancing incrementally. It's better to be feeling like things are getting better slowly than to be feeling like things aren't getting better at all.
So many things have gotten better, like food. Food has gotten immeasurably better in our society than it was in the ’90s. The food you can eat at a regular restaurant is just so much tastier. I don't know if it's more nutritious, but it's so much tastier, and so much more interesting and varied than it was in the ’90s, and people who are in their 40s or 50s remember that. And if they stop to think about it, they'll be like, “You know what? That is better.” We don't always stop to remember what the past was. We don't remember what food was like in the ’90s — I don't. When I'm going out to a restaurant to eat, I don't think about what a restaurant was like in 1994, when I was a kid. I don't think about that. It just doesn't come to mind. It's been a long time.
In Japan I noticed it a lot, because Japan had, honestly, fairly bland and boring food up until about 2010 or so. And then there was just this revolution where they just got the most amazing food. Now Japan is the most amazing place to go eat in the world. Every restaurant's amazing and people don't understand how recent that is. People don't understand how 20 years ago, 25 years ago, it was like an egg in a bowl of rice and sort of bland little fried things. People don't remember how mediocre it was, because how often did they go to Japan back in 2005?
It's better to be feeling like things are getting better slowly than to be feeling like things aren't getting better at all.
Redrawing the boundaries of energy tech (12:39)
Your answer raised several questions: One, you were talking about solar energy and batteries. Is that enough? Is solar and batteries enough? Obviously I read about nuclear power maybe too much, and you see a lot of countries trying to build new reactors, or restart old reactors, or keep old nuclear reactors, but over the long run, do we need any of that other stuff or can it really just be solar and batteries almost entirely?
Jesse Jenkins has done a lot of modeling of this and what would be the best solutions. And of course those models change as costs change. As battery costs go down and battery capabilities improve, those models change, and we can do more with solar and batteries without having to get these other things. But the current models that the best modelers are making right now of energy systems, it says that we're probably looking at over half solar and batteries, maybe two thirds, or something like that. And then we'll have a bunch of other solutions: nuclear, wind, geothermal, and then a little bit of gas, we'll probably never completely get rid of it.
But then those things will all be kind of marginal solutions because they all have a lot of downsides. Nuclear is very expensive to build and there's not much of a learning curve because it gets built in-place instead of in a factory (unless it's on a submarine nuclear plant, but that's a different thing). And then wind takes too much land, really, and also the learning curve is slower. Geothermal is only certain areas. It's great, but it's only certain areas. And then gas, fossil fuel, whatever.
But the point is that those will all be probably part of our mix unless batteries continue to get better past where we even have expected them to. But it's possible they will, because new battery chemistries are always being experimented with, and the question is just: Can we get the production cost cheap enough? We have sodium ion batteries, iron flow batteries, all these other things, and the question is, can we get the cost cheap enough?
Fortunately, China has decided that it is going to pour untold amounts of capital and resources and whatever into being the Saudi Arabia of batteries, and they're doing a lot of our work for us on this. They're really pushing forward the envelope. They're trying to scale every single one of these battery chemistries up, and whether or not they succeed, I don't know. They might be wasting capital on a lot of these, or maybe not, but they're trying to do it at a very large scale, and so we could get batteries that are even better than we expect. And in that case, I would say the share of solar and batteries would be even higher than Jesse Jenkins and the other best modelers now predict.
But you don't know the future of technology. You don't know whether Moore's Law will stop tomorrow. You don't know these things. You can trace historical curves and forecast them out, and maybe come up with some hand-wavy principles about why this would continue, but ultimately, you don't really know. There's no laws of the universe for technological progress. I wish there were, that'd be cool. But think solar and batteries are on their way to being a majority of our total energy, not just electricity, but total energy.
Racing China in research (15:59)
Does it concern you, in that scenario, that it's China doing that research? I understand the point about, “Hey, if they want to plow lots of money and lose lots of money,” but, given geopolitical relations, and perhaps more tariffs, or war in the South China Sea, does that concern you that that innovation is happening there?
It absolutely does concern me. We don't want to get cut off from our main sources of energy supply. That's why I favor policies like the Inflation Reduction Act. Basically, industrial policy is to say, “Okay, we need some battery manufacturing here, we need some solar panel manufacturing here in the country as a security measure.” Politicians always sell it in terms of, “We created this many jobs.” I don't care. We can create jobs anyway. Anything we do will create jobs. I don't care about creating specific kinds of jobs. It is just a political marketing tactic: “Green jobs, yes!” Okay, cool, cool. Maybe you can market it that way, good for you.
But what I do care about is what you talked about, which is the strategic aspect of it. I want to have some of that manufacturing in the country, even if it's a little inefficient. I don't want to sacrifice everything at the altar of a few points of GDP, or a few tenths of a percent of points of GDP at most, honestly. Or sacrifice everything in the altar of perfect efficiency. Obviously the strategic considerations are important, but, that said, what China's doing with all this investment is it's improving the state of technology, and then we can just copy that. That's what they did to us for decades and decades. We invented the stuff, and then they would just copy it. We can do that on batteries: They invent the stuff, we will copy it, and that's cool. It means they're doing some of our work, just the way we did a lot of their work to develop all this technology that they somehow begged, borrowed, or stole.
. . . what China's doing with all this investment is it's improving the state of technology, and then we can just copy that. That's what they did to us for decades and decades. We invented the stuff, and then they would just copy it. We can do that on batteries. . .
The original question I asked about: Why should we think the future will be different than the recent past? Why should we think that, in the future, America will spend more on research? Why do we think that perhaps we'll look at some of the regulations that make it hard to do things? Why would any of that change?
And to me, the most compelling reason is, it's quite simple just to say, “Well, what about China? Do you want to lose this race to China? Do you want China to have this technology? Do you want them to be the leaders in AI?” And that sort of geopolitical consideration, to me, ends up being a simple but yet very persuasive argument if you're trying to argue for things which very loosely might be called “pro-progress” or “pro-abundance” or what have you.
I don't want to whip up any international conflict in order to stimulate people to embrace progress for national security concerns. That wouldn't be worth it, that’s like wagging the dog. But, given that international conflict has found us — we didn't want it, but given the fact that it found us — we should do what we did during the Cold War, during World War II, even during the Civil War, and use that problem to push progress forward.
If you look at when the United States has really spent a lot of money on research, has built a lot of infrastructure, has done all the things we now retrospectively associate with progress, it was for international competition. We built the interstates as part of the Cold War. We funded the modern university system as part of the Cold War. And a lot of these things, the NIH [National Institutes of Health], and the NSF [National Science Foundation], and all these things, of course those came from World War II programs, sort of crash-research programs during and just before World War II. And then, in the Civil War, of course, we built the railroads.
So, like it or not, that's how these things have gotten done. So now that we see that China and Russia have just decided, “Okay, we don't like American power, we want to diminish these guys in whatever way we can,” that's a threat to us, and we have to respond to that threat, or else just exceed to the loss of wealth and freedom that would come with China getting to do what it wants to us. I don't think we should exceed to that.
I don't want to whip up any international conflict in order to stimulate people to embrace progress. . . But, given that international conflict has found us. . . we should do what we did during the Cold War, during World War II, even during the Civil War, and use that problem to push progress forward.
Recalling Japanese economic history (20:32)
You write a lot about Japan. What is the thing you find that most people misunderstand about the last 30 years of Japanese economic history? I think the popular version is: Boom, in the ’80s, they looked like they were ahead in all these technologies, they had this huge property bubble, the economy slowed down, and they've been in a funk ever since — the lost decades. I think that might be the popular economic history. How accurate is that?
I would say that there was one lost decade, the ’90s, during which they had a very protracted slowdown, they ameliorated many of the effects of it, but they were very slow to get rid of the root cause of it, which was bad bank debts and a broken banking system. Eventually, they mostly cleaned it up in the 2000s, and then growth resumed. By the time per capita growth resumed, by the time productivity growth and all that resumed, Japan was aging very, very rapidly, more rapidly than any country has ever aged in the world, and that masked much of the increase in GDP per worker. So Japan was increasing its GDP per worker in the 2000s, but it was aging so fast that you couldn't really see it. It looked like another lost decade, but what was really happening is aging.
And now, with fertility falling all around the world right now in the wake of the pandemic, probably from some sort of effect of social media, smartphones, new technology, whatever, I don't know why, but fertility's falling everywhere — again, it looked like it had bottomed out, and then now it's falling again. We're all headed for what happened to Japan, and I think what people need to understand is that that's our future. What happened to Japan in the 2000s where they were able to increase productivity, but living standards stagnated because there were more and more old people to take care of. That is something that we need to expect to happen to us, because it is. And, of course, immigration can allay that somewhat, and it will, and it should. And so we're not because of immigration
Will it in this country? In this country, the United States, it seems like that should be something, a major advantage going forward, but it seems like it's an advantage we seem eager to throw away.
Well, I don't know about eager to throw away, but I think it is in danger. Obviously, dumb policies can wreck a country at any time. There's no country whose economy and whose progress cannot be wrecked by dumb policies. There's no country that's dumb-proof, it doesn't exist, and it can't exist. And so if we turn off immigration, we're in trouble. Maybe that's trouble that people are willing to accept if people buy the Trumpist idea that immigrants are polluting our culture, and bringing all kinds of social ills, and eating the pets, and whatever the hell, if people buy that and they elect Trump and Trump cracks down hard on immigration, it will be a massive own-goal from America. It will be a self-inflicted wound, and I really hope that doesn't happen, but it could happen. It could happen to the best of us.
There's no country whose economy and whose progress cannot be wrecked by dumb policies. There's no country that's dumb-proof, it doesn't exist, and it can't exist.
Regulating AI well (23:49)
Do you think what we're seeing now with AI, do you think it is an important enough technology that it is almost impossible, realistically, to screw it up through a bad regulation, through a regulatory bill in California, or something on the national level? When you look at what's going on, that if it's really as important as what perhaps the most bullish technologists think it is, it's going to happen, it's going to change businesses, it's going to change our lives, and unless you somehow try to prohibit the entire use of the technology, there's going to be an Age of AI?
Do people like me worry too much about regulation?
I can't say, actually. This is not something I'm really an expert on, the potential impact of regulation on AI. I would never underestimate the Europeans' ability to block new technologies from being used, they seem to be very, very good at it, but I don't think we'll completely block it, it could hamper it. I would say that this is just one that I don't know.
But I will say, I do think what's going to happen is that AI capabilities will outrun use cases for AI, and there will be a bust relatively soon, where people find out that they built so many data centers that, temporarily, no one needs them because people haven't figured out what to do with AI that's worth paying a lot of money for. And I have thoughts on why people haven't thought of those things yet, but I'll get to that in a second. But I think that eventually you'll have one of those Gartner Hype Cycles where eventually we figure out what to do with it, and then those data centers that we built at that time become useful. Like, “Oh, we have all these GPUs [graphics processing units] sitting around from that big bust a few years ago,” and then it starts accelerating again.
So I predict that that will happen, and I think that during the bust, people will say, just like they did after the Dot-com bust, people will say, “Oh, AI was a fake. It was all a mirage. It was all useless. Look at this wasted investment. The tech bros have lied to us. Where's your future now?” And it's just because excitement about capabilities outruns end-use cases, not all the time, obviously not every technology obeys this cycle, for sure . . . but then many do, you can see this happen a lot. You can see this happen with the internet. You can see this happen with railroads, and electricity. A lot of these things, you've seen this pattern. I think this will happen with AI. I think that there's going to be a bust and everyone's going to say, “AI sucks!” and then five, six years later, they'll say, “Oh, actually AI is pretty good,” when someone builds the Google of AI.
Rethinking growth strategy in the EU (26:46)
To me, this always gets a lot of good attention on social media, if you compare the US and Europe and you say, the US, it's richer, or we have all the technology companies, or we're leading in all the technology areas, and we can kind of gloat over Europe. But then I think, well, that's kind of bad. We should want Europe to be better, especially if you think we are engaged in this geopolitical competition with these authoritarian countries. We should want another big region of liberal democracy and market capitalism to be successful.
Can Europe turn it around? Mario Draghi just put out this big competitiveness report, things Europe can do, they need to be more like America in this way or that way. Can Europe become like a high-productivity region?
In general, European elites’ answer to all their problems is “more Europe,” more centralization, make Europe more like a country. . . But I think that Europe's strength is really in fragmentation . . .
I think it can. I wrote a post about this today, actually, about Mario Draghi's report. My bet for what Europe would have to do is actually very different than what the European elites think they have to do. In general, European elites’ answer to all their problems is “more Europe,” more centralization, make Europe more like a country. You know, Europe has a history of international competition. France, and Germany, and the UK, and all these powers would fight each other. That's their history. And for hundreds of years, it's very difficult to change that mindset, and Mario Draghi's report is written entirely in terms of competitiveness. And so I think the mindset now is “Okay, now there's these really big countries that we're competing with: America, China, whatever. We need to get bigger so we're a big country too.” And so the idea is to centralize so that Europe can be one big country competing with the other big countries.
But I think that Europe's strength is really in fragmentation, the way that some European countries experiment with different institutions, different policies. You've seen, for example, the Scandinavian countries, by and large, have very pro-business policies combined with very strong welfare states. That's a combination you don't see that in Italy, France, and Germany. In Italy, France, and Germany, you see policies that specifically restrict a lot of what business can do, who you can hire and fire, blah, blah, blah. Sweden, and Denmark, and Finland, and Norway make it very easy for businesses to do anything they want to do, and then they just redistribute. It's what we in America might even call “neoliberalism.”
Then they have very high taxes and they provide healthcare and blah, blah, and then they basically encourage businesses to do business-y things. And Sweden is more entrepreneurial than America. Sweden has more billionaires per capita, more unicorns per capita, more high-growth startups per capita than America does. And so many people fall into the lazy trap of thinking of this in terms of cultural essentialism: “The Swedes, they're just an entrepreneurial bunch of Vikings,” or something. But then I think you should look at those pro-business policies.
Europeans should use Sweden as a laboratory, use Denmark, use Norway. Look at these countries that are about as rich as the United States and have higher quality of life by some metrics. Look at these places and don't just assume that the Swedes have some magic sauce that nobody else has, that Italy and Greece and Spain have nothing to learn from Sweden and from Denmark. So I think Europe should use its fragmentation.
Also, individual countries in Europe can compete with their own local industrial policies. Draghi talks about the need to have a Europe-wide industrial policy to combat the industrial policies of China and America, but, often, when you see the most effective industrial policy regimes, they're often fragmented.
So for example, China until around 2006, didn't really have a national industrial policy at all. At the national level, all they did was basically Milton Friedman stuff, they just privatized and deregulated. That's what they did. And then all the industrial policy was at the provincial and city levels. They went all out to build infrastructure, to attract FDI [foreign direct investment], to train workers, all the kinds of things like that. They did all these industrial policies at the local level that were very effective, and they all competed with each other, because whichever provincial officials got the highest growth rate, you'd get promoted, and so they were competing with each other.
Now, obviously, you don't want to go for growth at the expense of anything else. Obviously you'd want to have things like the environment, and equality, and all those things, especially in Europe, it's a rich country, they don't just want to go for growth, growth, growth only. But if you did something like that where you gave the member states of the EU more latitude to do their local policies and to set their local regulations of things like the internet and AI, and then you use them as laboratories and copy and try to disseminate best practice, so that if Sweden figures something out, Greece can do it too, I think that would play to Europe's strength, because Draghi can write a million reports, but Europe is never going to become the “United States of Europe.” Its history and ethno-nationalism is too fragmented. You'll just break it apart if you try.
The European elites will just keep grousing, “We need more Europe! More Europe!” but they won't get it. They'll get marginally more, a little bit more. Instead, they should consider playing to Europe's natural strengths and using the interstate competitive effects, and also laboratory effects like policy experimentation, to create a new development strategy, something a little bit different than what they're thinking now. So that's my instinct of what they should do.
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Micro Reads
▶ Business/ Economics
* Behind OpenAI’s Audacious Plan to Make A.I. Flow Like Electricity - NYT
* OpenAI Pitched White House on Unprecedented Data Center Buildout - Bberg
* OpenAI Executives Exit as C.E.O. Works to Make the Company For-Profit - NYT
* OpenAI to Become For-Profit Company - WSJ
* Mark Zuckerberg’s AI Vision Makes Metaverse a Slightly Easier Sell - WSJ
* Intel’s Foundry Shake-Up Doesn’t Go Far Enough - WSJ
* OpenAI CTO Mira Murati Is Leaving the Company - Wired
* Meta unveils augmented reality glasses prototype ‘Orion’ - FT
▶ Policy/Politics
* The Schumer Permitting Exception for Semiconductors - WSJ Opinion
* Biden breaks with environmentalists, House Dems on chip bill - Politico
* Mark Zuckerberg Is Done With Politics - NYT
▶ AI/Digital
* I Built a Chatbot to Replace Me. It Went a Little Wild. - WSJ
* Meta's answer to ChatGPT is AI that sounds like John Cena or Judi Dench - Wapo
* Want AI that flags hateful content? Build it. - MIT
* The Celebrities Lending Their Voices to Meta’s New AI - WSJ
▶ Biotech/Health
* Why do obesity drugs seem to treat so many other ailments? - Nature
* Antimicrobial resistance is dangerous in more ways than one - FT Opinion
* Who’s Really Keeping Ozempic and Wegovy Prices So High? - Bberg Opinion
▶ Clean Energy/Climate
* Microsoft’s Three Mile Island Deal Is Great News - Bberg Opinion
* China’s accelerating green transition - FT
* Microsoft’s Three Mile Island Deal Isn’t a Nuclear Revival — Yet - Bberg Opinion
* A Faster, Cheaper Way to Double Power Line Capacity - Spectrum
* A Public Path to Building a Star on Earth - Issues
▶ Space/Transportation
* Hypersonic Weapons — Who Has Them and Why It Matters - Bberg
▶ Up Wing/Down Wing
* Trump Offers Scare Tactics on Housing. Harris Has a Plan. - Bberg Opinion
* The Sun Will Destroy the Earth One Day, Right? Maybe Not. - NYT
* How supply chain superheroes have kept world trade flowing - FT Opinion
* Can machines be more ‘truthful’ than humans? - FT Opinion
▶ Substacks/Newsletters
* America's supply chains are a disaster waiting to happen - Noahpinion
* The OpenAI Pastiche Edition - Hyperdimensional
* The Ideas Anticommons - Risk & Progress
* Sam Altman Pitches Utopian impact of AI while Accepting UAE Oil Money Funding - AI Supremacy
* The Government’s War on Starter Homes - The Dispatch
* NEPA Nightmares III: The Surry-Skiffes Creek-Whealton Transmission Line - Breakthrough Journal
* Dean Ball on AI regulation, "hard tech," and the philosophy of Michael Oakeshott - Virginia’s Newsletter
Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
When it comes to sports, everybody is basically aligned that the goal here is helping every kid reach their potential. We celebrate talent, we give athletes the resources and personalized support they each need to develop their skills. We have varsity leagues, we have junior varsity leagues. We make sure that kids are challenged at the appropriate level for their current level abilities. And for some reason, when it comes to academics, we throw all of that out the window.
Our progress as a society depends a lot on the brilliant ideas of our greatest thinkers. To improve our way of life, we should be promoting our best and brightest to the highest heights of their potential. Instead, we seem to be stemming the flow of great minds at the source: in our public schools. With a one-size-fits-all, equality-of-outcome model, we rob our kids, and our society, of their potential.
Today on Faster, Please — The Podcast, I talk with Niels Hoven, founder and CEO of Mentava, an educational software company. Hoven’s goal: to help kids learn at their own pace, whether that includes additional support, or simply the resources to excel beyond expectations.
Hoven is the father of four, former product manager at Cloudflare, and was VP of product development at Pocket Gems.
In This Episode
* Treating academics like athletics (1:35)
* School as childcare and instruction (5:44)
* The role of parents (8:04)
* Mentava’s mission (10:04)
* Reframing the public school (15:20)
* The San Francisco algebra ban (17:50)
* Investing in our future (20:05)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
Pethokoukis: Niels, welcome to the podcast.
Hoven: Thank you so much. I appreciate you having me here.
Treating academics like athletics (1:35)
You argue that the current American education system is fundamentally flawed.
I do think it has some issues.
How does closing achievement gaps hurt our education system? How does it hold students back?
So obviously my problem is not with closing achievement gaps, my problem is what happens when you set up policies with that as the only goal. I think what we've seen is that the goal of today's modern education policy is closing the gaps between high achievers and low achievers, which is, of course, wonderful, but the way that has actually manifested in schools is by slowing down high achievers and not giving them the opportunity to achieve their potential. In San Francisco, you're literally not allowed to teach material above grade level, which I think is crazy.
Most school systems have gifted programs. Doesn't that meet your concern?
So those gifted programs, I think they don't go far enough to support the learning needs of students who are really capable of achieving dramatically more, and, in a lot of places they're very, very hard to get into. So in our school district right now, in order to qualify for the gifted program, you have to take a series of tests and you basically have to score 99th percentile on all of those tests. All of those tests are basically grade-level tests, so they're not really teaching seeing how far above grade level you are, so it's really, “Are you really, really good at taking the tests, so well that three times in a row you can score 99th percentile on grade level stuff?” That's not really getting the kids who need their learning needs supported by these special programs, and these programs really only operate a single grade above grade level. What about the kids who could be doing calculus in middle school, or want to be moving much faster than that: Two years of math a year, every single year — we aren't supporting them.
You've proposed treating academics more like sports. What does that look like in practice and how might that change how we approach education and how we think about education more broadly?
When it comes to sports, everybody is basically aligned that the goal here is helping every kid reach their potential. We celebrate talent, we give athletes the resources and personalized support they each need to develop their skills. We have varsity leagues, we have junior varsity leagues. We make sure that kids are challenged at the appropriate level for their current level abilities.
And for some reason, when it comes to academics, we throw all of that out the window. We just say, “Okay, everybody must progress at the same speed, learn the same thing at the same time.” To me that's like saying, “Okay LeBron, you are not allowed to dunk until everybody else can dunk also.” And so I want to see us treat academics more like sports, where we encourage students to pursue their interests, to develop their talents to the fullest potential, and respect the diversity of kids' ability and motivations.
To what do you attribute the staying power of this — I don’t know if it's a one-size-fits-all system, but of a system that, in many key ways, isn't different than it was a hundred years ago?
It is a government-sponsored monopoly, so I guess that would be my answer. How did the taxi cab medallion system last so long, even though it was dramatically underserving everybody who wanted to take a taxi? There's no competition.
What does that more sports-like environment look like? It sounds like there'd be more freedom, there'd be less regimentation. What does that world look like?
What I'm really pushing for is I would like to see students receiving instruction appropriate for their current level. I talk a lot about high-achieving students, but this is also true for struggling students. Right now we have a very one-size-fits-all model of education, and that means students who are struggling and need extra attention to get caught up aren’t given the opportunity that they need to perhaps move at a slower pace or get extra support, and kids who want to be moving faster and maybe learning two years of math a year, every single year, so that they can be doing college-level math in middle school, they're also not getting that support. We managed to do that in sports, we have lots of different leagues so that kids can find the level of competition that is appropriate for them, but for some reason, when it comes to academics, we refuse to allow that amount of differentiation.
School as childcare and instruction (5:44)
You advocate reducing instruction time to two hours a day. One, is that enough? And two, what are the kids doing for the other . . . are they getting into mischief? What are they doing for the rest of the day if they're not studying?
I think we've really conflated the role of school, and I think an important question to ask is: Is school as we provide it now, is it childcare or is it academics? And I think it is both. An interesting fact about school is, despite all of the problems that we all understand our schools have, schools have like an 80 percent approval rating from parents, and that's because the job that schools do for most parents is actually childcare. It is free childcare for while the parents are at work, it is finding a place where your children are entertained and loved, and that is super important.
But somehow we have also layered this layer of academic theater on top of that childcare instead of saying, “Okay, these kids can play in the woods for eight hours a day, or they can play dodgeball or grow their social-emotional skills and build their friendships with a friend.” We had to say, “No, they have to be learning something – but not too fast at this very, very slow pace.” And if you look at things like homeschoolers, you see most homeschoolers do two hours of academics a day, and they have the same outcomes as kids who are going to public schools, so we really don't need that much more time doing academics as long as that time is being spent efficiently.
Is this new world possible within a mostly public school system as it exists today? Can you do this, or are you talking about private school, homeschooling, but does this have anything to do with the public school system, which seems to me fairly resilient? Certainly, I think the changes of the sort of magnitude you're talking about.
I like the public school system. I went to public school, I had a really positive experience in public school. My own kids go to public school. And I think the difference is that when I was in public school, people were much more accepting of the idea of kids who wanted to move at their own pace. And so Mentava, certainly we're happy to support kids who are homeschoolers, who are in private school, but the real vision is to allow kids to be part of, essentially, their local public school community, go to school with friends from the neighborhood, but still have the opportunity to progress at their own pace
The role of parents (8:04)
Tell me a little bit about your personal educational experience and how that shaped your views and how it eventually led to your company.
Education has always been very important to my family. My dad taught me to read early, when I arrived at kindergarten, I could already read, I was roughly a year ahead in math. And so he negotiated with my school to just let me, during math class, just for an hour a day, could I just go to the next grade up and sit in on their math class and then come back to my own class for the rest of the day. And we did that, and that worked great until third grade, because my school only went up to third grade, so there wasn't a class for me. So at that point, I just started doing independent study. Just during math class, for an hour a day, I would go to the back of the classroom, I would study out of a math book, and then at the end of that hour I would come back and rejoin my friends for the rest of the day.
And I did that for the next four years, and basically, thanks to that accelerated support, I ended up taking calculus in eighth grade. There are kids who can be moving that fast if you just kind of get out of their way. My own son — he goes to a public school — we also got permission for him to do independent study last year, and now in fourth grade he'll probably be ready to start pre-algebra.
This is doable now. This was doable when I was a kid with textbooks, this is doable now with off-the-shelf software, but it's harder than it needs to be. And so our vision is: We can make this easier. I think a lot of kids could have done what I did, but they weren't given the opportunity. We want to make sure that more kids have this opportunity to have their learning needs supported.
Do you think parents underestimate what their kids are capable of doing?
Parents have no idea what their kids are capable of doing, especially parents of high-achieving kids. We've seen this over and over again with the families who are entering in Mentava’s learn-to-read software now. We target our software at kids as young as two, but often age three and four, we're trying to teach them to read, trying to get them to about a second grade reading level in maybe six to 12 months. We just had a three-year-old complete our entire curriculum, which gets us close to a second grade reading level, in about six months. So it is doable, it can move fast, and we have parents who say, “I had no idea that my kid was capable of doing this at this point!”
Mentava’s mission (10:04)
So walk me through what your company does, the service it provides, how it all works.
The long-term vision for our company is to support the learning needs of kids who are not being supported in school. If you have a child who wants to learn two years of math in a year, the real gating factor of that is, a lot of times it's teacher availability, or it's school policy that says there's no one available to give them that instruction. But imagine that they had the opportunity to just go open a math book.
It's a resource issue. We'd love to do it, but we don't have the resources.
We don’t have the resources. Sometimes that's true, sometimes that's not true, sometimes it's policy, but whatever. But they could go get a math book, they could just study that book and go as fast as they wanted — but that's boring. Not every kid is going to have that motivation. And so, to some extent, we're not really solving for curriculum, we are solving for motivation. We want to build software that can deliver that same curriculum — we know how to teach math, we know how to teach reading — deliver it in a more sort of fun, entertaining, motivating way, and allow kids to essentially continue to progress at their own pace without being gate-kept by the availability of teachers to essentially unlock that knowledge for them. And so we are starting at a very young age by teaching kids to read with software.
What I really want to teach is math. I want to get kids to learn math as fast as possible, but in order for kids to be able to teach themselves math, they have to be able to read, and so that is our first piece of software: learn-to-read software for preschoolers.
And obviously preschoolers, these are young kids, so is your expectation that software will be done at home? Are there schools trying to incorporate in some way? How's that working?
We've started talking to schools about pilots, but I think, right now, we get a lot of attention from parents. Incentives are just better aligned that way. Schools right now are not particularly concerned with, “Are we supporting our kids achieving their fullest potential or are we ensuring our kids can learn as fast as possible?” But parents really care about that. And so right now we have a lot of customers who are basically parents at home who realize, “Oh, my three- or four-year-old is ready to start reading, what can I do to best support them now?”
How long has the company been in business?
We kind of accidentally launched about six months ago.
Was this a pandemic-related idea?
This was. I have four kids. I had three kids during the pandemic and the fourth one arrived during the pandemic. They were at home, doing school at home, and I also had a job at the time, so did my wife, we had two working parents trying to take care of three kids at home, we were trying to figure out how to help them learn, and really the only way to make that work was to give them the skills that they needed to teach themselves. And at that time, my kids were five and three. And so how can I get my five-year-old teaching themselves math? How do I get my three-year-old teaching themselves to read? And the solution to that is software. We know the curriculum, we know if you want to teach reading, it's phonics, but how do you get the kid to sit down and memorize the 44 sounds in the English language? Well, turns out that software and games are really, really good at solving motivation, so we just needed to package that all together and that was how Mentava was started.
So during this exact period that you've thought of this idea, you're putting together a company, putting together the software, we have sort of a new stage in software happening with chatbots and large language models. Are those technologies that compliment what you're doing? Are you going to have to do something different to use those technologies? How's that going to work out for you?
It's very complimentary. So we're not using AI right now, but we see it coming. There is kind of this perfect storm of timing right now where, I think because of Covid, parents started to realize that, “Oh, my kid is not learning as much in school as I thought. This is what they're doing in school?” We had all that visibility when our kids were doing homeschool in front of screens at home.
Technology has gotten to a point where we can give screens to every kid, and iPads, and other tablets. Touchscreens make learning much more accessible. We're seeing the effectiveness of some learning software — a lot of learning software is really, really bad, but some of it is good, and people are seeing that. And then, at the same time, like you see AI coming out and getting people very excited about the potential of software to affect education.
It’s funny, when we were raising money, the idea that software could be a teacher was a very contrarian perspective. Everybody said, “How could software possibly be a teacher? You’re going to need a human there.” And then about 12 months later, AI came out, people said, “Oh, of course you're going to have software teachers. We've always believed that.”
But my take on AI is that the power of AI is really in its adaptability, and you actually don't need that much adaptation for teaching reading or teaching math. You memorized the 26 letters, the 44 sounds in the English language, you learn addition, and then you learn subtraction, then you learn multiplication, then you learn division. It's pretty linear. It's pretty sequential. And so my belief is that there's actually this core learning pathway that you can really, really optimize, and we should focus on that. And it's fairly sequential, and it's fairly deterministic. And then the power of AI is to catch the kids who fall off of that and get confused and ask, “Okay, what are you confused about? I see you're confused about this thing. Let me give you some custom instruction and then get you back on that main pathway.”
Reframing the public school (15:20)
In an ideal world — and let's just stick with, I think it's reasonable to think that, for the time being, most kids are going to be educated by public schools. That's a lot of kids, a magnitude difference in how many kids are in private school or are homeschooled. What should that public school day look like, ideally, given what you've learned going through this process?
The biggest challenge for public school is that there's such a diversity of student needs there. Public schools are simultaneously academics, but they're also childcare, and they're also a social support network. They're a safety net for a lot of kids, and they're trying to provide all those services to all these different kids by giving them all the exact same thing. To me that makes no sense, and what I would really love to see in our public schools is just more differentiation, more acceptance of diversity of needs, diversity of motivations, diversity of abilities, and saying, “Okay, these children need this particular service from our public schools. Let's make sure that they're in a place where they can get those services. But we have these other kids who want to learn two years of math every year. They can do that in two hours a day, and then they want to spend the rest of the day playing in the forest.” That would be amazing.
Should that actual classroom time look markedly different? I'm sure that if I went into most classrooms — I had kids, one currently in high school and ones who were in high school not that long ago — that those classrooms, blackboards, teachers, lecturing: That's the classroom experience. That's in 2024, that was the classroom experience in 1924. Should that classroom experience look fundamentally different?
I think that's an interesting question. I think it's going to look different for different kids. I think there is a sense that some of the rigor I would say of the old days has been lost, and I think that there's good and bad to that. I think a lot of that is a result of conflating childcare with academics. You can't do rigorous academics for eight hours a day. It’s sort of like weightlifting; you can't do squats for eight hours a day, but you can do them very effectively for half an hour. But if you want to pretend that you're exercising for eight hours a day, then you, by definition, have to remove a lot of that rigor. So I would like to get rid of the academic theater and be very clear about, “Okay, this time is play time, this is childcare time, and this time is academic time, and we're really going to buckle down and focus here.”
The San Francisco algebra ban (17:50)
A few years back, there was a ban on teaching middle school algebra in San Francisco. Can you give me some background on that?
So this was passed about 10 years ago. The way it used to work is that most kids took algebra in eighth grade. If you were ready earlier, you could take algebra in seventh grade, but essentially in San Francisco, because some kids were not prepared to take algebra in eighth grade, they said across the board, all kids must take algebra in ninth grade. So even the kids who used to take it in seventh grade, the kids who used to take it in eighth grade, “Sorry, we're not doing it in middle school anymore. You all have to take it in ninth grade.”
Usually these sorts of educational decisions, they're just lost in the noise, parents don't have time to focus on the nitty and gritty of curriculum, but this was a big problem for parents because this meant that you could not get through calculus in high school without essentially taking summer school or getting private tutoring. And for a lot of competitive colleges, you need to be in calculus, have taken calculus, in high school. And so parents had a real problem with this particular curriculum change.
The irony of all of this is that this was enacted with the hope of increasing equity, of driving more equal outcomes, and it had the opposite effect because now it’s just the parents with the resources who are able to go out and do summer school, and private tutors, and then get their kids the math support that they needed. So this happened a decade ago, and it has been a battle for 10 years to get algebra back into middle schools in San Francisco, and it actually went the other way: California statewide nearly got rid of algebra in their statewide middle school curriculum because of the quote-unquote “success of San Francisco,” which is basically, if you look into it, it's just San Francisco cooking the books, literally lying about their outcomes.
And so finally, this past year, parents essentially had enough and they put it on the ballot and said, “We're going to take a vote about, should middle schoolers be allowed to learn algebra.” It's funny because a lot of times people think that this cuts along party lines: Conservatives versus Democrats, red versus blue, but even in San Francisco, the most progressive city in the United States, 80 percent of families were like, “Yes, we should support all kids learn these. Yes, if a kid is ready to take algebra in middle school, we should allow them to do that.”
Investing in our future (20:05)
I'll tell you the one thing I kept thinking of as I was learning more about your company and your outlook was it seems to me like it'd be really important, as a country, that every kid can reach their potential, but especially the very smartest kids, that we get everything out of them that we can, right? That's pretty important. These are people who are going to be designing the next stage of AI, they're going to be designing the new computer chips, they're going to be in biotechnology. If we can get more out of those kids, there's a huge multiplier there.
I believe that very deeply. I believe leaders are important. I believe in the power of single individuals to create huge amounts of change, but not everybody agrees with that. I was at a school the other day, and a bench outside the school literally has carved into it —a bench that every student sees as they go into the school — it says, “Strong people do not need strong leaders.” And I fundamentally disagree with that. I think we need strong people and we also need strong leaders, and the way we get both of those is ensuring that every student has the opportunity to have their learning needs supported and have the opportunity to achieve their potential.
What's the direction of the company? Where are you going to be in five years? What's the dream?
Right now, we are in the process of officially launching our learn-to-read app, targeted at preschoolers, and then what I really want to do is start transitioning into math. So once we have taught kids to read, we have essentially unlocked their ability to teach themselves. And so our goal is to keep up with this earliest cohort of kids who are learning to read and support them as they continue through their K–12 career. If they want to learn two years of math a year, then I would love to build two years of math curriculum each year so that they continue using Mentava to support their K–12 experience, and then they discovered that, I don't know, they're done with math in middle school, and then they get to figure out what's next after that. Do I go start a company? Do I do internships? Do I go learn marine biology? I don't know.
What about computer science? Does that play a role here?
When I say math, I would say specifically math and computer science are what I'm most passionate about. I think of it almost as vocational school. Those are the skills that we can teach that directly contribute to, okay, this person is able to create more value in the world because they know these two fundamental skills now.
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American global leadership is due in great part to its innovators — visionaries who drive society beyond the preconceived limits. Historically, government-led initiatives like the Manhattan Project or the Apollo Project pushed boundaries. Today, too often, government lags behind technologically.
Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Katherine Boyle about American Dynamism, the spirit of pro-progress innovation, and how a new generation of Silicon Valley startups is spurring government to break out of its old habits.
Boyle is a general partner at VC giant Andreessen Horowitz, having previously been a partner at General Catalyst and a general assignment reporter at The Washington Post. She primarily invests in national security, aerospace and defense, and public safety companies, among others.
In This Episode
* American Dynamism (1:25)
* From software to the physical world (7:23)
* Government collaboration: challenges & opportunities (11:29)
* Playing the long-game in Washington (21:16)
* Building the American Dream (24:35)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
American Dynamism (1:25)
Let's just start with a little bit of definition about American Dynamism. Broadly, what challenges or problems is this effort directed toward?
It's a bit of a long story as to what American Dynamism is, how it arrived to be a category of innovation, but the short definition is American Dynamism is built for companies that support the national interest. So a very broad category of companies, everything from aerospace, defense, national security, companies that sell directly to the US government and to our allies, but also things like housing, education, transportation, infrastructure, things that are built in the physical world where Washington or states usually like to regulate those things.
So one of the things that we saw in our own portfolio is that there are a lot of companies that we used to be classifying as “enterprise” or “consumer,” and really what they were were government companies because they had to interface with a regulator much earlier in their trajectory, or they saw government as a potential buyer of the product. So in cases of things like aerospace and defense, those are very obvious government buyers, but things like public safety, where we have companies like Flock Safety, for example, that started out selling to homeowners associations thinking they were a consumer company, but ultimately got extraordinary pull from local governments and from public safety officials because of how good the technology was. So the companies, in some ways, they were these N-of-One companies, really solving really important civic problems, but over time it became very clear that this was a growing category of technology.
But the broader underlying thesis, I'd say, of where the movement came from, and when we really started seeing this as an area where founders, in particular, were excited to build, I think it did come out of “It’s Time to Build,” my partner Mark Andreessen's canonical post where he basically said during Covid that we have to be able to build things in the physical world. And there was sort of this realization that technology has solved many, many problems in the digital realm that I think, in some ways, the last 15 years of the Silicon Valley technology story has really been about changes in consumer technology or changes in the workplace, but now we're finally seeing the need for changes in government and civic goods, and there's just an extraordinary amount of momentum from young founders who really want to build for their country, build for the needs of the citizenry.
Does it change what you do, or maybe the kinds of expertise that are needed, to think about these things as a category, rather than different companies scattered in these other kinds of categories. Thinking of them as like, “Oh, there's some sort of commonality,” how is that helpful for you?
The thing that's interesting is that there's sort of a “yes” and “no” part to that question. The yes is that the founders are coming from different places. So the companies that have led to this sort of, I would say, extraordinary wealth of engineering talent where people are not afraid to tackle these problems, there's a handful of the companies that have scaled: it's companies like SpaceX, companies like Palantir, where, 20 years ago, they were banging their heads against the wall trying to figure out, “How do we sell to government?” In many cases, they had to sue the government in order to be able to sell and compete against the larger incumbents that have been around for, in many cases, 50, 70 years. But now you have these talented engineers who've sort of seen those playbooks, both in terms of, they understand what good engineering looks like, they understand the pace of innovation, how quickly you have to bring new products to market, and they also understand that you have to be in touch with your customer, constantly iterating.
And so you now have companies that have scaled in these categories where there is this nice thing that happens in Silicon Valley, and I always say it's a mark of a really successful company when three, four, five years into the journey, you start seeing the early people at that company say, “Well, I want to solve this problem,” or “I want to go be a founder, myself,” and they start building more companies. So I think that, in some ways, the natural order of how Silicon Valley progresses, in terms of, do you need to have different expertise, or are there different talent pools? Yes, they're coming from different companies, but it's the same story of Silicon Valley Dynamism, which is, someone comes in, I always joke, they go to the University of Elon Musk and they learn how to manufacture, and then they say, “Well, actually, I don't want to just work on rockets anymore, I'd like to work on nuclear.” And so then you have companies like Radiant Nuclear that have spun out of SpaceX several years ago that are building in a totally different category for the built world, but have that sort of manufacturing expertise, that engineering expertise, and also know what it's like to work in a highly regulated environment.
Does it require a different expertise, then, to advise these companies because of that government interface?
I think in some ways it does, yes, the types of people who are investing in this category, maybe there's a number of investors where they got their start at Palantir, for example, or they understand the early journey of SpaceX. But at the same time, the thing that I think has been most surprising to us is just how quickly this movement caught on among the broader Silicon Valley ecosystem. And I think that's a very good thing, because, at its core, these are software companies in many cases. Yes, they're building hardware, but software is the lever that's allowing these companies to scale. So you are seeing the traditional venture capital firms that used to say, “Oh, I would never touch anything that is operating in the physical world,” or the meme you had five years ago, which is, “You'll never be able to sell anything to the US government, I'm not wasting my money there.” You've seen a complete 180 in the Silicon Valley ecosystem in terms of venture firms where they're now willing to take bets on these types of companies.
And you're also seeing, there's a number of founders where their first company, for example, might've done very well, and it might've just been pure software, or in a consumer enterprise, sort of a more classical Silicon Valley domain, and now you're seeing those founders say, “Actually, I want to build for the civic need. I want to build for the national interests. These are issues I care about.” And so you're seeing those founders actually decide to build in the category and team up with founders who maybe have a little bit more experience in government, or maybe have a little more experience in terms of how they're building in the physical world.
From software to the physical world (7:23)
That period you referred to, which seems like a lot of what Silicon Valley was doing with the first 15 years or so of this century: they're doing internet, social media, very consumer-facing. How valuable was that period? Because that is a period that, here in Washington, is much criticized as trivial, “Why wasn't Silicon Valley solving these huge problems like we did in the ’60s?” Again, there were some critics who just looked at it as a waste of brainpower. To what extent is that a fair criticism, and do you think, is that unfair? That stuff was valuable, people valued the kinds of products that were produced
You would actually be better able to speak to this than me, but I'll say, the graph or the chart that's going viral today, as we speak, is the comparison of 2009 US GDP versus Eurozone GDP, which were roughly equal in 2009, coming right off the Great Recession, to today, which I actually think it was tweeted something like, I think it's. . . the US is 77 percent greater in terms of GDP than the Eurozone countries, which means that, for some reason, the Silicon Valley ecosystem — and it is largely attributed to Silicon Valley. When I first wrote the thesis on American Dynamism, I looked actually at 1996, because it was 25 years when I published it, but 1996, if you looked at the top US companies by market cap, all six of them were outside of technology as an ecosystem. They were energy companies, I would say almost archaic industries that had grown over a long period of time, but if you look at those six companies today, they are all tech companies. And so something has happened in the 21st century. You could say the new American Century is actually built off the back of software. It's built off of these large tech companies that were built in California, in many cases. And so the 15-year period that you're talking about, which is this sort of, it was a zero-interest-rate environment, cost of capital was very low, there was a lot of experimentation going on, it was, in many ways, the canonical example of American Dynamism broadly, that you had risk capital going after many new ideas in many different areas, but they were particularly really focused on the areas that government was not interested in regulating.
And that's always been the theme of innovation in Silicon Valley is, “Let's go where they're not necessarily paying attention.” Maybe you had some one-offs in terms of, you'll always have to meet with your regulator at some point—in the case of Uber or Airbnb—but these companies were really born of the needs that founders understood. They were built off the back of a platform shift in terms of, 2007, 2008, the iPhone becomes the thing that everyone wants to build on, it becomes the mobile era. And so you really did have this focus of software, and enterprise software, and consumer, and companies were able to grow to extraordinary heights. And if you just look at what it has done for US GDP in comparison to even something like Europe, it is really extraordinary. So that is a story that I think we should be celebrating and telling.
But what has happened, I think, since Covid is this new shift, which is, we've explored many of the digital frontiers that we can. And of course there's always a new digital frontier. Every time we think it's over, we get hit with a new one — in the case of AI. But the thing that I think has really changed is that entrepreneurs now are not afraid of the physical world, and they are realizing — and I hate to use the word “inevitable,” but in some ways this is an inevitability — that you are going to have to interface with government at a certain point if you are going to build in the physical world. And there are so many opportunities, there are so many different places where founders can build, that that really did take on new meeting post- this slew of black swan events, in the case of Covid, and then of course Russia invaded Ukraine, where I think it did wake up a lot of founders who said, “I want to work on these really hard problems.” And thankfully we have companies that have scaled during that time, that have trained these manufacturing capabilities, they've trained engineers how to do these things. So it is our view that that 15-year period was extraordinary for software, but the next 10 years are going to be extraordinary for these American Dynamism companies, as well.
Government collaboration: challenges & opportunities (11:29)
When you talk about interfacing with government, what popped into my head was a bit of video of a congressional hearing, and they were trying to decide, do we want to bring the private sector and SpaceX into the space program, and so not just have it be a government effort by NASA? And I just remember these senators just lambasting the idea. And I think they might've brought in some astronauts, too. And if I was interested in interfacing with government and I had seen that video, I'm like, “Boy, oh boy, I hope the attitude of government has changed since then, because it seems like that's a wall.” What is the attitude on the other side? You said the attitude of the entrepreneurs has changed, of funders, but what about on the other side? What is the openness to the kinds of solutions that your companies are presenting?
I think it's changed because it has to, and I always point to the late former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, who in 2015 started DIUx [Defense Innovation Unit Experimental] as an innovation unit for the DoD [Department of Defense], recognizing that there's a talent problem that US government has had; and it didn't start in the last 10 years. When I was exploring this talent problem, I actually realized that there had been a commission on the lack of talent going into the bureaucracy at the federal level.
In the 1990s, Paul Volcker actually chaired the commission, it was called a “Quiet Crisis.” Basically that young people today, unlike in the ’50s and the ’60s where government was seen as this extraordinary job that you could have or that you could go into one of these companies and work in a company for 30 years and then draw a pension, that young people today want to go work in the private sector, and the growth and dynamism of the private sector has actually been an issue for government, and that is not a new issue. It was explored in the late ’80s, early ’90s, and it has gotten precipitously worse because of tech. I would say that the technological innovation risk capital going to Silicon Valley and saying, “We're going to fund young people as they come out of college because they understand this new type of engineering.” You're seeing some of the best and brightest young people decide not to go to traditional companies, which has been a huge issue for the prime contractors that supply 40 percent of the government programs for the DoD, but what has happened is you're seeing this extraordinary engineering talent go to startups. And so I think what even — this is 10 years ago now — DIU saw, if all of our best and brightest software talent is avoiding government, or much of it is avoiding government, they're avoiding traditional companies that we work with, we have to meet them where they are.
And so the DoD I actually think was the first government organization to really recognize this crisis and to decide, we're going to need to have new interfaces. Now, whether that means new procurement, that's always going to be a debate, and that's a Washington issue that I think we've been fighting for several years now in order to change how these companies are able to work with the DoD on these big programs, but I think even just recognizing that this was an issue 10 years ago was a huge step for government.
And over time now, we've seen a handful of what we would call “defense 1.0” companies, in terms of startups, many of them kind of built off the back of a company like SpaceX, now realizing that you can build for USG [US Government], you can build hardware-software hybrid that you can then sell into production contracts, and it's companies like Anduril that were started in 2017 when people said, “This is impossible to do. You're never going to be able to sell to USG,” and this year was chosen for a massive program, the CCA [Collaborative Combat Aircraft] program with the Air Force, over many prime contractors.
And so I think that is the story now that Silicon Valley has seen, and I always joke that, particularly investors and founders, they really only need to see a handful of winners to know that something is a category, and so you're going to see more and more of these companies being founded, scaling, and I think that circuitous cycle and that virtuous cycle actually leads more to the DoD saying, “Okay, this is a real ecosystem now.” It's not as risky to take a chance on a startup, which is what government is always worried about, if we take a chance on anything innovative, are we going to look foolish? And so I think, in some ways, you are seeing the government respond to what's happened in the private sector, but this is not something that's a year old, two years old, or three years old, this is something that's been talked about for almost 10 years now, and of course SpaceX now is an over-20-year-old company.
Is this still primarily a Defense Department-focused effort? Are there other areas of government who are looking at what's happening with DoD and they're drawing lessons? How diverse of an effort has this become?
We see this across every sector that government cares about. So it's not just defense, it's aerospace, it's energy, it's logistics, it's transportation. We always joke, if there is a department in Washington that exists to regulate a sector, that is American Dynamism, and you are seeing innovation in those sectors. But it's happening at different rates. I'd say the DoD is one of the largest spenders. The largest private US company right now is SpaceX, so there's success in those categories, so you're seeing a lot of interest in it now, but then there's companies in public safety. That's an area where I think there's just been an extraordinary explosion of innovation in the last few years, largely driven by the fact that there is a labor crisis happening in public safety across America, but it is a different sale, it's not selling to federal government, selling to state and local.
One of our companies, Flock Safety, which I mentioned at the beginning of our chat, they now are involved in solving 10 percent of vehicular crimes in America.
What do they do?
So, it's a great story about a company that was founded in Atlanta in 2017, and they built a very small modular license plate reader that only tracks cars, not people, and started building for homeowners associations with the recognition that most crimes in America are committed with a car, and so if you can put these in areas of high traffic, areas to augment the work of law enforcement, crime will go down. And they started selling to homeowners associations and immediately got pull around Atlanta and suburban Atlanta from police chiefs who said, “I need 10 of these in areas where we don't have enough people who can look at different areas.”
So now this company is operating across America, they're in all 50 states, and what's extraordinary about what they've been able to do as a technology company, just putting up cameras in different sectors and following cars, is one of the hardest problems for law enforcement is when a car that has committed at theft or — one of the most extraordinary stories they've told us recently was there was a young girl kidnapped, a young child kidnapped in Atlanta, and the car went into a different county. And so when that happens, for law enforcement it's often one of the most difficult things, if a car goes into a different county, to do data sharing across these places. But if you have a network of cameras that can track the car, you find that kidnapped child, or you find that stolen vehicle much, much faster. In many ways, catching the cars at the moment where they've moved from county to county has actually solved one of the bigger data issues that law enforcement has.
What's interesting about this example — and it provides a nice lead-in to my next question — is, in that situation, the solution wasn't to help the various databases communicate better, it was a completely different sort of solution. So, are what these companies doing — it seems like what they're not doing is taking existing operations and improving efficiency, but providing a new way to approach the problem that they're trying to tackle.
Yes. And what's incredible about that story is it was not started as a company that was supposed to support law enforcement. It was started for homeowners associations, it was a consumerization of a civic problem. And I think that's what's really interesting is, one of the biggest issues, and this is why I think you're now seeing really interesting technology companies enter government at all levels is, you have a population that has grown up with consumer technology now. So as the boomers retire, the boomers remember what it was like to be in government, or to be in office places without Zoom, without the consumer internet, and without the things that make life much easier and tangible, as those people retire, you have young people demanding, “We have to use better technology.”
And so the solutions are not, “Okay, let's iterate on the existing systems that we've used for the last 10 or 20 years,” it's, “Why can't my experience when I walk into my job in government feel exactly the same way that it does when I walk into my home and I experience the consumerization of everything around me?”
So I think that is part of it, that you have this millennial generation that's now coming into leadership. In many cases, you have people who don't necessarily remember the world before the internet or didn't have formative experiences in the workplace or in government before the internet. And that is shaping and reshaping all of how government functions, and likely will for the next 20 years. The thing that, especially when we talk about the Department of Defense and the warfighter, the thing that has always been tragic is that you have more technology in your phone than you do when you go onto the battlefield. And so I think there's this understanding that young people are demanding to have the same level of technology and the same ease-of-use in all aspects of governance, in all aspects of civic goods.
Playing the long-game in Washington (21:16)
You seem like a very upbeat, positive person. My experience as people from Silicon Valley — or now, in your case, from Miami, a new startup hotbed — they come through Washington, they bring that optimism with them, then after a few days of dealing with people on Capitol Hill, the optimism is drained out of them, they go back shells of their former selves, because if you've dealt with a lot of people on Capitol Hill and staffers, what they're really good at saying is, “That will never pass . . . that will take 20 years . . . three of my predecessors worked on it, it didn't work . . .” How have you been able to maintain a fairly upbeat attitude, given that this is the world that your companies have to deal with?
I agree with you that one of the biggest problems that we see, and which we joke about, is that the only reason why people in Silicon Valley 10 years ago were going to Washington was to apologize for the things that they did. They would get hauled in front of Congress, say they're sorry, and so I think what we've seen in these sectors, in particular, is it's a specific type of founder and person who knows that this is very mission-driven. They are called to build these companies. They care about these companies. They're passionate about the national interest. And so they know they have to go to Washington repeatedly, and I think some of the mistakes that, say, founders who had no exposure to Washington, or have no exposure to regulated industries, when they would go to Washington, they'd say, okay, maybe I go once a year, shake some hands, it's kind of fun, and then I go back and I build, and they would be surprised when they got nowhere. And of course, I think that the most sophisticated companies recognize that they have to learn to play the game that Washington cares about. And there is a totally different culture in Washington, there's a totally different set of incentives. I say it's really the difference between, Silicon Valley is a positive-sum culture: Everyone helps everyone, knowing that the pie can always get bigger, and you always want a piece of that bigger pie as it's growing, and so the more things that you're doing, the better. It's why we have this beautiful angel investing network. It's why we have all of these things that make no sense to people in Washington where it's elections, where 10,000 votes in a state could decide the election, and it's a zero-sum game, and that is what decides who is in office and who is in think tanks. And so it's a very different way of thinking about things.
The thing that I think has changed the most about Silicon Valley is recognizing, we might not be good at zero-sum games and zero-sum thinking, but that is the people that we are interfacing with, and we need to understand their incentive systems when they decide to make a purchasing decision, when they decide whether they're going to vote on a bill in a certain way, when they think about, what do their constituents care about back home in a place that has nothing to do with Silicon Valley or California. So I think that level of empathy for what Washington does, which is very different than what Silicon Valley does, is important.
Is it hard to stay optimistic? There are times where you're banging your head against the wall, we're on very short time horizons, Washington can go in perpetuity doing what it does without necessarily seeing much change. But having those points of connection, and constantly having the conversation, and recognizing that it is a long game and not a short game, I think has been very beneficial, and now there are success stories: Palantir, Anduril, Shield AI, these companies that have been around for 10 years now, that have really shown that it is possible to do good work and to support the needs of the DoD, and to speak the language of the DoD, as well, I think has really led to this next generation of founders understanding what they need to do to be successful as well.
Building the American Dream (24:35)
What kind of world are you trying to create? I'm sure it's intellectually challenging, I'm sure it's well-paying, but, fundamentally, why are you doing this? And I would think it's to create some world that is better than the one we're currently living. What is the world you're trying to create?
I think there is a recognition post-Covid, in particular, for a lot of young people, a lot of engineers, that things were broken, things are broken in this country. The physical world has not kept up with the digital world, and there's been extraordinary changes, technology is moving as fast as it possibly can, and a lot of the things that people care the most about have been left out of that story: Education, which is something we haven't necessarily talked about yet, but education needs to be completely transformed in an era where technology is at our fingertips and where people who are good at learning learn faster than they ever possibly could, and people who are not good at learning don’t, and so you have a disparity between those people.
But there's an extraordinary amount of change that has happened in the last 25 years where the things that American citizens care most about have not changed in the way that they need to keep up with, again, the changes in the consumer internet and what we've seen in the enterprise.
And so the story of, how do we make America strong? How do we continue to be the most dynamic country in the world? How do we make sure that all American citizens and the things they care about most in terms of the American Dream are part of that story? I think that is something that the founders who work in American Dynamism care deeply about. They recognize, and I always point this out, but there are so many founders now who are working at companies like Anduril, like Saronic, where they don't necessarily even remember September 11th — they weren't old enough — but they care deeply about the idea that America needs to be a strong country, and that we need to have a mode of deterrence, and we need to have a strong national defense that keeps America the most dynamic country so that people can build inside of it. The same thing with recognizing that there needs to be changes in housing, needs to be changes in education, these are things that were part of the American Dream when our parents were growing up and feel a little bit distant for a lot of other young people growing up today. So I think there is a recognition that technology has to be a part of those big sectors in order to support the American Dream that many of us grew up with and that many of us aspire to.
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In our highly globalized economy, exogenous shocks and unsettling headlines are everywhere. It makes sense that market forecasters should be biting their nails, but so often their prophecies of doom prove completely false. Philipp Carlsson-Szlezak is a proponent of “rational optimism.” He believes there’s a calmer, more measured way of going about financial and economic analysis that sets us up to be more flexible to the highs and lows of the economic events. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Carlsson-Szlezak about why an overreliance on models — and a tendency to assume the worst — can impair our ability to roll with unexpected events and make the best of them.
Carlsson-Szlezak is the global chief economist at Boston Consulting Group, and leads the Center for Macroeconomics at their Henderson Institute. He is the co-author of the new book, Shocks, Crises and False Alarms: How to Assess True Macroeconomic Risk.
In This Episode
* Optimism during a polycrisis (1:39)
* AI employment panic (7:47)
* Risk-assessment strategy (13:08)
* Federal Reserve predictions (19:44)
* Impending shocks? (23:41)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
Pethokoukis: Philipp, welcome to the podcast.
Carlsson-Szlezak: Thanks for having me.
Optimism during a polycrisis (1:39)
It seems as if there are multiple challenges facing the world and the global economy simultaneously. People described it as a “polycrisis,” and it could be everything from trying to navigate economies to a soft landing after a bout of inflation; part of it, I guess, is the big rise in debt; we have war in Europe; maybe, eventually, war in Asia over Taiwan; and, of course, climate change; aging population; falling birth rates; and some people seem to view AI as more of a threat than a positive, it's going to take jobs, and perhaps other bad things. If I've given a sensible description of the world, how can one be a “rational optimist” in a world of polycrisis?
Just taking maybe two of your examples: The soft landing that was supposed to be impossible, remember that? We need, what was it, six percent unemployment for how many years to bring inflation down? So clearly that didn't pan out like the pessimists said. Or think about the war in Ukraine that you mentioned, which, of course, is the tragedy, but the fact is that there is no recession in the Eurozone so far. The fact is that industrial production has held up rather well, even in the heartland of industrial production in Germany. So real industrial output is actually remarkably resilient. Overall, there's little doubt that there are many, many risks. There are crises, but, more often than not, we're focusing on the tail ends of the distribution and pretend that those risks are at the very center of the risk distribution.
It sort of reminds me — it's not a perfect analogy — of where we were in the early 1990s. I suppose you can always point to, and maybe this is part of your point, if you want to focus on bad news, the world will give you plenty of bad news to focus on. But I remember at the beginning of the 1990s, very bad recession here in the United States, a lot of concerns about the ability for rich economies to grow quickly. Again, debt was an issue, and though, looking back, it may seem like, wow, people should have been really excited: end of the Cold War, there was a lot of uncertainty what would happen to the former Soviet Union, a lot of talk back then about suitcase nukes, who knew what was going to happen in the world? And of course, all of this kind of concern and uncertainty led right into a big economic boom.
So to kind of get back to what you were saying, it seems to me that, rather than being rational optimists, we’re sort of naturally irrational pessimists.
Yeah, but we shouldn't be. I think your example of the ’90s and what the mid- and late ’90s delivered, I think is not a bad analogy for what I think will play out in the 2020s, the rest of the decade. We're in an “era of tightness,” is what we call it in the book, which is really a structural condition of the labor market. Lots of people think that shortages in the labor market are a byproduct of Covid, but that's not true. The labor market turned tight already in 2017, so, in technical language, that's when unemployment dropped below U*. Covid was an interruption of this tightness. Unemployment went to almost 15 percent, and then it came down just as fast, but we are in this era of tightness, and I think it will persist.
To be clear, even if and when you get another recession, you will return to a tight stance. And there are a lot of silver linings that come with eras of tightness: It translates into better real wage growth, it nudges and forces firms do capital-for-labor substitution, it pushes them towards the technological frontier in their respective areas, and all of that should lead into some boost of productivity growth. I'm not of the kind where we're predicting this big jump in productivity growth, I think that's too hyped, but I do believe that the structural tightness, which is almost like a spark to the fuel of technology, I think that will push gradually and measurably over the years to come.
And the driving forces of that tightness are what?
We have a number of things going. Essentially, you had a mismatch of demand of supply already in the late ’10s, as I described, so there's a supply issue, we don't have enough labor supply. You have certain forces on the demographic side that constrained that. And I think often we hear the story that AI is going to produce so much unemployment that there will be mass unemployment, and I don't believe any of this. I think that will play out very differently. Historically, technology has never given us structural or technological unemployment. On the contrary, technology is the deflationary force in the medium- and long-run. Firms that can deliver cost savings, they can lower prices, they will do so to grab market share. That is a real income boost for consumers. So when their real incomes grow, they redeploy that gained real income to new services, new goods purchase and consumption, and that leads to new employment. And so I think, essentially, you will remain with a story where labor is tight, and that is the defining underpinnings of what's coming.
Today people don't remember that even in the 2010s, I think it was Bill Gates, he wanted a robo-tax, a robot tax. Because why? Because automation was taking over the assembly lines and we're going to have to provide for all these people who are going to lose their jobs! Well, where are we today? Near record-low unemployment. And this is in a line of a long tradition where Nobel Prize winners, and technologists, and politicians, they've all predicted technological unemployment.
AI employment panic (7:47)
I wanted to talk a bit about AI labor, since you brought it up. If you don't think mass-unemployment is a valid concern, could there be other downsides from deployment of generative AI in an economy? Could it be, instead of higher employment, might it just be greater inequality? Maybe, before, we had technology hurting blue-collar workers; certainly there's a lot of white collars worried about it. I was just reading a story in the New York Times — all of these people in Hollywood are just terrified, whether they're doing special effects, or they're sound editors, they're all terrified that their white-collar jobs are going away. So do you see, in the near term, any downside from AI?
In macro there's always this tension between the aggregate, which is what macroeconomics is about, and then the distribution of experiences under the hood of macro, if you will. So there will be winners and losers, and there will be those that are harder hit than others, but I think when you look at the aggregate, you add it all up the net-net, I don't anticipate this being a structural or technological unemployment situation.
To go to the micro level, you can take the other side of that argument, too. This is not a big area of research for me, so I'm straying outside of my field of expertise here, but plenty of people have argued that perhaps AI will give a lift to those least-skilled. Why? Because AI is a companion for them that makes them more productive and allows them to create more value, and therefore to be paid better. So I think the jury is out on that.
I don't anticipate a smooth ride where everyone will be a winner and everything will be just plain sailing. Of course this is disruptive, of course there will be gyrations, but the story about technological unemployment's been told for so long. Today people don't remember that even in the 2010s, I think it was Bill Gates, he wanted a robo-tax, a robot tax. Because why? Because automation was taking over the assembly lines and we're going to have to provide for all these people who are going to lose their jobs!
Well, where are we today? Near record-low unemployment. And this is in a line of a long tradition where Nobel Prize winners, and technologists, and politicians, they've all predicted technological unemployment.
There's a nice story with Wassily Leontief, a Nobel Prize winner in economics. He said in the ’70s that human labor was going to go the way of the horse after the introduction of the automobile. Well, 50 years on, we're here with very tight labor markets. And Kennedy was worried about it, too, and others before him. And so I think we have to point to something that's truly different about AI to tell that story. I think we can potentially find some reasons that are genuinely different about AI, but before we all become hysterical about it, I think we should take a deep breath.
Does it strike you as odd that, in a world of low unemployment and, if you're correct, perhaps a longer-term structural tightness, that it's at this moment that people are very worried about technological unemployment, it's at this very moment that they're very worried about immigration coming in and taking jobs. You would think these would be concerns at periods of very high unemployment: people standing in line around the block to get a job, but that's not where we're at. Yet the public mood seems to not be in sync with that.
I think that's a good observation, I don't have a great explanation for it. The technology that's on display is impressive, it is novel, and what's different, generally, is that it makes a credible promise to impact the service economy. In our book, the way we position the slump of productivity growth has little to do with high debt and all those explanations that are occasionally fashionable. It has a lot to do with the fact that the US economy transitioned from being a physical economy to a service economy. And in the physical economy, the production of goods, you always had pretty respectable productivity growth, including the last few decades. But because of this mix shift into services where you did not have the technology to make progress on the productivity side, this mix shift dragged down aggregate productivity growth. If you have zero or very little productivity growth in services, which is like 65, 70 percent of the economy, and you have very high productivity growth and the part that is 30 or 35 percent of the economy, well the blended average is going to be low. And so, as we now have productivity growth promises from AI and services, I think a lot can change there. Again, not in a step change way, this is not like flipping a switch, it's going to be hard slog, and incremental, and cumulative, but something will happen there.
There's plenty of risk out there. New crises will come and happen, but for every true crisis, there are many false alarms, and that is something that I think we need to internalize more, and that is something that can help us see risk a little more calmly and in a measured way.
Risk-assessment strategy (13:08)
Just to take a quick step back: Describe your process for assessing risk. Where do you begin? What are the factors? Do you have a fundamental baseline model of the way the world works? How does that process start and work for you?
The way we go about risk in the book is to say macroeconomic risk should be viewed both as the downside, which is how we commonly view risk, like a recession, or even a structural downside like a deflationary depression — these are downsides. But for practitioners, risk is also hidden in potential upside if you miss out on it. And both the downside and the upside, they come in two flavors: tactical, short-term stuff, cyclical stuff; and the more structural strategic kind, like shifts that happen over longer periods of time. And so we like to think of macro risk in those four flavors: the short, the long term, and the upside and the downside, if you will
Generally when we look at risk, it's very seductive and tempting to focus on bad outcomes and then start analyzing how bad will it be and how quickly they're going to happen. In most situations, it pays off to take a step back, and take a deep breath, and say, “Well, how is the system constructed? What are the drivers? What is the history of this thing?” and an important question, “What would it take to get that outcome from the edges of the risk distribution? What does it take to get there?” Too often in public discourse, we jump straight to the tails of the risk distribution. We're immediately obsessing with the cliff edge and the fall into economic death, and then we're pretending that that risk outcome, which is part of the distribution, so we can't ignore it, but we're pretending that the edges of the distribution are the very center.
And so what we do in the book for a number of areas of risk in the real economy, the financial economy, and the global economy, we go over and over again into these approaches of asking, “How is this thing constructed? What are the drivers? What do you have to believe for the truly bad outcome?” There's plenty of risk out there. New crises will come and happen, but for every true crisis, there are many false alarms, and that is something that I think we need to internalize more, and that is something that can help us see risk a little more calmly and in a measured way.
How well did markets, investors, economists — how well was their risk-assessment process in 2020, given where we are today? My guess is that the global economy is better in 2024 than people thought in February, or March, or April of 2020 as the pandemic was kicking in. Did we do a good job assessing risk and reward back then?
No. Public discourse did a terrible job at that. The conventional wisdom and received wisdom in March and April, May, even June, July, and even August, the summer, when you had the first signs of recovery, the conventional wisdom was: This is worse than 2008, and this could be as bad as the Great Depression. And we have a great collection of headlines that we keep, there are lots of them in the book as well. It was, in my mind, a prediction failure. Why? Because what happens is that a lot of the commentary, a lot of the thinking, was too model-based, what we call “master-model mentality” in the book.
So how do you project a recovery, typically? You look at the unemployment rate as a proxy for the health of the economy, and if you have a high unemployment rate and a recession, well, it can take a long time to bring that down. After 2008, it took the better part of the 2010s to bring unemployment down, and you had “only” (in quotation marks) unemployment of 10 percent after the Global Financial Crisis. Now with Covid, you almost went to 15 percent. So the models extrapolated outside their empirical range. They said, “Well, if it took almost a decade to bring down this unemployment rate after 10 percent unemployment, then after 15 percent unemployment, well it's going to take even longer.” Hence, the narrative of “worse than 2008,” “as bad as the 1930s,” and blah, blah, blah.
Even at the time, you could ask exactly these questions, and I'm not saying this with hindsight bias. We did a piece on March 28th, 2020 in Harvard Business Review where we did exactly that thought experiment. We said, “What does it take for this to be a structural downgrade for the US economy? What does it take for to be worse than 2008?” You're going to need to see damage on the supply side of the economy. You're going to need to see the downgrading of the labor market of a window of capital investment that isn't happening, and the loss of skills, et cetera. And we asked, “Well, how likely is that?” And, of course, it comes down to stimulus. Of course it does, and it comes down to how innovative, fast, and big are we in backstopping the real economy? And we were. And so even in March — and this is shelter-in-place phase, right? This is not even sort of the full lockdown. Even then, you could ask sober questions about very bad risks. And if you did that, you arrived at answers that weren't predictive in “this will happen” at a point forecast level of accuracy. But there was clearly a path and a narrative in March 2020 that was consistent with what actually happened: the tightest recovery on record, and a US economy that was not pushed off its trend path. So after 2008, the US economy was actually pushed off its prior trend path, never made it back in terms of what the trend was, did make it back in terms of growth rates after 2008, but it never made this levels recovery in that sense. All of that was avoided in 2020, and you didn't have to be a magician to at least entertain the possibility that that was a meaningful part of the outcome distribution.
Federal Reserve predictions (19:44)
Speaking of models, how has the Fed's model performed? Which is another way of saying, how has the Fed performed, and continues to perform?
In the recent inflation surge, et cetera? I think the Fed has taken too much flak for what happened in the inflation spike. The inflation spike, by the way, again, was immediately spun into a structural inflection point, the 1970s narrative, off to the races, wage price spirals, all that nonsense. It was an idiosyncratic mismatch of demand and supply. It was an overshoot in consumption following stimulus, and you had the supply chain crunch, and then you had a number of exogenous shocks that nobody could foresee, and those who like to take credit for having predicted the spike, they didn't foresee the Ukraine war, the shock in oil that followed, and many other of the things that played into the spike. The bigger story, though, is quite simply that, as this mismatch of demand and supply unwound, inflation also came down pretty fast.
Now, back to the Fed: Yes, there were slow in responding. Would it have been better for them to go early, perhaps, yes, let's say yes. But at the same time, the idea that they would fail to step up and act, and reign this in, and stand by and watch this whole thing go to hell. I mean that was never credible. And they did step up, and they did what they had to do, and I think also attempting the soft landing was the right thing. People at the time did say, “We need a draconian recession right now to remove all the risk of a regime break in inflation!” Well, you would've cut short a really tight labor market that has a lot of real wage gain that delivers a lot of good things for particularly the bottom of the labor market. So it was the right call to attempt a soft landing rather than saying, “Look, we're going to cut this cycle short right now to remove any risk of inflation spiraling out of control.” They did the right thing. They're successful at it. The soft landing is a success. We're well into it. And so I give them more credit.
Is that what you think is the biggest mistake people are making, that they're still asking, “What about the soft landing?” And what you're saying is, “We're already into it. You sort of missed it. It happened. You're still looking for it.”
Every so often you still see the headline, “Are we going to get a soft landing?” And I'm like, “Well, let's just take a step back.” What is a soft landing? The task was to cool down the labor market, best seen through the eyes of job openings, to cool that down without pushing up the unemployment rate. These two are mirror images of each other. When firms stop hiring, they usually also start firing, so we had to pull off this trick: You stop hiring, but you don't start firing.
That was the soft landing. That's the definition of a soft landing, nothing else. And that is what happened: Job openings are down more than three-and-a-half million or so — don't nail me on the decimal — and the unemployment rate is up a little, but, as you and I know, the unemployment rate is not up because of firings. The unemployment rate is up for compositional and participation reasons. So if that is not a soft landing, at least, I would call it the second of three stages, if you will, I don't know what it is. And back to the topic of headlines, most of them are just confusing people more than they're helping them. It's always nice to write something clickbaity that people will be scared of and think this is the cliff edge. How about a headline: “Wow, this is a really great soft landing! This is remarkably good!” Why don't we acknowledge that for a moment?
You can always speculate. You can speculate on, for example, exogenous shocks. Covid is an exogenous shock, and there are others: There are solar flares, and there are new pandemics, and there are things that can do immediate damage, and you can spend millions of dollars on models, and they simply won't capture that exogenous risk.
Impending shocks? (23:41)
Yeah, I mean, the name of the book is Shocks, Crises and False Alarms. As I look over the rest of this decade, if you take the most bullish and extravagant predictions about AI, it’s not clear to me what the economy looks like a decade from now. Again, if you take the most bullish kind of [view]: we get the human-level AI and all that. So there's that.
I also am not quite sure what the world looks like if some of these worst-case scenarios with Taiwan, and the US, and China, because that seems to me to be so potentially bad, I don't want to think about it. I don't know what the global economy looks like on the other side.
What are the big risks, or the things which you believe pose the greatest risk of disruption? Disruptions are going to be good and bad. If you're really worried about AI, that must mean AI is very powerful, it can do a lot of good things, too. So what out there do you really worry about that the disruption will be just bad and have far more downside?
You can always speculate. You can speculate on, for example, exogenous shocks. Covid is an exogenous shock, and there are others: There are solar flares, and there are new pandemics, and there are things that can do immediate damage, and you can spend millions of dollars on models, and they simply won't capture that exogenous risk. So that's one story.
Geopolitics, since you mentioned it, a third of the book, roughly, the third part is about those types of risks, and they can be devastating, there's no doubt about it; but would you build a central case around this and make that the base case and expectation of how to view the future? Geopolitics is extremely treacherous when it comes to translating its impact on the economy. It's fascinating to me often how little the complexity is acknowledged and understood, and, in the book, we use an example juxtaposing a start of World War I and World War II.
So when World War I breaks out, the Dow is down 10 percent, they close it for 136 days, and when they reopen it, it's down another 20 percent. Exactly as you would expect, right? It makes a lot of sense, a world war and the market's in the gutter. Yet, when World War II breaks out in ’39, the market jumps 10 percent and stays up. Why? It ends the Great Depression, it puts to use labor, it has capital expenditure and investment, and it singlehandedly ends a decade of malaise.
And there is a silver lining to this, and all of this doesn't sit well with how we want to think and should also think about geopolitics, which is in humanitarian terms, and also values and idealistic views. All of this is true and correct, but if we are to assess the impact on the economy, we are going to have to restrain some of these instincts, and we're going to have to say, what are the transmission channels from geopolitics to the real economy, to the financial economy, and to the institutions that we have in place that govern our economy? What are those transmission channels? And often, the bar is higher than you think.
Just think about it, the Ukraine war. It's left no mark on the US economy at all, virtually. Why? Because the real linkages weren't there; virtually no trade into this part of the world, either Ukraine or Russia. The financial linkages weren't really there; it's not like balance sheets of US banks were impaired by shutting off that part of the world. And on the institutional side, we can discuss sanctions, and we can discuss using the US dollar as a means of punishing Russia, and all that. But essentially, once you think soberly about, well, how is that shock supposed to transmit to the economy? Well, it looks a lot different.
The same could be said about the tragedy in the Middle East. The oil price is lower than before the attack on Israel, right? If you look at futures and forward pricing, or the price of insurance against swings in the oil price, it’s lower today than before the attack on Israel and before the retaliation that Israel enacted. So any of these geopolitical risks and hotspots, they are to be taken seriously. I'm not saying they don't matter, but when we extrapolate from them straight to the economy, it more often goes wrong than it goes right.
And a final thought: I’m not a Taiwan and China watcher, but one thing that's also clear to me, since you mentioned the unthinkable and the worst-case scenario, my next question would be, okay, what shape would that take? Would that be a blockade? Would that be an actual invasion? Would it be something that involves airlifting semiconductors out of the island? Would that be . . . There's a myriad ways of how such a thing could play out. It'd be a big shock, and terrible, but I can't say with confidence what it would do linearly to an economy like the US economy. It would come down to the details of that.
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In a world of Artificial General Intelligence, machines would be able to match, and even exceed, human cognitive abilities. AGI might still be science fiction, but Séb Krier sees this technology as not only possible, but inevitable. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I chat with Krier about how our public policy should facilitate AGI’s arrival and flourishing.
Krier is an AI policy expert, adviser, and attorney. He currently works in policy development and strategy at Google DeepMind. He previously served as Head of Regulation for the UK Government’s Office for Artificial Intelligence and was a Senior Tech Policy Researcher at Stanford’s Cyber Policy Center.
In This Episode
* The AGI vision (1:24)
* The risk conversation (5:15)
* Policy strategy (11:25)
* AGI: “if” or “when”? (15:44)
* AI and national security (18:21)
* Chatbot advice (20:15)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
Pethokoukis: Séb, welcome to the podcast.
Krier: Thank you. Great to be here.
The AGI vision (1:24)
Let's start with a bit of context that may influence the rest of the conversation. What is the vision or image of the future regarding AI — you can define it as machine learning or generative AI — that excites you, that gets you going in the day, that you feel like you're part of something important? What is that vision?
I think that's a great question. In my mind, I think AI has been going on for quite a long time, but I think the aim has always been artificial general intelligence. And in a sense, I think of this as a huge deal, and the vision I have for the future is being able to have a very, very large supply of cognitive resources that you can allocate to quite a wide range of different problems, whether that's energy, healthcare, governance, there's many, many ways in which this technology can be applied as a general purpose technology. And so I guess my vision is seeing that being used to solve quite a wide range of problems that humans have had for decades, centuries, millennia. And I think you could go into so many different directions with that, whether it's curing diseases, or optimizing energy grids, and more. But I think, broadly, that’s the way I think about it. So the objective, in a sense, is safe AGI [Artificial General Intelligence], and from that I think it can go even further. And I think in many ways, this can be hugely beneficial to science, R&D, and humanity as a whole. But of course, that also comes with ways in which this could be misused, or accidents, and so on. And so huge emphasis on the safe development of AGI.
So you're viewing it as a tool, as a way to apply intelligence across a variety of fields, a variety of problems, to solve those problems, and of course, the word in there doing a lot of lifting is “safely.” Given the discussion over the past 18 months about that word, “safely,” is, one, I think someone who maybe only pays passing attention to this issue might think that it's almost impossible to do it safely without jeopardizing all those upside benefits, but you're confident that those two things can ultimately be in harmony?
Yeah, absolutely, otherwise I wouldn't be necessarily working on an AGI policy. So I think I'm very confident this can be done well. I think it also depends what we mean by “safety” and what kind of safety we have in mind. Any technology, we will have costs and trade-offs, but of course the upside here is enormous, and, in my mind, very much outweighs potential downsides.
However, I think for certain risks, things like potentially catastrophic risks and so on, there is an argument in treading some careful path and making sure this is done scientifically with a scientific method in mind, and doing that well. But I don't think there's fundamentally a necessary tension, and I think, in fact, what many people sometimes underestimate is how AI itself, as a technology, will be helpful in mitigating a lot of the risks we're foreseeing and thinking about. There's obviously ways in which AI can be used for cyber offense, but many ways in which you can also use that for defense, for example. I'm cautiously optimistic about how this can be developed and used in the long run
The risk conversation (5:15)
Since these large language models and chatbots were rolled out to public awareness in late 2022, has the safety regulatory debate changed in any way? It seems to me that there was a lot of talk early on about these existential risks. Now I seem to hearing less about that and more about issues about, maybe it's disinformation or bias. From your perspective, has that debate changed and has it changed for the better, or worse?
I think it has evolved quite a lot over the past — I've been working in AI policy since 2017 and there's been different phases, and at first a lot of skepticism around AI even being useful, or hype, and so on, and then seeing more and more of what these general models could do, and I think, initially, a lot of the concerns were around things like bias, and discrimination, and errors. So even things like, early-on, facial-recognition technologies were very problematic in many ways: not just ways in which they were applied, but they would be prone to a lot of errors and biases that could be unfair, whereas they're much better now, and therefore the concern now is more on misuse than it accidentally misidentifying someone, I would say. So I think, in that sense, these things have changed. And then a lot of the discourse around existential risk and so on, there was a bit of a peak a bit last year, and then this switched a bit towards more catastrophic risks and misuse.
There's a few different things. Broadly, I think it's good that these risks are taken seriously. So, in some sense, I'm happy that these have taken more space, in a way, but I think there's also been a lot of alarmism and unnecessary doomerism, of crying wolf a little bit too early. I think what happens is that sometimes people also conflate a capability of a system and how that fits within a wider risk or threat model, or something; and the latter is often under-defined, and there's a tendency for people to often see the worst in technology, particularly in certain regions of the world, so I think sometimes a lot has been a little bit exaggerated or overhyped.
But, having said that, I think it’s very good there's lots of research going on on the many ways in which this could potentially be harmful, certainly on the research side, the evaluation side, there’s a lot of great work. We've published some papers on sociotechnical evaluations, dangerous capabilities, and so on. All of that is great, but I think there has also been some more polarized parts calling for excessive measures, whether regulatory, or pausing AI, and so on, that I think have been a little bit too trigger-happy. So I'm less happy about these bits, but there's been a lot of good as well.
And much of the debate about policy has been about the right sort of policy to prevent bad things from happening. How should we think about policy that maximizes the odds of good things happening? What should policymakers do to help promote AI to reshape science, to help promote AI diffusing as efficiently as possible throughout an economy? How do we optimize the upside through policy rather than just focusing on making sure the bad things don't happen?
I think the very first thing is not having rushed regulation. I'm not personally a huge fan of the Precautionary Principle, and I think that, very often, regulations can cause quite a lot of harm downstream, and they're very sticky, hard to remove.
The other thing that you can do beyond avoiding bad policy is I think a lot of the levers to making sure that the development goes well aren't necessarily all directly AI-related. So it'll be things like immigration: attracting a lot of talent, for example, I think will be very important, so immigration is a big one. Power and energy: you want there to be a lot more — I'm a big fan of nuclear, so I think that kind of thing is also very helpful in terms of the expected needs for AI development in the future. And then there are certain things governments could potentially do with some narrow domains like Advance Market Commitments, for example, although that's not a panacea.
Commitments to do what?
Oh, Advance Market Commitments like pull mechanisms to create a market for a particular solution. So like Operation Warp Speed, but you could have an AI equivalent for certain applications, but of course there's a lot of parameters in doing that well, and I wouldn't want a large industrial-policy-type approach to AI. But I think generally it's around ensuring that all the enablers, all the different ingredients and factors of a rich research and development ecosystem continue to thrive. And so I think, to a large extent, avoiding bad regulation and ensuring that a lot of things like energy, immigration, and so on go well is already a huge part of the battle.
How serious of a potential bottleneck is the energy issue? It seems to me like it's a serious issue that's coming fast, but the solutions seem like they'll take more time, and I'm worried about the mismatch between the problem and finding a solution to the problem.
I suspect that, over the coming years, we will see more and more of these AI systems being increasingly useful, capable, and then integrated into economic systems, and I think as you start seeing these benefits more and more, I think it'll be easier to make the case for why you need to solve some of these kind of policy issues a bit faster.
And I also think these solutions aren't that difficult, ultimately. So I think there’s a lot that can be done around nuclear, and wind, and solar, and so on, and many regulatory processes that could be simplified, and accelerated, and improved to avoid the vetocracy system we're in at the moment. So I don't think the solutions are that difficult, I think mustering the political will might be right now, but I expect that to be less of a challenge in the coming years with AI showing more and more promise, I think.
Policy strategy (11:25)
Speaking of vetocracy, whatever the exact substance of the regulation, I am concerned, at least in the United States, that we have 50 states, and perhaps even more bodies if you look at cities, who all have a lot of ideas about AI regulation, and I'm extremely concerned that that sort of fractured policy landscape will create a bottleneck.
Can we get to where we need to go if that's the regulatory environment we are looking at, at least in the United States? And does, ultimately, there need to be a federal . . . I think the technical word is “preemption” of all those efforts? So there's a federal approach, and there aren't a federal approach, plus a 50-state approach, plus a 175-city approach to regulation. Because if it's going to be what I just described, that seems like a very difficult environment to deal with.
I'm not wildly optimistic around a patchwork of different state-level regulatory systems. I think that will come with various externalities, you'll have distortionary effects. It will be a very difficult environment, from a commercial perspective, to operate in smoothly. I think I'm a lot more open to something at a federal level at some point, rather than a big patchwork of city-level or state-level regulation. Now, it depends on exactly what we're talking about. There might be specific domain, and context, and application-specific regulations that might make sense in some state and not another, but in general, from a first principles level at least, I think that would probably not be desirable.
A second regulatory concern — and maybe this is dissipating as policy makers learn more, especially at the federal level, maybe, learn more about AI — is that, at least initially, it seems to me that whatever your policy idea was for social media, or about content moderation or what have you, you just kind of took that policy framework and applied it to AI because that was what you had. You pulled that baby right off the shelf. Are we still seeing that, or are people beginning to think, “This is its own thing, and my ideas for social media may be fine for social media, but I need to think differently about AI”? Obviously the technology is different; also, I think both the risks and potential rewards are very different.
Yeah, totally. I think that has been an issue. Now, I wouldn't say that's the case for everyone. There's been some groups and some institutions doing some very careful work that really think about AI, and AGI, and so on in careful, more calibrated ways; but also I’ve seen quite a lot of reports where you could have easily imagined the same text being about social media platforms, or some kind of other policy issue, or blockchain, or something just being repurposed for AI. And there's a lot of stuff out there that's just very high level, and it's hard to disagree with at a high level, but it’s far harder to apply and look at from an operational or practical perspective.
So I've been seeing quite a lot of that; however, I think over time, the field is maturing more and more, and you're seeing better thinking around AI, what it really is, what's appropriate at the model level versus at the application level and the existing landscape of laws and regulation and how these might apply as well, which is often that's something that's forgotten, or you have lots of academics coming in and just trying to re-regulate everything from first principles, and then you're like, “Well, there's tort law, and there's this and that over there.” You got to do your gap analysis first before coming out with all this stuff.
But I think we are seeing the field of AI governance and policy maturing in that space, and I expect it to continue, but I still, of course, see a lot of bad heuristics and poor thinking here, and particularly an underestimation of the benefits of AI and AGI. I think there's a tendency to always think of the worst for everything, and it's necessary, you need to do that too, but few are really internalizing how significant AGI would be for growth, for welfare, and for solving a lot of the issues that we've been talking about in the first place.
The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were Promised
AGI: “if” or “when”? (15:44)
Is AGI an “if” issue, or is it a “when” issue, and if it's a “when,” when? And I say this with the caveat that predictions are difficult, especially about the future.
In my mind, it's definitely a “when” question. I see no real strong reason why it would be an “if,” and that being completely impossible. And there's been many, many, many examples over the last 10 years of people saying, “Well, this is not possible with neural networks,” and then 10 minutes later, it is proven to be possible. So that's a recurring theme, and that may not be sufficient to think that AGI is feasible and possible, but I'm pretty confident for a variety of reasons. About AGI, by the way, I think there's an excellent paper by Morris and others on Levels of AGI [for] Operationalizing Progress on the Path of AGI, and I think it's a very good paper to [frame one’s thinking about AGI].
And that goes back to one point I made earlier in that, at some point, you'll have systems that will be capable of quite a lot of things and can do probably anything that your average human can do, starting at least virtually, remotely, to start with, and eventually to the physical world, but I think they'll be capable in that sense. Now, there's a difference between these systems being capable in an individual lab setting or something and then them being actually deployed and used in industrial processes, commercial applications, in ways that are productive, add value, create profits, and so on, and I think there's a bit of a gap here. So I don't think we'll have a day where we'll wake up and say, “Oh, that's it, today we have AGI.” I think it'll be more of a kind of blurry spectrum, but gradually I think it'll be harder and harder people to deny that we have reached AGI, and as this stuff gets integrated into production systems, I think the effects on growth and the economy will speak for themselves.
As to when exactly, I would think that, at least the capabilities, I would expect that in the next five years you could easily see a point where people could make a very confident claim that, yeah, we've got systems now that are AGI-level. They’re generally capable, and they are pretty competent, or even expert-level to at least 90th percentile of skilled adults, and then the challenge will be then operationalizing that and integrating that into a lot of systems. But in my mind, it's definitely not an “if,” and I would say the next five to 10 years is the kind of relevant period I have in mind, at least. It could be longer, and I think the tech community has a tendency to sometimes over-index, particularly on the R&D side.
AI and national security (18:21)
Do you have any thoughts, and maybe you don't have any thoughts, about the notion that, as perhaps AGI seems closer, and maybe the geopolitical race intensifies, that this becomes more of a national security issue, and the government takes a greater role, and maybe the government makes itself a not-so-silent partner with tech companies, and it really becomes almost like a Manhattan Project kind of deal to get there first. Leopold Aschenbrenner wrote this very long, very long paper — is that an issue that you have any thoughts on? Is it something that you discuss, or does it seem just science fictional to you?
Yeah, I do do a lot of thinking on that, and I've read Leopold’s report, and I think there's a lot of good things in there. I don't necessarily agree with everything. I think things like security are really critical, I think thinking about things like alignment, and so on, is important. One thing I really agree with with Leopold’s report that I'm glad he emphasized was the need to secure and cement liberal democracy, “the free world must prevail” kind of thing. I think that is indeed true, and people tend to underestimate the implication on that front. Now, what that looks like, what that means and requires in practice is not fully clear to me yet. I think people talk about a Manhattan Project, but there are many other potential blueprints or ways to think about that. There could be just normal procurement partnerships, there could be different models for this. At some point, something like that could be defensible, but it's very hard to predict that in advance, given particularly. . . well, how hard it is to predict anything with AI to start with. And secondly, there's loads of trade-offs with all these different options, and some might be a lot better than others, so I think certainly more work might be needed there. But, in principle, the idea doesn't seem completely crazy or science fiction to me.
Chatbot advice (20:15)
You recently posted on X that you were baffled at how many people don't use these language models or chatbots daily. I think a lot of people don't know what they would use them for. Do you have any recommendations for ways that people who are not in your line, who are not coders, that people can use them? Do you use them in ways that are applicable to the way regular people might use them?
Yeah, I think so, and under the post, I gave a few examples of how I use it. Now admittedly, most of these wouldn't be something that anyone would do, but I thought about this last weekend when I was seeing my parents and I was trying to get them to understand what Claude or Gemini is and how to think about it, what kind of questions are worth asking, and what kind of questions are not worth asking, and it's very hard to come up with a very crisp way of sharing these intuitions. I think the first piece of advice I'd give is probably to just take one of these models and have a very long conversation with it about some sort of topic, like try to poke holes, try to contradict, and I think that starts giving you maybe a few better intuitions about what this can do, as opposed to just treating it as some sort of question-and-answer Oracle-type search engine, which I think is not the right use case.
That is probably the most unsatisfying way to look at it, and just treat it as a better Google search engine. I mean really that sort of conversational, curious aspect, rather than saying like, “Find me a link.” “Find me a link” isn't a great use.
Exactly, and people will often do that. We'll do a thing, we'll get some incorrect answer, or hallucination, or whatever, and then we'll say, “Oh, these things are not good, they're not accurate,” and we'll stop using it, and to me, that is just crazy. It is very fundamentally incurious, and I think there's ways of using them and thinking of them that is very useful. So what have I done recently? I'm trying to think of an example. . .
I had some papers that I couldn't understand very well, and I would just ask it for better analogies, explanations, try to dig into certain concepts and ideas and just play around with them until the insights and intuitions were easier for me to internalize and understand. And I think you could do that at different levels, and regular people also want to understand things, so I think that might be potentially an example. But the very first thing I would do is simply long, protracted conversations to really get a sense of how far the model can really go, and then, as you do that, you'll find things that are a bit more creative than, “Can you please rewrite this email for me? Can you find typos?” or “Can you fill in my tax report?” or something. I think one way a friend used it — and of course, there are obvious limitations to that, get a lawyer and everything — but he had a legal contract that someone sent to him, and he couldn't afford a lawyer straight away, so he just said, “Can you help me find potential issues and errors in here? Here's who I am in this kind of contract. Here's what I'm concerned with.” And it's a first starting point. It can be useful. It gives you interesting insights. It doesn't mean it replaces a lawyer straight away, but it is one potential interesting way that everyday people could use.
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✈ A quick note: I will be traveling through the middle of the month and will be posting a bit less than usual and perhaps a bit shorter than usual.
These days, it seems that critics of capitalism are more prevalent and more vocal than ever. But Ruchir Sharma, author of What Went Wrong with Capitalism, argues that the free market never let us down; our government did. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, Sharma and I discuss the American addiction to “pain management” — unnecessary economic intervention aimed at dulling the effects of the natural ups and downs of a free market, and how it crippled American capitalism.
Sharma is chairman of Rockefeller International and the founder and chief investment officer of Breakout Capital. He previously served as head of emerging markets and chief global strategist at Morgan Stanley.
In This Episode
* Disillusionment (1:20)
* Economic booms (6:12)
* Pain management (8:49)
* Populist policy (14:38)
* Catalyzing change (17:32)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
Disillusionment (1:20)
Pethokoukis: In the book, you write with some concern about the declining faith in capitalism, really among all Americans, especially Democrats and the young. It may be worrisome, but is it really surprising, given we had a financial crisis . . . hard to believe it was, what, 14 years ago? 15? Well, I guess 16, 2008 . . . Financial crisis, slow recovery. So, for a lot of people, there's a pretty good chunk of their lives where the economy didn't seem to be really zipping along very quickly and making a big change in their lives, so if people are skeptical of capitalism, can you really blame them?
Sharma: Well, as I argue in the book, Jim, that the current system we have in place is very far from capitalism. It's a very distorted form of capitalism that we have in place, and the surprise, I think, has to be the fact that, at the headline level, the numbers from the American economy look pretty good, which are the fact that the economy is growing at above two percent, the stock market is booming, America is seen as the center of all the tech innovation, AI, and, compared to its major rivals such as Europe, America seems to be in a much better place. And I think that a lot of people in the Biden administration try to put that out, which is that, “What's the problem, given how well the American economy is doing?”
And I think that the polling data is obviously very different. It shows a persistent and consistent decline in faith in the American economy, that the voters and people have, and, as you pointed out at the outset, that a lot of young people, in fact, say that now they prefer socialism to capitalism. So I guess that's the surprise, which is the fact that, at the headline level, the numbers look fine, and especially when you compare it to other countries, and yet, if you look beneath the hood, both the numbers, in terms of polling numbers and then a deeper look at capitalism, which is what I've done in the book, reveal that something is wrong with the system. The general feeling that the average American has, that the system is almost rigged against them, and rigged in favor of Big Business.
Clearly one reason people are sort of unhappy is because we had a big surge of inflation, and, even though the rate of inflation has come down, prices are still a lot higher than they remember. But that seems to me to be a temporary aberration. As every day, and month, and year goes by, we'll be a little further from this inflation surge. And then you mentioned all those positive things: in every sort of emerging technology, America seems to be the leader. Is there really a deep problem that will be more or less solved on its own the further we get away from the pandemic and that pandemic-era economy?
Well, anything can happen, but I wouldn't bet on that because, as you said, that the decline in the faith in America's brand of capitalism and the number of people who feel that the country's moving in the wrong direction, all that data predates the pandemic. So it's not as if there was a surge in inflation and that suddenly changed people's thinking about the economy and they're feeling much worse off because their real wages got wiped out by inflation. This happened even before that. Through the last 10 or 20 years, you've seen a consistent decline in American faith in the economy, in American faith in government. So this is not just about the near-term inflation data, or even in terms of what's happened in the post-pandemic world, and to bet, therefore, that, with the passage of time, as the pandemic sort of becomes more and more of a distant memory that this is going to change. I think the problems are much deeper, and it shows up in the fact that, as I argue in the book, that economic and social mobility in America today is close to record lows. Only 35 percent of Americans feel today that they're going to be better off than their parents, and when the American Dream was really flowering, that number used to be 70 to 80 percent of people felt that they'd be better off than their parents. So there's a whole host of data to show here that the problem and the disaffection with the economic system is much deeper than just the pandemic-driven surge in inflation.
Economic booms (6:12)
Is there anything about this economy that four or five years of above-average economic growth won't solve? I sort of recall that in the early ’90s, you could have made a very similar case that we had a nasty recession in the early ’90s. Some people have forgotten about it, but it was a bad recession. And then we had the Gulf War, and there were a lot of newspaper articles saying that the era of fast growth was over, America just couldn't grow fast anymore, and just as people were convinced that the good days were over, the economy took over, internet boom, tech boom, and we had very rapid growth—and, interestingly, it was also a period of high inequality, but people didn't seem to care so much because the economy was cooking and real wages were rising. So is there anything wrong that a little bit of faster growth couldn't solve?
In terms of the fact that I remember living through that era, and I think that if you compare the polling data, it shows the fact that the problems are much deeper now, and the disaffection is much deeper than what was there, in terms of the fact that what solved it back then — even back then, the basic faith in American capitalism was never lost. I think that what's happened now is a feeling that we don't have an equality of opportunity anymore, and that inequality levels now have risen much further than back then. So I think that it's always possible for some hopeful turn to take place, but I'd say that the problems this time are much deeper, and that's what I try and say: Why has this happened? The book is a deep investigation of why has this happened systematically over time. We've gotten to a point now where, across the Western world, leaders are universally, almost, unpopular, and they are also struggling to get reelected. This is happening in Europe, and I argue in the book that capitalism is in worse shape in Europe: much more statist, much more bureaucratic, much more intrusive, and Europe's an even greater regulatory hegemon than America is. So something which is going on across Western societies for this disaffection and feeling that the American government is more pro-business than it is pro-competition, which should be the essence of capitalism.
Pain management (8:49)
But where do you think it all went wrong?
That’s the crux of the argument. As the tagline of the book goes, that capitalism did not fail, it was ruined. What ruined it? As I show, that it is the suite of government habits, that how the government's role in American society has come to resemble that of pain management, which is the fact that every time there is the slightest hint of pain, we administer opiates. That's one of the reasons we have the opiate crisis, where people are just hooked to opiates, because at the slightest pain, you give them opiate to relieve the pain without quite solving the underlying cause of the problem. I think, in a similar way, what's happened with American capitalism is the fact that the government has been trying to socialize risk and take risk out of the system to try and mitigate pain, and in doing so, it's got the economy hooked to constant stimulus, constant government intervention, which is leading to a lot of perverse consequences.
What are those purpose consequences? One of them, as I've argued in the book, is that productivity has declined. Now remember, capitalism is supposed to generate lots of competition, lead to more creative destruction, lead to an increase in productivity, and productivity is the key to economic growth. But in the last 30 to 40 years, we have seen a big decline in productivity growth across the western world, including in the United States.
On the other hand, we have seen a lot of deadwood being kept alive due to all these interventions. The culture of bailouts, the culture of regulation, has kept a lot of deadwood alive in the system, which is not only dampening productivity growth, but it's preventing the entry of new businesses and new firms to come. As a result, the pace of startups in this country today has gone down significantly. It's picked up a bit after the pandemic, but for the last 30 to 40 years, the rate of new startups in this country has declined.
So I think that the systematic increase in the government's involvement in the economy has led to these perverse consequences, and those changes are quite recent. The American government was never this involved at a very basic level. The share of government spending in the economy was just three percent a hundred years ago. It has gone up over time, now we're closing in on 40 percent, the government spending, the share of the economy.
But it's not just that. The culture of bailouts: America never believed that it should be bailing out private sector enterprises. And yet, from the 1980s onwards, it's been an increased culture of bailouts. Before that, America did not do bailouts of private-sector companies, but once the precedent was set with the large financial sector bailout of 1984 of Continental Illinois, you've seen one bailout after another, and get bigger and bigger with each crisis.
And then, of course, you have the entire role that the Fed has played the, US Central Bank, in the way it has tried to micromanage the cycle and always try to act with policies where, on the upside, it's fine if markets rise, but on the downside, it's there to protect and socialize risk, which, once again, has undermined productivity and kept a lot of deadwood and possibly zombie companies alive.
So it's this suite of government habits that I think has corroded capitalism and brought us to this position today where capitalism is so distorted.
Famously, during the financial crisis, President Bush said, in his own colloquial way, “This sucker is going down.” Would you just have “let this sucker go down” rather than bail out banks back in 2008?
Each bailout seems justifiable because, at that point in time, you're in the midst of a crisis, and there's always this fear that if you don't bail out, we will end up being like the liquidationists of the 1929s and lead to a Great Depression. And I think that
“Liquidate farmers! Liquidate labor!” Andrew Mellon.
Totally correct. But I think that the impulse now is the opposite, which is, “liquefy, liquefy, liquefy.” So even in 2008, if you needed to intervene to prevent a financial crisis, they can argue that was justifiable. But after that, look at what happened: the Fed continued to do quantitative easing, to lift asset prices, thinking that high asset prices will be good for economic growth, whereas it only increased inequality because the owners of asset prices tend to be the rich, and put many aspirants of the property market, or buyers of the property market, it put those things out of reach.
And then also the fact that you had, in terms of the last year, when you had the Silicon Valley Bank problems, you intervened again to try and prevent it. And again, the fear is raised that if you don't intervene, you'll have the Great Depression. So I think we need to find a balance here, which is that you've gone from “liquidate, liquidate, liquidate” to now “liquefy, liquefy, liquefy.” And I think that we need to get back to some balance and, yeah, there is a role for government, like in a terrible crisis, but you can't have a government always be there to intervene at this slightest hint of trouble. That is what causes problems.
Populist policy (14:38)
If we indeed live in a populist political age, I would assume that I would see more intervention, and more bailouts, and more pain-prevention, because that's what populism is. Populism is saying that you've been taken advantage of by the elites, it's not your fault, and if it's not your fault, you shouldn't feel any pain, therefore we will intervene to help you. Government will help you. So wouldn’t you expect in the near future just to have more of this kind of thing: more pain-management public policy?
I think that you're right that this trend can continue, because the default path of politicians is to keep doing what they've been doing unless there's a crisis which forces them to reverse course and forces, I'd say, American society then to wake up and say, “This is not working.” But to say that this is a populist thing, I'm not sure, because this is the strategy which has been pursued for the last few years, if not decades, which is what I've argued in the book. So if you're going to keep pursuing the same strategy, then you should not expect different outcomes. If the strategy of so-called populism of more intervention was working, then why should so many people be upset with what's going on?
I've been in the last few days talking about this book. I'm surprised at how receptive people have been to the idea that it's not the government's business to be bail out private sector companies. It's not the government's business to be instituting 3,000 new regulations a year. The average number of new regulations that the government would put into a year has gone up dramatically over the last couple of decades. Now, again, it is not the job of the government to be putting in so many regulations because the more regulations you put in, the harder it is for small and midsize businesses to thrive, and it creates a barrier to entry, because the cost of regulation has gone up significantly, it can be borne only by big businesses, the average business finds it more difficult. And also the lobbyists, then, are able to rewrite regulations in their favor, and they're hired typically by the Big Tech firms or the people with all the money.
I think a populist agenda would favor deregulation. A populist agenda would say that you can't have the Fed run monetary policy which keeps on inflating asset prices, particularly property prices, and makes it harder and harder for Americans to afford a home. And similarly, a populist agenda should be against bailouts, because bailouts typically help the entrenched powerful companies rather than the average person. And as I said, it's time to try something different also because what's been tried so far is clearly not working in terms of making Americans happy.
Catalyzing change (17:32)
Let me ask you this, then: What do you see, then, that makes you think we're going to do something differently?
I don't see anything as yet in terms of that, just because, as I said, the politicians will keep doing the same thing unless there's a crisis. What forces countries to change course, including the countries which are held by liberals as these great paragons of economic virtue like Sweden or the other Nordic countries?
The bond market? Is that the action-forcing entity here? Would it be the bond market?
Eventually, yes. I think that that's it, which that only when the markets stop financing these incredible deficits do you begin to see a course-correction. But what my book tries and does here is, as I said, the first step to a cure is to at least diagnose the problem correctly. So far, the diagnosis that the Biden administration offered was, “Oh, the government needs to double down because we have had this era of small government for the last 30 to 40 years. We need to double down on what the government's been doing to correct all these problems.” But the problem is this, that we never had an era of small government! So to say that now we need to reverse that era is just wrong. As I demonstrate in the book, capitalism has been about just expanding the government over the last 30 to 40, at least the capitalism practiced by the Western societies in the last few decades.
So I would say that you're right that the bond market, eventually, is obviously the ultimate disciplinarian. It did that to Greece, it did that to Sweden, and other countries before that. But we don't seem to be at that point yet, but we could be, because the next time you have an economic downturn in the US, the budget deficit will widen to nine, 10 percent of GDP. As revenues fall, more and automatic spending kicks in, and, after that's done, the ability for interest rates to come down, which typically do to help a country go through a recession, I think will be quite limited in countries such as the United States, because your government spending would've been so high already by then.
If I were to put together a short-but-sweet economic agenda to deal with some of these, I might say, “Boy, you're worried about debt and deficits?” I would say, “What we need is a value-added tax and we need to at least lower the projected pace of spending on social security and Medicare.” So Medicare reform, social security reform, a value-added tax—and if I tried running on that agenda, I think they would run me out of town.
Since we don't have politicians generally calling for that, isn't the revealed preference of American voters for more of the same: “Don't tax me, but also don't take away my benefits,” and off we go. If there was this deep swell for any change that you think might be there, based on maybe your conversations with folks, wouldn't it be already reflected by our politicians? But I don't see that.
Yeah, you're absolutely correct that politicians don't live in a vacuum, they react to a societal chain. But my point is that no one seems to be doing . . . I just pointed out to you that outside of this so-called “tough medicine,” which you just highlighted, there are other things which can be done in terms of drawing the line on bailouts, drawing the line on instituting new regulations. Even Trump came to par, he spoke about the fact that he's going to withdraw two regulations for every one that he puts into place. In the end, though, he ended up putting out as many regulations per year as the Obama administration had done, so there was no change in that.
So I think this tough medicine, which is hard to administer, and societies only bear tough medicine once they see an apparent crisis, not something more insidious, like what I'm describing in the book, maybe yes, but there are things, as I said, whether it's got to do with the conduct of monetary policy, or it's got to do with regulation, or the culture of bailouts, I think these things can change, and the American voter will be much more receptive to it.
What's the option? That the politicians keep doing what they're doing today, the person in office will keep being unpopular and keep losing elections. As I pointed out in the book, as well, and in one of my FT [Financial Times] columns, that if you look at it, the number of politicians across the Western world who are getting reelected is declining. Typically, if you were in office, you had the platform, that if you stood for reelection, you'd get reelected. In the last few years, being an incumbent has become a disadvantage rather than an advantage. So clearly the people are unhappy, and if the politicians are going to keep doing the same thing, they should be more prepared to lose elections once in office.
Well, I think maybe they should be prepared to lose elections. Maybe they all should pray for an AI-driven productivity boom, that'll cover up a lot of bad policy.
Yes, we got that briefly in the late ’90s and early 2000s when you had a big tech productivity boom, which took place with the internet, but that has faded over time, and as I argue in the book that you can keep doing all this great technological stuff, but if you're going to undermine the fabric of capitalism, the creative-destructive fabric of capitalism with much more government intervention and more statist policies, then you should be prepared also to see a decline in productivity, and that will offset the gains coming from technology like AI.
Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
Micro Reads
▶ Business/ Economics
* ChatGPT Maker OpenAI Goes Smaller and Cheaper With New AI Tech - WSJ
* The Mysterious Slowdown in US Manufacturing Productivity - SSRN
* Can the returns from Big Tech’s staggering capex live up to the hype? - FT Opinion
* Trapped! China and the ‘middle-income trap’ - CEPR
* The Economic Populists Have a Point - WSJ Opinion
* Pandemic Layoffs and the Role of Stay-At-Home Orders - San Francisco Fed
* Is Greece’s Six-Day Work Week a Harbinger? - Project Syndicate
▶ Policy/Politics
* Trump's Tariffs Will Send Prices Up Mount McKinley for Americans - Bberg
* California is a battleground for AI bills, as Trump plans to curb regulation - Wapo
* Trump Is Wrong About Taiwan's Chip Industry - Bberg Opinion
* Why planetary problems need a new approach to politics - Aeon
* Political chaos rattles clean energy investors - E&E
▶ AI/Digital
* Data for A.I. Training Is Disappearing Fast, Study Shows - NYT
* Generative AI Can Harm Learning - SSRN
* The Push to Develop Generative A.I. Without All the Lawsuits - NYT
▶ Biotech/Health
* Retinol's anti-ageing effects may work by changing your skin microbes - NS
▶ Clean Energy/Climate
* AI Is Already Wreaking Havoc on Global Power Systems - Bberg
* Our Understanding Of How To Modulate Climate Change Is Ballooning – Issues & Insights
▶ Space/Transportation
* Advanced Propulsion Researchers from GE Aerospace Successfully Test Cutting-Edge Dual-Mode Hypersonic Ramjet - The Debrief
▶ Substacks/Newsletters
* Bad and good arguments for industrial policy - Noahpinion
* Forget Adapting to Climate Change - Breakthrough Journal
Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
✈ A quick note: I will be traveling through the middle of the month and will be posting a bit less than usual and perhaps a bit shorter than usual.
After decades of resistance to nuclear power, growing concern over climate change, rising electricity needs, and a desire for greater energy independence are spurring renewed public interest in a future powered by atomic fission (perhaps fusion, too). Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk to Dr. Mike Goff about the state of US nuclear power, the developing advancements in nuclear technology, and what it will take to reach our vast potential.
Goff is the acting assistant secretary and the principal deputy assistant secretary for the Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy. He previously spent over 30 years at Idaho National Laboratory, including a major advisory and management role. He has written over 70 publications on the nuclear fuel cycle.
In This Episode
* Atomic Age 2.0 (1:31)
* Major concerns (7:37)
* Out of practice (11:04)
* Next-generation policy (17:38)
* Human capital (21:48)
* Fusion forecast (23:12)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
Atomic Age 2.0 (1:31)
The Energy Secretary recently spoke about adding a lot more nuclear capacity, tripling it, I think, by 2050 or so. And before we get into whether that's possible, I wanted to ask you: As you understand it, what is the current consensus explanation for why the Nuclear and Atomic Age of the ’50s and ’60s, why that kind of ended? Because when the secretary spoke about building more capacity, I thought about the — and this is something maybe a lot of people are unaware of, that President Nixon had a plan to build a lot of more nuclear reactors in this country back in the ’70s during the oil crisis; that didn't happen, and we all know about Three Mile Island. But is there a consensus as to why Atomic Age 1.0 came to an end? Obviously we still get a lot of energy from nuclear, but not what people had imagined 40 years ago.
There are a variety of reasons. We did build a lot at one point, and we were building 10 plants a year, pretty extensive builds out there. We did then have Three Mile Island in the late ’70s, and then we got costs started going up, and schedules started increasing on the builds, and we ended up not having a lot of energy growth, in fact, we went for a long period where we weren't having a lot of energy growth, and we had a lot of other energy sources, natural gas, coal, and all. We had a lot of other energy sources out there as well. So yeah, we became pretty stagnated around 20 percent of the electricity. But now, like you say, yeah, there's been a big change in what we think the needs are for nuclear going forward, for a variety of reasons.
My background is journalism, and as a journalist I’ve written, I know, multiple stories in my life about a Nuclear Renaissance. So I'm wondering why this time looks to be different. You suggested in your previous answer that there might be some reasons. What are those reasons that we may be entering a new age where we will see an expansion in the nuclear sector?
I do think we will see that expansion, and, in fact, I think we have to see that expansion, and it's because of a lot of the positive attributes of nuclear right now. Obviously there's a lot of focus on trying to get more clean energy out there, and nuclear is a large base load source of clean energy. And it's not just CO2 emission, but it doesn't emit particulates and all, as well, so it's good air, good quality of life. So it has those key attributes. But there are other clean energy sources as well: renewables, hydro, and all that. But I think the recognition that, if you are going to go toward decarbonization, you need still base load electricity too. You need base load electricity to help intermittent sources like renewables to be able to expand more as well. So nuclear is very good at enabling decarbonization, not just by adding clean electricity to the grid, but enabling you to expand out other renewables like wind and solar and all, as well.
Additionally, nuclear is very reliable. Of the energy sources, it has the highest capacity factor of any of the energy sources. In the United States, we run 93 percent of the time, so the existing fleet that we have out there of 94 plants, they're producing a 100 percent of the power 93 percent of the time, which dwarfs what any other energy source does out there as well.
Nuclear is safe. At times people are concerned about safety, but, in reality, it's actually one of the safest energy sources out there and continues to demonstrate that.
It's resilient for different weather-related events. It can still produce electricity out there as well. It also has a lot of energy security. And as we've learned, unfortunately, from Russia's unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine, we recognize energy security is national security, so nuclear really does help us on that national security front. It provides an energy source that we can largely on-source from us and our allies. We’ve got assured fuel supplies, and provides that long-term power. You can put fuel in it and it can last for two years or so.
And I guess one other thing I'll add out there as well, is it's a job creator. Of the different energy sources, the amount of jobs associated with nuclear are some of the highest on the amount of electricity produced. And when you actually start building nuclear, like we saw in Vogtle in Georgia where they were building the two plants, it creates huge amounts of jobs. In fact, I heard a stat recently that 35,000 union workers were trained as part of the construction of the Vogtle power plant, so it's a good job creator in all, as well. And again, the power density is great, it doesn't take up a lot of space, and with the advanced technologies that we've developed in the United States, you've continued to increase in the safety, you can have plants of a variety of different sizes that can be easily deployed to, say, retiring coal plants. It just has a lot of flexibility that it hasn't had in the past, but also it's that key recognition of its clean energy attributes, but its energy security attributes as well.
Major concerns (7:37)
I did not major in nuclear science, I majored in history and political science, but I remember I took a class as an undergraduate at Northwestern University on the nuclear fuel cycle, and I remember to this day that my professor — of course, this was obviously a while ago, and I think what most of the students knew about nuclear energy was probably Three Mile Island — and I remember to this day distinctly the professor saying, “If they wanted to build a nuclear reactor in my backyard, I would be totally fine with it.” He had zero fear on the safety issue. Now when you give that rap that you just gave me about the wonders of nuclear energy before regular people, what is their response? Do they worry about the nuclear waste? Do they worry about safety? Are they immediately sold, or what are the concerns that typically get raised to you?
You brought them up. I mean, safety is brought up because you do see these high profile accidents like Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, Fukushima, which were accidents. They weren't good things that you want to have happen, but the industry's also a very learning industry. The improvements that come out of those events have just made the industry even safer and safer. And again, it's still safer than most any other electricity-producing industry out there as well.
Waste does get brought up. We have not implemented a final disposal solution for the spent fuel from our reactors, but we have safely stored and managed the spent fuel over the last six decades, and the amount of fuel that's generated, I think the stat that gets tossed around, you could fit it all in a Walmart parking lot. This is not a lot of material because it's a high energy-density fuel. It's not a lot of material, and again, we safely manage that and store that. We have countries now that are moving forward with geological repositories, which we need to be doing in the United States. In fact, just last week, I went and visited the repository that hopefully will be operating next year in Finland for disposing of their spent fuel. We can do that, it’s not a technical issue, so we can safely manage the spent fuel.
The other issue that always comes up is still cost. We do have to demonstrate now that we can build these plants safely, and efficiently, and at a reasonable cost. On the Vogtle plant there were cost overruns and schedule overruns, but between Vogtle Unit 3 and Unit 4, there was about a 30 percent reduction in costs between those plants, so we are starting to get to where we can be deploying nth-of-a-kind cost plants out there as well. And hopefully with some of the small modular reactor designs and all that are going to rely more on modular construction, we can even get to nth-of-a-kind cost even quicker. It still takes some pushing and understanding to make sure that people do understand the advancements that have been made on nuclear technology, that it's not our parents' nuclear technology, there's a new round of technology out there.
Out of practice (11:04)
You raised two good points there. The cost issue, and that's a great stat about the Vogtle plant and the reduction between the two reactors. Is it your sense that the fact that we haven't been consistently building reactors and learning from the previous build, and having trained people who've worked on multiple reactors, that each one has become like this bespoke mega project? It’s my sense, and it seems logical, at least to me, that that has been a cost driver, that we haven't been able to churn these out like 10 a year, every year, decade after decade, because clearly, if that was the case, I don't see how we don't learn how to build them better, faster, and more efficiently. But that's not what we've been doing, obviously.
That's right. It's not. Even when I say with Vogtle, you had to stand back up the whole supply chain, you had to retrain the workforce, so there was a lot of learning in that process, even though, too, we did recognize on that plant you need to have designs very well finalized and standardized as well. One of the problems we realized from the buildout of the 90-something plants that we have now is no two plants were ever that similar. Everyone wanted to make a tweak in their plant, so we never got to where we had standardized designs.
So I think now that we're getting that trained workforce, getting the supply chain up there, and our vendors are really saying, “We're doing standardized plants. If someone else wants to make a tweak on this plant, they have to go somewhere else,” that people are going to go with standardized designs so we can really replicate these and get that cost benefit from it. The challenges that you brought up, we have to overcome, and I think we're set up now to be able to overcome that. I appreciate all the effort that went into building Units 3 and 4 at Vogtle. We've got enough benefit from that learning there and hopefully build very soon here.
There's a world where we have tripled our nuclear generating capacity, as Secretary Granholm said. Can that be a world where we get all our nuclear power from light water nuclear reactors, or must there be different kinds of reactors? You mentioned the small modular reactors, and I've interviewed startups doing microreactors, I don't know, maybe they'll be used to power data centers, but can that world of greatly increased nuclear generation, even with improvements in light water reactors, must there be different kinds of reactors?
I wouldn't say “must.” I think there will be. I think we will have that variability. I think we will still have large plants being built. I think maybe five years ago you wouldn't hear that people were talking about building gigawatt-sizes plants again. I think we'll have the gigawatt-size plants, we'll have the small modular reactors that are water-cooled, but I think we will get some of those advanced reactors out there: the Generation IV reactors, the sodium-cooled fast reactors that have the capacity to be able to burn waste better and also increase the sustainability of the amount of fuel they use. I think you’ll also have the high-temperature gas reactors that are helium-cooled, that use TRISO fuel. You'll have those because we need to not only decarbonize the electricity sector, we've got to decarbonize the industrial sector. That's much more challenging, and the high temperatures that can be provided from those reactors will help us in that decarbonization process.
So I think we will have a mixture out there. There are cases where the Gen IV systems are going to be better than the gigawatt-sized plants for the needs that are out there, but large power plants are going to be needed as well. Especially, like you say, you bring up the data centers, the amount of growth that we're hearing for electricity right now, I think again, we'll see gigawatt-sized plants will be needed to be able to meet that growth.
Yeah, I tell you, nothing frustrates me more than reading about what AI could perhaps do for our economy and then having people say, “Well, but we know we can't do it because we can't supply the power” or “We can't supply enough clean power,” I mean, well then it’d be sure great to have more nuclear energy. And I wonder, as you sort of tick off some of the potential advances and new kinds of reactors, maybe I look backward too much, but I can't help but wonder what nuclear reactors would be like today, where we would be today, maybe we would already have fusion reactors had we proceeded with this kind of momentum every decade since 1980. It drives me crazy, and you're a nuclear engineer, that must drive you crazy.
It does, I've been doing this . . . my first job in the nuclear industry was almost 40 years ago when I was still in college, and there have definitely been ups and downs in funding. In fact, there were some periods where there was almost zero research and development dollars spent in the government on nuclear energy. Luckily, though, the thing that we have is, under the four presidential administrations, there's been a real steady climb in the recognition of the importance of nuclear, and the funding to support it. So I'm happy that we have had this period that goes back to the early 2000s that's been really steady growth in recognition of nuclear. If we would've not had some of those laws in the late ’80s and ’90s, yeah, we could probably be further ahead, especially on some of the advanced technologies. Because yes, some of those advanced technologies started on research that was back in the ’50s, ’60s and ’70s: the sodium-cooled fast reactor, the molten salt reactor, all of those were based on R&D that we did back in the early days, as well.
Next-generation policy (17:38)
Which leads me to this question: You work for the government. I work for a public policy think tank, so of course I'm going to think about: Given where we are today, what government needs to do going forward, both on the R&D front and on the regulatory front, are we doing enough basic research for whatever the next, or the next next generation of nuclear is, and do we now have the kind regulatory framework we need for that next generation of reactors?
I'll go to the research one first—and I should note, my background is, I'm an R&D person, I came out of the national labs, so of course we always need more research and development. But that said, we have been blessed by funding from Congress and the administration that there's a significant amount of money for research and development in the United States. And I'll say that's good, because the one thing I will note, I do believe innovation in the US, as far as the nuclear technology, we are the best. The technologies that we're developing and our vendors are deploying it, really, it is the cutting edge technology, so it's good we have that R&D, and it's important, as you know, we need to continue to have it to move forward on that next generation of technologies and continue to make improvements on the technologies out there. So I think we have a good research base.
There's some infrastructure that we still need if we start deploying, say, when we mentioned that sodium-cooled fast reactor, we don't have a testing capability for that type of system. We shut down our last testing system on a fast reactor in 1994. We would probably need some additional infrastructure. But again, we have a pretty good base. And I'll say that also on the regulatory side. We do have a pretty good base as well. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is obviously focused on light water reactors throughout its history, but they've actually been doing a good job at being able to work with some of the developers.
We have three entities out there that are working on Generation IV reactors. TerraPower did submit their construction authorization to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and they've accepted it, so they're working well with them, even though they have a water-based system. Hopefully X-energy, who's doing a high-temperature gas reactor, working with the government and all, as well, will be moving forward, as well. And we've had a third that's working in the molten salt space, a molten salt-cooled reactor that has already received a construction permit to go forward on a prototype reactor, a Kairos company.
I'm sure there's got to be reforms still on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and make sure that we are timely and responding to license applications, but they are moving in the right direction. There's been a lot of interface with various laws, whether it's the NEICA (Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act), or NEIMA (Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act), two bills that were passed a little while back looking at reforming. And I think there still needs to be improvements and still need to be increase in the resource and capacity of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, but they're heading in the right direction.
We have a good regulator, and that's one of the things that helps us make sure we feel that we can deploy this technology safely here, but also helps us in exporting our technology, where we can say, “Our technology has been licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,” which has such a high view externally in other countries, that helps us. So I want them to continue to be that safe regulator, but again, they are continuing to work to improve and streamline the process. Hopefully we get toward where we're standardizing, that we don't have to have a lot of interface and we don't — that'll come to the utilities, too — we don't make changes once we've got something approved, so we hopefully can speed up the process from the utility side, and all is well.
Human capital (21:48)
Are we going to turn out enough nuclear engineers? I imagine that, for a while, that probably seemed like a hard sell to someone who had an interest in science and engineering, to be in this industry versus some others. Probably a little easier sell; are we going to have enough people going into that to build all these reactors?
We are going to need to continue to increase it. We’re already seeing the uptick, though, in that area. I'll note: Our office, the office of Nuclear Energy, we've really — going back to the 2010 timeframe — really recognized that we needed to do more in that area, so we actually started investing almost 20 percent of our R&D budget to the universities to hopefully foster that next generation. And in fact, this year we just hit the mark where we've now spent $1 billion since the start of those programs on the universities to make sure we're doing R&D there and getting that next generation of folks out there. It’s something that we've got to continue to focus on to make sure that we do. Because yeah, if we triple, it's going to need a lot more nuclear engineers. But I also note, the thing I'm concerned about also is making sure we have the right trades and all, as well. If we're building these plants, making sure you have the welders, the pipe fitters, and all, that's going to be a big challenge, as well, especially if we're going to start building, say, 10 plants a year. That's a lot of people out there.
Fusion forecast (23:12)
I’m excited about the prospects for nuclear fusion, and I've talked to people at startups, and it has probably looked as promising as it ever has. How promising is it? How should I think about it as being part of our energy solution going forward, given where we're at? In fact, there are no commercial nuclear fusion reactors right now. Obviously people at startups give a lot of optimistic forecasts. How should I even think about that as being a partial solution in the coming decades? How do you look at it, at least?
I think it can be part of the solution in the coming decades. I think some of the changes that's taken place, especially over the last two years where there is more of a change to focus on, not fusion as a science program, but fusion as deployment, as an energy producer, you look at it as an applied energy. I think that's an important change that's occurred over the last two years, and the fusion programs within the Department of Energy are much more focused to that. It's similar to what's happened somewhat with fission. Fission, about 15 years ago, it was government-driven, and you pull along industry, until about 15 years ago you started having industry investing a lot of money and pulling along the government. You're now starting to see that happen in fusion, where people are doing a lot of a private investment, they're pulling along the government, and the government's working to see, how can we use the resources of the government to enable it?
So I think it will happen. I don't think fusion is going to be producing electricity to the grid this decade, but I think the vision that's been put forth by the government is their bold, decade-old vision to have a fusion pilot facility sometime within the decade. I think that is feasible. So maybe before the 2050s you can start having fusion generating some of our electricity. I'm a fission person at my heart, but I think fusion is, we're getting much more focused on moving it forward as an electricity source, and that'll help it be able to be deployed sometime here in our lifetime.
Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
Micro Reads
How Elon Musk and SpaceX Plan to Colonize Mars - NYT
What happened to the artificial-intelligence revolution? - Economist
The EV trade war between China and the West heats up - Economist
Defeated by A.I., a Legend in the Board Game Go Warns: Get Ready for What’s Next - NYT
Pfizer pins hopes on daily pill to crack market for weight-loss drugs - FT
Rise of the Restaurant Robots: Chipotle, Sweetgreen and Others Bet on Automation - WSJ
Saudi Arabia's Trillion-Dollar Makeover Faces Funding Cutbacks - Bberg
AI Spending: Goldman Strategists Say Big Tech’s Splurge Worries Investors - Bberg
It’s Time for AI to Start Making Money for Businesses. Can It? - WSJ
Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
Artificial intelligence may revolutionize the American economy, but whether we see that potential actualized depends on a few key factors: whether generative AI is a general purpose technology, whether the labor force makes a smooth pivot, how employers prioritize their resources, and whether the US chooses to take the lead in AI’s deployment. These are just a few of the topics I cover on the podcast today with Guy Ben-Ishai.
Ben-Ishai is the head of economic policy research at Google. He previously served as a principal at the Brattle Group and as chief economist in the office of the attorney general of the state of New York. He is also a co-author of the paper “AI and the Opportunity for Shared Prosperity: Lessons from the History of Technology and the Economy.”
In This Episode
* Is gen AI a general purpose tech? (1:22)
* Risks and benefits (7:46)
* Barriers to a boom (14:27)
* Investing in employees (19:16)
* Human-complimenting AI (25:29)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
Is GenAI a general purpose tech? (1:22)
Pethokoukis: Do you have any doubt that generative AI, and perhaps machine learning more broadly, is an important general purpose technology that will eventually make a substantial and measurable impact in the economic statistics and productivity and economic growth?
Ben-Ishai; The immediate response is absolutely, but let me unpack that: Do I have doubts about the immense potential of the technology? No, and I'm saying that very confidently, which is uncommon for an economist. We put together the paper that you've initially cited at Google to look exactly at that question: When we say that AI marks a pivotal moment in human history, what does that actually mean for an economist? And I think the conclusion there that we're looking not in an ordinary technology, but rather at a general purpose technology, that is immense. That means that we're probably looking at the most transformative economic development of our generation. And to think, Jim, that the two of us are having a conversation about that today, that is historic. I feel incredibly privileged and lucky to think and work of these issues in our day and age.
But the second part of your question alluded to not the potential, but actually the actual impact. And if there's one takeaway from that exercise from the paper that we put together and from my conversation with so many academics and policymakers around the world, is that this is not just a watershed moment, it's not just a pivotal moment in human history, it's a fragile moment as well. This story can easily be a story of missed opportunity. I think that we so easily take for granted the fact that, yes, we will of course develop AI and deploy it and apply it very successfully. And it's so easy to get caught in the moment, particularly as the nation that advanced the science, I think somewhere in the back of the minds of all of us, there's that presumption that we will be the global leaders in deployment of AI. I am actually worried about that. To ensure that we are, it’s a tumultuous, fragile, and careful process that we’ve got to be really thoughtful about, with a lot of deliberate action about what we do, how do we proceed, and how do we ensure that we are indeed the ones that capitalize on the potential?
It's remarkable how quickly the narrative around American tech has shifted. Not long ago, Silicon Valley faced criticism for focusing on social media rather than groundbreaking innovations like the Apollo program or cancer cures. Now, they've unveiled generative AI, potentially the most significant technology of our era.
Regarding fragility, it's worth considering why AI might need special handling. Unlike the seamless diffusion of technologies like the internal combustion engine or electricity, AI seems more akin to nuclear power - a technology that was stifled by regulation. Do we need a proactive agenda to prevent AI's potential from being similarly constrained?
That's a great question, Jim. I'm so tempted to go back to your first part of the question about the importance of digital technologies, and economists get a really bad rap, but try to be a librarian these days. We tend to overlook the tremendous importance of information as a driver of economic growth in our economies. And even if you look just at small businesses and the tremendous opportunities that digital technologies have provided them. To think that a mom and shop store today can actually run a marketing campaign, analyze its customer base on large databases, export products to far markets, those are things that used to be the exclusive domain of just a few large companies that today are actually available broadly and widely through digital technologies. And maybe it's the fault of economists that we are not shouting off the tops of mountains frequently enough about the tremendous power of information and digital technologies and the accumulation of knowledge as a driver of economic growth.
The application of knowledge and intelligence — that seems to me to be pretty important.
I cannot agree more! And I think, to a great degree, it explains some of the tremendous optimism around AI as a technology that really reduces the barriers to interact with technology and democratizes its use in a way that we haven't seen before.
Risks and benefits (7:46)
We quickly shifted from marveling at AI's potential to fixating on its risks — existential threats, job losses, and disinformation. But let's step back for a moment. Can you elaborate on why you see this as an exciting technology with significant benefits? It seems many people aren't fully aware of its upside potential.
That's a great question, this is really the reason why we at Google, too, we paused for a minute and kind of wanted to think about this. We're at a sector where enthusiasm is in no short supply, so what does it actually mean when we say that this is a pivotal moment in human history? What does it mean for economists? I think it really boils down to this question of: Is AI an ordinary technology, or is it really a general purpose technology? That is the term of art that economists use, and I think it's actually important to pause for a minute and think about that, because it's critical. A general purpose technology is not just pervasive in use, it is a technology that enables productivity-enhancing applications to be applied across all segments and entire economies in ways that are not just advancing and accelerating economic growth, but are also expanding the frontier of innovation and technology. It's a source of ongoing and continual innovations.
And if you think about it for a minute, if you think about the prior general purpose technologies that we've had, if it's electricity, if it's personal computers, or it's the steam engine, their impact was tremendous. And at the time that they were launched, I think nobody had the perfect vision of where . . . we of course knew where we started, in the very same way that we do today about AI, but it's really difficult, if not impossible, to know where we will end. The compounding nature of these technologies is immense, particularly when you're looking at a general use technology and multi-domain technology that can lead to applications on such a broad basis. I don't think that today we can envision what new occupations, new applications, new sectors will emerge as a result of AI. And I think the fact that it's not an ordinary technology, but rather a general purpose technology, that is important, that does imply that we're probably looking at the most profound economic transformation in our generation. That is huge.
It's relatively straightforward to assess AI's ability to replicate current human tasks. But predicting the new possibilities it might unlock, like accelerating scientific discovery, is far more challenging. These potential upsides are difficult to quantify or model economically.
While we can more easily grasp potential downsides like job automation (which isn't necessarily negative), the upsides are less tangible. They depend on entrepreneurs creating new businesses and scientists leveraging AI for breakthroughs. This makes it harder to definitively argue that the benefits will outweigh any drawbacks.
Oh my God, Jim, I cannot agree more, and I think that there's two issues, and you have written about this just recently, and I think that there's really two issues that come up, at least in my mind, as a reaction to some of the studies that really focus on the measurement. We're trying to really drill this question of, “What will be the productivity gain from AI over the next five or 10 years?” I don't want to dismiss that question —
And can you give it to me within three decimal points, right?
Exactly! But we're doing such a huge disservice as economists when we focus on that. I think it really pertains to two reasons that you brought up. The first one relates to measurement. We are really looking, these studies are primarily based on occupational exposure of existing work streams. Little do we know today about what new work streams, occupations, tasks, creativity, or human endeavors will actually be triggered by this new technology. In a way, we're really just looking under a flashlight rather than thinking about the broader issue, the broader economic benefits that will emerge, kind of like the unknown unknowns that we know today about this technology.
Just to put it in perspective, think about the printing press that led to a scientific revolution. Think about the steam engine that led to an industrial revolution, to an electronic circuit that led to the digital age. We are at that point with AI today, and to think that we're looking at SOC, standard occupational codes, to look at the future impact on productivity, I think minimizes the value of our profession.
The other point that you touched on, which I think is so incredibly important: We're missing the point. It's really not about the third decimal point of our estimates. It's about the fact that we can reshape technology. Rather than measuring its benefit, let's actually make sure that we can capitalize on the potential. That is far more important than anything else. And at some point, we'll go back to your other question about fragility, but there are genuine barriers that we need to address collectively as a society. And if we are not going to do it, other countries will, right? And I think economists have a role in that conversation. I think that is the critical issue that we need to focus on.
Barriers to a boom (14:27)
We have a technology that seems, right now, it's fast evolving, but it seems pretty darn important. It's hard to believe that we've only really been having the specific conversation about generative AI for maybe a year and a half or so publicly. So what are the barriers? If this turns out not to be an important technology that's widely diffused throughout the American economy, what went wrong? What are the barriers that concern you?
I think there are three main categories that we focus on. First and foremost, you need digital infrastructure. I think it's a misconception, and I think we will learn that very quickly over the next few years, that AI or digital infrastructure is limited to broadband. It is increasingly becoming more so about access to data, large data centers, and compute power. And I think not just the US, but many other countries, will realize, or are in the process of understanding very soon, that those are the type of investments that one needs to make in order to deploy the technology. That's one category.
Another one is the regulatory environment and the legal standards. You know Jim, and this is something you've of course written about a lot, I don't think that no single country deliberately chooses to fall behind, and I think that we often fail to recognize the long-term impact and unintended consequences of regulations. We, of course, have a duty to protect, and there are areas that raise concern, but we have to balance that duty to protect with the desire to capitalize on the potential, to foster innovation, and to make sure, at the end of the day, that we emerge as the global leaders of this technology, that we lead its deployment. I think that the legal ecosystem is incredibly important in that respect and an important current dimension of competition between countries and the future over the deployment of AI.
And the third one is our workforce readiness. We need a workforce transition strategy. Let me pause here for a minute. If our workforce is not ready for an AI transition, our employers and our companies would find it very difficult to actually implement and adopt AI. It's simple as that. And if our companies do not adopt AI applications or technologies, we will quickly find out that we will fall behind. If you're looking at the history of our labor markets, we have been not just resilient, consistently resilient in our institutions and labor market operations, but we've also been highly effective at transitioning individuals from low-productivity to high-productivity occupations.
We used to be a primarily agrarian economy in the 19th century. We transitioned successfully to manufacturing, which at some point was about 27 percent of our workforce, now it's below 10 percent. From there, we switched on to services. We absorbed women into the workforce in an effective way. We have highly effective labor markets, which is a competitive advantage when we're thinking about global competition.
At the very same time, it's not without a cost. And in a lot of ways, I do think that it can be a double-edged sword, because the competitiveness of our labor markets also implies, at least factually, that the relationships that we have between employer and employee tend to be less permanent than they are in other economies, and that implies that employers have less of an incentive to actually invest in employees. That may put us at a relative disadvantage compared to other countries that have longer relationships between employers and employees and can afford for actually employers to participate, to take part, whether it's through apprenticeships or training programs, in making sure that their workforce is ready for an AI transition. That, Jim, worries me. I think it's more than just making sure that individuals that may lose their job get reinstated in the workforce, it's really an economic strategic objective for us. Unless we take care of our workforce, we will find it exceedingly difficult to implement AI on an economy-wide basis.
Investing in employees (19:16)
While Washington isn't dictating data center construction, companies are investing heavily in this infrastructure. Shouldn't the same logic apply to workforce development? If understanding and working with AI technology is crucial for business survival, there's a strong private incentive to invest in employees' skills. This holds true even considering the unique structure of the American labor market compared to, say, Europe's.
Let me pause for a minute, take it back one step so that we can think about why is investment in worker training and vocational programs are so difficult? Why are they so challenging, and why do they perhaps create externalities, the way that we just discussed, more broadly? Why are they ultimately a strategic concern for the US economy? So look, these programs are exceptionally difficult to get right in an ordinary course of business. And we at Google have invested a tremendous amount of resources on these programs, which are not a core product for us. They're not even a monetizable product for us. And we're not the only ones. A lot of other tech companies have done the same, to be honest.
Now, what are the challenges with these programs? First and foremost, they have to be relevant and they have to provide education, skills, programs that are actually relevant, that keep up to date with the advancements in technology. That is something that's really difficult to do. You have to make sure that employers are actually buying in. We may have the best program, but unless it enables the individuals who graduated from the program to signal to employers that these are individuals with high qualifications because they went through a program, let's say at Google, the program is simply not going to work.
And then the third thing, think about it from the employee perspective: For an individual, it's not about giving somebody a pamphlet, “Hey, let's participate in this great program.” It's really about, can you take time off, at a tremendous opportunity cost of time with your family, career, and work, to invest in a serious program that would end up in an outcome which actually lands you at a better career, more stable job, that is better paid. Those are tremendously difficult in the ordinary course of business, let alone when we're going through a transition where we don't even know today how tasks and occupations will evolve. Now, as I mentioned, private tech firms, because of also market expertise and access to occupational data that is far better, in a lot of ways, than what the government data that we have on occupations are perfectly positioned to carry out those programs. The question is whether they can be actually carried out independently, unilaterally, without the collaboration of federal agencies, whether it’s local governments, state or federal, without the participation of employers, colleges and other institutions —
It sounds to me like employers will have to be part of this.
For sure. Jim, maybe let me just mention one thing that we don't want to do. We've been in this movie before. Following NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), we had the trade adjustment programs where we invested a lot of money in rescaling and training employees, and the results were very minimal, at best. So I do think that this is the type of a grand challenge, if you will, that no single actor can really solve independently. And I know that we're naturally, as economists, we're naturally hesitant about government intervention, but what better role for a government can you think of other than identifying a market failure that is of strategic importance to the US economy, and in a thoughtful way, collaborating with other relevant constituents to come up with solutions that are effective. Scaling those programs to a national level is going to be a real challenge. And I do think that there's a role for governments to actually lead, in collaboration with other constituents, those efforts.
And of course you are aware of the sort of deep skepticism among people about these programs.
Yes.
So obviously we talk about innovation, technological innovation, we also need program innovation, education innovation here.
Jim, I’ve got to be perfectly honest here — and this is just my individual experience — as economists, I would be lying if I wouldn't say that I share that skepticism and concern. At the very same time, I think that we need to consider the other ramifications and what is truly an issue. We are at a certain disadvantage because of the lower incentives that our businesses have, our employers have, to invest in employees, and we see it. Apprenticeship programs is one example that is working phenomenally well in other places, but not in the US. So I do worry about that. In the paper, we didn't offer any descriptive solutions, but we really highlight the challenge here: How do we find market-based, thoughtful solutions to scaling and vocational programs so that our workforce can be ready for an AI transition?
Human-complimenting AI (25:29)
I'm skeptical of the idea that we can guide AI development through policy to ensure it complements rather than just automates human work. It's unclear what policy levers could effectively achieve this — tweaking the tax code seems unlikely to produce specific AI outcomes.
But where we can make a difference is in human capital development. If we want AI that complements human skills and enables new business creation, we need to ensure people understand this technology. Currently, many don't, given its novelty. Focusing on education and skill development seems a more practical approach to shaping AI's impact.
You know, Jim, it’s really interesting, so Chris Pissarides, the Nobel Prize winner from London School of Economics, has a phenomenal paper about this question. He comes up with a very interesting finding that countries that actually invest in right regulatory environments and legal standards, that have the right infrastructure, that have the right environment to foster innovation, ultimately witness less concerns about substitution because the technology that's being advanced tends to be more complimentary, and as an economist, that makes a lot of sense to me.
Let me pause for a minute and explain why: There is a genuine concern about whether AI is being deployed or used to substitute labor. And I think if you think about the Turing Trap that Eric Brynjolfsson has written about, this notion that you can come up with the most myopic, plug-and-play, cheapest AI application, put that in some individual function in your business, and replace existing work streams that are being done by humans, that is a genuine concern, particularly for firms that are looking for the highest rate of return, at the lowest cost, without really investing and transforming their business.
As an economist, I can understand why that happens, but keep in mind that when that happens, those businesses are actually really failing to leverage and capitalize on the full potential of the technology. They're really going for the plug-and-play, cheapest applications. That's not good for labor because it leads to substitution. But certainly that's not good to the business, itself. In a competitive market—and I think one thing that we need to stress is the importance of competition in our markets—you'd anticipate that firms that actually go through the effort to invest, to reform, to transform their businesses, to reinvent themselves, are the ones that will prevail.
And I would think that would be a very powerful lesson for other businesses if that is indeed the case, right?
Exactly. And the question is, how can we promote this broader, more meaningful, more valuable application and adoption of AI? And I think it goes back to the fundamentals: You need the AI infrastructure, the right legal institutions and regulatory standards, and ultimately a workforce that is ready to transform. And I think once you put those together, I do believe (and I’m deliberately saying belief, because I don't know that we can really study this explicitly) that that will lead to more complementarity and augmentation, and less substitution.
Historical precedent suggests that extreme job loss scenarios, like robots taking all jobs, are unlikely. While AI will undoubtedly cause disruption, do you believe it will follow the pattern of past technologies? That is, replacing some tasks, enhancing others, and creating entirely new job categories. Given the policies we've discussed, are you confident that this balanced outcome is achievable with AI, or do you have doubts?
Oh my God, that's a tough question, Jim. You saved it for last.
I'll add an addendum, I'll add a qualifier: within the next 20 years. I don't know what it'll look like in 100 years from now, but within our immediate lifetimes as workers, you and me.
Let me address it in this way. Yes, absolutely, I am, I want to say, cautiously optimistic, because if we learned one thing from the last century, a period of time that reflects the most advanced technological progress in human history, is that we didn't witness an increase in unemployment and we didn't witness a decline in labor participation. That leads me to be optimistic about the future of AI as well. Having said that — I think you alluded to this — history doesn't always repeat itself, and we've never faced a technology that can automate such a wide range of human tasks and activities. So that should be concerning for us. We also should mention that, even if AI does not lead to mass unemployment or to net loss of jobs, there will be significant occupational and sectoral shifts if we get this right, which I am optimistic about us doing so. So that will be something that we will need to consider as well. So I would say, optimistic: absolutely. Cautiously optimistic: that's probably more correct.
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Micro Reads
Business/ Economics
* Supreme Court curtails Chevron deference - The Verge
* Here’s What the Court’s Chevron Ruling Could Mean in Everyday Terms - The New York Times
* America’s Frozen Housing Market Is Warping the Economy - The Wall Street Journal
* Startup Silicon Box to Build $3.4 Billion Chip Plant in Italy - The Wall Street Journal
* Trump’s Economic Policies Could Hinder His Campaign - The Washington Post
Policy/Politics
* Chips Act Could Fail Without More Visas for Skilled Immigrants - Bloomberg
* House Privacy Talks Implode in Spectacular Fashion - The Washington Post
* Big Tech investors should be paying more attention to EU’s regulatory strikes - Financial Times
AI/Digital
* This Viral AI Chatbot Will Lie and Say It’s Human - Wired
* A New Method for Evaluating AI Models - arXiv
* OpenAI’s CriticGPT Outperforms Humans in Catching AI-Generated Code Bugs - Ars Technica
Biotech/Health
* To cure disease, AI needs more of our data - Financial Times
* Challenges in the Global Health Landscape - Nature
Clean Energy/Climate
* Solar Power’s Expansion and Food Production Are Compatible - Bloomberg
* Maldives’ Climate Change Challenges - The New York Times
* Innovations in Carbon Removal Technologies - Financial Times
* Carbon Removal’s Existential Question - Heatmap
Robotics/AVs
* A New Approach to Robot Navigation Using Camera and Feet - IEEE Spectrum
Space/Transportation
* SpaceX Valuation Reaches Record $210 Billion - Bloomberg
* Amazon Delays Launch of Project Kuiper Broadband Satellites - Bloomberg
Up Wing/Down Wing
* Secrets of 2000-Year-Old Antikythera Mechanism Revealed with Help from Gravitational Wave Technology - The Debrief
Substacks/Newsletters
* Is AI Going to Make Us Rich or Kill Us? - Economic Forces
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The image of the skyscraper is the hallmark of the modern city. Futuristic depictions of urban landscapes nearly always feature towering structures high above the clouds. Today, however, developing countries seem to be putting the greatest effort into building the most impressive skyscrapers, from the Burj Khalifa in the UAE, to the future Jeddah Tower in Saudi Arabia. Whether you love them or hate them, it’s worth asking why we build skyscrapers and what their role will be in future cities. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I sit down with Jason Barr, author of Cities in the Sky: The Quest to Build the World’s Tallest Skyscrapers.
Barr is a professor of economics at Rutgers University – Newark, and is a member of the Rutgers Global Urban Systems PhD program. He is also the author of Building the Skyline: The Birth and Growth of Manhattan’s Skyscrapers.
In This Episode
* Demand for the skyscraper (1:35)
* The end of the skyscraper (9:00)
* Pillars of commerce (14:05)
* The sky’s the limit (18:36)
* Manhattan extension (23:04)
* Trends and styles (24:23)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
The image of the skyscraper is the hallmark of the modern city. Futuristic depictions of urban landscapes nearly always feature towering structures high above the clouds. Today, however, developing countries seem to be putting the greatest effort into building the most impressive skyscrapers, from the Burj Khalifa in the UAE, to the future Jeddah Tower in Saudi Arabia. Whether you love them or hate them, it’s worth asking why we build skyscrapers and what their role will be in future cities. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I sit down with Jason Barr, author of Cities in the Sky: The Quest to Build the World’s Tallest Skyscrapers.
Barr is a professor of economics at Rutgers University – Newark, and is a member of the Rutgers Global Urban Systems PhD program. He is also the author of Building the Skyline: The Birth and Growth of Manhattan’s Skyscrapers.
Demand for the skyscraper (1:35)
Pethokoukis: You obviously love skyscrapers, you're fascinated by them. You wrote a whole book on them. So I want to just start the very basic question: Why do skyscrapers fascinate you, and the people who aren't fascinated by them, what are they missing?
Barr: Great questions. Well, I grew up on Long Island, and so I was always really fascinated with Manhattan. I grew up in the ’70s, and so New York back then was a very dark, mysterious place for a youngster. So when I grew up, actually when I was in college, I started hanging out in the city. So to me, the skyline of Manhattan and New York City, they're just two sides of the same coin. I really developed an interest in tall buildings through my interest and fascination with Manhattan’s and New York City's history.
So when I came to Rutgers Newark, I just started doing research on tall buildings, especially in New York City: what was driving the heights of these buildings; there's all these interesting height cycles over the last 150 years. So I wrote my first book on the Manhattan skyline, that was called Building the Skyline, and then after that I thought, let's see what's happening around the rest of the world. So to me, the tall building is an interesting thing because it's part and parcel with urbanization, and I just personally don't think you could have one without the other.
I think some people might think that skyscrapers are, at least for rich countries, that they're kind of a 20th-century thing that we did as we were growing, and cities were getting bigger, and skyscrapers are a part of that, but now they're for other parts of the world, parts of the world which are still urbanizing, which are still getting richer. Are skyscrapers are still a thing for America?
The short answer is yes, but, given how dense cities are, tall buildings are just being added a lot more slowly. In New York, the population's kind of slowly growing, and so tall buildings are either replacing old buildings that are wearing out, or there's always this push by big global corporations to be in the newest and latest tall building. And obviously there's this international demand from people abroad to have an apartment — or national demand — global demand to have some kind of residential presence in New York. But the thing is, people in other countries: cities, planners, residents in other countries, they look to New York, they look to Chicago, and I think, for many of them, they see New York as something they want to emulate, and New York is, on just about almost any metric, it's probably the top global city. And so I think cities today, especially in China, and Asia more broadly, they're trying to kind of replicate that, what you might call “the Manhattan magic,” and I don't really think people in this country realize how much tall building construction is going on in other cities around the world. People in this country are a little bit more cynical about the role of the tall building in urban growth and in housing affordability and stuff like this, but other cities are basically going gangbusters, is a way to put it.
Is that driven by fundamental economic forces? Is it kind of a “national greatness” kinds of signaling projects? Are there fundamental reasons, not just to build skyscrapers, but to build very, very tall skyscrapers?
“All of the above” is the answer. Fundamentally, if there's many, many people who want to be working, living, playing in the center, the only way to accommodate the demand to be in the center is to make more land in the center, so the skyscraper, at its heart, is what I would say is “land in the sky.” You just go vertical because there's constraints on how much land there is in the center.
Having said that, definitely the skyscraper is seen as a kind of way to advertise, a way to increase confidence in the place, and so you boost foreign direct investment. Observatories are huge money makers, there’s a big tourism component. A lot of critics will say, “Oh, it's all about spectacle and ego.” But really, for the book, and just more broadly my research, when you drill down on the economics of these super tall buildings, not all of them are profitable or profit-maximizing, but they all have a strong economic rationale.
Now, I just also want to say, China has its own thing going on, which sort of compounds the skyscraper construction-building there because of their unique governance structure and land ownership structure, but China is building tall buildings because, at the end of the day, there's a kind of, what I call, a “tall building bling.” There's just something that says, “This city is growing, this city is drawing population.” So we build a tall building and we boost confidence in the city. And it works, really.
The pictures don't have to be too old, if you look at a picture of Shanghai, it looks a lot different not too long ago. It's almost as if a whole other city just kind of fell from the sky, a city of skyscrapers, and where there were once goats or something grazing, there's now a bunch of massive skyscrapers.
Yeah, absolutely, and there's a few reasons for this. One is, I think Chinese residents more broadly see tall building as a natural way to live. I've talked to many Chinese residents, whether it's Shanghai or other cities, and to them, to own an apartment in the sky is like the greatest thing. It's their equivalent of the single family home in the United States. Living in the clouds is something many people aspire to. The other aspect of it is, Shanghai, and the Pudong neighborhood in Shanghai, was chosen basically to become a financial hub. Basically, the leaders were looking at Hong Kong and they thought it was a, to quote, I forgot the author, but to quote him in the book, the Shanghai officials and the National Party officials saw Hong Kong as that frustratingly free city, and so they wanted to create a kind of a financial hub in Shanghai. And so the Shanghai Tower, for example, is part of that plan to really draw people's attention to Shanghai, itself. So it was part of a master plan.
The end of the skyscraper (9:00)
I certainly remember that, after 9/11, I heard about “the end of the skyscraper,” and then during the pandemic, I heard about “the end of the city.” Now I'm guessing that cities will continue to exist and we're going to continue to build tall buildings.
Absolutely. What 9/11 did was just make sure that we make our building safer with fire protection measures. In many Asian countries, every 20 floors, let's say, are mechanical floors, so you have the electric equipment, and the heating, and the cooling, and water tanks. They can also surround these in concrete, and so if something's on fire, if a floor is on fire, they can go to this hermetically sealed floor, a refuge floor, and stay there and be protected. And the elevator cores, they're made of concrete, and so you wouldn't have something like what happened on 9/11. So it didn't really impact the demand; 9/11 didn't impact the demand for the tall building, it just made us make tall buildings safer. And of course the downside is if you want to go into an office building, you have to have a swipe and you have to have an entry, so the negative of 9/11 was more about heightened security and increasing protections in a way that engenders a little bit more mistrust of us. But the demand didn't go away.
Same thing with Covid. For big cities like New York and San Francisco, I'm sure the empty-office problem is going to dissipate. It'll take a while. This may be an overly broad statement, but the truth is, our present and future is in cities. The funny thing about the internet and social media and all that, it was supposed to allow us to suburbanize more, or run away from these big, overcrowded cities, but the truth is, social media and internet technology has just made cities even more important. So, as long as cities are growing, there'll be a demand for tall buildings
Of the tallest, I don't know, half-dozen buildings, have you been to all of them?
That's a good question. I've been to the Shanghai Tower, which was the second-tallest building in the world, now is the third-tallest. The one that replaced it, I think it's [Merdeka 118] in Kuala Lumpur, I believe. I didn't go to that one yet because that just opened up recently. I've been to the Burj Khalifa, which is the world's tallest building. I'd have to look at the list. I've been to the Sears Tower, Empire State Building . . . Anyway, so I've been to a handful of them. I can't say I've been to every single one of the super-tall buildings in the world
And in any of those super-tall buildings, can you open a window? Why can't you open the windows in these skyscrapers?
Well, the wind forces are just tremendous! The biggest problem engineering tall buildings is making sure that the building doesn't sway so that people feel it. The really fascinating thing about engineering tall buildings is this question: How do you allow the building to sway enough so that you don't have to — you don’t want to over-engineer a building so that you make it perfectly stiff because that's just completely uneconomic to do that, but you want to make sure the building sways just enough so if you're sitting there reading a newspaper or drinking a cup of coffee on the top floor, you don't feel it. And so the wind forces high, a thousand feet in the air, are just so tremendous. I think if you open the window, everything would just would just blow away.
I was thinking about some of those very, super-skinny residential buildings, which I guess seem to be becoming more popular, and do those people really feel the motion?
From what I can tell, the short answer is no. There's one lawsuit in Manhattan, in particular, where the engineering wasn't exactly perfectly right, but I think that represents the exception that proves the rule. The building is safe, that's not the problem, it's just that, when you're dealing with these super-skinny buildings — these are kind of a new kind of breed of super-tall buildings, so sometimes the engineering isn't perfectly right, so they will figure out ways to kind of fix those problems. The problems are solvable, but sometimes if you don't get it 100 percent right, people complain, and obviously there's lawsuits and you have to go back in and tweak the engineering. But these things are selling for 70, 80, 100 million dollars for a penthouse on the 90th floor, so people still value them, and if motion sickness was a problem, they'd be worthless.
Pillars of commerce (14:05)
In the book, you run through a number of myths: tall buildings being only for the rich, that they drive up housing prices in cities, again, that you mentioned a little bit earlier, that they're somehow bad economic deals. All these myths all tend to be very negative.
I'm not going to rename your book, but I could call it “Cathedrals in the Sky,” I mean, I think these are beautiful buildings that say a lot about human aspiration and to create a sense of awe. Boy, but some people just do not see it that way.
I think there's a few strands; I've been thinking about this. There's a kind of a NIMBY strand, and sort of a NIMBY/gentrification strand. So people in the middle income, let's say, they see their housing prices going up, their rent going up, and then they see these billionaire condos, and so they, in my opinion, or based on my research, there's a confusion of correlation and causation. So the most visible manifestation in people's minds of gentrification and affordability problems are the super-slim buildings, but New York City has something like 3.6 million housing units, and if you look at the outlying areas of Queens and Staten Island, they're just covered in one- and two-family homes. Those neighborhoods have added barely any housing. So all of the housing — I'm exaggerating here when I say the word “all,” but the vast majority of new housing units happens in the center where either the zoning is more permissive, or old industrial sites come online and things like this, so people don't realize that the problem of housing affordability is citywide, it just looks naturally to be in their neighborhood where high rises are going up.
Then there's another strand, which I would say is kind of the “Jane Jacobs strand” / the anti-public-housing strand. Jane Jacobs has some great points in her book, The Death and Life of Great American Cities about walkability, about eyes on the street. She wasn't a big fan of tall buildings, and this has kind of given rise to this whole movement of “human scale,” where five-story Greenwich Village buildings, or 10-story Parisian mansard-roof-type buildings are perfect, and any other deviation from that is somehow destroying the city. So there's that part of it, that people see tall buildings as somehow destroying the feel or the perfect fabric of the city. And lastly, obviously, some of the failures with the public housing policy has made people convinced that it's unhealthy to live in these tall buildings. I think that gets at what you're inquiring about. I think there's those different strains.
I wonder if part of it stems for a confusion about what are cities for, and I mean cities are, for a large part, are where people to come together for jobs and to conduct commerce. And if you think of them that way, then certain things make sense; but if you think of them as, I don't know, some sort of urban retreat, where it's kind of like a garden or . . . I don't know, but it's a very different view, and perhaps it is not just about bike paths, but it's about what facilitates people to connect.
Without jobs, without a labor market, there's no purpose to have a city. Maybe in the 18th or 19th century, you can create a city for the king or the empire, as are many examples, or the Vatican or something like this; so you can have these sort of political capital cities, or even Washington DC, but, fundamentally, 99 percent of the world’s cities are places where people go to work, and so, if you don't allow the labor market to function properly, which means having a functioning housing market, then all these ideas about “the good city” and “the perfectly crafted city,” they kind of are irrelevant.
So you have to start with: what makes a city grow, what makes people productive, and then how do we accommodate that? To the extent that we can improve design, all the better. There's always a million ways to make things better for people design-wise. I think bike lanes are great, and I think pedestrian-friendly cities are better than car-centric cities, but you can't start with designing the city first and then seeing what happens. You have to start with “let's make an attractive place to live and work” first, and then work on the design feature second.
The sky’s the limit (18:36)
How tall are these buildings going to get?
Okay, well, the next world's tallest building is going to be one kilometer: The Jeddah Tower, which had started, I think back in 2013 or 2015, had been stalled, there was some sort of political turmoil in Saudi Arabia, and they've just restarted this Jeddah Tower in the city of Jeddah. And so when that's completed, that's going to be one kilometer. There were some plans floated to have a two-kilometer building in Riyadh. I don't think anyone really thinks that's going to happen.
How long does it take to get up to your office in a two-kilometer building?
Well, that's the thing. They're coming up with new ways to get people up there faster. The old conventional steel cables could maybe go 500 meters or something like that, which is maybe 80 floors or something. Maybe if you had a really good cable, you can get people to 80 floors and then they'd have to switch. Now they have these composite . . . it’s KONE UltraRope, which could go 1000 meters, which could go basically one kilometer continuously. So if you can get people from the ground floor to wherever their destination is within a minute, that's kind of like the golden rule here. People are not willing to wait more than a minute once they get in the elevator. The trick really is the ear pressure, and that's probably the hardest part because you're going up so quickly, the air pressure changes, so you have to figure out ways to make sure the cabin remains pressurized, and then there's the air pressure up on the highest floors. So that, I would argue, is the fundamental issue that's going to be coming next on the horizon is how to efficiently pressurize the highest floors. Let's say you're a mile high; if you're a mile high on the top floor, that's the equivalent of going from New York to Denver in a minute, or two minutes. So you have to figure out a way how to pressurize the entire building so it has a constant air pressure.
If I were to look at the skyline of major American cities 50 years from now, would you expect them to be radically different, futuristic looking, maybe not two-kilometer buildings, but a lot of very, very tall buildings? Or is it again, if they're not growing, if population isn't growing, then that won’t happen?
People are always asking me what I think about the doom loops and all that. Pick New York as one end of the spectrum: It's always going to be adding new buildings, that's just in its DNA, and so you're going to have this kind of collage of different building styles. But other cities, smaller cities, maybe where people are moving now because working from home, they'll add a few tall buildings here, they'll have mini-skylines. Then the other cities, like a St. Louis, that's just going to have to kind of figure out a plan for growth. So I don't see the world as a kind of Jetsons-type world.
I mean, you never know what's going to happen with the technology. There’s one company, TK or Thyssenkrupp elevators, they're working on Maglev elevators, and this can actually be a game changer because you have these shafts, so the Maglev elevator cars, they can go up or down or they can go horizontal. Part of the goal with that is that everybody has their own — if it's an apartment building, they have their own elevator car, it takes them up to their apartment, it becomes the door. So that could be a real game changer . . . And then you could run these things horizontally. So if you have these Maglev elevators, you can not only run them horizontally within the building, but, in principle, if you could work out property rights or whatever, you could connect these things across buildings. But at the end of the day, it's really about preferences and a kind of cultural perception of the tall building, and I just don't see us in the United States us having a dramatic, country-wide rethinking of where we live. There's always going to be this desire for the single-family home in the suburbs. Now maybe that'll diminish to some degree, but as long as people see their own little house as their own little castle . . .
Unlike China, where there seems to be a great desire to live in these kinds of buildings.
Manhattan extension (23:04)
Have you had any takers about your proposal to make Manhattan bigger?
No.
You would extend it by about 2000 acres and maybe build some tall buildings on that, I don't know.
The idea would be to create a new mini-Manhattan extending Manhattan into New York Harbor. Just briefly, the idea was both to add more housing and add more land, and to protect lower Manhattan against sea level rises and so forth. I proposed this in a New York Times op-ed piece, and, naturally, I would say the majority of commenters and people had this sort of kneejerk reaction against it.
I had a kneejerk reaction for it! I loved it!
You are part of a small, select core of appreciators, let's say. Having said that, in the 21st century it’s just not something I think most people are willing to wrap their heads around. So
To me, that's an idea with the future, and I think you should not be dejected that it was not initially well-received. I think that kind of idea might actually have some legs.
Trends and styles (24:23)
Finally, let me ask you, whether it's because of computers or new materials, would we expect skyscrapers in the future to look any differently? I think some people would love to go back to the 1930s style. They love that style of skyscraper, and they don't like the glass-and-steel, very rectangular skyscraper; they want it to look like Gotham City or something.
Actually, if you look in Manhattan, in Brooklyn there's one, I think they're calling it something like the “Dark Knight Tower” or the “Gotham Tower.” It's in Brooklyn and it has this almost art deco sort of —
It slipped my mind, I was thinking art deco, yes.
And there's a high rise apartment near Columbia University, which uses the same color masonry as the surrounding buildings. I think it's the Union Theological Seminary, which sold some of the land to build a high rise. It sort of blends in. So I guess the question is really architecturally speaking, and it's sort of hard to say. I think maybe there'll be some neo-historical buildings coming up here or there, but there's two things: One is that people like glass windows. People love to have light and views, and so that's really just pushing the glass buildings. I think developers like glass too, because it's easy to work with, and architects — if you're a developer and you want a super-tall building, you usually go to a handful of architects and you have some kind of design competition, and, chances are, you're going to get something that looks full of glass and has some funky geometry to it.
But they seem more twisty than they used to, so they're not just perfect rectangles.
Right, so you're creating a lot of illusion. The interesting thing is, at the end of the day, you can only have certain internal shapes because you need functional spaces, so you have to have illusion with the twisting and these sort of Jenga towers, and a lot of that is due to massive improvements in computer technology; so the rendering software has dramatically improved, the engineering know-how, the engineering technology improved, you can send your designs right to the manufacturer where they can then use the computer programs to design exactly the shapes and sizes.
So it's the learning curve of every building that you do adds to the knowledge of how to do something a little bit different, or some version of something before, and also just massive computer power. I think there'll be a lot more of these sort of funky architectural shape. How they hold up, only time tells. In the ’80s there was this massive postmodern boom with all kinds of pastiche-type buildings with all kinds of references to old buildings, and funky buildings, and some of those haven't held up as well.
Frankly, I'm from Chicago, and I know exactly what you're talking about. Also being from Chicago, I appreciate you calling that building the Sears Tower rather than what other name they try to put on it. Last question: Do you have a favorite skyscraper?
I’m from New York and I like the Empire State Building, and it's not just because architecturally a classic building, but it speaks to New York as a city of strivers. And the more research I did into the Empire State Building, the more I appreciate the sheer guts of these guys who built this building. And the thing is, when it was completed in 1931, Great Depression was really starting to kick into high gear, and so the building was unrented, and it kind of gave this whole mythology about how these guys didn't know what they were doing, but when you crunch the numbers, they knew exactly what they were doing. They knew what the landscape looked like for New York, and the costs, and the revenues. Nobody saw the Great Depression coming, and so to say that the Great Depression showed how foolish these were, I just think it's a bad standard to hold them to. And if you look at the revenues and them building value over its 90-whatever, 93-year history, it's been a money-maker for almost a century. After the Great Depression, it recovered and has become an icon and a moneymaker, so what's not to love about that?
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The media is full of dystopian depictions of artificial intelligence, such as The Terminator and The Matrix, yet few have dared to dream up the image of an AI utopia. Nick Bostrom’s most recent book, Deep Utopia: Life and Meaning in a Solved World attempts to do exactly that. Bostrom explores what it would mean to live in a post-work world, where human labor is vastly outperformed by AI, or even made obsolete. When all of our problems have been solved in an AI utopia . . . well, what’s next for us humans?
Bostrom is a philosopher and was founding director of the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University. He is currently the founder and director of research at the Macrostrategy Research Initiative. He also wrote the much-discussed 2014 book, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies.
In This Episode
* Our dystopian predisposition (1:29)
* A utopian thought experiment (5:16)
* The plausibility of a solved world (12:53)
* Weighing the risks (20:17)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
Our dystopian predisposition (1:29)
Pethokoukis: The Dutch futurist, Frederik Polak famously put it that any culture without a positive vision of the future has no future. It's a light paraphrase. And I kind of think that's where we are right now, that despite the title of your book, I feel like right now people can only imagine dystopia. Is that what you think? Do I have that wrong?
Bostrom: It's easier to imagine dystopia. I think we are all familiar with a bunch of dystopian works of fiction. The average person could rattle off Brave New World, 1984, The Handmaid's Tale. Most people couldn't probably name a single utopian work, and even the attempts that have been made, if you look closely at them, you probably wouldn't actually want to live there. It is an interesting fact that it seems easier for us to imagine ways in which things could be worse than ways in which things could be better. Maybe some culture that doesn't have a positive vision has no future but, then again, cultures that have had positive visions also often have ended in tears. A lot of the times utopian blueprints have been used as excuses for imposing coercively some highly destructive vision on society. So you could argue either way whether it is actually beneficial for societies to have a super clear, long-term vision that they are staring towards.
I think if we were to ask people to give a dystopian vision, we would get probably some very picturesque, highly detailed visions from having sort of marinated in science fiction for decades. But then if you asked people about utopia, I wonder if all their visions would be almost alike: Kind of this clean, green world, with maybe some tall skyscrapers or something, and people generally getting along. I think it'd be a fairly bland, unimaginative vision.
That would be the idea of “all happy families are alike, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own unique way.” I think it's easy enough to enable ways in which the world could be slightly better than it is. So imagine a world exactly like the one we have, except minus childhood leukemia. So everybody would agree that definitely seems better. The problem is if you start to add these improvements and you stack on enough of them, then eventually you face a much more philosophically challenging proposition, which is, if you remove all the difficulties and all the shadows of human life, all forms of suffering and inconvenience, and all injustice and everything, then you risk ending up in this rather bland future where there is no challenge, no purpose, no meaning for us humans, and it then almost becomes utopian again, but in a different way. Maybe all our basic needs are catered to, but there seems to be then some other part missing that is important for humans to have flourishing lives.
A utopian thought experiment (5:16)
Is your book a forecast or is it a thought experiment?
It's much more a thought experiment. As it happens, I think there is a non-trivial chance we will actually end up in this condition, I call it a “solved world,” particularly with the impending transition to the machine intelligence era, which I think will be accompanied by significant risks, including existential risk. In my previous book, Superintelligence, which came out in 2014, focused on what could go wrong when we are developing machine super intelligence, but if things go right—and this could unfold within the lifetime of a lot of us who are alive on this planet today—if things go right, they could go very right, and, in particular, all kinds of problems that could be solved with better technology could be solved in this future where you have superintelligent AIs doing the technological development. And we might then actually confront the situation where these questions we can now explore as a thought experiment would become pressing practical questions where we would actually have to make decisions on what kinds of lives we want to live, what kind of future we want to create for ourselves if all these instrumental limitations were removed that currently constrain the choices set that we face.
I imagine the book would seem almost purely a thought experiment before November 2022 when ChatGPT was rolled out by OpenAI, and now, to some people, it seems like these are questions certainly worth pondering. You talked about the impending machine superintelligence—how impending do you think, and what is your confidence level? Certainly we have technologists all over the map speaking about the likelihood of reaching that maybe through large language models, other people think they can't quite get us there, so how much work is “impending” doing in that sentence?
I don't think we are in a position any longer to rule out even extremely short timelines. We can't be super confident that we might not have an intelligence explosion next year. It could take longer, it could take several years, it could take a decade or longer. We have to think in terms of smeared out probability distributions here, but we don't really know what capabilities will be unlocked as you scale up even the current architectures one more order of magnitude like GPT-5-level or GPT-6-level. It might be that, just as the previous steps from GPT-2 to GPT-3 and 3 to 4 sort of unlocked almost qualitatively new capabilities, the same might hold as we keep going up this ladder of just scaling up the current architectures, and so we are now in a condition where it could happen at any time, basically. It doesn't mean it will happen very soon, but we can't be confident that it won't.
I do think it is slightly easier for people maybe now, even just with looking at the current AI systems, we have to take these questions seriously, and I think it will become a lot easier as the penny starts to drop that we're about to see this big transition to the machine intelligence era. The previous book, Superintelligence, back in 2014 when that was published—and it was in the works for six years prior—at that time, what was completely outside the Overton window was even the idea that one day we would have machine superintelligence, and, in particular, the idea that there would then be an alignment problem, a technical difficulty of steering these superintelligent intellects so that they would actually do what we want. It was completely neglected by academia. People thought, that’s just science fiction or idle futurism. There were maybe a handful of people on the internet who were starting to think about that. In the intervening 10 years, that has changed, and so now all the frontier AI labs have research teams specifically trying to work on scalable methods for AI alignment, and it's much more widely recognized over the last couple of years that this will be a transformative thing. You have statements coming out from leading policy makers from the White House, the UK had this global summit on AI, and so this alignment problem and the risks related to AI have sort of entered the Overton window, and I think some of these other issues as to what the world will look like if we succeed, similarly, will have to come inside the Overton window, and probably will do so over the next few years.
So we have an Overton window, we have this technological advance with machine intelligence. Are you as confident about one of the other pillars of your thought experiment, which is an equally, what might seem science-futuristic advance in our ability to edit ourselves, to modify ourselves and our brains and our emotions. That seems to hand-in-hand with the thought experiment.
I think once we develop machine superintelligence, then we will soon thereafter have tremendous advances in other technological areas as well because we would then not be restricted to humans trying to develop new technologies with our biological brains. But this research and development would be done by superintelligences on digital timescales rather than biological timescales. So the transition to superintelligence would, I think, mean a kind of telescoping of the future.
So there are all these technologies we can see are, in principle, possible. They don't violate the law of physics. In the fullness of time, probably human civilization would reach them if we had 10,000 years to work on it, all these science fiction like space colonies, or cures for aging, or perfect virtual reality uploading into computers, we could see how we might eventually . . . They're unrealistic given the current state of technology, but there's no (in principle) barriers, so we could imagine developing those if we had thousands of years to work on them. But all those technologies might become available quite soon after you have superintelligence doing the research and development. So I think we will then start to approximate the condition of technological maturity, like a condition where we have already developed most of those general purpose technologies that are physically possible, and for which there exists some in principally feasible pathway from where we are now to developing them.
The plausibility of a solved world (12:53)
I know one criticism of the book is, with this notion of a “solved world” or technological maturity, that the combinatorial nature of ideas would allow for almost an unlimited number of new possibilities, so in no way could we reach maturity or a technologically solved state of things. Is that a valid criticism?
Well, it is a hypothesis you could entertain that there is an infinite number of ever-higher levels of technological capability such that you'd never be able to reach or even approximate any maximum. I think it's more likely that there will eventually be diminishing returns. You will eventually have figured out the best way to do most of the general things that need doing: communicating information, processing information, processing raw materials, creating various physical structures, et cetera, et cetera. That happens to be my best guess, but in any case, you could bracket that, we could at least establish lower bounds on the kinds of technological capabilities that an advanced civilization with superintelligence would be able to develop, and we can list out a number of those technologies. Maybe it would be able to do more than that, but at least it would be able to do various things that we can already sort of see and outline how you could do, it's just we can't quite put all the pieces together and carry it out yet.
And the book lists a bunch of these affordances that a technologically mature civilization would at least have, even if maybe there would be further things we haven't even dreamt of yet. And already that set of technological capabilities would be enough to radically transform the human condition, and indeed to present us with some of these basic philosophical challenges of how to live well in this world where we wouldn't only have a huge amount of control over the external reality, we wouldn't only be able to automate human labor across almost all domains, but we would also, as you alluded to earlier, have unprecedented levels of control over ourselves or our biological organism and our minds using various forms of bio technologies or newer technologies.
In this kind of scenario, is the purpose of our machines to solve our problems, or, not give us problems, but give us challenges, give us things to do?
It then comes down to questions about value. If we had all of these capabilities to achieve various types of worlds, which one would we actually want? And I think there are layers to this onion, different levels of depth at which one can approach and think about this problem. At the outermost layer you have the idea that, well, we will have increased automation as a result of advances in AI and robotics, and so there will be some humans who become unemployed as a result. At the most superficial layer of analysis, you would then think, “Well some jobs become unnecessary, so you need to maybe retrain workers to move to other areas where there is continued demand for human labor. Maybe they need some support whilst they're retraining and stuff like that.”
So then you take it a step further, like you peel off another layer of the onion and you realize that, well, if AI truly succeeds, if you have artificial general intelligence, then it's really not just some areas of human economic contribution that gets affected, but all areas, with a few exceptions that we can return to. But AIs could do everything that we can do, and do it better, and cheaper, and more efficiently. And you could say that the goal of AI is full unemployment. The goal is not just to automate a few particular tasks, but to develop a technology that allows us to automate all tasks. That's kind of what AI has always been about; it's not succeeded yet, but that's the goal, and we are seemingly moving closer to that. And so, with the asterisk here that there are a few exceptions that we can zoom in on, you would then get a kind of post-work condition where there would be no need for human labor at all.
My baseline—I think this is a reasonable baseline—is that the history of technology is a history of both automating things, but then creating new things for us to do. So I think if you ask just about any economist, they will say that that should be our guide for the future: that this exact same technology will think of new things for people to do, that we, at least up to this point, have shown infinite creativity in creating new things to do, and whether you want to call those “work,” there's certainly things for us to do, so boredom should not be an issue.
So there's a further question of whether there is anything for us to do, but if we just look at the work part first, are there ways for humans to engage in economically productive labor? And, so far, what has been the case is that various specific tasks have been automated, and so instead of having people digging ditches using their muscles, we can have bulldozers digging ditches, and you could have one guy driving the bulldozer and do the work of 50 people with a shovel or something. And so human labor is kind of just moving out of the areas where you can automate it and into other areas where we haven't yet been able to automate it. But if AIs are able to do all the things that we can do, then that would be no further place, it would look like, at least at first sight, for human workers to move into. The exceptions to this, I think, are cases were the consumer cares not just about the product, but about how the product
They want that human element.
You could have consumers with just a raw preference that a particular task was performed by humans or a particular product—just as now sometimes consumers play a little premium sometimes if a little gadget was produced by a politically favored group, or maybe handcrafted by indigenous people, we may pay more for it than if the same object was made in a sweatshop in Indonesia or something. Even if the actual physical object itself is equally good in both cases, we might care about the causal process that brought it into existence. So to the extent that consumers have those kinds of preferences, there could remain ineliminable demand for human labor, even at technological maturity. You could think of possible examples: Maybe we just prefer to watch human athletes compete, even if robots could run faster or box harder. Maybe you want a human priest to officiate at your wedding, even if the robot could say the same words with the same intonations and the same gestures, et cetera. So there could be niches of that sort, where there would remain demand for human labor no matter how advanced our technology.
Weighing the risks (20:17)
Let me read one friendly critique from Robin Hanson of the book:
Bostrom asks how creatures very much like him might want to live for eons if they had total peace, vast wealth, and full eternal control of extremely competent AI that could do everything better than they. He . . . tries to list as many sensible possibilities as possible . . .
But I found it . . . hard to be motivated by his key question. In the future of creatures vastly more capable than us I'm far more interested in what those better creatures would do than what a creature like me now might do there. And I find the idea of creatures like me being rich, at peace, and in full control of such a world quite unlikely.
Is the question he would prefer you answer unanswerable, therefore you cannot answer that question, so the only question you can answer is what people like us would be like?
No, I think there are several different questions, each of which, I think, is interesting. In some of my other work, I do, in fact, investigate what other creatures, non-human creatures, digital minds we might be building, for example, AIs of different types, what they might want and how one might think of what would be required for the future to go well for these new types of being that we might be introducing. I think that's an extremely important question as well, particularly from a moral point of view. It might be, in the future, most inhabitants of the future will be digital minds or AIs of different kinds. Some might be at scales far larger than us human beings.
In this book, though, I think the question I'm primarily interested in is: What if we are interested in it from our own perspective, what is the best possible future we could hope for for ourselves, given the values that we actually have? And I think that could be practically relevant in various ways. There could, for example, arise situations where we have to make trade-offs between delaying the transition to AI with maybe the risk going up or down, depending on how long we take for it. And then, in the meantime, people like us dying, just as a result of aging and disease and all kinds of things that currently result in people.
So what are the different risk tradeoffs we are willing to take? And that might depend, in part, on how much better we think our lives could be if this goes well. If the best we could hope for was just continuing our current lives for a bit longer, that might be a different choice situation than if there was actually on the table something that would be super desirable from our current point of view, then we might be willing to take bigger risks to our current lives if there was at least some chance of achieving this much better life. And I think those questions, from a prudential point of view, we can only try to answer if we have some conception of how good the potential outcome would be for us. But I agree with him that both of these questions are important.
It also seems to me that, initially, there was a lot of conversation after the rollout of ChatGPT about existential risk, we were talking about an AI pause, and I feel like the pendulum has swung completely to the other side, that, whether it's due to people not wanting to miss out on all the good stuff that AI could create, or worried about Chinese AI beating American AI, that the default mode that we're in right now is full speed ahead, and if there are problems we'll just have to fix them on the fly, but we're just not going to have any substantial way to regulate this technology, other than, perhaps, the most superficial of guardrails. I feel like that's where we're at now; at least, that's what I feel like in Washington right now.
Yeah, I think that has been the default mode of AI development since its inception, and still is today, predominantly. The difficulties are actually to get the machines to do more, rather than how to limit what they're allowed to do. That is still the main thrust. I do think, though, that the first derivative of this is towards increased support for various kinds of regulations and restrictions, and even a growing number of people calling for an “AI pause” or wanting to stop AI development altogether. This used to be basically a completely fringe . . . there were no real serious efforts to push in this direction for almost all decades of AI up until maybe two years ago or so. And since then there has been an increasingly vocal, still minority, but a set of people who are trying hard to push for increased regulation, and for slowing down, and for raising the alarm of AI developments. And I think it remains an open question how this will unfold over the coming years.
I have a complex view on this, what would actually be desirable here. On the one hand, I do think there are these significant risks, including existential risks, that will accompany a transition. When we develop superintelligent machines, it's not just one cool more gadget, right? It's the most important thing ever happening in human history, and they will be to us as we are to chimpanzees or something—potentially a very powerful force, and things could go wrong there. So I do agree with the C.
So I've been told over the past two years!
And to the point where some people think of me as a kind of doomsayer or anti-AI, but that's not the full picture. I think, ultimately, it would be a catastrophe if superintelligence was never developed, and that we should develop this, ideally carefully, and it might be desirable if, at a critical point, just when we figure out how to make machines superintelligent, whoever is doing this, whether it's some private lab, or some government Manhattan Project, whoever it is, has the ability to go a little bit slow in that, maybe to pause for six months or, rather than immediately cranking all the knobs up to 11, maybe do it incrementally, see what happens, make sure the safety mechanisms work. I think that might be more ideal than a situation where you have, say, 15 different labs all racing together first, and whoever takes any extra precautions just immediately fall behind and become irrelevant. I think that would seem . . .
I feel like where we're at right now—I may have answered this differently 18 months ago—but I feel like where we're at right now is that second scenario. At least here in the United States, and maybe I'm too Washington-centric, but I feel we're at the “crank it up to 11,” realistically, phase.
Well, we have seen the first-ever real AI regulations coming on board. It's something rather than nothing, and so you could easily imagine, if pressure continues to build, there will be more demand for this, and then, if you have some actual adverse event, like some bad thing happening, then who knows? There are other technologies that have been stymied because of . . . like human cloning, for example, or nuclear energy in many countries. So it's not unprecedented that society could convince itself that it's bad. So far, historically, all these technology bans and relinquishments have probably been temporary because there have been other societies making other choices, and eventually, just like each generation is, to some extent, like a new role of the die, and eventually you get . . .
But it might be that we already have, in particular with AI technologies that, if fully deployed, could allow a society in a few years to lock itself in to some sort of permanent orthodoxy. If you imagine deploying even current AI systems fully to censor dissenting information—if you had some huge stigmatization of AI where it becomes just taboo to say anything positive about AI, and then very efficient ways of enforcing that orthodoxy by shadow banning people who dissent from it, or canceling them, or you could imagine surveilling anybody not to do any research on AI like that, the technology to sort of freeze in a temporary social consensus might be emerging. And so if 10 years from now there were a strong global consensus of some of these issues, then we can't rule out that that would become literally permanent. My probably optimal level of government oversight and regulation would be more than we currently have, but I do worry a little bit about it not increasing to the optimal point and then stopping there, but once the avalanche starts rolling, it could overshoot the target and result in a problem. To be clear, I still think that's unlikely, but I think it's more likely than it was two years ago.
In 2050, do you feel like we'll be on the road to deep utopia or deep dystopia?
I hope the former, I think both are still in the cards for what we know. There are big forces at play here. We've never had machine intelligence transition before. We don't have the kind of social or economic predictive science that really allows us to say what will happen to political dynamics as we change these fundamental parameters of the human condition. We don't yet have a fully reliable solution to the problem of scalable alignment. I think we are entering uncharted territories here, and both extremely good and extremely bad outcomes are possible, and we are a bit in the dark as to how all of this will unfold.
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While AI doomers proselytize their catastrophic message, many politicians are recognizing that the loss of America’s competitive edge poses a much more real threat than the supposed “existential risk” of AI. Today on Faster, Please!—The Podcast, I talk with Adam Thierer about the current state of the AI policy landscape and the accompanying fierce regulatory debate.
Thierer is a senior fellow at the R Street Institute, where he promotes greater freedom for innovation and entrepreneurship. Prior to R Street, he worked as a senior fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, president of the Progress and Freedom Foundation, and at the Adam Smith Institute, Heritage Foundation, and Cato Institute.
In This Episode
* A changing approach (1:09)
* The global AI race (7:26)
* The political economy of AI (10:24)
* Regulatory risk (16:10)
* AI policy under Trump (22:29)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
A changing approach (1:09)
Pethokoukis: Let's start out with just trying to figure out the state of play when it comes to AI regulation. Now I remember we had people calling for the AI Pause, and then we had a Biden executive order. They're passing some sort of act in Europe on AI, and now recently a senate working group in AI put out a list of guidelines or recommendations on AI. Given where we started, which was “shut it down,” to where we're at now, has that path been what you might've expected, given where we were when we were at full panic?
Thierer: No, I think we've moved into a better place, I think. Let's look back just one year ago this week: In the Senate Judiciary Committee, there was a hearing where Sam Altman of OpenAI testified along with Gary Marcus, who's a well-known AI worrywart, and the lawmakers were falling all over themselves to praise Sam and Gary for basically calling for a variety of really extreme forms of AI regulation and controls, including not just national but international regulatory bodies, new general purpose licensing systems for AI, a variety of different types of liability schemes, transparency mandates, disclosure as so-called “AI nutritional labels,” I could go on down the list of all the types of regulations that were being proposed that day. And of course this followed, as you said, Jim, a call for an AI Pause, without any details about exactly how that would work, but it got a lot of signatories, including people like Elon Musk, which is very strange considering he was at the same time deploying one of the biggest AI systems in history. But enough about Elon.
The bottom line is that those were dark days, and I think the tenor of the debate and the proposals on the table today, one year after that hearing, have improved significantly. That's the good news. The bad news is that there's still a lot of problematic regulatory proposals percolating throughout the United States. As of this morning, as we're taping the show, we are looking at 738 different AI bills pending in the United States according to multistate.ai, an AI tracking service. One hundred and—I think—eleven of those are federal bills. The vast majority of it is state. But that count does not include all of the municipal regulatory proposals that are pending for AI systems, including some that have already passed in cities like New York City that already has a very important AI regulation governing algorithmic hiring practices. So the bottom line, Jim, is it's the best of times, it's the worst of times. Things have both gotten better and worse.
Well—just because the most recent thing that happened—I know with this the senate working group, and they were having all kinds of technologists and economists come in and testify. So that report, is it really calling for anything specific to happen? What's in there other than just kicking it back to all the committees? If you just read that report, what does it want to happen?
A crucial thing about this report, and let's be clear what this is, because it was an important report because senator Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer was in charge of this, along with a bipartisan group of other major senators, and this started the idea of, so-called “AI insight forums” last year, and it seemed to be pulling some authority away from committees and taking it to the highest levels of the Senate to say, “Hey, we're going to dictate AI policy and we're really scared.” And so that did not look good. I think in the process, just politically speaking—
That, in itself, is a good example. That really represents the level of concern that was going around, that we need to do something different and special to address this existential risk.
And this was the leader of the Senate doing it and taking away power, in theory, from his committee members—which did not go over well with said committee members, I should add. And so a whole bunch of hearings took place, but they were not really formal hearings, they were just these AI insight forum working groups where a lot of people sat around and said the same things they always say on a daily basis, and positive and negatives of AI. And the bottom line is, just last week, a report came out from this AI senate bipartisan AI working group that was important because, again, it did not adopt the recommendations that were on the table a year ago when the process got started last June. It did not have overarching general-purpose licensing of artificial intelligence, no new call for a brand new Federal Computer Commission for America, no sweeping calls for liability schemes like some senators want, or other sorts of mandates.
Instead, it recommended a variety of more generic policy reforms and then kicked a lot of the authority back to those committee members to say, “You fill out the details, for better for worse.” And it also included a lot of spending. One thing that seemingly everybody agrees on in this debate is that, well, the government should spend a lot more money and so another $30 billion was on the table of sort of high-tech pork for AI-related stuff, but it really did signal a pretty important shift in approach, enough that it agitated the groups on the more pro-regulatory side of this debate who said, “Oh, this isn't enough! We were expecting Schumer to go for broke and swing for the fences with really aggressive regulation, and he's really let us down!” To which I can only say, “Well, thank God he did,” because we're in a better place right now because we're taking a more wait-and-see approach on at least some of these issues.
A big, big part of the change in this narrative is an acknowledgement of what I like to call the realpolitik of AI policy and specifically the realpolitik of geopolitics
The global AI race (7:26)
I'm going to ask you in a minute what stuff in those recommendations worries you, but before I do, what happened? How did we get from where we were a year ago to where we've landed today?
A big, big part of the change in this narrative is an acknowledgement of what I like to call the realpolitik of AI policy and specifically the realpolitik of geopolitics. We face major adversaries, but specifically China, who has said in documents that the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] has published that they want to be the global leader in algorithmic and computational technologies by 2030, and they're spending a lot of money putting a lot of state resources into it. Now, I don't necessarily believe that means they're going to automatically win, of course, but they're taking it seriously. But it's not just China. We have seen in the past year massive state investments and important innovations take place across the globe.
I'm always reminding people that people talk a big game about America's foundational models are large scale systems, including things like Meta’s Llama, which was the biggest open source system in the world a year ago, and then two months after Meta launched Llama, their open source platform, the government of the UAE came out with Falcon 180B, an open source AI model that was two-and-a-half times larger than Facebook's model. That meant America's AI supremacy and open source foundational models lasted for two months. And that's not China, that's the government of the UAE, which has piled massive resources into being a global leader in computation. Meanwhile, China's launched their biggest super—I'm sorry, Russia's launched their biggest supercomputer system ever; you've got Europe applying a lot of resources into it, and so on and so forth. A lot of folks in the Senate have come to realize that problem is real: that if we shoot ourselves in the foot as a nation, they could race ahead and gain competitive advantage in geopolitical strategic advantages over the United States if it hobbles our technology base. I think that's the first fundamental thing that's changed.
I think the other thing that changed, Jim, is just a little bit of existential-risk exhaustion. The rhetoric in this debate, as you've written about eloquently in your columns, has just been crazy. I mean, I've never really seen anything like it in all the years we've been covering technology and economic policy. You and I have both written, this is really an unprecedented level of hysteria. And I think, at some point, the Chicken-Littleism just got to be too much, and I think some saner minds prevailed and said, “Okay, well wait a minute. We don't really need to pause the entire history of computation to address these hypothetical worst-case scenarios. Maybe there's a better plan than that.” And so we're starting to pull back from the abyss, if you will, a little bit, and the adults are reentering the conversation—a little bit, at least. So I think those are the two things that really changed more, although there were other things, but those were two big ones.
The political economy of AI (10:24)
To what extent do you think we saw the retreat from the more apocalyptic thinking—how much that was due from what businesses were saying, venture capitalists, maybe other tech . . . ? What do you think were the key voices Congress started listening to a little bit more?
That's a great question. The political economy of AI policy and tech policy is something that is terrifically interesting to me. There are so many players and voices involved in AI policy because AI is the most important general-purpose technology of our time, and as a widespread broad base—
Do you have any doubt about that? (Let me cut you off.) Do you have any doubt about that?
I don't. I think it's unambiguous, and we live in a world of “combinatorial innovation,” as Hal Varian calls it, where technologies build on top of the other, one after another, but the thing is they all lead to greater computational capacity, and therefore, algorithmic and machine learning systems come out of those—if we allow it. And the state of data science in this country has gotten to the point where it's so sophisticated because of our rich base of diverse types of digital technologies and computational technologies that finally we're going to break out of the endless cycle of AI booms and busts, and springs and winters, and we're going to have a summer. I think we're having it right now. And so that is going to come to affect every single segment and sector of our economy, including the government itself.
I think industry has been very, very scrambled and sort of atomistic in their approach to AI policy, and some of them have been downright opportunistic, trying to throw each other’s competitors under the bus
Now let me let you go return to the political economy, what I was asking you about, what were the voices, sorry, but I wanted to get that in there.
Well, I think there are so many voices, I can't name them all today, obviously, but obviously we're going to start with one that's a quiet voice behind the scenes, but a huge one, which is, I think, the National Security community. I think clearly going back to our point about China and geopolitical security, I think a lot of people behind the scenes who care about these issues, including people in the Pentagon, I think they had conversations with certain members of Congress and said, “You know what? China exists. And if we're shooting ourselves in the foot, we begin this race for geopolitical strategic supremacy in an important new general-purpose technology arena, we're really hurting our underlying security as a nation. I think that that thinking is there. So that's an important voice.
Secondly, I think industry has been very, very scrambled and sort of atomistic in their approach to AI policy, and some of them have been downright opportunistic, trying to throw each other’s competitors under the bus, unfortunately, and that includes OpenAI trying to screw over other companies and technologies, which is dangerous, but the bottom line is: More and more of them are coming to realize, as they saw the actual details of regulation and thinking through the compliance costs, that “Hell no, we won't go, we're not going to do that. We need a better approach.” And it was always easier in the old days to respond to the existential risk route, like, “Oh yeah, sure, regulation is fine, we'll go along with it!” But then when you see the devilish details, you think twice and you realize, “This will completely undermine our competitive advantage in the space as a company or our investment or whatever else.” All you need to do is look at Exhibit A, which is Europe, and say, if you always run with worst-case scenario thinking and Chicken-Littleism is the basis of your technology policy, guess what? People respond to incentives and they flee.
Hatred of big tech is like the one great bipartisan, unifying theme of this Congress, if anything. But at the end of the day, I think everyone is thankful that those companies are headquartered in the United States and not Beijing, Brussels, or anywhere else.
It’s interesting, the national security aspect, my little amateurish thought experiment would be, what would be our reaction, and what would be the reaction in Washington if, in November, 2022, instead of it being a company, an American company with a big investment from another American company having rolled out ChatGPT, what if it would've been Tencent, or Alibaba, or some other Chinese company that had rolled this out, something that's obviously a leap forward, and they had been ahead, even if they said, “Oh, we're two or three years ahead of America,” it would've been bigger than Sputnik, I think.
People are probably tired of hearing about AI—hopefully not, I hope they'll also listen to this podcast—but that would all we would be talking about. We wouldn’t be talking about job loss, and we wouldn't be talking about ‘The Terminator,’ we'd be talking about the pure geopolitical terms that the US has suffered a massive, massive defeat here and who's to blame? What are we going to do? And anybody at that moment who would've said, “We need to launch cruise missile strikes on our own data centers” for fear. . . I mean! And I think you're right, the national security component, extremely important here.
In fact, I stole your little line about “Sputnik moment,” Jim, when I testified in front of the House Oversight Committee last month and I said, “Look, it would've been a true ‘Sputnik moment,’ and instead it's those other countries that are left having the Sputnik moment, right? They're wondering, ‘How is it that, once again, the United States has gotten out ahead on digital and computational-based technologies?’” But thank God we did! And as I pointed out in the committee room that day, there's a lot of people who have problems with technology companies in Congress today. Hatred of big tech is like the one great bipartisan, unifying theme of this Congress, if anything. But at the end of the day, I think everyone is thankful that those companies are headquartered in the United States and not Beijing, Brussels, or anywhere else. That's just a unifying theme. Everybody in the committee room that day nodded their head, “Yes, yes, absolutely. We still hate them, but we're thankful that they're here.” And that then extends to AI: Can the next generation of companies that they want to bring to Congress and bash and pull money from for their elections, can they once again exist in the United States?
Regulatory risk (16:10)
So whether it's that working group report, or what else you see in Congress, what are a couple, three areas where you're concerned, where there still seems to be some sort of regulatory momentum?
Let’s divide it into a couple of chunks here. First of all, at the federal level, Congress is so damn dysfunctional that I'm not too worried that even if they have bad ideas, they're going to pursue them because they're just such a mess, they can't get any basic things done on things like baseline privacy legislation, or driverless car legislation, or even, hell, the budget and the border! They can't get basics done!
I think it's a big positive that one, while they're engaging in dysfunction, the technology is evolving. And I hope, if it's as important as I think you and I think, more money will be invested, we'll see more use cases, it'll be obvious—the downsides of screwing up the regulation I think will be more obvious, and I think that's a tailwind for this technology.
We're in violent agreement on that, Jim, and of course this goes by the name of “the pacing problem,” the idea that technology is outpacing law in many ways, and one man's pacing problem is another man's pacing benefit, in my opinion. There's a chance for technology to prove itself a little bit. That being said, we don't live in a legislative or regulatory vacuum. We already have in the United States 439 government agencies and sub-agencies, 2.2 million employees just at the federal level. So many agencies are active right now trying to get their paws on artificial intelligence, and some of them already have it. You look at the FDA [Food and Drug Administration], the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], NHTSA [National Highway Traffic Safety Administration], I could go all through the alphabet soup of regulatory agencies that are already trying to regulate or overregulating AI right now.
Then you have the Biden administration, who's gone out and done a lot of cheerleading in favor of more aggressive unilateral regulation, regardless of what Congress says and basically says, “To hell with all that stuff about Chevron Doctrine and major questions, we're just going to go do it! We're at least going to jawbone a lot and try to threaten regulation, and we're going to do it in the name of ‘algorithmic fairness,’” which is what their 100-plus-page executive order and their AI Bill of Rights says they're all about, as opposed to talking about AI opportunity and benefits—it's all misery. And it's like, “Look at how AI is just a massive tool of discrimination and bias, and we have to do something about it preemptively through a precautionary principle approach.” So if Congress isn't going to act, unfortunately the Biden administration already is and nobody's stopping them.
But that's not even the biggest problem. The biggest problem, going back to the point that there are 730-plus bills pending in the US right now, the vast majority of them are state and local. And just last Friday, governor Jared Polis of Colorado signed into law the first major AI regulatory measure in Colorado, and there's a bigger and badder bill pending right now in California, there's 80 different bills pending in New York alone, and any half of them would be a disaster.
I could go on down the list of troubling state patchwork problems that are going to develop for AI and ML [Machine Learning] systems, but the bottom line is this: This would be a complete and utter reversal of the winning formula that Congress and the Clinton administration gave us in the 1990s, which was a national—a global framework for global electronic commerce. It was very intentionally saying, “We're going to break with the Analog Era disaster, we're going to have a national framework that's pro-freedom to innovate, and we're going to make sure that these meddlesome barriers do not develop to online speech and commerce.” And yet, here with AI, we are witnessing a reversal of that. States are in the lead, and again, like I said, localities too, and Congress is sitting there and is the dysfunctional soup that it is saying, “Oh, maybe we should do something to spend a little bit more money to promote AI.” Well, we can spend all the money we want, but we can end up like Europe who spends tons of money on techno-industrial policies and gets nothing for it because they can't get their innovation culture right, because they’re regulating the living hell out of digital technology.
So you want Congress to take this away from the states?
I do. I do, but it's really, really hard. I think what we need to do is follow the model that we had in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1998. We've also had moratoriums, not only through the Internet Tax Freedom Act, but through the Commercial Space Amendments having to do with space commercial travel and other bills. Congress has handled the question of preemption before and put moratoria in place to say, “Let's have a learning period before we go do stupid things on a new technology sector that is fast moving and hard to understand.” I think that would be a reasonable response, but again, I have to go back to what we just talked about, Jim, which is that there's no chance of us probably getting it. There's no appetite in it. Not any of the 111 bills pending in Congress right now says a damn thing about state and local regulation of technology!
Is the thrust of those federal bills, is it the kinds of stuff that you're generally worried about?
Mostly, but not entirely. Some of it is narrower. A lot of these bills are like, “Let's take a look at AI and. . . fill in the blank: elections, AI and jobs, AI and whatever.” And some of them, on the merits, not terrible, others, I have concerns, but it's certainly better that we take a targeted sectoral approach to AI policy and regulation than having the broad-based, general-purpose stuff. Now, there are broad-based, general-purpose measures, and here's what they do, Jim: They basically say, “Look, instead of having a whole cloth new regulatory approach, let's build on the existing types of approaches being utilized in the Department of Commerce, namely through our NIST [National Institute of Standards and Technology], and NTIA [National Telecommunications and Information Administration] sub-agencies there. NIST is the National Standards Body, and basically they develop best practices through something called the AI Risk Management Framework for artificial intelligence development—and they're good! It's multi-stakeholder, it's bottom up, it's driven by the same principles that motivated the Clinton administration to do multi-stakeholder processes for the internet. Good model. It is non-regulatory, however. It is a consensus-based, multi-stakeholder, voluntary approach to developing consensus-based standards for best practices regarding various types of algorithmic services. These bills in Congress—and there's at least five of them that I count, that I've written about recently—say, “Let's take that existing infrastructure and give it some enforcement teeth. Let's basically say, ‘This policy infrastructure will be converted into a quasi-regulatory system,’” and there begins the dangerous path towards backdoor regulation of artificial intelligence in this country, and I think that's the most likely model we'll get. Like I said, five models, legislative models in the Senate alone that would do that to varying degrees.
AI policy under Trump (22:29)
Do you have any feel for what a Trump administration would want to do on this?
I do, because a month before the Trump administration left office, they issued a report through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and it basically laid out for agencies a set of principles for how it should evaluate artificial intelligence systems, both that are used by the government or that they regulate in the private sector, and it was an excellent set of principles. It was a restatement of the importance of policy, forbearance and humility. It was a restatement of a belief in cost-benefit analysis and identifying not only existing regulatory capacity to address these problems, but also non-regulatory mechanisms or best practices or standards that could address some of these things. It was a really good memo. I praised it in a piece that I wrote just before the Trump administration left. Now, of course, the Trump administration may change.
Yes, and also, the technology has changed. I mean, that was 2020 and a lot has happened, and I don't know where. . . . I'm not sure where all the Republicans are. I think some people get it. . .
I think the problem, Jim, is that, for the Republican Party, and Trumpian conservatives, in particular, they face a time of choosing. And what I mean by this is that they have spent the last four to six years—and Trump egged this on—engaging in nonstop quote-unquote “big tech bashing” and making technology companies in the media out to be, as Trumps calls them, “the enemy of the American people.” And so many hearings now are just parading tech executives and others up there to be beaten with a stick in front of the public, and this is the new thing. And then there's just a flood of bills that would regulate traditional digital technologies, repeal things like Section 230, which is liability protection for the tech sector, and so on, child safety regulations.
Meanwhile, that same Republican Party and Mr. Trump go around hating on Joe Biden in China. If it's one thing they can't stand more than big tech, it's Joe and China! And so, in a sense, they've got to choose, because their own policy proposals on technology could essentially kneecap America's technology base in a way that would open up the door to whether it's what they fear in the “woke DEI policies” of Biden or the CCP’s preferred policy agenda for controlling computation in the world today. Choose two, you don't get all three. And I think this is going to be an interesting thing to watch if Mr. Trump comes back into office, do they pick up where that OMB memo left off, or do they go right back to beating that “We’ve got to kill big tech by any means necessary in a seek-and-destroy mission, to hell with the consequences.” And I don't know yet.
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Project Apollo was a feat of human achievement akin to, and arguably greater than, the discovery of the New World. From 1962 to 1972, NASA conducted 17 crewed missions, six of which placed men on the surface of the moon. Since the Nixon administration put an end to Project Apollo, our extraterrestrial ambitions seem to have stalled along with our sense of national optimism. But is the American spirit of adventure, heroism, and willingness to take extraordinary risk a thing of the past
Today on the podcast, I talk with Charles Murray about what made Apollo extraordinary and whether we in the 21st century have the will to do extraordinary things. Murray is the co-author with Catherine Bly Cox of Apollo: The Race to the Moon, first published in 1989 and republished in 2004. He is also my colleague here at AEI.
In This Episode
* Going to the moon (1:35)
* Support for the program (7:40)
* Gene Kranz (9:31)
* An Apollo 12 story (12:06)
* An Apollo 11 story (17:58)
* Apollo in the media (21:36)
* Perspectives on space flight (24:50)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
Going to the moon (1:35)
Pethokoukis: When I look at the delays with the new NASA go-to-the-moon rocket, and even if you look at the history of SpaceX and their current Starship project, these are not easy machines for mankind to build. And it seems to me that, going back to the 1960s, Apollo must have been at absolutely the far frontier of what humanity was capable of back then, and sometimes I cannot almost believe it worked. Were the Apollo people—the engineers—were they surprised it worked?
Murray: There were a lot of people who, they first heard the Kennedy speech saying, “We want to go to the moon and bring a man safely back by the end of the decade,” they were aghast. I mean, come on! In 1961, when Kennedy made that speech, we had a grand total of 15 minutes of manned space flight under our belt with a red stone rocket with 78,000 pounds of thrust. Eight years and eight weeks later, about the same amount of time since Donald Trump was elected to now, we had landed on the moon with a rocket that had 7.6 million pounds of thrust, compared to the 78,000, and using technology that had had to be invented essentially from scratch, all in eight years. All of Cape Canaveral, those huge buildings down there, all that goes up during that time.
Well, I'm not going to go through the whole list of things, but if you want to realize how incredibly hard to believe it is now that we did it, consider the computer system that we used to go to the moon. Jerry Bostick, who was one of the flight dynamics officers, was telling me a few months ago about how excited they were just before the first landing when they got an upgrade to their computer system for the whole Houston Center. It had one megabyte of memory, and this was, to them, all the memory they could ever possibly want. One megabyte.
We'll never use it all! We'll never use all this, it’s a luxury!
So Jim, I guess I'm saying a couple of things. One is, to the young’ins out there today, you have no idea what we used to be able to do. We used to be able to work miracles, and it was those guys who did it.
Was the Kennedy speech, was it at Rice University?
No, “go to the moon” was before Congress.
He gave another speech at Rice where he was started to list all the things that they needed to do to get to the moon. And it wasn't just, “We have these rockets and we need to make a bigger one,” but there was so many technologies that needed to be developed over the course of the decade, I can't help but think a president today saying, “We're going to do this and we have a laundry list of things we don't know how to do, but we're going to figure them out…” It would've been called pie-in-the-sky, or something like that.
By the way, in order to do this, we did things which today would be unthinkable. You would have contracts for important equipment; the whole cycle for the contract acquisition process would be a matter of weeks. The request for proposals would go out; six weeks later, they would've gotten the proposals in, they would've made a decision, and they'd be spending the money on what they were going to do. That kind of thing doesn't get done.
But I'll tell you though, the ballsiest thing that happened in the program, among the people on the ground — I mean the ballsiest thing of all was getting on top of that rocket and being blasted into space — but on the ground it was called the “all up” decision. “All up” refers to the testing of the Saturn V, the launch vehicle, this monstrous thing, which basically is standing a Navy destroyer on end and blasting it into space. And usually, historically, when you test those things, you test Stage One, and if that works, then you add the second stage and then you add the third stage. And the man who was running the Apollo program at that time, a guy named Miller, made the decision they were going to do All Up on the first test. They were going to have all three stages, and they were going to go with it, and it worked, which nobody believed was possible. And then after only a few more launches, they put a man on that thing and it went. Decisions were made during that program that were like wartime decisions in terms of the risk that people were willing to take.
One thing that surprises me is just how much that Kennedy timeline seemed to drive things. Apollo seven, I think it was October ’68, and that was the first manned flight? And then like two months later, Apollo 8, we are whipping those guys around the moon! That seems like a rather accelerated timeline to me!
The decision to go to the moon on Apollo 8 was very scary to the people who first heard about it. And, by the way, if they'd had the same problem on Apollo 8 that they'd had on Apollo 13, the astronauts would've died, because on Apollo 8 you did not have the lunar module with them, which is how they got back. So they pulled it off, but it was genuinely, authentically risky. But, on the other hand, if they wanted to get to the moon by the end of 1969, that's the kind of chance you had to take.
Support for the Program (7:40)
How enthusiastic was the public that the program could have withstood another accident? Another accident before 11 that would've cost lives, or even been as scary as Apollo 13 — would we have said, let's not do it, or we're rushing this too much? I think about that a lot now because we talk about this new space age, I'm wondering how people today would react.
In January, 1967, three astronauts were killed on the pad at Cape Canaveral when the spacecraft burned up on the ground. And the support for the program continued. But what's astonishing there is that they were flying again with manned vehicles in September 1967. . . No, it was a year and 10 months, basically, between this fire, this devastating fire, a complete redesign of the spacecraft, and they got up again.
I think that it's fair to say that, through Apollo 11, the public was enthusiastic about the program. It's amazingly how quickly the interest fell off after the successful landing; so that by the time Apollo 13 was launched, the news programs were no longer covering it very carefully, until the accident occurred. And by the time of Apollo 16, 17, everybody was bored with the program.
Speaking of Apollo 13, to what extent did that play a role in Nixon's decision to basically end the Apollo program, to cut its budget, to treat it like it was another program, ultimately, which led to its end? Did that affect Nixon's decision making, that close call, do you think?
No. The public support for the program had waned, political support had waned. The Apollo 13 story energized people for a while in terms of interest, but it didn't play a role.
Gene Kranz (9:31)
500 years after Columbus discovering the New World, we talk about Columbus. And I would think that 500 years from now, we'll talk about Neil Armstrong. But will we also talk about Gene Kranz? Who is Gene Kranz and why should we talk about him 500 years from now?
Gene Kranz, also known as General Savage within NASA, was a flight director and he was the man who was on the flight director's console when the accident on 13 occurred, by the way. But his main claim to fame is that he was one of — well, he was also on the flight director's desk when we landed. And what you have to understand, Jim, is the astronauts did not run these missions. I'm not dissing the astronauts, but all of the decisions . . . they couldn't make those decisions because they didn't have the information to make the decisions. These life-and-death decisions had to be made on the ground, and the flight director was the autocrat of the mission control, and not just the autocrat in terms of his power, he was also the guy who was going to get stuck with all the responsibility if there was a mistake. If they made a mistake that killed the astronauts, that flight director could count on testifying before Congressional committees and going down in history as an idiot.
Somebody like Gene Kranz, and the other flight director, Glynn Lunney during that era, who was also on the controls during the Apollo 13 problems, they were in their mid-thirties, and they were running the show for one of the historic events in human civilization. They deserve to be remembered, and they have a chance to be, because I have written one thing in my life that people will still be reading 500 years from now — not very many people, but some will — and that's the book about Apollo that Catherine, my wife, and I wrote. And the reason I'm absolutely confident that they're going to be reading about it is because — historians, anyway, historians will — because of what you just said. There are wars that get forgotten, there are all sorts of events that get forgotten, but we remember the Trojan War, we remember Hastings, we remember Columbus discovering America. . . We will remember for a thousand years to come, let alone 500, the century in which we first left Earth.
An Apollo 12 story (12:06)
If you just give me a story or two that you'd like to tell about Apollo that maybe the average person may have never heard of, but you find . . . I'm sure there's a hundred of these. Is there one or two that you think the audience might find interesting?
The only thing is it gets a little bit nerdy, but a lot about Apollo gets nerdy. On Apollo 12, the second mission, the launch vehicle lifts off and into the launch phase, about a minute in, it gets hit by lightning — twice. Huge bolts of lightning run through the entire spacecraft. This is not something it was designed for. And so they get up to orbit. All of the alarms are going off at once inside the cabin of the spacecraft. Nobody has the least idea what's happened because they don't know that they got hit by lightning, all they know is nothing is working.
A man named John Aaron is sitting in the control room at the EECOM’s desk, which is the acronym for the systems guide who monitored all the systems, including electrical systems, and he's looking at his console and he's seeing a weird pattern of numbers that makes no sense at all, and then he remembers 15 months earlier, he'd just been watching the monitor during a test at Cape Canaveral, he wasn't even supposed to be following this launch test, he was just doing it to keep his hand in, and so forth, and something happened whereby there was a strange pattern of numbers that appeared on John Aaron's screen then. And so he called Cape Canaveral and said, what happened? Because I've never seen that before. And finally the Cape admitted that somebody had accidentally turned a switch called the SCE switch off.
Okay, so here is John Aaron. Apollo 12 has gone completely haywire. The spacecraft is not under the control of the astronauts, they don't know what's happened. Everybody's trying to figure out what to do.
John Aaron remembers . . . I'm starting to get choked up just because that he could do that at a moment of such incredible stress. And he just says to the flight director, “Try turning SCE to auxiliary.” And the flight director had never even heard of SCE, but he just . . . Trust made that whole system run. He passes that on to the crew. The crew turns that switch, and, all at once, they get interpretable data back again.
That's the first part of the story. That was an absolutely heroic call of extraordinary ability for him to do that. The second thing that happens at that point is they have completely lost their guidance platform, so they have to get that backup from scratch, and they've also had this gigantic volts of electricity that's run through every system in the spacecraft and they have three orbits of the earth before they have to have what was called trans lunar injection: go onto the moon. That's a couple of hours’ worth.
Well, what is the safe thing to do? The safe thing to do is: “This is not the right time to go to the moon with a spacecraft that's been damaged this way.” These guys at mission control run through a whole series of checks that they're sort of making up on the fly because they've never encountered this situation before, and everything seems to check out. And so, at the end of a couple of orbits, they just say, “We're going to go to the moon.” And the flight director can make that decision. Catherine and I spent a lot of time trying to track down the anguished calls going back and forth from Washington to Houston, and by the higher ups, “Should we do this?” There were none. The flight director said, “We're going,” and they went. To me, that is an example of a kind of spirit of adventure, for lack of a better word, that was extraordinary. Decisions made by guys in their thirties that were just accepted as, “This is what we're going to do.”
By the way, Gene Kranz, I was interviewing him for the book, and I was raising this story with him. (This will conclude my monologue.) I was raising this story with him and I was saying, “Just extraordinary that you could make that decision.” And he said, “No, not really. We checked it out. The spacecraft looked like it was good.” This was only a year or two after the Challenger disaster that I was conducting this interview. And I said to Gene, “Gene, if we had a similar kind of thing happen today, would NASA ever permit that decision to be made?” And Gene glared at me. And believe me, when Gene Kranz glares at you, you quail at your seat. And then he broke into laughter because there was not a chance in hell that the NASA of 1988 would do what the NASA of 1969 did.
An Apollo 11 story (17:58)
If all you know about Apollo 11 is what you learned in high school, or maybe you saw a documentary somewhere, and — just because I've heard you speak before, and I've heard Gene Kranz speak—what don't people know about Apollo 11? There were — I imagine with all these flights — a lot of decisions that needed to be made probably with not a lot of time, encountering new situations — after all, no one had done this before. Whereas, I think if you just watch a news report, you think that once the rocket's up in the air, the next thing that happens is Neil Armstrong lands it on the moon and everyone's just kind of on cruise control for the next couple of days, and boy, it certainly doesn't seem like that.
For those of us who were listening to the landing, and I'm old enough to have done that, there was a little thing called—because you could listen to the last few minutes, you could listen to what was going on between the spacecraft and mission control, and you hear Buzz Aldrin say, “Program Alarm 1301 . . . Program Alarm 1301 . . .” and you can't… well, you can reconstruct it later, and there's about a seven-second delay between him saying that and a voice saying, “We're a go on that.” That seven seconds, you had a person in the back room that was supporting, who then informed this 26-year-old flight controller that they had looked at that possibility and they could still land despite it. The 26-year-old had to trust the guy in the back room because the 26-year-old didn't know, himself, that that was the case. He trusts him, he tells the flight director Gene Kranz, and they say, “Go.” Again: Decision made in seven seconds. Life and death. Taking a risk instead of taking the safe way out.
Sometimes I think that that risk-taking ethos didn't end with Apollo, but maybe, in some ways, it hasn't been as strong since. Is there a scenario where we fly those canceled Apollo flights that we never flew, and then, I know there were other plans of what to do after Apollo, which we didn't do. Is there a scenario where the space race doesn't end, we keep racing? Even if we're only really racing against ourselves.
I mean we've got . . . it's Artemis, right? That's the new launch vehicle that we're going to go back to the moon in, and there are these plans that somehow seem to never get done at the time they're supposed to get done, but I imagine we will have some similar kind of flights going on. It's very hard to see a sustained effort at this point. It's very hard to see grandiose effort at this point. The argument of, “Why are we spending all this money on manned space flight?” in one sense, I sympathize with because it is true that most of the things we do could be done by instruments, could be done by drones, we don't actually have to be there. On the other hand, unless we're willing to spread our wings and raise our aspirations again, we're just going to be stuck for a long time without making much more progress. So I guess what I'm edging around to is, in this era, in this ethos, I don't see much happening done by the government. The Elon Musks of the world may get us to places that the government wouldn't ever go. That's my most realistic hope.
Apollo in the Media (21:36)
If I could just give you a couple of films about the space program and you just… thought you liked it, you thought it captured something, or you thought it was way off, just let just shoot a couple at you. The obvious one is The Right Stuff—based on the Tom Wolfe book, of course.
The Right Stuff was very accurate about the astronauts’ mentality. It was very inaccurate about the relationship between the engineers and the astronauts. It presents the engineers as constantly getting the astronauts way, and being kind of doofuses. That was unfair. But if you want to understand how the astronauts worked, great movie
Apollo 13, perhaps the most well-known.
Extremely accurate. Extremely accurate portrayal of the events. There are certain things I wish they could include, but it's just a movie, so they couldn't include everything. The only real inaccuracy that bothered me was it showed the consoles of the flight controllers with colored graphics on them. They didn't have colored graphics during Apollo! They had columns of white numbers on a black background that were just kind of scrolling through and changing all the time, and that's all. But apparently, when their technical advisor pointed that out to Ron Howard, Ron said, “There are some things that an audience just won't accept, but they would not accept.”
That was the leap! First Man with Ryan Gosling portraying Neil Armstrong.
I'll tell you: First place, good movie—
Excellent, I think.
Yeah, and the people who knew Armstrong say to me, it's pretty good at capturing Armstrong, who himself was a very impressive guy. This conceit in the movie that he has this little trinket he drops on the moon, that was completely made up and it's not true to life. But I'll tell you what they tell me was true to life that surprised me was how violently they were shaken up during the launch phase. And I said, “Is that the way it was, routinely?” And they said, yeah, it was a very rough ride that those guys had. And the movie does an excellent job of conveying something that somebody who'd spent a lot of time studying the Apollo program didn't know.
I don't know if you've seen the Apple series For All Mankind by Ronald D. Moore, which is based on the premise I raised earlier that Apollo didn’t end, we just kept up the Space Race and we kept advancing off to building moon colonies and off to Mars. Have you seen that? And what do you think about it if you have? I don't know that you have.
I did not watch it. I have a problem with a lot of these things because I have my own image of the Apollo Program, and it drives me nuts if somebody does something that is egregiously wrong. I went to see Apollo 13 and I'm glad I did it because it was so accurate, but I probably should look at For All Mankind.
Very reverential. A very pro-space show, to be sure. Have you seen the Apollo 11 documentary that's come out in the past five years? It was on the big screen, it was at theaters, it was a lot of footage they had people had not seen before, they found some old canisters somewhere of film. I don’t know if you've seen this. I think it's just called Apollo 11.
No, I haven't seen that. That sounds like something that I ought to look at.
Perspectives on space flight (24:50)
My listeners love when I read . . . Because you mentioned the idea of: Why do we go to space? If it's merely about exploration, I suppose we could just send robots and maybe eventually the robots will get better. So I want to just briefly read two different views of why we go to space.
Why should human beings explore space? Because space offers transcendence from which only human beings can benefit. The James Webb Space Telescope cannot articulate awe. A robot cannot go into the deep and come back with soulful renewal. To fully appreciate space, we need people to go there and embrace it for what it fully is. Space is not merely for humans, nor is space merely for space. Space is for divine communion.
That’s one view.
The second one is from Ayn Rand, who attended the Apollo 11 moon launch. This is what Ayn Rand wrote in 1969:
The next four days were torn out of the world’s usual context, like a breathing spell with a sweep of clean air piercing mankind’s lethargic suffocation. For thirty years or longer, the newspapers had featured nothing but disasters, catastrophes, betrayals, the shrinking stature of man, the sordid mess of a collapsing civilization; their voice had become a long, sustained whine, the megaphone a failure, like the sound of the Oriental bazaar where leprous beggars, of spirit or matter, compete for attention by displaying their sores. Now, for once, the newspapers were announcing a human achievement, were reporting on a human triumph, were reminding us that man still exists and functions as a man. Those four days conveyed the sense that we were watching a magnificent work of art—a play dramatizing a single theme: the efficacy of man’s mind.
Is the answer for why we go to space, can it be found in either of those readings?
They're going to be found in both. I am a sucker for heroism, whether it's in war or in any other arena, and space offers a kind of celebration of the human spirit that is only found in endeavors that involve both great effort and also great risk. And the other aspect of transcendence, I'm also a sucker for saying the world is not only more complicated than we know, but more complicated than we can imagine. The universe is more complicated than we can imagine. And I resonate to the sentiment in the first quote.
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As I often remind subscribers to Faster, Please!, predictions are hard, especially about the future. The economic boom of the 1990s came as a surprise to most economists. Equally surprising was that it ended so soon. Neither of these events caught Ed Yardeni off-guard. Some forecasters, Yardeni included, anticipated a new Roaring ’20s for this century… only to be interrupted by the pandemic. But is it too late for this prediction to become a reality? According to Yardeni, not at all.
Ed Yardeni is president of Yardeni Research, and he previously served as chief investment strategist at a number of investment companies, including Deutche Bank. He has additionally held positions at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, and US Treasury Department. For more economic insights and investment guidance, visit yardeni.com.
In This Episode
* The ’90s Internet boom (1:25)
* The Digital Revolution (5:01)
* The new Roaring ’20s (9:00)
* A cautious Federal Reserve (14:24)
* Speedbumps to progress (18:18)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
The ’90s Internet boom (1:25)
Pethokoukis: Statistically speaking, the PC Internet boom that you first started writing about back in the early ’90s ended in 2004, 2005. How surprising was that to economists, investors, policy makers? I, to this day, have a report, a 2000 report, from Lehman Brothers that predicted, as far as the eye could see, we would have rapid growth, rapid productivity growth for at least another decade. Now, of course, Lehman didn't make it another decade. Was that a surprise to people that we didn't have an endless productivity boom coming out of the ’90s?
Yardeni: I think it definitely was a surprise. I mean, it was surprising both ways. Not too many people expected to see a productivity boom in the second half of the 1990s, which is what we had. I did, as an economist on Wall Street. More importantly, Alan Greenspan was a big promoter of the idea that the technology revolution would in fact lead to better productivity growth and that that might mean better economic growth and lower inflation. And it didn't look that way for a while; then suddenly the Bureau of Economic Analysis went back and revised the data for the late 1990s and, lo and behold, it turned out that there was a productivity boom. And then it all kind of fizzled out, and it raises the question, why did that happen? Why was it such a short lived productivity boom? And the answer is—well, let me give you a personal anecdote.
I worked at Deutsche Bank in New York in the late 1990s, and I had to be very careful walking down the corridors of Deutsche Bank in midtown Manhattan not to trip over Dell boxes. Everybody was getting a Dell box, everybody was getting the Dell boxes loaded up with the Windows Office. And when you think back on what that was able to do in terms of productivity, if you had a lot of secretaries on Selectric typewriters, Word could obviously increase productivity. If you had a lot of bookkeepers doing spreadsheets, Excel could obviously increase productivity. But other than that, there wasn't really that much productivity to be had from the technology at the time. So again, where did that productivity boom come from? It couldn't have been just secretaries and bookkeepers. Now the answer is that the boxes themselves were measured as output, and so output per man hour increased dramatically. It doesn't take that many workers to produce Dell boxes and Windows Office and Windows software. So as a result of that, we had this big boom in the technology output that created its own productivity boom, but it didn't really have the widespread application to all sorts of business model the way today's evolution of the technology boom is, in fact, capable of doing.
What you've just described, I think, is the explanation by, for instance, Robert Gordon, Northwestern University, that we saw a revolution, but it was a narrow revolution.
It was the beginning! It was the beginning of a revolution. It was the Technology Revolution. It started in the 1990s and it's evolved, it's not over, it's ongoing. I think a big development in that revolution was the cloud. What the cloud allowed you to do was really increase productivity in technology itself, because you didn't need to have several hundred people in the IT department. Now, with the cloud, one person can upgrade the software on hundreds of computers, and now we're renting software so that it automatically upgrades, so that's been a big contribution to productivity.
The Digital Revolution (5:01)
So perhaps I spoke too soon. I talked about that boom—that ’90s boom—ending. Perhaps I should have said it was more of a pause, because it seems what we're seeing now, as you've described it, is a new phase of the Digital Revolution—perhaps a broader phase—and, to be clear, if I understand what you've been speaking about and writing about, this isn't an AI story, this predates what we're seeing in the data now, it predates ChatGPT, when do you date this new phase beginning—and you mentioned one catalyst perhaps being the cloud, so—when did it begin and, again, what are the data markers that you've been looking at?
I don't remember the exact date, but I think it was 2011 where my little investment advisory got ourselves on the Amazon cloud, and that's been a tremendous source of productivity for us, it saves us a lot of money. We used to have a couple of servers on a server farm in the old days, and every now and then it would go down and we'd have to reach somebody on the server farm and say, “Would you mind turning it on and off?” Remember the word “reboot?” I don't remember the word “reboot” being used in quite some time. Amazon's never gone down, as far as I can recall. I think they've always had their systems in Virginia, and they had a backup somewhere overseas, but it's always worked quite well for us.
But now we're finding with some of the other software that's available now, we can actually cut back on our Amazon costs and use some of these other technologies. There's lots of technologies that are very user-friendly, very powerful, and they apply themselves to all sorts of different businesses, and, as you said, it's not just AI. I think the cloud—let's put it around 2011 or so—was a huge development because it did allow companies to do information processing in a much more efficient way, and the software gets automatically updated, and with what it used to take hundreds of people in an IT department to do, now you can do it with just one, which is what we, in fact, have, just one person doing it all for us. But I would say that's as good a point as any. But along the way here, what's really changed is the power of the software that's available, and how cheap it is, and how you can rent it now instead of having to own it.
That's a fantastic example, and, of course, we want to see these sort of examples at some point reflected in the data. And going through some of your writings, one period that you were very focused on was, we may have seen a bottom, maybe at the end of 2015, before the pandemic, where we saw the slowest, I think 20-quarter average… annual average growth rate of productivity.
0.5 annual rate.
But by 2019, leading into the pandemic, it tripled. Is the story of that tripling, is it the cloud? And that certainly has to be one reason why you, among other people, thought that we might see a new Roaring ’20s, right into the teeth of the pandemic, unfortunately.
Well, it's not so unfortunate, I mean, clearly nobody saw the pandemic coming, but we weathered the storm very, very well, and I don't think we can come to any conclusion about productivity during the pandemic, it was all over the place. At first, when we were on lockdown, it actually soared because we were still producing a lot with fewer workers, and then it took a dive, but we're now back up to two percent. We had a really, really good year last year in productivity. The final three quarters of last year, we saw above-trend growth in productivity. And so we're already now back up to two percent, which, again, compared to 0.5, is certainly moving in the right direction, and I don't see any particular reason why that number couldn't go to three-and-a-half, four-and-a-half percent per year kind of growth—which sounds delusional unless you look back at the chart of productivity and see that that's actually what productivity booms do: They get up to something like three-and-a-half to four-and-a-half percent growth, not just on a one-quarter basis, but on a 20-quarter trailing basis at an annual rate.
The new Roaring ’20s (9:00)
This forecast predates the word “generative AI,” predates ChatGPT, and, in fact, if I understand your view, it's even broader than information technology. So tell me a bit about your broader Roaring ’20s thesis and the technological underpinnings of that.
One of the developments we've seen here, which has been somewhat disconcerting, is the challenge to globalization. I'm a big believer in free trade, and the free trade creates more economic growth, but, on the other hand, we have to be realistic and realize that China hasn't been playing by the rules of the game. And so now, as a result, we're seeing a lot of production moving out of China to other countries, and we're seeing a lot of on-shoring in the United States, so we're building state-of-the-art manufacturing facilities that are full of robots and automation that I think are going to bring manufacturing productivity back quite significantly.
Everybody seems to be of the opinion that the reason productivity is weak is because of services. It's actually manufacturing. What happened is, when China joined the World Trade Organization back at the end of 2001—December 11th, 2001, to be exact—manufacturers said hasta la vista to the United States, and we've had absolutely no increase in industrial production capacity since that time, since 2001. And so companies basically gave up on trying to do anything, either expand capacity or improve productivity of manufacturing here, when they could do it so much more cheaply over in China.
I think what's really the most important thing that's changed here is, demographically, we've run out of workers. Certainly even in China, we don't have a growth in the working-age population. We don't have a growth in the working-age population here. And when it comes to skilled labor, that's even more the case, so there's tremendous incentive and pressure on companies to figure out, well, how do we deal with an environment where our business is pretty good, but we can't find the workers to meet all the demand? And the answer has to be productivity. Technology is part of the solution. Managing for productivity is another part of the solution. Giving workers more skills to be more productive is a very good use of money, and it makes workers sticky, it makes them want to stay with you because you're going to have to pay them more because they’re more knowledgeable, and you want to pay them more because you want to keep them.
I think a big part of the productivity story really has to do with the demographic story. China, of course, accelerated all that with the One Child Policy that, as a result, I kind of view China as the world's largest nursing home. They just don't have the workforce that they used to have. Japan doesn't have the workforce. Korea, Taiwan, all these countries… If you want to find cheap, young labor, it's still in Africa and in India, but there are all sorts of issues with how you do business in these countries. It's not that easy. It's not as simple as just saying, “Well, let's just go there.” And so I think we are seeing a tremendous push to increase productivity to deal with the worldwide labor shortage.
We have three really good quarters of productivity growth and, as you mentioned, economists are always very cautious about those productivity numbers because of revisions, they're volatile. But if this is something real and sustainable, it should also reflect in other parts of the economy. We should see good capital investment numbers for here on out if this is a real thing.
I think not only capital investment, but also real wages. Productivity is fairy dust. I mean it's a win-win-win situation. With better-than-expected productivity, you get better-than-expected, real GDP, you get lower-than-expected unit labor costs, which, by the way, unit labor costs, which reflect hourly wages offset by productivity, they're under two percent—or they're around two percent, I should say more accurately—and that's highly correlated with the CPI, so the underlying inflation rate has already come down to where the Fed wants it to be. This is not a forecast, this is where we are right now with unit labor costs. So there's a very strong correlation between productivity growth and the growth of inflation-adjusted compensation. So you can take average hourly earnings, you can take hourly compensation…
There are a bunch of measures of wages, and divide them by the consumption deflator, and you'll see on a year-over-year basis that the correlation is extremely high. And, theoretically—it's the only thing I learned when I went to college in economics that ever made any sense to me, and that is—people in a competitive marketplace—it doesn't have to be perfectly competitive, but in a relatively competitive marketplace—people get paid their real wage. The productivity the workers have, they get paid in their real wages, and we've seen, for all the talk about how “standards of living have stagnated for decades,” if you look at average hourly earnings divided by the consumption deflator, it's been going up 1.4 percent since 1995. That's a doubling of the standard of living every 40 years. That's pretty good progress. And if productivity grows faster than that, you'll get even a better increase in real wages.
If we don't have workers, if there's a shortage of workers—though, obviously, immigration puts a whole different spin on these things—but for what we know now in terms of the workers that are available that are allowed to work, they are getting paid higher real wages. I know that prices have gone up, but people sometimes forget that wages have also gone up quite a bit. But again, it's fairy dust: You get better real growth, you get lower inflation, you get real wages going up, and you get better profit margins. Everybody wins.
A cautious Federal Reserve (14:24)
In the ’90s, we had a Fed chairman who was super cautious about assuming a productivity boom, but eventually saw the reality of it and acted accordingly. It seems to me that we have a very similar such situation where we have a Federal Reserve chairman who is certainly aware of these numbers, but seems to me, at this point, certainly reluctant to make decisions based on those numbers, but you would expect that to change.
Yeah, well, I mean if you just look at the summary of economic projections that the Federal Open Market Committee… that comes out on a quarterly basis reflecting the consensus of Fed Chair Powell's committee that determines monetary policy, they're looking for real GDP growth of less than two percent per year for the next couple of years, and they're obviously not anticipating any improvement in productivity. So I think you're right, I think Fed Chair Powell is very much aware that productivity can change everything; and, in fact, he's talked about productivity, he knows the equation. He says, “Look, it's okay to have wages growing three percent if inflation's two percent.” Then he implied, therefore, that productivity is growing one percent. So he's basically in the one percent camp, recognizing that, if productivity is more than that, then four percent wage growth is perfectly fine and acceptable and non-inflationary. But at this point he's, in terms of his pronouncements, he's sticking to the kind of standard line of economists, which is, maybe we'll get one percent, and if we get one percent and the Fed gets inflation down, let's say to only two-and-a-half percent, then wages can grow three-and-a-half percent, and right now wages are growing at a little bit above. I think we're growing more like four percent, so the wage numbers aren't there yet, but they could be the right numbers if, in fact, productivity is making a comeback.
If we hit productivity gains of the sort you've talked about—three percent, four percent by the end of the decade—that is a radically different-looking economy than what the Fed, or the CBO, or even a lot of Wall Street firms are talking about. So it's not just this statistic will be different; we're looking at really something very different. I would assume a much higher stock market; I'm not sure what interest rates look like, but what does that world look like in 2030?
These are all good questions, they’re the ones I'm grappling with. I mean, should interest rates be lower or should they be higher? It’s the so-called real interest rates, so if the economy can live with a Fed funds rate of, let's say five and a half percent—five and a quarter, five and a half percent, which is what it is now—and the bond yield at four and a half percent and the economy is doing perfectly fine and inflation's coming down, and it's all because productivity is making comeback, then those rates are fine. They're doing their job, they're allocating capital in a reasonable fashion, and capital is going to get allocated to where capital should go. You mentioned before that, in order to increase productivity, we are going to need more capital investments.
Here the Fed has raised interest rates dramatically, and most of the economists said, “Oh, that's going to lead to a big drop in capital,” because capital spending is dependent on interest rates, and that hasn't happened at all, really, because the technology capital spending—which now, in current dollars, technology capital spending accounts for about 50 percent of capital spending in nominal terms. You can't do it in real terms because there's an indexing problem. But in nominal terms, half of capital spending is technology. And by the way, that's an understatement because that's information technology, hardware, it's software and R&D. It doesn't even include industrial machinery, which is mostly technology, hardware and software these days. And even the trucking industry, the truck is sort of the device, and then there's a software that runs the device logistics. There's so many areas of the economy that have become very high-tech that people still think of as a low-tech industry.
Speedbumps to progress (18:18)
If this doesn't happen. Well, I suppose one thing we could say may have happened is that we've really overestimated these technologies and they're not as transformative. But let me give you two other things that people might point to as being—and you've written a bit about these—that could be speed bumps or barriers. One: debt, possible debt crisis. And two: this energy revolution, climate change transition, which we really have a lot of government involvement and a lot of government making decisions about allocating resources. So what is the risk that those two things could be a slow things down, speed bump, or what have you?
There's three issues that you're raising. One is sort of the private sector issue of whether a lot of this artificial intelligence and technology stuff is hype, and it's not going to have the impact on productivity. The other one, as you mentioned, is the two government issues, government’s meddling in the climate change policies, and then the government having this irresponsible fiscal excesses.
With regards to artificial intelligence, even though I should be a cheerleader on this, because I should say, “See, I told you so…” I have been telling people I told you so because I said, I'll tell you when the stock market started to discount the Roaring ’20s was November 30th, 2022 when Open AI introduced ChatGPT, and that's when these AI stocks went crazy. A week later I signed up for the $20 a month version of ChatGPT, figuring, “This is great! I'm not going to have to work anymore. This is going to do all my writing for me. I'll just ask it the question and say, ‘What do you think we should be writing about this? Go ahead and write about it.’” Well, it took me more time to correct all the errors for what it produced than it would've taken me just to write the damn thing.
So I kind of cooled off to chat GPT, and I come to the conclusion that, from what I see right now in terms of what is available to the public and what's tied to the internet, it's really autofill on speed and the steroids. You know when you type Word and sometimes it guesses what you're going to say next? That's what this thing does at the speed of light. But, you know, “haste makes waste,” as Benjamin Franklin used to say, and it makes a lot of mistakes. And, by the way, garbage in, garbage out. It could create even more garbage on the internet because I've seen situations where it starts quoting its own sources that would never have existed in the first place. So there's some really funky stuff when you have it in the public domain.
But I think that when you have it sort of segmented off and it only has the data that you need for your specific industry, and it's not polluted by other the open source ability to take any data, I think it may very well work very well. But it's basically just a really fast, lightning-speed calculations. So I think it has lots of potential in that regard, but I think there is a certain amount of hype. But look, so much money is being spent in this area. I can't believe it's all going to go for naught. I mean, we saw a lot of money spent in the late 1990s on internet and dotcoms and all that. The internet's still here, but the dotcoms are gone.
With regards to the government policies, I have this very simplistic view that it's amazing how well this country has done despite Washington. Washington just keeps meddling and meddling, it just keeps picking our pockets, keeps interfering, comes up with industrial policies that, to a large extent, don't work. And yet, the economy continues to do well because working stiffs like you and me and people listening in, that's what we do for a living: we work. We don't have time for politics. So the politicians have plenty of time to figure out how to pick our pockets. Well, we have to just figure out, “Okay, given their meddling, how do we make our businesses better, notwithstanding these challenges.” Maybe it's really more my hope that we somehow in the private sector figure out how to keep doing what we're doing so well, including increasing productivity, in the face of the challenges that the government poses with its policies.
But then, if we are successful in the private sector at creating good productivity growth that gives you better real GDP growth, that real growth is one way to reduce the debt burden. It doesn't make it go away and it would be a lot better if we didn't have it, but some of these projections of how this debt is going to eat us all up may be too pessimistic about their assumptions for economic growth. But look… I guess I had a happy childhood, so I tend to be an optimist, but I can't say anything good at all about this deficit problem. And we did get a little glimpse in August, September, October, of what happens when the bond market starts to worry about something like supply. It worried about it for three months, and then lower inflation and less supply of long-term bonds helped to rally the bond market. But here we are back at four and a half percent, and if we do have some more fears about inflation coming back, then we could very well have a debt crisis more imminently. People like Ray Dalio has been saying that we're under verge of getting it. I think it's an issue, but I don't think it's an issue that's going to be calamitous at this time.
The problems people talk about, you have the skepticism about free enterprise, or the skepticism about trade, and immigration. I would like to see what this country looks like in 2030 with the economic scenario you've just outlined: Strong real wage growth. Maybe it's too simplistic, but I think people being able to see in their everyday lives, big gains year after year, I think the national mood would be considerably different.
Well, I think, even now, if you look at real consumption per household, it's $128,000, it's at an all-time record high. And yeah, I guess the rich might be gluttons and might eat more than the rest of us, and maybe they have bigger and more houses and cars, but there just aren't enough of them to really explain how it could possibly be that real consumption per household is at an all-time record high. And I know that's materialistic, but I can't think of a better way to measure the standard of living than looking at real consumption per household: All-time record high.
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Micro Reads
▶ Business/ Economics
Meta, in Its Biggest A.I. Push, Places Smart Assistants Across its Apps - NYT
Google streamlines structure to speed up AI efforts - FT
Tesla’s Layoffs Won’t Solve Its Growing Pains - Wired
▶ Policy
Put Growth Back on the Political Agenda - WSJ
Regulate AI? How US, EU and China Are Going About It - Bberg
Three ways the US could help universities compete with tech companies on AI innovation - MIT
▶ AI/Digital
The AI race is generating a dual reality - FT
Searching for the Next Big AI Breakthrough at the TED Conference - Bberg
These photos show AI used to reinterpret centuries-old graffiti - NS
Environmental Damage Could Cost You a Fifth of Your Income Over the Next 25 Years - Wired
AI now surpasses humans in almost all performance benchmarks - New Atlas
▶ Biotech/Health
A new understanding of tinnitus and deafness could help reverse both - New Scientist
Beyond Neuralink: Meet the other companies developing brain-computer interfaces - MIT
▶ Robotics
Hello, Electric Atlas: Boston Dynamics introduces a fully electric humanoid robot that “exceeds human performance” - IEEE Spectrum
▶ Space/Transportation
NASA may alter Artemis III to have Starship and Orion dock in low-Earth orbit - Ars
▶ Up Wing/Down Wing
Technological risks are not the end of the world - Science
▶ Substacks/Newsletters
Five things to be optimistic about in America today - Noahpinion
Who Governs the Internet? - Hyperdimensional
Meta is Surprisingly Relevant in Generative AI - AI Supremacy
Larry Summers isn’t worried about secular stagnation anymore - Slow Boring
Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
As private and government interest in nuclear fusion technology grows, an array of startups have arisen to take on the challenge, each with their own unique approach. Among them: LaserFusionX. Today on Faster, Please!—The Podcast, I talk with CEO Stephen Obenschain about the viability of fusion energy, and what sets his approach apart.
Obenschain is the president of LaserFusionX. He was formerly head of the Plasma Physics Division branch at the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory.
In This Episode
* Viability of commercial fusion (0:58)
* The LaserFusionX approach (7:54)
* Funding the project (10:28)
* The vision (12:52)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
Viability of commercial fusion (0:58)
Pethokoukis: Steve, welcome to the podcast.
Obenschain: Okay, I'm glad to talk with you. I understand you're very interested in high-tech future power sources, not so high tech right now are windmills…
Well, I guess they're trying to make those more high tech, as well. I recall that when the Energy Department, the National Ignition Laboratory [NIF], they had the—I guess that's over about maybe 15 months ago—and they said they had achieved a net gain nuclear fusion, using lasers, and the energy secretary made an announcement and it was a big deal because we had never done that before by any means. But I remember very specifically people were saying, “Listen, it's a great achievement that we've done this, but using lasers is not a path to creating a commercial nuclear reactor.” I remember that seemed to be on the news all the time. But yet you are running a company that wants to use lasers to create a commercial fusion reactor. One, did I get that right, and what are you doing to get lasers to be able to do that?
I don't know why people would come to that conclusion. I think we are competitive with the other approaches, which is magnetic fusion, where you use magnetic fields to confine a plasma and get to fusion temperatures. The federal government has supported laser fusion since about 1972, starting with the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission]. Originally it was an energy program, but it has migrated to being in support stockpiled stewardship because, with laser fusion, you can reach physics parameters similar to what occur in thermonuclear weapons.
Yeah. So that facility is about nuclear weapons testing research, not creating a reactor—a fusion reactor.
Yeah. All that being said, it does advance the physics of laser fusion energy, and what the National Ignition Facility did is got so-called ignition, where the fuel started a self-sustaining reaction where it was heating itself and increasing the amount of fusion energy. However, the gain was about three, and one of the reasons for that is they use so-called indirect drive, where the laser comes in, heats a small gold can, and the X-rays from that then that drive the pellet implosion, which means you lose about a factor of five in the efficiency. So it's limited gain you get that way.
Your way is different. It sort of cuts out the middleman.
Okay. The better way to go—which, we're not the only ones to do this—is direct drive, where the laser uniformly illuminates the target at the time that Livermore got started with indirect drive, we didn't have the technologies to uniformly illuminate a pellet. First at NRL [Naval Research Laboratories], and then later at University of Rochester in Japan, they developed techniques to uniformly illuminate the pellets. The second thing we're doing is using the argon fluoride laser. The argon fluoride laser has been used in lithography for many years because it's deep UV.
The unique thing we have been trying to do—this was when I was supervising the program at the Naval Research Laboratory—was to take it up to high energy. We started years ago with a similar Krypton fluoride laser, built the largest operating target shooter with that technology, demonstrated the high repetition rate operation that you need for energy and NIF will shoot a few times a day—you need five to 10 shots per second to do a power plant—demonstrated that on a krypton fluoride laser, and, more recently, we switched to the focus to argon fluoride, which is deeper UV and more efficient than the Krypton fluoride. And that basically—at NRL when I was supervising it—reached the energy record for that technology. But we've got a long ways to go to get it to the high energy needed for a power plant.
Now, what the immediate goal of my company is to get the funds and to build a beam line of argon fluoride that would have the energy and performance needed for a power plant. One of the advantages to laser fusion: you want have a situation where I'm building more than one of something, so for an implosion facility, you have many beam lines, so you build one and then you have the advantage of building more, and a learning curve as you go toward a power plant. We developed a phase program where first we build the beamline, then we build a NIF-like implosion facility only operating with the argon fluoride, demonstrate the high gain—which is a hundred plus for a power plant—and then, after doing that, do the physics in parallel, develop the other technology you need, like low-cost targets. (They can't be expensive. The NIF targets are probably tens of thousands. We can't spend that.) We're going 10 shots per second. All the technologies required for a pilot power plant build a pilot power plant, which, in my view could be maybe 400 megawatts electricity. However, its main function would be to develop the procedures, test the components, and so forth for the follow-on, mass-produced power plants. So one, when you build a pilot power plant, you want to operate it for a few years to get the kinks out before going to mass production. The vision is to go from the beginning of that to the end in about 16 years.
So the challenges are you have to generate enough heat, and you have to be able to do this over, and over, and over again.
Right. That's right. It has to be high reliability. For an implosion facility, a hundred-thousand-shot reliability is okay. For a power plant, it's got to be in the billion-shot class.
And at this point, the reason you think this is doable is what?
I think we have confidence in the pellet designs. I have a lot, and I have colleagues that have a lot of experience with building large excimer systems: KrF [Krypton Fluoride Excimer Laser], ArF [Argon Fluoride Excimer Laser]…
Those are lasers?
Yes. And we have credible conceptual designs for the facility.
There’s a lot of companies right now, and startups, with different approaches. I would assume you think this is the most viable approach, or has some other advantages over some of the other things we're seeing with Commonwealth Fusion Systems, which gets mentioned a lot, which is using a different approach. So is the advantage you think it's easier to get to a reactor? What are the advantages of this path?
The LaserFusionX approach (7:54)
Well, for one, it's different. It's different challenges from the Commonwealth Fusion Systems. There is overlap, and there should be collaboration. For example, you have to, theirs is also deuterium-tritium. However, the physics challenges are different. I think we're farther along in laser fusion to be able—it's a simpler situation than you have. It's very complex interactions in tokamak, and you also have things… have you ever heard of a disruption? Basically it's where all of the magnetic energy all of a sudden goes to the wall, and if you have something like what Commonwealth Fusion Systems—they’ve got to be careful they don't get that. If they do, it would blow a hole in the wall. We don't have that problem with laser fusion. I think we're further along in understanding the physics. Actually, the National Ignition Facility is ahead of the highest fusion gains they've gotten in facilities. I think that they're somewhere just below one or so with the jet. They're up at one and a half.
To what extent are the challenges of physics and science, and to what extent are the challenges engineering?
Well, the physics has to guide the precision you have on the laser. And I won't say we're 100 percent done in the physics, but we're far enough along to say, okay. That's one reason where I envision building an implosion facility before the pilot power plant so we can test the codes and get all the kinks out of that. Nothing's easy. You have to get the cost of the targets down. The laser, okay, we've demonstrated, for example, at NRL—
And NRL is…?
Naval Research Laboratory.
Naval Research Lab, right.
A hundred-shot operation of the KrF laser. We use spark gap for that. We need to go to solid state pulse power, got up to 10 million shots. We need to get from there to a billion shots. And some of that is just simply improving the components. It's straightforward, but you've got to put time into it. I think you need really smart people doing this, that are creative—not too creative, but where you need to be creative, you are creative, and I think if, basically, if you can get the support, for example, to build (a beam line is somewhere around a hundred million dollars). To build the implosion facility and pilot power plant, you're getting into the billion shot, billion dollar class and you have to get those resources and be sure enough that, okay, if the investors put this money in, they're going to get a return on it.
Funding the project (10:28)
I think people who are investing in this sector, I would assume they may be more familiar with some of the other approaches, so what is the level of investor interest and what is the level of Department of Energy interest?
Well, one of the challenges is that, historically, the Department of Energy has put money into two pots. One, laser fusion for stockpile stewardship, and magnetic fusion for energy. That's starting to change, but they don't have a lot of money involved yet, to put money into laser fusion or inertial fusion energy. And one of my challenges is not that the companies are aware of magnetic fusion, they don't understand the challenges of that, or laser fusion, or what's a good idea and a bad idea. And like Commonwealth Fusion systems I think has a good technical basis. If you go the next one down to Helion Energy, they're claiming they can burn helium three made from deuterium interactions, which violates textbook physics, so I'm very… I wonder about that.
Would it surprise you, at the end of the day, that there are multiple paths to a commercial fusion reactor?
Oh no. I think there are multiple paths to getting to where I get fusion burn, and maybe I make electricity. I think ultimately the real challenge for us is: Can we go reasonably fast? At 16 years, I'm considered somewhat slower than others. The ones that are saying five years I think are delusional. The ones that are saying 50 years, or say never, I don't think understand that yeah, we're pretty far along in this.
How big, or rather, how small, theoretically, could one of these reactors be? I know there's been talk about using nuclear fusion as a way to provide power for these new data centers that gobble up so much power that they're using AI for. Would this be the kind of reactor that would power a city power, a big factory power, a data center, all of the above?
I think you can get down, at least with our approach, to a couple hundred megawatts. However, my own vision is you're probably better off having power stations for some of the nuclear—with these, the big nuclear plants have multiple reactors at one place, and you'd get the advantage, for example, in our case, to just simply have one target factory and so forth. I don't think we're going to be able to compete. I don't know how small modular reactors go—a hundred megawatts or so, I would guess, and probably can't get down there, but one of my own goals is to get the size down as much as possible, but I think we're talking about hundreds of megawatts.
The vision (12:52)
What's the big vision? Why are you doing this?
Why am I doing it?
Yeah, what's the vision? What drives you and where do you think this goes over the next two decades?
I may have the best route to get there. If I thought one of these other ones were going to get there, no problem… but all of us have challenges, and I think we can get there. I think from a standing start. As far as getting investment, I've just had pre-seed money, I don't have the big bucks yet. I’ve brought on people that are more experienced than me at extracting money from VCs and investors. (I was told you know a few billionaires.) Basically, for me, I need a few tens of millions to get started—like I'd say, about a hundred million to build the beamline. And then after that… actually I have a conference call on Friday with a representative of the investment bank industry that is very dubious about fusion.
I mean, you can understand the skepticism, as a technology. What do they say? “It's the future of energy and always will be.”
But the really good thing, I think, about the private investment is that the public investment has been too much focus on big machines which will give you physics, but have pretty much zero chance of being a direct path to fusion energy. You know, $25 billion and I make 500 megawatts thermal, occasionally, and we show that to a power plant executive, they're going to say, “You're kidding me.” We hope to get down cost for the power plants in the few-billion-dollar range.
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In a world facing climate change and clean energy challenges, it’s starting to look like a nuclear energy renaissance is starting to happen. That is, if we can overcome our irrational fear of nuclear. In this episode of Faster, Please! - The Podcast, I talk with Dr. Spencer Weart about the cultural influences that shaped generations of anxiety around nuclear power, and how that tide may be turning.
Weart holds advanced degrees in both Astrophysics and History. For over three decades, he served as Director of the Center for History of Physics at the American Institute of Physics. He is the author of two children’s science books and has written or co-edited seven other books. Among his most recent is The Rise of Nuclear Fear, published in 2012.
In This Episode
* A history of radiation (1:05)
* The rise of nuclear fear (7:01)
* Anti-bomb to anti-nuclear (11:52)
* Today’s anti-nuclear voices (20:21)
* Changing generational attitudes (24:01)
* Nuclear fear in today’s media (28:58)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
A history of radiation (1:05)
Pethokoukis: To what extent, when radiation was discovered at the turn of the century—and then, of course, the discovery of nuclear fission—to what extent were we already as a society primed by our cultural history to worry about radiation and nuclear power?
Weart: Totally. Because you say radiation was discovered, presumably you're referring first to the discovery of X-rays and then, shortly after that, the discovery of what they called “atomic radiation,” we now call it “nuclear radiation.” But, of course, before that, there was the very exciting discovery of infrared radiation. And before that, people have always known about radiation: the rays, the heat from the sun; and they've always had a very powerful cultural significance. You think of the halos of rays of light going out from holy figures in Buddhism and Christian iconography, or you think of the ancient Egyptians with the life-giving rays of the sun bestowing life on things because actually, of course, radiation of the sun is life-giving, it does contain a vital life force. So it's not a mistake to think of radiation as some kind of super magical, powerful thing.
And then of course there's also death rays. Death rays actually did become very popular in the literature after the discovery of X-rays because X-rays could, in fact, cause great damage to people, and then so could atomic rays, so, already by the early 20th century there were lots of kids' books and exciting adventure fiction featuring death rays. But you go back before that, there's the evil eye. There's rays radiating out from the evil eye could cause harm. Then there's astrology, the rays from the stars could influence human destiny. So as soon as you mention radiation, there's an enormous complex of things that come out, which was very easily linked to atomic radiation because of all the other characteristics of atomic discoveries.
And yet, certainly in the first half or first third of the 20th century, there was, people saw radiation as having great promise, even to create a Golden Age. Tell me a bit about that.
It came out as soon as radiation was discovered. Whenever there's a new physics discovery, almost the first thing that people think about is medical applications. And that happened with electricity and with X-rays—of course, x-rays do have great medical applications—and nuclear radiation (I'll call it “nuclear,” even though they called it “atomic” back then). Nuclear radiation did turn out to be radon and radium and so forth that Curie discovered did turn out to be useful for curing certain types of skin cancers and so forth.
But people went much beyond that because there was all this magical stuff associated with it. We have to remember that very early on it was discovered that nuclear radiation is the product of the transmutation of elements: uranium and radium and so forth and even other elements.
Like alchemy.
Yeah, transmutation was alchemy. It was immediately recognized that, oh, the nuclear physicists were the new alchemist and they were happy to talk of themselves as that. But of course, as soon as you have something powerful, as I said, the first thing, when you have a new discovery, that you think about is medicine. The second thing you think about 10 seconds later is weapons, so nuclear death rates were very early imagined. And the atomic bomb—the first atomic bomb actually was sort of a device carried by a terrorist in the 1901 novel. And then in 1915, H.G. Wells conceived of the idea of an atomic warfare weapon that civilization destroyed, but then followed by transmutation and of course humans destroy civilization, then we’ll rise again in atomic powered cars. We love utopia powered by nuclear energy. So all these things were there together, the good side and the bad side. On one side you had people saying that this is the 1930s mind. This is before nuclear fission was discovered. This was entirely science fiction.
Would you call that a period of general sort of pro-progress science and technology enthusiasm?
Well, it was, except… this was certainly the case in the 1900s. People thought that radium could cure all ills. Nuclear energy was seen as the elixir of life, talking about the old alchemists and so forth. There were all these wonderful things it could do and by the time it got to the First World War and the Great Depression, people were a little less happy about technology. So in addition to the wonders of atomic power plants and so forth, there were also things like… my favorite is a movie in which Boris Karloff doesn't play the mad scientist’s monster, he plays the mad scientist who discovers a new kind of radium rays, and of course he means to use it for good and he uses it… always using it to irradiate the young women to cure them, because, of course, radiation carries not only life force, but if you dig down deep into the radium side that has this sort of sexual thing. So these 1930s science fiction images of nuclear or mad scientists irradiating young women having a definite violation aspect. In this movie Boris Karloff gets too big a dose of radiation and goes mad and it turns him into a monster and goes around glowing in the dark—maybe the origin of the glowing in the dark idea—and then killing people with the touch of his radioactive hand. So it was all there together, both magical good and magical evil. Very, very strongly mythologized and Freudenized. The writers at the time read their Freud and they were happy to put in all these ideas of bad parents. And the mad scientist is the bad parent out to rape… well, I probably shouldn't go too far with this because… You have to see the pictures to really appreciate how deep this stuff goes.
Would you say that, overall, pre-Hiroshima, that the general public attitude was sort of positive about the potential of radiation and, eventually, atomic fission? Was it overall positive?
Yes, I would say it was generally positive, but with very deep roots. The positivity was mingled, when you go down deep enough, with all sorts of negative or ambiguous things: ideas of mad scientists as sort of the bad parent or the authority figure, the mean, merciless dictator, all of these things and the evil eye death ray kind of thing. They're all there sort of broiling around at a very deep level, a very deep psychological level and a very deep cultural level. And on the surface side, I would say it was generally positive and the overall idea was positive.
The rise of nuclear fear (7:01)
So if those things were sort of bubbling around, was it the atomic bombings of Japan that brought that stuff to a boil? Was that the key moment, or did that happen afterward? Was that the key inflection point?
It came afterwards. When Hiroshima happened, all the commentators from President Truman on down, the feeling was, “Oh, oh, it's actually real!” All the stuff that we thought was things that teenage boys read in their pulp fiction or in horror movies, all this stuff is actually real, so that was a shock.
And so it went two ways. One of course was the actual image of Hiroshima. And then when atomic bombs started to proliferate, when the Russians got the atomic bombs and we worried about them bombing our homes, then all this stuff that was sort of underground and seemed mythological—atomic war and the end of the world, and so forth—all became a scientific reality.
But at the same time, the other side also was coming out very strongly, and this was partly done deliberately. The government—well, the American government, the British government, the French government, the Soviet government—all got very worried about how upset their publics were and how frightened they were by atomic bombs. So they made a very strong effort to promote what they called “Atoms for Peace:” nuclear reactors, nuclear-powered ships, nuclear-powered everything. We use radiation. Radiation has a life force, right? So we'll radiate seeds and we'll get these new kinds of petunias and better crops.
Both of these things came out and there was a strong mixture of positivity and negativity, mostly connected with nuclear war, originally. It originally was connected with atomic explosions. And then this phase ended, this sort of 1950s Atoms for Peace thing ended with the hydrogen bomb, all of a sudden, there was a very big shift.
Is that just because it was just obviously a much more powerful explosive, or was it the Bravo incident which you write about in the book?
Yeah. There's two things going on here. First place is the hydrogen bomb is a thousand times more powerful than an atomic bomb. So this whole business of “duck and cover,” which, I was born in 1942, I did the “duck and cover” in school and so forth, that made sense with an atomic bomb. Okay, oh, the atomic bomb goes off in New York City, I'm in the suburbs, I duck under the desk. In a hydrogen bomb, you're inside the fireball. The whole idea of hiding from it is useless. So there's that one overwhelming thing. And the second thing with hydrogen bombs is that besides burning a city, they produce an enormous amount of fallout. Now, the fallout from the Hiroshima bomb actually didn't do much damage and the atomic bomb tests that people conducted in Nevada, they actually did do damage, but people didn't know it at the time because the atomic authorities were kind of hiding it. The Atomic Energy Commission had what they called—everybody at the time, called it—a “father-knows-best attitude,” which later turned out to be the bad father, the dangerous father.
But with the hydrogen bombs coming along, you couldn't hide the fallout. It was just enormous. If you were a thousand miles away, you had to take shelter from the fallout. And so there was a big rush for a couple of years to build fallout shoulders. And then people realized, “No, what's the use of staying in a fallout shoulder for two weeks, and then when you come out, what are you going to get?” It was at this was point that the positivity got just overwhelmed. Particularly the positivity about radiation got overwhelmed.
Radiation can be useful. Radiation is very medically useful. In fact, medical radiation and use of radioactive isotopes and nuclear rays saves, I don’t know, millions of lives a year. In a single year it saves far more lives than I've ever died from nuclear radiation. But people then were sort of overwhelmed by the idea of nuclear war and of nuclear fallout, and this had a very strong political component.
Anti-bomb to anti-nuclear (11:52)
So tell me about the political component and then tell me how people sort of went from fearing radiation from nuclear war to fearing a nuclear reactor, which is not a bomb.
After the hydrogen bomb an anti-war movement appeared, and it began in Japan, and it began in an interesting way. The first hydrogen bomb test polluted some fishermen who were nearby and they made them very sick and a pool of Marshall Islanders, Pacific Islanders, and made them very sick, and it caused some deaths, and the commission didn't want to admit it. But it also came down in the Pacific and all the tuna in the Pacific, the Japanese got very upset. Tuna to the Japanese is hamburger to Americans. Okay, it's a sacred thing. And the idea that you could hold a Geiger counter to it and there might be radioactivity in it was very frightening. And, of course, the Japanese had a natural worry about atomic warfare in the first place, so a movement began against fallout from nuclear weapons. It was against the testing of nuclear weapons.
What they really didn't want—and this was true as the movement spread entirely around the world—what they mainly didn't want was to be bombed. The actual aim of the anti-nuclear movement, which ended up mobilizing millions and millions of people coming out into the streets, a very major movement, which had a very strong effect on politics and even in the Soviet Union. So what the leaders of the movement decided is they were going to focus on the fallout from bomb tests. The idea was to stop the bomb tests as a way of slowing down the nuclear arms race. If we could stop the tests, at least they won't be making more bombs. That's the first part, because it was a backyard issue. We can tell people the fallout is going into their backyard. My favorite is a kid says, “Oh, my mother says you shouldn't eat snow because there might be a piece of the bomb in it.” Okay, that's what radioactive material is now, it's a piece of the bomb. And so it was very powerful. It's in mother's milk, it's in your children's teeth. So it was a very powerful thing.
And in order to do this, however, there was a certain little scientific difficulty, which is that the radioactivity in fallout, by the time it's thousands of miles away, is extremely low. Now, we do not know the effects of extremely low radiation. If you give a dose of unit one to one person, that person will die. If you give a dose of one millionth of a unit to one million people, will one person die? Well, that can be argued.
And, in fact, the scientific evidence suggests that when you get to very, very low levels, that is, to the levels that are sort of normally in an environment, the levels that you get when you take one flight in the airplane or you go to some places in China where there's natural radioactivity, or if you live inside a brick house, these very low levels of radiation don't seem to be especially harmful. Life evolved for 5 billion years in the presence of low levels of radioactivity. So there's a scientific argument about this, and there's still a scientific uncertainty, but the scientists, feeling very bad about atomic weapons, decided, “We will say that, scientifically, very low levels of radioactivity experienced over millions of people are a bad thing.” And that's been the sort of official view of the anti-nuclear, anti-bomb scientists to this day. And so that became established. That was the point in which radiation, which is, as I said, is something we've lived with for three billion years, was established—this force of nature was established as just definitely an evil thing. It's a piece of the bomb. We don't want to have anything to do with it.
And if it's an evil thing, then whether that radiation is generated for military use, or peaceful use, it's a bad thing, and there's just inherent risk. We cannot control this demon.
It’s the mad scientist’s monster, it's the evil eye, it's the death ray. And, again, there's politics here because after the Cuban Missile Crisis and the tremendous excitement, and Kennedy and Khrushchev said, “We have to do something, our populaces are terrified now. This is very bad for us as leaders of our countries, to have our populace terrified that the things that we as leaders are doing are going to do…” Well it's very simple. We put the bomb test underground. Go on testing the bombs, we don't stop the arms race, we put the bomb test underground, so there's no fault. And the whole anti-nuclear movement just collapsed. They'd made this their issue. They made a good background issue. They say, we're going to stop fault. They did stop fault. So the thing went away. So what happened to these people? Well, meanwhile, atoms for peace was progressing.
Nuclear reactors were beginning to come online, and some of the people who had been anti-atomic bomb began to worry about low level radiation for reactors. It's the same issue. And for reactor issues, this tiny, tiny amount of radioactivity, but that's over millions of people. Well, we've already decided it is a bad thing. And so an anti-nuclear reactor movement began up, and it made, through a very substantial extent, the same arguments about low level radioactivity and the same organizations and the same individuals, in many cases, who’d been agitating against atomic war. I would argue that this may be a case of psychological formation known as “displacement.” You can't deal with something: nuclear war, you deny. We're just going to go into denial about if the bombs are there. We're not going to think about, which is still the case, by the way. We’re still largely in denial of the fact that the president of the United States and the president in the president of Russia, by their sole power, can press a button, so to speak, and can launch nuclear war. Each of these two men—well, I guess it’s also true of Xi now, he seems to be pretty much in power in China—there's three people now who've been launched a nuclear war on their own say-so and launch hundreds and hundreds of missiles essentially destroy civilization. We're all in denial about that, and people have been in denial about that since about 1965.
But if you're locked in a room with a guy with a flame thrower and somebody lights a match, you're going to get upset. And that seems to be what happened with the anti-nuclear reactor movement. And that's now become embedded, for example, the Green Party in Germany began as an anti-bomb party, converted to an anti-reactor party. What they actually are, if you get down to it, is an anti-additional low levels of radiation. When radiation is at a certain level, we don't want to add one percent in any place on earth from any reactor to it, and that's become their DNA, it’s in their DNA. So the Green Party in Germany, it can't escape from their original orientation because of the same anti-bomb…
So we see this transfer from nuclear weapons to nuclear reactors with radiation as sort of the common… But then in the ’70s, it's also then sort of the anti-reactor position then seemed to get mixed up with a broader anti-modernity, anti-industrial society sort of attitude.
Right, but actually this began more in Europe and the Europeans were very big on this, the whole 1960s thing, and really it's a 1960s phenomenon—the Baby Boomer, the 1968 generation, perhaps—that don't like nuclear. There is a feature of nuclear reactors, and this is an inherent feature of nuclear actors, is you need a lot of capital. If you're in a socialist country like the Soviet Union, you still need a lot of capital, it's just going to be under some big organization. In fact, the government always has to be involved, especially when people are worried about the safety of it, and you're going to need government regulations, so you're going to have a big government, you're going to have big corporations, and, because nuclear weapons are involved, you're also going to have secrecy. So, no matter what, you're dealing with these sort of secret, paternalistic authorities, which the kids of 1968 hated the whole idea of paternalistic authorities with their immense powers, and secrets, and God knows what they're up to with their machinations.
Whereas, the original idea was, “Well, solar power is dispersed.” Okay, anybody can put up a solar panel, so that's very communitarian. So that became a very important part of the politics of it. Less so now, I would say.
Today’s anti-nuclear voices (20:21)
Let me ask you about the politics of now because I understand that, and then obviously Three Mile Island was perhaps the capstone event, but yet, today, maybe the attitudes toward nuclear are changing and there's talk of nuclear renaissance, and in Europe—though not Germany—there's a lot of talk about building new reactors, keeping reactors open. Is the anti-nuclear sentiment today… in what ways is it different? Is it more about cost, or nuclear waste? It's not necessarily a fear of sort of “bigness,” we seem to generally like technology in this country.
That was the thing of the ’60s. That's not the thing now. In the United States and Western Europe, cost is a big feature because we can't seem to be able to build these things on time and in budget, but then we can't build a subway or a highway or a railroad on timer and budget, either. So these big projects we're not very good at these days, and that is a problem for the nuclear reactors. So the hope is to build smaller nuclear reactors so we don't run into this giant project syndrome that the United States and Western Europe seem to have problems with. But there's a lot of other things going on here.
Certainly the younger generation doesn't have the same feelings that the older generation did. Nuclear energy for the young folks, it's the symptoms. It's a postmodern thing. The three-eyed fish is not a scary thing. It's kind of a postmodern reference to the stuff that your parents were afraid of. So it's all ironic. The game Fallout, which is enormously important, made a billion dollars of sale (well, four, I think it was a billion dollars of sales in the first 24 hours after it was released) these are big cultural phenomena, so it's the post-apocalyptic wasteland, but it's a reference to the scary post-apocalyptic wasteland. Like I say, we're in denial about the actual. Radioactive mutant monsters? Of course there are radioactive monsters. When I give this lecture, I show a picture of one, he's wearing shades, he’s is kind of cool. It's all ironic and distancing, and so on and so on. The younger generation doesn't have that thing, but they have sort of an automatic response, which has just been built into the culture, an automatic response that, “Oh, there's something bad about radiation, I'm not actually viscerally afraid of it the way my parents were, but I just automatically think it's bad. And I'll give you an important example, okay, I'm going to give a life and death example.
After the Fukushima accident, when the tsunami overcame this thing—the Japanese had done very bad job there—the Japanese evacuate a lot of people from around there. Two thousand people died in the immediate evacuation, mostly the older people were yanked out of their homes or retirement homes or hospitals and so forth. Since then, a lot of the people have not been allowed to go back. They've been displaced. There's a lot of morbidity and mortality among these people whose communities have disrupted. This was totally unnecessary. If they had just left everybody in place and maybe handed out some iodine pills, nobody would have died. The kind of reactions that people have to these things… But that's not the worst mortality from Fukushima, the worst mortality from Fukushima is that the Japanese and the Germans shut down the nuclear power plants and burned coal instead, and the death rate—the deaths from burning the coal instead of the nuclear reactors—is now estimated at about 400,000 people. 400,000 people died from—oh, sorry, I’m off by an order magnitude: 40,000 people. Anyway, many tens of thousands of people have died from coal smoke that didn't have to die if people hadn't panicked.
Changing generational attitudes (24:01)
It is significant. It's research I mentioned in my book, and I've actually had some of the economists who've done some of that research on this podcast, and it's a lesson that the Japanese seem to have learned, whether it's to have less pollution or meet various environmental objectives, they seem to have re-embraced nuclear. Given, perhaps, how younger people today, younger voters maybe don't have that sort of deeper repulsion toward radiation that their parents did. Do you think, one, maybe putting the economics aside, that from a public perceptions standpoint, are you positive or negative about a nuclear renaissance in this country and can any optimism survive any sort of nuclear accident almost no matter how small?
It's going to be difficult because, like I say, the reaction to Fukushima shows that the government reaction and the media reaction shows that there's still an enormous amount of this stuff going on, both in the older people and also just by habit, by automatic response from the younger people. What's the worst power accident that's happened recently? Most people wouldn't realize it was the breaking of hydroelectric dams in Libya. They killed tens of thousands of people. Over 10,000 people died when a hydroelectric dam broke. A hydroelectric dams, that's renewable, that's supposed to be great stuff, right? Nobody talks about that. No nuclear reactor has ever killed 10,000 people, or a thousand people, or a hundred people, even. But hydroelectric dams, this isn't the first time a hydroelectric dam has broken and killed 10,000 people, either. It seems to happen every 20, 30 years or so, but people aren't afraid.
So yes, it's very serious. Nevertheless, there is another thing which is becoming very prominent in many people's minds, and which has, in fact, led to quite a substantial number of environmentalists who were originally opposed to nuclear actors who were saying, “We must have nuclear reactors,” and you know what this is: This is climate change. This, as you may know, is the other thing I've spent 25 years of my life on, is climate change. And so I'm now just going to give you a very brief little homily.
Under the current agreement, Paris Agreement as extended, if all the countries keep their pledges (that's a big “if”), they keep their pledges, some countries may do better than the pledges, but the estimate from the IPCC is that there will warm up to 2.7 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial. We're now at about 1.4, so that's getting about twice as far as we are now. 2.7 degrees Celsius, in a world at that level, it will be rather difficult to maintain a prosperous and liberal civilization. Right now we have maybe a third of the world lives in a prosperous, liberal, fairly liberal free society. We would like that to be a hundred percent by the year 2100, but if we get up to 2.7 degrees C, which is the trajectory we're on now, then it's going to be extremely difficult to maintain that even for the third of the people who have it now.
But there's another feature which the climate people mostly don't like to talk about. You actually have to read the footnotes in the IPCC report to get this. You have to look at the graphs and get the numbers off the graphs. People, when they say, everybody says 2.7 degrees C, that's what the IPCC says is the most likely outcome, but there are large error bars on that. It could be 4.5 C degrees Celsius. What's the probability of going above 4.5 if you read it off the graphs? Five percent. And I have quotes from two separate very senior climate scientists saying, “Well, you wouldn't get on an airplane if it had a five percent chance of crashing.” This is why people are fighting to keep it down below two degrees. Once we get above two degrees, the probability of the airplane crashing becomes fairly high.
Is the consensus middle path or sort of these more extreme predictions, are they scary enough that environmental groups, which still are anti-nuclear, will change and there'll be a broader environmental pro-nuclear shift?
It definitely has made a difference to some prominent individuals. I'm not going to name names, but they're quite a substantial number of people and increasing numbers of people who are… The scientists are terrified, and the climate scientists are just, they have a hard time sleeping at night, so they worry about their kids. I had experience because I lived for 25 years studying nuclear war and all that stuff, so I guess I have a little thick skin when I think about the climate, but it's even scarier than nuclear war, simple fact of the matter, because nuclear war was a question of, can we avoid it? But climate change is something we're on track for now. That's where we're actually heading.
Nuclear fear in today’s media (28:58)
Let me finish up with this question, since you talk so much in the book about culture and the images that we sort of feed to ourselves. So I can think of two, perhaps, relevant bits of media over the past few years. I was wondering if you've seen either and if you had any general thoughts. One was the fine Chernobyl miniseries, which may have been on HBO, it was a four-part series on Chernobyl. And the film Oppenheimer. Have you seen either, and maybe give some context on how you look at those?
I'm not going to comment on Oppenheimer, that's very complicated. Chernobyl, they did a wonderful job of reproducing the Soviet thing. Everybody was smoking all the time. I was in the Soviet Union, you know? I'll just give you one example. They showed a helicopter going over and they showed it crashing. And the implication there is, “Oh, somehow magical radiation from the reactor crashed the helicopter.” Well, there actually was a helicopter crash, and it crashed because it ran into a crane. So that's just dishonest. That's just dishonest. And unfortunately, this is the way that the media is still, to a substantial extent, treating radiation.
There came a point in that miniseries, which, overall, I thought was excellent, when you finally found out what the actual death toll was, I think many viewers were surprised because if you watched every one of those episodes where they were talking about just how dangerous this meltdown was and the potential deaths, if the reactors exploded, you would've thought that many, many tens of thousands or a hundred thousand people had died—and they didn't! It was almost anti-climactic to find out how few people actually died. And if this is the first you had ever heard of Chernobyl, I think it was probably fairly surprising to people.
People die all the time in coal mine accidents. I have no idea what the death toll is. It's terrible. But coal is familiar, okay, as one of the people said in 1946 when they were talking about reactors, “Well, it wasn't 10,000 tons of coal they dropped on Hiroshima.” We have these associations with nuclear things that we just don't have with traditional things. And the associations, as we've discussed, go very far back into death rays, mad scientists, bad fathers, sexual implications of things, all kinds of magical and mysterious things that get associated with nuclear energy that they've never been associated with the more traditional forms of energy production.
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Education was among the first victims of AI panic. Concerns over cheating quickly made the news. But AI optimists like John Bailey are taking a whole different approach. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Bailey about what it would mean to raise kids with a personalized AI coach — one that could elevate the efficacy of teachers, tutors, and career advisors to new heights.
John Bailey is a colleague and senior fellow at AEI. He formerly served as special assistant to the president for domestic policy at the White house, as well as deputy policy director to the US secretary of commerce. He has additionally acted as the Director of Educational Technology for the Pennsylvania Department of Education, and subsequently as Director of Educational Technology for the US Department of Education.
In This Episode
* An opportunity for educators (1:27)
* Does AI mean fewer teachers, or better teachers? (5:59)
* A solution to COVID learning loss (9:31)
* The personalized educational assistant (12:31)
* The issue of cheating (17:49)
* Adoption by teachers (21:02)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
Education was among the first victims of AI panic. Concerns over cheating quickly made the news. But AI optimists like John Bailey are taking a whole different approach. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Bailey about what it would mean to raise kids with a personalized AI coach — one that could elevate the efficacy of teachers, tutors, and career advisors to new heights.
John Bailey is a colleague and senior fellow at AEI. He formerly served as special assistant to the president for domestic policy at the White house, as well as deputy policy director to the US secretary of commerce. He has additionally acted as the Director of Educational Technology for the Pennsylvania Department of Education, and subsequently as Director of Educational Technology for the US Department of Education.
An opportunity for educators (1:27)
Pethokoukis: John, welcome to the podcast.
Bailey: Oh my gosh, it's so great to be with you.
We’d actually chatted last summer a bit on a panel about AI and education, and this is a fast moving, evolving technology. People are constantly thinking of new things to do with it. They're gauging its strengths and weaknesses. As you're thinking about any downsides of AI in education, has that changed since last summer? Are you more or less enthusiastic? How would you gauge your evolving views?
I think I grow more excited and enthusiastic by the day, and I say that with a little humility because I do think the education space, especially for the last 20 years or so, has been riddled with a lot of promises around personalized learning, how technology was going to change your revolutionize education and teaching and learning, and it rarely did. It was over promise and under-delivered. This, though, feels like it might be one of the first times we're underestimating some of the AI capabilities and I think I'm excited for a couple different reasons.
I just see this as it is developing its potential to develop tutoring and, just in time, professional development for teachers, and being an assistant to just make teaching more joyful again and remove some of the drudgery. I think that's untapped area and it seems to be coming alive more and more every day. But then, also, I'm very excited about some of the ways these new tools are analyzing data and you just think about school leaders, you think about principals and superintendents, and state policy makers, and the ability of being able to just have conversations with data, not running pivot tables or Excel formulas and looking for patterns and helping to understand trends. I think the bar for that has just been dramatically lowered and that's great. That's great for decision-making and it's great for having a more informed conversation.
You're right. You talked about the promise of technology, and I know that when my kids were in high school, if there were certain classes which were supposedly more tech adept, they would bring out a cart with iPads. And I think as parents we are supposed to be like, “Wow, every kid's going to have an iPad that's going to be absolutely amazing!” And I'm not sure if that made the teachers more productive, I'm not sure, in the end, if the kids learned any better.
This technology, as you just said, could be different. And the one area I want to first focus on is, it would be awesome if we had a top-10-percent teacher in every classroom. And I know that, at least some of the early studies, not education studies, but looking at studies of using generative AI in, perhaps, customer service. One effect they notice is kind of raising the lower-performing group and having them do better. And so I immediately think about the ability to raise… boy, if we could just have the lowest-performing teachers do as well as the middle-performing teachers, that would seem to be an amazing improvement.
I totally agree with you. Yeah, I think that was the BCG study that found when consultants used gen AI—I think, in that case, it was ChatGPT—everyone improved, but the folks that had the most dramatic improvement were the lowest performers in the consulting world. And here you could imagine something very similar for teachers that are teaching out of field—that happens a lot in science and mathematics. It's with new teachers, and the ability of helping them perform better… also, the ability, I think, of combining what they know with also what science and research is saying is the best practice. That's been very difficult.
One of the examples I give is the Department of Ed has these guides called the What Works Clearinghouse Practice Guides, and this is what evaluation of research, and studies, and evaluation has to say, “This is the best way of teaching math, or the best way of teaching reading,” but these are dense documents, they're like 137 PDF pages. If you're asking a new teacher teaching out of field to read 137 pages of a PDF and apply it to their lesson that day, that's incredibly difficult. But it can happen in a matter of seconds now with an AI assistant that can read that practice guide, read your lesson, and make sure that you're getting just-in-time professional development, you're getting an assistant with your worksheets, with your class activities and everything. And so I totally agree with you, I think this is a way of helping to make sure that teachers are able to perform better and to really be an assistant to teachers no matter where they are in terms of their skill level.
Does AI mean fewer teachers, or better teachers? (5:59)
I recall a story, and I forget which sort of tech CEO was talking to a bunch of teachers, and he said, “The good news: in the future, all teachers will make a million dollars a year… bad news is we're only going to need like 10 percent of you” because each teacher would be so empowered by—this was pre-AI—by technology that they would just be so much more productive.
The future you're talking about isn't necessarily a future of fewer teachers, it's just sort of the good part of it, which is more productive teachers, and any field where there's a huge human element is always tough to make more productive. Is the future you're talking about just… it's not necessarily fewer teachers, it's just more productive teachers?
I think that's exactly right. I don't think this is about technology replacing teachers, I think it's about complimenting them. We see numerous studies that ask teachers how they spend their time and, on average, teachers are spending less than half of their time on instruction. A lot of it is on planning, a lot of it is on paperwork. I mean, even if we had AI that could take away some of that drudgery and free up teachers' times, so they could be more thoughtful about their planning or spend more time with students, that would be a gift.
But also I think the best analog on this is a little bit in the healthcare space. If you think of teachers as a doctor, doctors are your most precious commodity in a healthcare system, you want to maximize their time, and what you're seeing is that now, especially because of technology and because of some tools, you can push a lot of decisions to be more subclinical. And so initially that was with nurses and nurse practitioners so that could free up doctor's time. Now you're seeing a whole new category, too, where AI can help provide some initial feedback or responses, and then if you need more help and assistance, you’d go up to that nurse practitioner, and if you need more help and assistance, then you go and you get the doctor. And I bet we're going to see a bunch of subclinical tools and assistance that come out in education, too. Some cases it's going to be an AI tutor, but then kids are going to need a human tutor. That's great. And in some cases they're going to need more time with their teacher, and that's great, too. I think this is about maximizing time and giving kids exactly what they need when they need it.
This just sort of popped in my head when you mentioned the medical example. Might we see a future where you have a real job with a career path called “teacher assistant,” where you might have a teacher in charge, like a doctor, of, maybe, multiple classes, and you have sort of an AI-empowered teaching assistant as sort of a new middle-worker, much like a nurse or a physician's assistant?
I think you could, I mean, already we're seeing you have teacher assistants, especially in higher education, but I think we're going to see more of those in K-12. We have some K-12 systems that have master teachers and then teachers that are a little bit less-skilled or newer that are learning on the job. I think you have paraprofessionals, folks that don't necessarily have a certification that are helping. This can make a paraprofessional much more effective. We see this in tutoring that not every single tutor is a licensed teacher, but how do you make sure a tutor is getting just-in-time help and support to make them even more effective?
So I agree with you, I think we're going to see a whole category of sort of new professions emerge here. All in service by the way, again, of student learning, but also of trying to really help support that teacher that's gone through their licensure that is years of experience and have gone through some higher education as well. So I think it's a complimentary, I don't think it's replacing,
A solution to COVID learning loss (9:31)
You know, we're talking about tutoring, and the thing that popped in my head was, with the pandemic and schools being hybrid or shut down and kids having to learn online and maybe they don't have great internet connections and all that, that there's this learning-loss issue, which seems to be reflected in various national testing, and people are wondering, “Well great, maybe we could just catch these kids up through tutoring.” Of course, we don't have a nationwide tutoring plan to make up for that learning loss and I'm wondering, have people talked about this as a solution to try to catch up all these kids who fell behind?
I know you and I, I think, share a similar philosophy of where… in DC right now, so much of the philosophy around AI is, it's doomerism. It's that this is a thing to contain and to minimize the harms instead of focusing on how do we maximize the benefits? And if there's been ever a time when we need federal policymakers and state policy makers to call on these AI titans to help tackle a national crisis, the learning crisis coming out of the pandemic is definitely one of those. And I think there's a way to do tutoring differently here than we have in the past. In the past, a lot of tech-based tutoring was rule-based. You would ask a question that was programmed, Siri would give a response, it would give a pre-programed answer in return. It was not very warm. And I think what we're finding is, first of all, there's been two studies, one published in JAMA, another one with Microsoft and Google, that found that in the healthcare space, not only could these AI systems be not just technically accurate, but their answers, when compared to human doctors, were rated as more empathetic. And I think that's amazing to think about when empathy becomes something you can program and maximize, what does it mean to have an empathetic tutor that's available for every kid that can encourage them?
And for me, I think the thing that I realized that this is fundamentally different was about a year ago. I wanted to just see: Could ChatGPT create an adaptive tutor? And the prompt was just so simple. You just tell it, “I want you to be an adaptive tutor. I want you to teach a student in any subject at any grade, in any language, and I want you to take that lesson and connect it to any interest a student has, and then I want you to give a short quiz. If they get it right, move on. If they get it wrong, just explain it using simpler language.” That literally is the prompt. If you type in, “John. Sixth grade. Fractions. Star Wars,” every example is based on Star Wars. If you say, “Taylor Swift,” every example is on Taylor Swift. If you say, “football,” every example is on football.
There's no product in the market right now, and no human tutor, that can take every lesson and connect it to whatever interest a student has, and that is amazing for engagement. And it also helps take these abstract concepts that so often trip up kids and it connects it to something they're interested in, so you increase engagement, you increase understanding, and that's all with just three paragraphs of human language. And if that's what I can do, I'd love to sort of see our policymakers challenge these AI companies to help build something that's better to help tackle the learning loss.
The personalized educational assistant (12:31)
And that's three paragraphs that you asked of a AI tutor where that AI is as bad as it's ever going to be. Oftentimes, when people sort of talk about the promise of AI and education, they'll say like, “In the future,” which may be in six months, “kids will have AI companions from a young age with which they will be interacting.” So by the time they get to school, they will have a companion who knows them very well, knows their interests, knows how they learn, all these things. Is that kind of information something that you can see schools using at some point to better teach kids on a more individualized basis? Has there been any thought about that? Because right now, a kid gets to school and all teacher knows is maybe how the kid did it in kindergarten or preschool and their age and their face, but now, theoretically, you could have a tremendous amount of information about that kid's strengths and weaknesses.
Oh my gosh, yeah, I think you're right. Some of this we talked about in the future, that was a prompt I constructed, I think for ChatGPT4 last March, which feels like eons ago in AI timing. And I think you're right. I think once these AI systems have memory and can learn more about someone, and in this case a student, that's amazing, to just sort of think that there could be an AI assistant that literally grows up with the child and learns about their interests and how they're struggling in class or what they're thriving in class. It can be encouraging when it needs to be encouraging, it can help explain something when the child needs something explained, it could do a deeper dive on a tutoring session. Again, that sounds like science fiction, but I think that's two, three years away. I don't think that's too far.
Speaking of science fiction, because I know you're a science fiction fan, a lot of what we're describing now feels like the 1995 Sci-Fi novel, The Diamond Age and that talked about this, it talked about Nell, who was a young girl who came in a possession of a highly advanced book. It was called the Young Lady’s Illustrated Primer, and it would help with tutoring and with social codes and with a lot of different support and encouragement. And at the time when Neil wrote that in ’95, that felt like science fiction and it really feels like we've come to the moment now—you have tablet computers, you have phones that can access these super-intelligent AI systems that are empathetic, and if we could get them to be slightly more technically accurate and grounded in science and practice and rigorous research, I don’t know, that feels really powerful. It feels like something we should be leaning into more than leaning away from
John, that reference made this podcast an early candidate for Top Podcasts of 2024. Wonderful. That was really playing to your host. Again, as you're saying that, it occurs to me that one area that this could be super helpful really is sort of career advice when kids are wondering, “What I should do, should I go to college?” and boy, to have a career counselor's advice supplemented by a lifetime of an AI interacting with this kid… Counselors will always say, “Well, I'm sure your parents know you better than I do.” Well, I'll tell you, a career counselor plus a lifetime AI, you may know that kid pretty well.
Let's just take instruction off the table. Let's say we don't want AI to help teach kids, we don't want AI to replace teachers. AI as navigators I think is another untapped area, and that could be navigators as parents are trying to navigate a school choice system or an education savings account. It could be as kids and high school students are navigating what their post-college plan should be, but these systems are really good with that.
I remember I played with a prompt a couple months ago, but it was that, I said, “My name is John. I play football. Here's my GPA. I want to go to school in Colorado and here's my SAT score. What college might work well for me?” And it did an amazing job with even that rudimentary prompt of giving me a couple different suggestions in why that might be. And I think if we were more sophisticated there, we might be able to open up more pathways for students or prevent them from going down some dead ends that just might not be the right path for them.
There's a medical example of this that was really powerfully illustrative for me, which is, I had a friend who, quite sadly a couple of months ago was diagnosed with breast cancer. And this is an unfolding diagnosis. You get the initial, then there's scans and there's biopsies and reports, and then second and third and fourth opinions, it's very confusing. And what most patients need there isn't a doctor, they need a navigator. They need someone who could just make sense of the reports that can explain this Techno Latin that kind of gets put into the medical jargon, and they need someone to just say, what are the next questions I need to ask as I find my path on this journey?
And so I built her a GPT that had her reports and all she could do was ask it questions, and the first question she said is, “Summarize my doctor notes, identify they agree and where they disagree.” Then, the way I constructed the prompt is that after every response, it should give her three questions to ask the doctor, and all of a sudden she felt empowered in a situation where she felt very disempowered with navigating a very complex, and in that case, a life-threatening journey. Here, how can't we use that to take all the student work, and their assessments, their hobbies, and start helping them be empowered with figuring out where they should be pursuing a job or college or some other post-secondary pathway.
The issue of cheating (17:49)
You know I have a big family, a lot of kids, and I've certainly had conversations with, say, my daughters about career, and I'll get something like, “Ugh, you just don't understand.” And I'll say, “Well, help me, make me understand.” She's like, “Oh, you just don't understand.” Now I'm like, “Hey, AI, help me understand, what does she want to do? Can you give me some insights into her career?”
But we've talked about some of the upsides here and we briefly mentioned, immediately this technology attracted criticism. People worried about a whole host of things from bias in the technology to kids using it to cheat. There was this initial wave of concerns. Now that we're 15 months, maybe, or so since people became aware of this technology, which of the concerns do you find to be the persistent ones that you think a lot about? Are you as worried, perhaps, about issues of kids cheating, on having an AI write the paper for them, which was an early concern? What are the concerns that sort of stuck with you that you feel really need to be addressed?
The issue of cheating is present with every new technology, and this was true when the internet came out, it was true when Wikipedia came out, it was true when the iPhones came out. You found iPhone bans. If you go back and look at the news cycle in 2009, 2010, schools were banning iPhones; and then they figure out a way to manage it. I think we're going to figure out a way to manage the cheating and the plagiarism.
I think what worries me is a couple different things. One is, the education community talks often about bias, and when they usually talk about bias, in this case, they're talking about racial bias in these systems. Very important to address that head on. But also we need to tackle political bias. I think we just saw that recently with Gemini that, often, sometimes these systems can surface a little bit of center-left perspective and thinking on different types of subjects. How do we fine-tune that so you're getting it a little bit more neutral. Then also, in the education setting, it's pedagogical bias. Like when you're asking it to do a lesson plan or tutoring session, what's the pedagogy that's actually informing the output of that? And those are all going to be very important, I think, to solve.
The best case scenario, AI gets used to free up teacher time and teachers can spend more time in their judgment working on their lesson plans and their worksheets and more time with kids. There's also a scenario where some teachers may fall asleep at the wheel a little bit. It's like what you're seeing with self-driving cars, that you're supposed to keep your hands on the wheel and supposed to be at least actively supervising it, but it is so tempting to just sort of trust it and to sort of tune out. And I can imagine there's a group of teachers that will just take the first output from these AI systems and just run with it, and so it's not actually developing more intellectual muscle, it's atrophying that a little bit.
Then lastly, I think, what I worry about with kids—this is a little bit on the horizon, this is the downside to the empathy—what happens when kids just want to keep talking to their friendly, empathetic, AI companion and assistant and do that at the sacrifice of talking with their friends, and I think we're seeing this with the crisis of loneliness that we're seeing in the country as kids are on their phones and on social media. This could exaggerate that a lot more unless we're very intentional now about how to make sure kids aren't spending all their time with their AI assistant, but also in the real life and the real world with their friends.
Adoption by teachers (21:02)
Will teachers be excited about this? Are there teachers groups, teachers unions who are… I am sure they've expressed concerns, but will this tool be well accepted into our classrooms?
I think that the unions have been cautiously supportive of this right now. I hear a lot of excitement from teachers because I think what teachers see is that this isn't just one more thing, this is something that is a tool that they can use in their job that provides immediate, tangible benefits. And if you're doing something that, again, removes some drudgery of some of the administrative tasks or helps you with figuring out that one worksheet that's going to resonate with that one kid, that's just powerful. And I think the more software and systems that come out that tap that and make that even more accessible for teachers, I think the more excitement there is going to be. So I'm bullish on this. I think teachers are going to find this as a help and not as a threat. I think the initial threat around plagiarism, totally understandable, but I think there's going to be a lot of other tools that make teachers' lives better.
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Readers and listeners of Faster, Please! know how incredible the untapped potential of nuclear power truly is. As our society (hopefully) begins to warm to the idea of nuclear as an abundant, sustainable, and safe source of energy, a new generation of engineers and entrepreneurs is developing a whole new model of nuclear power: the microreactor.
Here on this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with James Walker, a nuclear physicist and CEO of NANO Nuclear Energy about the countless applications of his company’s under-development, mobile, and easily-deployable nuclear reactors.
In This Episode
* Why the microreactor? (1:14)
* The NANO design plan (7:11)
* The industry environment (11:42)
* The future of the microreactor (13:45
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
Why the microreactor? (1:14)
Pethokoukis : James, welcome to the podcast.
Walker: I would say the way NANO got going is probably of interest, then. When we first entered the nuclear space, and my background is a nuclear physicist, nuclear engineer, so I knew that there's a very high bar to entry in nuclear and there's a lot of well-established players in the space. But, really, when we actually took a look at the whole landscape, most of the development was in the SMR space, the Kairos, the Terra Powers, the NuScales, and we could see what they were doing: They were aiming for a much more manufactural reactor that could deploy a lot faster. It was going to be a lot smaller, fewer mechanical components, smaller operating staff to bring down costs. So that all made a lot of sense, but what I think was missing in the market—and there are a few companies involved in this—was that the microreactor space looked to be the larger potential market. And I say that because microreactors are more readily deployable to places like remote mining sites, remote habitation, disaster relief areas, military bases, island communities… you put them on maritime vessels to replace bunk fuel, charging stations for EV vehicles... Essentially hundreds of thousands of potential locations competing against diesel generators, which, up until now, up until microreactors, had no competition. So the big transformative change here is—obviously SMRs are going to contribute that, but—micro reactors can completely reshape the energy landscape and that's why it's exciting. That's the big change.
You gave some examples, so I want you to give me a couple more examples, but I'll say that I was thinking the other day about the expansion, partially due to AI, of these big data centers around the country. Is that the kind of thing—and you can give me other examples, as well—of where a much smaller microreactor might be a good fit for it, and also tell me, just how big are these reactors?
AI centers and data centers are particularly a big focus of tech at the moment. Microsoft even have people deliberately going out and speaking to nuclear companies about being able to charge these new stations because they want these things to be green, but they also want them in locations which aren't readily accessible to the grid. And a lot of the time, some of the power requirements of these things might be bigger than the town next to them where they've got these things. So their own microreactor or SMR system is actually a really good way of solving this where it's zero carbon-emitting energy, you can put it anywhere, and it is the most consistent form of energy. Now you can out-compete diesel in that front, it can go outcompete, wind or solar. It really has no competitors. So they are leaning in that direction and a lot of the big drive in nuclear at the moment is coming from industry. So that's the big change, I think. It's not strictly now a government-pushed initiative.
What's the difference between these and the SMR reactors, which my listeners and readers might be a little bit more familiar with?
SMRs, the small modular reactors, obviously if you think of a large conventional nuclear power station, you're thinking dozens and dozens of acres of land being occupied by essentially a big facility. An SMR brings that down by an order of magnitude. You still need to probably have an area about 10 city blocks, but the reactor itself is much, much smaller, occupied by a much smaller footprint than that.
Microreactors are much smaller, again, so if you take our design as an example, the whole system, the core and the turbine that produces the electricity, all fits within an ISO container. If you think of the standard shipping container you see on the back of a ship or you see on the back of a truck or a train, that's where you're really looking at. And the reason for that is that we're trying to make it as deployable and as mobile as possible. So conventional transportation—infrastructure, trucks, trains, ships—get these things anywhere in the world. Helicopter them in, if you really want. And once they're down there you've got 10, 15, 20 years of power consistently without that constant need to import fuel like you would with the diesel generator. That's the real big advantage of these things. Obviously SMRs don't have that ability, but they are more powerful machines. So you're powering cities, or bit towns, and that kind of thing. They are catering to different markets. They're not exactly competitors, they're very complimentary.
But even for big grid systems, micro reactors could play a big part because they could be intermittently placed within a grid system so that you have backup power systems all the time that's not reliant on one major area to produce power for the entire grid system. It can always draw power from wherever it needs. And there's a big advantage to micro correctors there.
Other examples of where microreactors could be used: We know that the military is very interested because they have an obligation to be able to self-power for at least two weeks. And obviously micros can take you well beyond that for, like, 50 years, so that easily meets their requirements. They're looking to get rid of diesel and replace them with microreactors and they're putting money in that space.
I would say a big market is going to be things like island communities that predominantly run on diesel at the moment, and that means it's expensive and it's polluting, and they're constantly bringing in diesel on a daily basis. Countries like the Philippines, Indonesia, where they have the majority of their population on these island communities that all run on diesel, you would essentially be taking hundreds of millions of people off diesel generator and putting them onto nuclear if you could bring in that technology to these areas.
And the US actually has an enormous population on island communities that run on diesel, too, that could be replaced with microreactors, and you could then have a zero carbon-emitting solution to energy requirements and less energy insecurity.
The NANO design plan (7:11)
Would they need to be refueled and how many people would it take? How many technical people would you need to operate one of them?
The idea here with our reactors is that we don't want to refuel at-site. What we would likely do is just decommission that reactor and remove it and we would just bring in a replacement. It's this less messy, there's no refueling process, it's easier to license that way. The interesting part about this is that we actually would probably only need a couple people on site while the reactor is running, and the reason for that is because obviously we need someone for physical security and maybe a mechanic on site who can just do some sort of physical intervention to modify the mechanical equipment.
The way these will likely work is that you'll have a central location where it monitors the behavior of dozens of reactors that are deployed at any one time. And you have all your nuclear engineers and your operators in that space and they monitor everything.
So you don't need a nuclear engineer at each site. And that way these things are very deployable and, to be honest, everybody who's going to work on these things are going to be quite bored. There's not going to be a lot to do because reactors are mostly self-regulating systems, and the intervention that's needed on a daily basis is very minimal. So even for the hub, it's mostly just an observation exercise to check on transient behavior as it's operating and then maybe some tweaks here and there, and that's essentially all that would need to be done for these things. And then you can bring down your OpEx costs very considerably.
So just a bit about the technology itself: You're working on two different reactors? Can you explain the differences in reactors and where they are in the development-deployment stage?
We have two expert technical teams working on two different reactor designs, and that's partly so we can de-risk our own operations. So we know that even if one meets critical problems, the other one will be able to go on, so we're just doubling our chances of success. The MO we gave to both of them was the same: It has to be modular, it needs to be passively cooling, it needs to be able to be shipped anywhere in the world, so it needs to be fit within an ISO container. And we gave both teams that MO. They both came up with very innovative and novel solutions to that problem.
So the Zeus reactor, which draws from the scientists and engineers down in California, their solution was just completely remove the coolants and use a thermal conduction. And if you do that, you can remove all the mechanical systems in the reactor. You reduce the size, you reduce the pumps, and then you have something that's very, very simple and size shrinks right down and you can get it in that ISO container system. That's very innovative, that's the Zeus reactor.
The Odin team, their solution was, “Well if you could introduce some initial heat into the system for a salt-based system and the uranium is providing that natural heat, and you create a natural circulation so you can remove pumps and you can remove circulatory systems and that way, again, you can shrink the reactor right down.”
So two very different solutions to the same problem, and that's how they differ. Odin does have a coolant that has a natural circulation that moves it around and Zeus has removed the coolant completely, which is more novel, I would say, and relies on a thermal conduction mechanism where the uranium just gets hot and it conducts through a solid core to the periphery where heat just gets removed by a naturally circulated air just going around.
Is there a difference with how much power each kind could potentially generate from a shipping container sized unit?
There was, originally, but I think the constraints of having to confine it to a shipping container almost got them into the same ballpark. So they're now both about, well, I'd say Zeus is maybe four megawatt thermal, Odin, it might be five megawatt thermal, but the power of the electric, once the conversion goes through, it brings them out to that one, one-and-a-half megawatt electric power output.
And what can that power?
A thousand homes for 20 years, mine sites, oil and gas sites for bringing the oil to the surface, remote communities, military bases…
Plenty of power for that kind of thing.
Plenty of power for that kind of thing. And also a big upside would be places where there's communities that completely are removed from the grid, desalination plans, medical facilities. Suddenly that all becomes very possible. You can unlock an enormous amount of wealth from landlocked resources, which just aren't economic because of fuel requirements to mine those things. So you can unlock trillions of dollars of value in resources just by having microreactors come into these remote locations.
The industry environment (11:42)
Whenever I talk with an expert about this topic, we eventually get to these two questions: One question is sort of, what is this technology’s timeline? So there’s that technology question. And then the second issue: What’s the regulatory environment like for you folks?
You're going to see SMRs come online first. They're going to get licensed first. They've got a bit of a head start. Microreactors, at the moment, all of the main contenders, including us, are basically at the same point. We're going into physical and test work that's looking at about a two-year process to collect all the data and licensing. Licensing is actually the longest-lead item that's about just under four years. That takes us all out to about 2030 where, before you have a commercial deployment of a microreactor, you're able to go anywhere we want.
I would imagine SMRs, it's going to be several years before that. But then once microreactors can deploy, you'll see many more of them being deployed than SMRs.
Would they be regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)? Is that who the chief regulator is?
Yeah, the NRC deals with all commercial ventures. So if it's defense or public, then you obviously would be DOE or DOD. NRC manages commercial ventures, so they're going to be in charge of the licensing for all micro and SMRs. I would say to your comment about the regulatory environment, I assume there are going to be adjustments made to the way these things are licensed because they are a very different product to a big conventional civil power plant, which is gigawatts or multiple gigawatts down to one megawatt. It's a very different device, very different operating system. I anticipate there will be changes. If there are not, that might complicate the deployment of microreactors.
We do know they are aware of the need to modify the regulatory framework around these new systems. So we're hoping obviously in time for when we go to licensing process, and all the other microreactors are probably hoping the same, that that framework is in place so we can be assessed on their own criteria.
The future of the microreactor (13:45)
Are you viewing this as primarily initially as an American market or as a European market, as an Asian market? What do you see as the potential market for this? Once we're up and running,
The first market will be the American market, and that's going to hit things like mining sites, military bases, data centers, AI centers, things removed off from the grid; but then you can expand very quickly in this state to something like charging stations for your EV vehicles in the middle of nowhere. If you bring diesel generators in to power those things, it defeats the point. And you can't just put wind and solar farms wherever you want because they're very locationally dependent on weather systems. But microreactors actually mean you can suddenly electrify the entire country. So you can periodically cite charging stations or EV vehicles throughout the whole country, and that'll be tens of thousands of potential essentially recharging stations that you can then drive your EV vehicle across the country because there could be periodic charging stations for all these vehicles. So it'll begin with that way.
And we'll see a similar thing in continents like Europe that have more sophisticated grid systems. But then as this expands into places like Southeast Asia and Indonesia, the Phillippines, Thailand, big island community countries where microreactors are replacing diesel generators and making them more green. And then in places like Africa, large swathes of population cut off from grid completely, and then you'll see them deploying into those areas for desalination, medical facilities, and then ultimately mining projects.
Big picture then, what’s the dream? What does the technology and the company look like in 2035 or 2040?
So I would say 2035, what we want to do is we want to be really deploying thousands of these things across the world. Not just the States and North America, but internationally. There's essentially an unlimited market for these. We won't sell the reactors, but we will sell the power. So we'll be an operator for all these companies, industry partners, mining companies. We hope to be putting these things on ships and replacing bunker fuel and maritime vessels.
We won't be hitting the main grid systems, exactly. I think SMRs will pick up a lot of slack there, but for the first time, we'll be in a position to really start taking our microreactors, and the cost of these things by 2035 will have fallen to such a point that they will be more economic than diesel generators in the middle of nowhere that rely on a constant importation of diesel and the associated costs with that, it could be very transformative. It could create an enormous amount of wealth, it could improve the health of the planet across the board, for locations that are cut off, cut off. And for NANO, I already believe we'll be a massive company anyway, but there'll be a lot of blue-sky potential for expanding into other industries.
You're designing, you're developing, would you be the manufacturer, ultimately, of these reactors?
Yes, we'll be the manufacturer of these things. As I mentioned though, we won't sell them because people won't be interested in a big upfront capital cost with the associated operating liability. So we will just sell power. You need 10 megawatts for 20 years? We’ll supply that. You need 16 megawatts for five years? We'll supply that, too. And that'll be the business model.
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The US Space Force, the newest branch of the American military, takes national defense to a new frontier. Here on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I sit down with AEI senior fellow Todd Harrison to discuss the state of the Space Force and its evolving mission.
Harrison has served as senior vice president and head of research at Metrea, a defense consulting firm, been a senior fellow for defense budget strategies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, directed the Defense Budget Analysis and Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and served as a captain in the US Air Force Reserve.
In This Episode
* Creating the Space Force (0:53)
* A New Kind of Warfare (9:15)
* Defining the Mission (11:40)
* Conflict and Competition in Space (15:34)
* The Danger of Space Debris (20:11)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
Creating the Space Force (0:53)
Pethokoukis: I was recently looking at an image that showed the increase in the number of satellites around the earth, and it's been a massive increase; I imagine a lot of it has to do with SpaceX putting up satellites, and it's really almost like—I think to an extent that most people don't understand; between government, military, and a lot of commercial satellites—it's really like the earth is surrounded by this information shell. And when looking at that, I couldn't help but think, “Yeah, it kind of seems like we would need a Space Force or something to keep an eye on that and protect that.” And I know there was a lot of controversy, if I'm not mistaken, like, “Why do we need this extra branch of government?” Is that controversy about why we need a Space Force, is that still an active issue and what are your thoughts?
Harrison: To start with where you started, yes. The number of satellites in space has been growing literally exponentially in the past few years. I'll just throw a few numbers out there: In 2023 alone, about 2,800 new satellites were launched, and in that one year it increased the total number of satellites on the orbit by 22 percent, just in one year. And all the projections are that the number of satellites, number of launches, are going to keep growing at a pace like that for the foreseeable future, for the next several years. A lot is going into space, and we know from all other domains that where commerce goes conflict will follow. And we are seeing that in space as well.
Like the Navy protecting the shipping lanes.
Yeah, exactly. So we know that to a certain extent that's inevitable. There will be points of contention, points of conflict, but we've already seen that in space just with the military dimension of our space. Back in 2007, I think a lot of the world woke up to the fact that space is a contested environment when the Chinese tested an anti-satellite weapon, which, by the way, produced thousands of pieces of space debris that are still in orbit today. More than 2,600 pieces of debris are still in orbit from that one Chinese ASAT test. And, of course, that was just one demonstration of counter-space capabilities. Space has been a contested war fighting domain, really, since the beginning of the Space Age. The first anti-satellite test was in 1959, and so it has become increasingly important for economic reasons, but also for military reasons. Now, when the Space Force debate kicked into high gear, I think it took a lot of people who weren't involved in military space, I think it took a lot of people by surprise that we were having this debate.
Yeah, it really seemed like it came out of nowhere, I think probably for 99 percent of people who aren't professionals tracking the issue.
In reality, that debate, it started in the 1990s, and there was a senator from up in New Hampshire who had written a journal article basically talking about, “Hey, we need to separate space into its own military service.” You had the Air Force chief of staff at the time in the mid-1990s, General Ron Fogleman. He said that the Air Force should eventually become an Air and Space Force, and then one day a Space and Air Force. So you had the seeds of it happening in the ’90s. Then you had Congress wanting to look at, “Okay, how do we do this? How do we reorganize military space?” They created a commission that was led by Donald Rumsfeld before he became Secretary of Defense for the second time. That commission issued its report in 2001, and it recommended a bunch of reforms, but it said in the midterm, in five to 10 years we should create a separate military service for space, something like a Space Corps.
Nothing happened, even though Rumsfeld then became Secretary of Defense. We kind of took our focus off of it for a while, there were a few other studies that went on, and then in 2016, two members of Congress, a Republican and a Democrat, Mike Rogers and Jim Cooper, who were on the House Armed Services Committee, they took this issue up. They got so fed up with the oversight of looking at how the Air Force was shortchanging space in many ways in terms of personnel and training and funding and modernization, that they then put a provision into the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act that would've created a Space Corps, they called it: a separate military service for space. And that bill actually passed the full House of Representatives.
The Senate did not have a similar provision in their bill, so it died. It didn't make it into law—but then, all of a sudden, a couple of years later, President Trump, pretty much out of the blue floats this idea of creating a Space Force, and he did it at a rally that was at a Marine Corps base out in California, and, for some reason, it caught on with Trump. And then you already had the votes, a bipartisan group in the House of Representatives who had already pushed this, and so it started to gain momentum.
It was very controversial at the time. The secretary of the Air Force at that time was adamantly opposed to it. Eventually, Trump forced it on the civilian establishment at DoD, and Congress ultimately enacted it, and the Space Force became a military service in December… I think December 20th, 2019. Now, there was some question, will the Biden administration keep it?
Is this here to stay?
It is written into law, so a president cannot unilaterally take it away, and, at this point, it's got its own roots in the ground and the Space Force is not going anywhere.
A little bit off topic, but was there a similar debate when they separated the Air Force out of the Army?
There was, yeah, and it lasted for a long time. So you had folks like Billy Mitchell who were in the Army Air Corps way back before World War II—I think in the late ’20s, early ’30s—they were advocating for a separate military service for Air. And I believe Billy Mitchell actually got court marshaled because he disobeyed orders from a superior about advocating for this with Congress.
And so the idea of a separate service for Air pretty much died out until World War II hit. And, of course, that was a war that we were brought into it by an attack that came from the air, and that really brought air power into full effect in terms of a major component of military power. So then, at the end of World War II, the Air Power advocates got together, they created the Air Force Association to advocate for a separate military service and they got it in the National Security Reform Act in 1947, I think the Air Force actually stood up in 1948.
It took longer, I would argue, a lot more advocacy and it took a World War, a crisis, to show us how important Air was to the military in order for us to actually create an Air Force. Now, I think, thankfully, we did that in advance of a crisis in terms of creating the Space Force.
Right now, what the Space Force does, is it tracking satellites, tracking and space debris, is it a monitoring and tracking service? It's not a fighting service yet?
Well, yes and no. A lot of what the Space Force does on a day-to-day basis is they provide space-enabling capabilities to the other military services. So if you want to get intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance from space, you can go to the Space Force. Separately, we have intel space that's run through the National Reconnaissance Office—that has not changed its organization. If you want to get GPS, the Space Force runs our GPS constellation of satellites, and they're responsible for defending it against all forms of attack, which it is attacked daily. If you want satellite communications, the Space Force delivers that. If you want missile warning… So the Space Force delivers lots of enabling capabilities for other parts of the military. At the same time, it is tasked with defending those capabilities, and it's not just against kinetic forms of attack where an adversary is literally trying to shoot a satellite out of the sky.
A New Kind of Warfare (9:15)
I guess that's the first thing that popped in my mind. Too much science fiction maybe, but…
Well, that is real, that's a real threat. The truth is there's not a lot you can do to actively protect against that—at least, we don't have a lot of capabilities right now—but the forms of attack we see on a daily basis are cyber, electromagnetic, and other forms of non-kinetic attack like lazing the sensors on a satellite. You could temporarily, or even permanently, blind the sensors on a satellite with a laser from an aircraft or from a ground station.
I'll give you an example: When Russia invaded Ukraine, at the very beginning of the invasion, one of the first attacks they launched was a space attack. It was cyber, and it was against a commercial space capability. What they did is they exploited a vulnerability, previously unknown, in ViaSat modems. ViaSat's, a commercial satellite communications company, they had some sort of a vulnerability in their modems. The Russians, through a cyber attack, basically bricked all those modems. They locked them out. The Ukrainian military relied on ViaSat for satellite communications, so it locked up all of their terminals right at the beginning. They could not communicate using Satcom. Incidentally, it locked up lots of ViaSat terminals across Europe in that same attack. So we see this happening all the time. Russian forces are constantly jamming GPS signals. That makes weapons and drones much less effective. They can't use GPS for targeting once they go into a GPS-denied environment.
But the Space Force has ways to overcome that. We have protected military GPS signals, we have ways of increasing the strength of those signals to overcome jamming. There's lots of things you can do with counter-space and then counter to the counter-space.
The problem is that we kind of sat on our laurels and admired our advantage in space for a couple of decades and did not make a concerted effort to improve the protection of our space systems and develop our own capability to deny others the advantage of space because others didn't have that same advantage for a long time.
Well, that has changed, and the creation of the Space Force, I think, has really set us in a positive new direction to get serious about space defense and to get serious about denying others the advantage of space if we need to.
Defining the Mission (11:40)
The Chief of Space Operation at the Space Force recently published a short white paper, which I guess begins to lay out kind of a doctrine, like, “What is the mission? How do we accomplish this mission?” Probably the first sort of Big Think piece maybe since Space Force became a branch. What did that white paper say? What do you make of it?
Yeah, so I think one of the criticisms of military space for a while has been that we didn't really have space strategy, space doctrine, we didn't have a theory of space power that was well developed. I would argue we had some of those, but it's fair to say that they have not been that well developed. Well, one of the reasons you need a military service is to actually get the expertise that is dedicated to this domain to think through those things and really develop them and flesh them out, and so that's what this white paper did, and I think it did a pretty good job of it, developing a theory of space power. He calls it a “theory of success for competitive endurance in the space domain.”
And one of the things I thought was really great that they highlight in the paper, that a lot of US government officials in the past have been reluctant to talk about, is the fact that we are under attack on a daily basis—gray zone-type aggression in the space domain—and we've got to start pushing back against that. And we've got to actually be willing and able to exercise our own defensive and counter-space capabilities, even in the competition phase before we actually get to overt conflict, because our adversaries are doing it already. They're doing it to us. We need to be able to brush them back. We're not talking about escalating and starting a conflict or anything like that, but when someone jams our satellite communication systems or GPS, they need to feel some consequences. Maybe something similar happens to their own space capabilities, or maybe we employ capabilities that show them we can overcome what you're doing. So I thought that was a good part of the theory of success is you can't just sit by and let an adversary degrade your space capabilities in the competition phase.
How much of the focus of Space Force currently, and maybe as that paper discussed what the department's mission is, focused on the military capabilities, protecting military capabilities, the military capabilities of other nations, versus what you mentioned earlier was this really expanding commercial element which is only going to grow in importance?
Today, the vast majority of the Space Force's focus is on the military side of providing that enabling military capability that makes all of our forces more effective, protecting that capability, and then, to a lesser extent, being able to interfere with our adversaries’ ability to use space for their own advantage.
They are just now starting to really grapple with, “Okay, is there a role for the Space Force in protecting space commerce, protecting commercial space capabilities that may be economically important, that may be strategically important to us and our allies, but are not directly part of a military capability?” They're starting to think through that now, and it really is the Space Force taking on a role in the future that is more like the Navy. The Navy does fight and win wars, of course, but the Navy also has a role in patrolling the seas and ensuring the free flow of commerce like we see the US Navy doing right now over in the Red Sea: They're helping protect ships that need to transit through that area when Houthi Rebels are targeting them. Do we need that kind of capability and space? Yeah, I think we do. It is not a huge priority now, but it is going to be a growing priority in the future.
Conflict and Competition in Space (15:34)
I don't know if such things even currently exist, but if you have satellites that can kill other satellites, do those exist and does the Space Force run them?
Satellites that can kill other satellites, absolutely. That is a thing that exists. A lot of stuff is kept classified. What we know that's unclassified is, back in the 1960s and early ’70s, the Soviets conducted many tests—a couple of dozen tests—of what they call a co-orbital anti-satellite system, that is a satellite that can kill another satellite, and there's still debris in space from some of those tests back in the ’60s and ’70s.
We also know, unclassified, that China and Russia have on-orbit systems that appear to be able to rendezvous with other satellites, get very close. We've seen the Russians deploy a satellite that appeared to fire a projectile at another Russian satellite—looks like a test of some sort of a co-orbital weapon. So yes, those capabilities are out there. They do exist. We've never seen a capability like that used in conflict, though, not yet, but we know they exist
Looking forward a decade… One can imagine a lot more satellites, multiple space platforms, maybe some run by the private sector, maybe others not. One could imagine permanent or semi-permanent installations on the moon from different countries. Are plans being made to protect those things, and would the Space Force be the one protecting them? If you have a conflict between the Chinese military installation on the moon and the American, would that be in the Space Force domain? Again, it seems like science fiction, but I don't think it's going to seem like science fiction before too long.
Well, that's right. We're not at that point today, but are we going to be at that point in 10, 20, 30 years? Perhaps. There are folks in the Space Force, like in the chief scientist’s office that have thought about these things; they publish some papers on it. There's no real effort going into that right now other than thinking about it from an academic perspective. Should that be in the mandate of the Space Force? Well, I think it already is, it's just there's not a need for it yet, and so it's something to keep an eye on.
Now, there are some rules, if you will, international agreements that would suggest, “Okay, some of these things should not happen.” Doesn't mean they won't; but, for example, the main treaty that governs how nations operate in space is the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. The Outer Space Treaty specifically says that you can't claim territory in space or on any celestial body like the moon or Mars, and it specifically says you cannot put a military installation on any celestial body.
So, should China put a military base on the moon, they would be clearly violating the Outer Space Treaty. If China puts a scientific installation that happens to have some military capabilities on it, but they don't call it that, well, you know, what are we going to do? Are we going to call them before the United Nations and complain? Or if China says, “Hey, we've put a military installation in this key part of the lunar South Pole where we all believe that there is ice water, and if anyone tries to land anywhere near us, you're going to interfere with our operations, you might kick up dust on us, so we are establishing a keep-out zone of some very large area around this installation.”
I think that there are some concerns that we could be headed in that direction, and that's one of the reasons NASA is pushing forward with the Artemis program to return humans to the moon and a set of international agreements called the Artemis Accords, where we've gotten, I think, more than 20 nations now to agree to a way of operating in the lunar environment and, to a certain extent, in Earth orbit as well, which will help make sure that the norms that develop in space, especially in deep space operating on the moon, are norms that are conducive to free and open societies and free markets. And so I give credit to former NASA administrator, Jim Breidenstein and the Trump administration; he came up with the Artemis Accords. I think it was wonderful. I would love to see us go even further, but NASA is still pursuing that and still signing up more countries to the Artemis Accords, and when they sign up to that, they can be part of our effort to go back to moon and the Artemis program, and right now we are on track to get there and put humans back on the moon before China. I just hope we keep it that way.
The Danger of Space Debris (20:11)
Let me finish up with a question based on something you've mentioned several times during our conversation, which is space debris and space junk. I see more and more articles about the concerns. How concerned are you about this? How should I think about that issue?
Yeah, it is a concern, and, I mean, the physics of the space domain are just fundamentally different than what we see in other domains. So, in space, depending on what orbit you're in, if something breaks up into pieces, those pieces keep orbiting Earth indefinitely. If you are below about 600 kilometers, those pieces of debris, there's a tiny amount of atmospheric drag, and, depending on your mass and your surface area and solar weather and stuff, eventually things 600 kilometers and below are going to reenter the Earth atmosphere and burn up in weeks, months, years.
Once you get above about 600 kilometers, things start staying up there much longer. And when you get out to geostationary orbit, which is 36,000 kilometers above the surface of the earth, those things aren't coming down, ever, not on their own. They're staying up there. So the problem is, imagine every time there was a shipwreck, or a car wreck, or a plane crash, that all of the debris kept moving around the earth forever. Eventually it adds up. And space, it's a very large volume, yes, but this stuff is whizzing by, if you're in low-earth orbit, you're going around 17,000 miles per hour constantly. And so you've got close approach after close approach, day after day, and then you run the risk of debris hitting debris, or debris hitting other satellites, and then creating more debris, and then increasing the odds that this happens again and again, the movie Gravity gave a dramatic effect to this.
I was thinking about that scene as you're explaining this.
Yeah. The timeline was very compressed in that movie, but something like that, the Kessler Syndrome, is theoretically possible in the space domain, so we do have to watch out for it. Debris is collecting, particularly in low Earth orbit above 600 kilometers, and ASAT tests are not helpful at all to that. So one of the things the Biden administration did is they instituted a unilateral moratorium on antisatellite testing by the United States. Well, it's easy for us to do. We didn't need to do any anti-satellite tests anymore because we already know we can do that. We have effective capabilities and we wouldn't want to use kinetic anti-satellite attacks anyway, ’cause it would hurt our own systems.
We have been going around trying to get other countries to sign up to that as well, to a moratorium on ASAT testing. It's a good first step, but really you need Russia and China. They need to sign up to not do that anymore. And India, India conducted a kinetic ASAT test back in, I think, 2019. So those are the countries we really need to get on board with that.
But there's a lot of accidental debris production that happens as well. When countries leave a spent rocket body up in orbit and then something happens. You know, a lot of times they leave their fuel tanks pressurized or they leave batteries on there, after five, 10 years in orbit, sometimes these things explode randomly, and then that creates a debris field. So there's more that we can do to kind of reach international agreements about just being smart stewards of the space domain. There are companies out there that are trying to work on technologies to clean up space debris. It's very hard. That is not something that's on the immediate horizon, but those are all efforts that should be ongoing. It is something to be concerned about.
And actually, to circle back to the chief of space operations and his theory of success in his white paper, that's one of the tensions that he highlights in there, is that we want to use space for military advantage, including being able to deny other countries the ability to use space. But at the same time, we want to be good stewards of the space domain and so there's an inherent tension in between those two objectives, and that's the needle that the Space Force is trying to thread.
I have one final question, and you may have no answer for it: If we were to track a large space object headed toward Earth, whose job would it be to stop it?
So it would be NASA's job to spot it, to find objects like near-Earth orbit asteroids. Whose job is it to stop it? I think we would be figuring that out on the fly. First of all, we would have to figure out, can we stop it? Is there a way to stop it? And it would probably require some sort of an international effort, because we all have a common stake in that, but yeah, it is not in anyone's job jar.
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What if there were a way to generate massive amounts of affordable, carbon-free energy with minimal environmental or safety risk? Sounds too good to be true, but nuclear fusion just might be the kind of energy source that America—and the world—has been waiting for.
Michl Binderbauer is the CEO of California-based TAE Technologies, a company trying to develop an aneutronic commercial fusion reactor. Michl joins us on this episode of Faster Please! — The Podcast to explain how his team is trying to make fusion power a real thing.
In This Episode
* Fusion’s Moment (1:11)
* The Technical Challenge (12:11)
* The Economic Challenge (15:33)
* The Role of Government (22:20)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation.
Pethokoukis: What is sort of the current state of your company's technology, and in describing that, could you tell me how it sort of differs from other approaches in the field, keeping in mind I am not a nuclear physicist?
Binderbauer: Understood. Alright, well it's a great introductory question. So TAE has been around, as you probably have read, for a good two decades plus, but the 25 year anniversary was just this past April, actually. We're at the stage now, it’s really exciting, where the machine we're under construction on now, which we call Copernicus, which is our generation six, is actually intended to get us to a point to demonstrate that we can harvest more energy than we have to feed it. And this is on a really engineering comparison, how much energy comes into the site and deploys on the machine versus how much can you harvest. To be fair, this is not a full power plant, so we're going to measure the heat output, the collective heat output on it. Now that's where we're going, and that's really enabled by 20 plus years of a journey of, interestingly enough, a lot of scientific nuance discoveries, but mostly technology development.
What you learn is that the journey that we were on was mostly one of underestimating the complexity of power supplies, vacuum systems, heating systems in the form of us, this means energetic particle beams, and the technological tool chest around those things and making that work as a symphony, as a nice orchestra to do what we need it to do, and that's really where we spend most of the time, and now we're at the point where there's a confluence in understanding the science, understanding or having full practice capability, mastery of the tools, bringing these two things together in the sixth generation machine to drive net energy output. That's the goal. The other thing you asked me was how do we differ and to kind of contrast that a little bit?
Because this is a very interesting moment for fusion, broadly, which are a number of startups, of course some of my listeners might be familiar with the breakthrough from the National Ignition Facility, which isn't really meant to create a nuclear power plant, but it was a great proof of concept that we can do some sort of fusion here. So I guess in a somewhat understandable way, given my own personal limitations, what are you doing that's sort of different than maybe some of the other companies such as, I mean I've written about Commonwealth Fusion and a few others, as well.
Of course. Let me start by saying that, for most of that I should give credit to my brilliant PhD mentor who was a technical co-founder and co-founder in general of TAE. Norman Rostoker was his name, and Norman had an illustrious career in the field of fusion science and, in fact, accelerators and a few other areas of physics. He was a sort of polymath and really broad guy, which probably was a critical ingredient to get to where we are today. And so while he was very instrumental in the early days of the field in putting together a lot of the fundamental theory and things that I always joke and say, “You can't get a PhD in this field without suffering through a lot of the stuff he discovered.” But he also was very critical at the later stage in his career and he looked at this and said, “If we want to build something that caters to power production in a civilian way with good economics and the right kind of maintainability and practicality, then maybe what we're doing as a field today on the large sort of federal or national program-funded research was sort of missing the mark a little bit because it was building towards the Tokamaks, which some of your readers may know, those donut-shaped machines, the biggest of which is under construction in the south of France right now, it’s a big international project. And Norman looked at that and said, “That can get us to maybe net energy but not necessarily practical net energy or economic net energy.”
In the end it's about an applied end product that we're going after, not textbook knowledge, in a sense, or a proof point for a laboratory experiment. With that in mind, when the company, before it even started—this is in the early ’90s when I became a student—he had a very delineated philosophy of end in mind: Let's look what this needs to look like. And that's pretty trivial to define, right? If I ask you, what do you think a good power plant should look like, you could probably tell me. If we can make it non-polluting, great, we want to make sure that it doesn't have maintenance every day. It's up most of the time and it can compete with what the grid needs today in terms of economics, who else makes power with from coal, the gas to whatever else. And that's kind of how we started, we said that would be the ideal reactor, and now how can we cater to that. And what is the gap if you reverse engineer from there to today that you have to fill? And that's really where we started and that led to a remarkably different trajectory.
One of those, the first one, frankly, was fuel, right? When you think about tritium, which is the conventional goal set, and that's a fuel that's heavy hydrogen, when you “burn” that, quote-unquote, you get neutrons, which we know from fission, those are what propagates the fission process, and if you have a lot of neutrons, you get radioactivity. And tritium by itself is also used in our warheads. It's not the ideal material you loose in a civilian setting, it's typically classified, et cetera, so there's all these headaches and there's very little tritium, by the way, to go around. There's like 50 kilograms of free tritium in the world, and that's super expensive, something like $30,000 a gram or so is what's usually quoted. So there's a lot of handicap there if you want to turn that into an economic prosperous thing. And so we said, “Alright, well, what else is terrestrially possible?”
And so not to be philosophical and say God gave us a very narrow bookshelf, but it kind of is. On one end you've got the neutronic fuel cycle with tritium, and then on the other end of this small bookshelf you have hydrogen and boron which are copiously available, both. There's no radioactivity to go in, and by the way, when they burn you get three helium particles, which is where our initial name came from, Tri Alpha Energy, we call helium particles in nuclear physics alpha particles. And so you look at it and you say, “Oh, that's pretty good!” I don't have radioactivity as a byproduct, I don't have to worry about shielding, I don't have high costs associated with those things. And by the way, if you look where boron is used today, it's dirt-cheap commodity products, it’s detergents and soaps and cleaning products and things like that. So, in a way, it fits the bill.
Now its big handicap is it needs a higher burn temperature to cook.
Very hot.
Yeah. You look at tritium on one end, that's about a hundred million degrees, which already sounds insane, but keep in mind, as a physicist, we sort of define that as just the energy state in that material beyond the gas. We call these plasmas. This plasma is at a hundred million degrees for tritium. If you want to burn boron, you need about a billion degrees. Now that sounds absolutely crazy, but it's not the stove plate hot of a solid. It's a very few particles that get to zip around in the container at very high energy, and that gets you to that definition of eventually a billion degrees.
By the way, for reference, the big Hadron Collider at CERN, the LHC, that actually makes charged particle clouds with temperatures up to five trillion degrees. So we can actually do this. Amazingly, humans have a technology base to actually do that. So we started with the idea of if we wanted that fuel cycle, we've got to find the container and the process that can hold that together and create those energetic states we need. And that led us ultimately to what is referred to as a “field reversed configuration,” and I won't bore everybody with the detail of that, it's a mouthful to begin with, but it's a very interesting magnetic container.
I will say that much, that instead of, in the case of most other confinement systems where you have a lot of magnets on the outset—and by the way the magnets are a big cost component in a reactor, they're superconducting, they're large in scale, complex to manufacture—and in this case, in the FRC, most of the field is actually created by the plasma itself.
So plasma is discharge particles, if they flow, they create a current and the current can make a magnetic field, and so the plasma can self-envelope with a magnetic field that it generates from its currents and that can help, believe it or not, hold it in place. It sounds kind of perverse, but it works. And the idea behind that was derived about 50 years ago—almost everything infusion had some origins back many, many decades ago—but it was always considered too finicky to make work because one thing you can appreciate, if there's anything wrong in the flow in the plasma, well then the fields start to deteriorate so it can very quickly get into negative feedback cycle unless you can keep it stable and well controlled.
And that's what we developed now. So now we have this perfect incarnation of it where we can run at will for as long as we want. We control this with active feedback today with extremely fast circuits and very smart software that's machine learning based, that self-corrects, recognizes patterns, and stuff. So take it as a supposition. Now we have ability to make these field reversed configurations at scale, meters in size, and can hold them steady as long as we want. And now what's interesting about that container is that has a much easier scalability, from a physics perspective, to those high energy conditions. This is why it's the right container to marry with the hydrogen boron, and most people just didn't go there for two reasons, I would think.
One is that when the field works mostly on, say, Tokamaks, then there is so much knowledge base developed there that, in a way, it self-propagates and the incoming young people that get graduate education, they work on what's the most prolific thing, which happen to be Tokamaks. So it sort of self-propagates.
And the other thing, of course, is people felt that confinement or the ability to hold this material together is already really stressful, and so if you have to go to a hundred million degrees, let's try to celebrate there before we bother going further. Norman was more maverick and said, “But that's not a good endpoint to be, so why don't we shoot for something a bit more out there that can really bring all that together. As a graduate student, I was game for that. I thought this was a brilliant idea. It appealed to me enormously to say let's connect what we're trying to do to the applied end product, and that's where we started, first in the university and then built the business.
neutral beams, the plasma maintains lasting, high-temperature field reverse configurations.
The Technical Challenge (12:11)
Where you are right now, what is required to get to the endpoint, which is a commercial reactor? Does that require continuous incremental progress and success, or does it still require something that you might call “leaps” in the technology? Where are we to get to that endpoint?
Of course I should also explain that temperature increments like you're walking up a ladder, there's different steps to it. At the step where we are now, we're operating today the machine, the generation five—which we actually call “Norman” by the way, in its honor, we named it Norman. The reason that was fitting is because it established the scientific proof that you can actually create stable, long-lift field reversed configurations with the right attributes, and today we're doing that about 75 million degrees in the current machine that runs every day about 50, 60 experiments. So we know we can scale, we're really sure we can scale this to a hundred million degrees. What gives a hundred million back to the fuels, that doesn't give you boron but that gives you tritium. If you think about an approach of sequences, is you ramp up to a billion degrees, somewhere you have to cross a hundred, so you have something harvestable there from an economic opportunity.
And so Copernicus, the next machine generation six that I alluded to earlier is the machine that's going to enable us to get into the tritium-level regime. This machine is going to show net energy capability at the a hundred to 150 million degree mark, which is typically where people operate with tritium. We were slated to do that by about ’26, somewhere late-’25 into ’26, and that's what we're constructing and fully projected to do. Now assuming success on that—which I believe is very much in our favor, we've been less than a factor of two of those operating conditions already and we have the engineering and the mastery, the operational mastery on this in hand—then the next step after that is to scale that up and build a machine that's about a factor of eight or so up in energy, and that gets you into the regime of the boron operation, and that's the stage when we think we will have net energy demonstrated out of hydrogen boron, and that's probably early 2030s.
So again, coming back the next three years, make a machine that gets into the tritium equivalent operational regime. One thing I should point out, perhaps people may question, are we using tritium in the machine directly? We are not. What we're doing, and I can get into why that is, Commonwealth for instance—you mentioned earlier Commonwealth Fusion Systems (CFS)—they're trying to be a bit more ambitious and build this Tokamak and eventually fuel it with tritium. That has a much larger price tag and operational complexity because tritium is not an end game for us. I just want to enable the energetic state to burn tritium without actually doing it. The field has today sufficient enough confidence and maturity to understand that if you can hold the material together at a hundred, 150 million degrees with the right density and everything, yes, you could make tritium-based net energy if you wanted to, and that'd be for somebody else to do, but TAE wants to march on and build its boron reactor.
The Economic Challenge (15:33)
So there's a technical challenge that you feel like you're on track and you're sort of hitting some milestones there, and then there's sort of the economic challenge that we just don't want to get this thing to work, you want to get this thing to work so it makes sense that someday this thing can get plugged into an electrical grid. How do you feel about that aspect? How pricey or inexpensive or expensive will this energy be, assuming the not-insignificant technical challenges are met sometime in the next decade or what have you?
Yeah, so great question. Obviously, we haven't built one yet. We haven't built the prototypes yet, let alone the full power plant, but there is actually a quite sane projection forward to those cost points from the fact that, after 25 years of working on this, we have a pretty good sense what we need. We have a great supply chain and partnerships established with people who built, not exactly this, but things like this. So you can do some estimates and you also know, as I said earlier, magnets are one of the biggest items, so there's a large amount of cost in there. The other big item that between those two controls more than two thirds is the heating equipment, and that can be radiofrequency heating like a microwave basically, or what we mostly use is injecting highly directional beams of atomic particles, neutral atoms that come in and then they collide with the fuel and then they basically transfer the energy that we directly shoot in and it becomes heat in the machine.
So those two things, the heaters and the container system, the magnets, are the big expense items. When you get a sense for where you need to be and what the geometry looks like and so on, you can actually make a reasonable estimate at cost, and so I'm saying this, at the same time I'm asking for forgiveness if we're going to be off because obviously, in the end, there'll be a lot of detail that'll add to that. But I think what we believe, and I have confidence that that's correct, that the first generation of plants coming out of this, let's say it's somewhere in the mid-2030s, we'd have the first commercial plants installing and not plant one, which is a hand-built one-of-a-kind, right? But if you built maybe tens of plants, you will be at a point where you have some learning curves that bring prices down, you kind of know now how to do it. I wouldn't say it's mass produced yet, but it's going into a more efficient production cycle. I think we will slot in somewhere in the midfield today of generation assets.
So if you're looking at solar, wind—solar maybe more than wind today—but you also add things like gas in the US, those are on the low end of the economics in terms of what they call LCOE, the Levelized Cost of Electricity, and then if you look at the upper end, you will find nuclear and the things where there's a lot of safety margin built in. We’ll be somewhere in the field in between there. That gets you pretty competitive right there because it has two other incredible attributes. One is that there is really no variability in fuel costs because it’s literally free because you need so little. Fusion is super high energy dense, so you don't need much.
And the other aspect is that it doesn't pollute, really. There's no carbon involved, there's really no radioactivity to speak of. And so you are ending with something that can be baseload power, that's dispatchable, as they call it today. The human controls when it's on and when it's not, not the sun or the wind. And you have essentially green energy. In that sense, even if it's more expensive than some of the cheapest things today, but it's midfield, it'll be very competitive on a global basis and it'll be an important component that the world will need.
How big a facility would you need to power Cincinnati or Chicago? My only experience is looking at the rather big nuclear fission reactors which are fairly big, so would this be a lot smaller than that?
Well, two things: There's the machine size and then there's the installation size, the site. In nuclear fission today you have exclusion zone around the plant. There's a lot of the plot of land that it's on and then some incremental infrastructure, safety, security shielding and so on adds a lot of additional cost and scale. If on the boron machine, the actual machine is a couple, maybe three double-decker buses back-to-back, something like that, maybe a bit taller, but not that much. So that would be comparable to a large gas turbine, for instance. Or if you are in a hydro plant and you're looking at the generating units, they'd be sort of on that scale. So it's not outsized relative to what conventionally is used in the utility space today.
Now if you look in the land footprint, it's pretty minimal. You're looking at a handful of acres at most. In fact, maybe even less over time. Now that's with hydrogen and boron because you then don't have radioactivity to speak of. You don't have the chance during an accident. The worst-case accidents that a plant like that would suffer would be industrial scale things. Things like a bad fire in a factory would just be similar, but it doesn't have nuclear meltdown capability. There is no chain reaction kind of thing, like we know from Chernobyl—and by the way, this isn't just true for TAE, this is true for all of fusion, it makes it really safe. So those attributes will shrink the site down. So if you're asking me how much can we get out of one of these systems at that scale, probably somewhere in the order of half a gigawatt, 400 to 500 megawatts is sort of what we're shooting for.
It's a larger gas turbine system and if you wanted to get gigawatt-level power like you would get out of a fission nuclear plant today, you would probably have, say, two, three of these units next to each other. What I really think the world will go to and what we hear from talking to a lot of the utility people, it's a more distributed grid, ideally. You have things on the 300–500 megawatt scale that deploys in a way where you have more redundancy if you needed it, there's more reliability, et cetera. This is the scale that I think you would look at, so feeding a city like Chicago out of one plant, or the whole Chicago metropolitan area, is not going to happen. You would have a distributed set of systems, and you think 400 megawatts or so, you get a few hundred thousand households that run on that, and then you scale from there.
The Role of Government (22:20)
You've been working on this for some time and obviously I work at a think tank, so I always think, do you want government to do something that it's not doing? Do you want government to stop doing something that it's currently doing? I know I've certainly talked to some startups, newer startups, they're in partnerships with the Department of Energy. So what is your engagement currently and what would you need, or not need, from government going forward to get to where you need to go?
That's a great question and one that has evolved. In the past, we've been purely privately funded and we built everything we've done so far on private capital and we're kind of the oldest of that. Now, as you said, there's a lot of younger companies in the space too, and I think this is great. We get more shots on goal and it makes us more valid. We’re not the only lone idiots out there. There's actually reason to believe that there's many smart people trying now, so that's a good thing.
Now where we're going, though, is a stage where I think public-private partnerships actually start to make sense. When you look at the history of any kind of energy technology that came about, nuclear is sort of—I hate to use it because it seems like we're so similar, we're obviously very different in some ways, we share the taxonomy “nuclear,” but that's about it—but fission, if you look at the evolution, it gets subsidies. There's a risk offtake for the early plants that the government tends to shoulder. That can be a loan guarantee, it can be other kinds of financial arrangements, and then eventually it becomes commercial enough in the sense that people believe in the viability, they have a good sense for its reliability and so on, and then it just propagates into the market in a very capitalist free market sense. That transition out of the lab into that stage of really rolling out at scale I think is where we absolutely need to count on government support.
In fact, what's wonderful to see now, over the last couple of years in particular, and you read about this, the White House last year had a summit where we and a few others in the front running in the private sector were there together with the national labs and people from DOE, and we had a very productive conversation about what the White House framed a bold decadal vision for fusion. Important in that is the recognition that it's not always 30 years away and always will be, it's much closer. And what can we do proactively and collectively to accelerate that?
I think that's what's really heartening to see, that as we're getting to that proof point, now we're getting net energy and then we want to leap to a prototype and a power plant. We're going to need that help, and there is a public-private partnership around multiple things on the technology or production side, but then also moving into the ultimate: How do you fund and risk underwrite these early plants when utilities typically are more risk averse? That we see on the federal level, and then on the state level, I don't know if you follow that, but recently California and North Carolina had a couple of bills coming out—for instance, California, we've had this nuclear moratorium where everything nuclear in nature is sort of not tolerable, and that's been modified. Fusion now is excluded out of that and in fact is now part of what they would call the benign side of the future of energy. In fact, the California bill made it very clear that it's to be treated as clean energy, essentially. And so in North Carolina, so you have now a blue state and right state looking at and saying, we want this. We need this, and we recognize the chance is high that over the next decade this comes about.
The other thing I can add is that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, they just this year in a sort of landmark first step, the commission ruled in terms of where do we slop the regulatory framework around fusion. It's not in the old Part 50, which deals with the fission world, but it's going to be in a world that's much closer to where you would regulate medical accelerator that makes pet isotopes for oncology scanning and stuff. So they recognize that this is, while nuclear in taxonomy, it's a very different form of risk to the public, and therefore the level of regulation is lower, and that's equally important.
The interaction with the government is super important now, and we're very heartened by the fact that we see there's really a nearing and a mutual excitement about bringing that out as quickly as possible against the backdrops from climate change to whatever else people are worried about with the national security and energy independence.
Obviously, from my perspective, what I like is the idea that if fusion can succeed, it becomes eventually a source of abundance because there's so much fuel here that we can harvest and we think we can do this at very economic levels, that you can lift up those parts of the world that today are living on the other side of the gradient in a very sort of depressed, low quality of life. In fact, if you look at all the energy use projections or demand projections forward, you can see that we're going to more than double, and most of the demand comes from the underdeveloped world. Fusion can be a very big contributor to a more equitable world as a whole. It's all these attributes that I think get people really excited, and now it's no longer just this visionary dream. We're really, really close to doing it. I think that's why you see the government and everybody coming together now and beginning these earnest conversations over the next few years: How do we structure programs from regulation to working together to ultimately loan guarantees and other things in a public-private partnership, and bring it to the grid.
Science. Ownership. Speed. Openness.
These are the four pillars of Andrew McAfee’s observed structure for successful companies. It is the “geeks,” the leaders at the forefront of cross-industry innovation, who embrace these norms and have the potential to redefine business as we know it. In order to break ground and create the kind of future we dream of, organizational leaders need to banish the fear of failure, embrace mistakes, and accept hard feedback with open arms.
Andrew is a best-selling author, Principal Research Scientist at the MIT Sloan School of Management, and co-founder of MIT’s Initiative on the Digital Economy. His books include More from Less and The Second Machine Age, co-authored with Erik Brynjolfsson. Today on the podcast, we discuss the ideas captured in his most recent book, The Geek Way: The Radical Mindset that Drives Extraordinary Results.
In This Episode
* The universal geek (1:35)
* The four geek norms (8:29)
* Tales of geeks and non-geeks (15:19)
* Can big companies go geek? (18:33)
* The geek way beyond tech (26:32)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation.
The universal geek (1:35)
Pethokoukis: Is The Geek Way really the Silicon Valley Way? Is this book saying, “Here's how to turn your company into a tech startup”?
McAfee: You mentioned both Silicon Valley and tech, and this book is not about either of those—it's not about a region and it's not about an industry, it's about a set of practices. And I think a lot of the confusion comes because those practices were incubated and largely formulated in this region called “Silicon Valley” in this industry that we call “tech”. So I understand the confusion, but I'm not writing about the Valley. Plenty of people do that. I'm not writing about the tech industry. Plenty of people do that. The phenomenon that I don't think we are paying enough attention to is this set of practices and philosophies that, I believe, when bundled correctly, amounts to a flat old upgrade to the company, just a better way to do the thing a company is supposed to do. That needed a label, because it's new. “Geek” is the label that I latched onto.
But there's a universal aspect to this, then.
Yeah, I believe there is. I understand this sounds arrogant—I believe it's a flat better way to run a company. I don't care where in the world you are, I don't care what industry you are in, if you're making decisions based on evidence, if you're iterating more and planning less, if you're building a modular organization that really does give people authority and responsibility, and if you build an organization where people are actually comfortable speaking truth to power, I think you're going to do better.
One reason I'm excited about this book is because, you as well, we think about technological progress, we think about economic growth and productivity and part of that is science and coming up with new ideas and a new technology, but all that stuff has to actually be turned into a commercial enterprise and there has to be well-run companies that take that idea and sell it. Maybe the economist’s word might be “diffusion” or something like that, but that's a pretty big part of the story, which I think maybe economists tend not to focus as much on, or policy people, but it's pretty darn important and that's what I think is so exciting about your book is that it addresses that: How to create companies that can do that process—invention-to-product—better. So how can they do it better?
Let me quibble with you just a little bit. There are alternatives to this method of getting goods and services to people, called “the company.” That's what we do in capitalist societies. Jim, like you know all too well, over the course of the 20th century, we ran a couple of experiments trying it a different way: These collectivist, command-and-control, centrally planned economies, those were horrible failures! Let's just establish that right off the bat.
So in most of the parts of the world—I think in all the parts of the world where you and I would actually want to live—I agree with you, we've settled on this method of getting most goods and services to people, most of what they consume, via these entities called companies, and I don't care if you're in a Nordic social democracy, or in the US of A, or in Southeast Asia, companies are the things getting you most of what you consume. I think in the United States, about 85 percent of what you and I consume, by some estimates, comes from companies. So, like them or hate them, they're incredibly important, and if a doohickey comes along that lets them their work X percent better, we should applaud that like crazy because that's an X percent increase in our affluence, our standard of living, the things that we care about, and the reason I got excited and decided to write this book is I think there's an upgrade to the company going on that's at the same level as the stuff that [Alfred] Chandler wrote about a century ago when we invented the large, professionally managed, pretty big company. Those dominated the corporate landscape throughout the 20th century. I think that model is being upgraded by the geeks.
It's funny because, I suppose maybe the geeks 50 years ago, maybe a lot of them worked at IBM. And your sort-of geek norms are not what I think of the old Big Blue from IBM in the 1960s. That has changed. Before we get into the norms, how did they develop? Why do we even have examples of this working in the real corporate world?
The short answer is, I don't know exactly. That's a pretty detailed piece of corporate history and economic history to work on. The longer answer is, what I think happened is, a lot of computer nerds, who had spent a lot of time at universities and were pretty steeped in that style of learning things and building things, went off and started companies and, in lots of cases, they ran into the classic difficulties that occur to companies and the dysfunctions that creep in as companies grow and age and scale. And instead of accepting them, my definition of a geek is somebody who's tenacious about a problem and is willing to embrace unconventional solutions. I think a lot of these geeks—and I'm talking about people like Reed Hastings, who's really articulate about what he did at Netflix and at his previous company, which he says he ran into mediocrity—a lot of these geeks like Hastings sat around and said, “Wait a minute, if I wanted to not repeat these mistakes, what would I do differently?” They noodled that hard problem for a long time, and I think via some conversation among the geeks, but via these fairly independent vectors in a lot of cases, they have settled on these practices, these norms that they believe—and I believe—help them get past the classic dysfunctions of the Industrial Era that you and I know all too well: their bureaucratization, their sclerosis, their cultures of silence. They are just endless stifling meetings and turf wars and factions and things like that. We know those things exist. What I think is interesting is that the geeks are aware of them and I think they've come up with ways to do better.
The four geek norms (8:29)
It's funny that once you've looked at your book, it is impossible to read any other sort of business biography of a company or a CEO and not keep these ideas in your head because I just finished up the Elon Musk biography by Walter Isaacson, and boy, I just kept on thinking of speed and science and the questioning of everything: Why are we doing this? Why are we building this rocket engine like this? Who told us to do that? Somebody in legal told us to do that?
Exactly.
So certainly those two pop to mind: the speed and the constant iteration. But rather than have me describe them, why don't you describe those norms in probably a much better way than I can.
There's a deep part of the Isaacson Musk biography that made my geek eyes light up, and it's when Isaacson describes Musk's Algorithm—I think it's capitalized, too, it's capital “The,” capital “Algorithm,”—which is all about taking stuff out. I think that is profound because we humans have a very strong status quo bias. We're reluctant to take things out. It's one of the best-documented human biases. So we just add stuff, we just layer stuff on, and before you know it, for a couple different flavors of reason, you wind up with this kind of overbuilt, encrusted, process-heavy, bureaucracy-heavy, can't get anything done [corporation]. You feel like you're pushing on a giant piece of Jell-O or something to try to get any work done. And I think part of Musk's brilliance as a builder and an organization designer is to come up with The Algorithm that says, “No, no, a big part of your job is to figure out what doesn't need to be there and make it go away.” I adore that. It's closest to my great geek norm of ownership, which is really the opposite of this processification of the enterprise of the company that we were super fond of starting in the ’90s and going forward.
So now to answer your question, my four great geek norms, which are epitomized by Musk in a lot of ways, but not always, are:
Science. Just make decisions based on evidence and argue a lot about that evidence. Science is an argument with a ground rule. Evidence rules.
Ownership. We were just talking about this. Devolve authority downward, stop all the cross-communication, coordination, collaboration, process, all that. Build a modular organization.
Speed. Do the minimum amount of planning and then start iterating. You learn, you get feedback, you see where you're keeping up to schedule and where you're not by doing stuff and getting feedback, not by sitting around asking everybody if they're on schedule and doing a lot of upfront planning.
Finally, openness, this willingness to speak truth to power. In some ways, a good synonym for it is “psychological safety” and a good antonym for it is “defensiveness.”
If anything, from what I understand about Musk, the last one is where he might run into challenges.
That's what I was going to say. The ownership and the speed and the science struck me and then I'm like… the openness? Well, you have to be willing to take some abuse to be open in that environment.
There are these stories about him firing people on the spot and making these kind of peremptory decisions—all of that is a violation, in my eyes, of the great geek norm of openness. It might be the most common violation that I see classic Silicon Valley techies engage in. They fall victim to overconfidence like the rest of us do, and they're not careful enough about designing their companies to be a check on their own overconfidence. This is something Hastings is very humble and very articulate about in No Rules Rules, the book that he co-wrote with Erin Meyer about Netflix and he highlights all these big calls that he was dead-flat wrong about, and he eventually realized that he had to build Netflix into a place that would tell him he was wrong when he was wrong, and he does all these really nice jobs of highlighting areas where he was wrong and then some relatively low-level person in the organization says, “No, that doesn't make sense. I'm going to go gather evidence and I'm going to challenge the CEO of the company with it.” And to his eternal credit, Hastings goes, “It's pretty compelling evidence. I guess I was wrong about that.” So that, to me, is actually practicing the great geek norm of openness.
So someone reading this book is thinking that this book is wrong. Where would that come from? Would that come from overconfidence? Would it come from arrogance? Would it come from the idea that if I am in the C-suite, that obviously I have it figured out and I can probably do all your jobs better than you can, so why are you challenging me? Why are you challenging the status quo? “Hey, that's how we got here was through a process, so trust the process!”
It's one of the main flavors of pushback that I hear, and it's very often not as naked as you just made it, but it is, “Hey, the reason I'm sitting in this executive education classroom with you is because I'm fairly good at my job. I made some big calls right, and my job is to provide vision to my team and to direct them not to be this kind of lead-from-behind more coach-y kind of leader.” That's one flavor of pushback I get. Another one is a very pervasive tendency, when we come across some challenging information, to come up with reasons why this doesn't apply to us and why we're going to be just fine. It's some combination of the status quo bias and the overconfidence bias which, again, two of the most common human biases. So very often when I'm talking about this, I get the idea that people in the room are going, “Yeah, okay, wow, I really wouldn't want to complete with SpaceX, but this doesn't apply to me or to my industry.” And then finally, look, I'm clearly wrong about some things. I don't know exactly what they are. Maybe the incumbents of the Enterprise Era are going to mount a surprising comeback by falling back on their 20th-century playbook as opposed to adopting the geek way. I will be very surprised if that happens and I'm taking bets like, “Let's go, let's figure out a bet based on that,” but maybe it'll happen. I'm definitely wrong about some things.
Tales of geeks and non-geeks (15:19)
Given what you've said, I would certainly think that it would be easier to apply these norms at a newer company, a younger company, a smaller company, rather than a company with a hundred thousand employees that's been around for 30 years. But it's possible to do the second one, right?
It is possible. Let me violently agree with you, Jim. You and I are of a vintage and we're both Midwesterners. We both remember Arthur Andersen, right? And what an iconic American Midwestern symbol of rectitude and reliability and a healthy culture that kept the business world honest by auditing their books. Remember all that? Remember how it fell apart?
I knew people, and if you got an interview with Arthur Andersen, they're like, “Wow, you are with the Cadillac of accounting consulting firms.”
But beyond that, you were doing a valuable thing for society, right? These people had status in the community because they kind of kept companies honest for a living.
That’s right. That's right. You were true of the truth tellers.
Yeah. It was a big deal and a lot of your listeners, I think, are going to be too young to remember it firsthand, but that company became a dysfunctional, unethical, ongoing, miserable train wreck of an organization in its final years before it finally fell apart. It could not have been more surprising to people of our vintage and where we came from. I tell the story of how that happened a little bit in the book to drive home that cultures can go off track in profound ways and in AA’s late years, if someone had teleported The Geek Way and waved it around, would it have made any difference? I'd like to hope so, but I kind of don't think so.
However, to tell a more optimistic story, I had the chance to interview Satya Nadella about his turnaround at Microsoft, which I think is at a level maybe even above the turnaround that [Steve] Jobs executed when he came back to Apple. The amount of value that Nadella has created at Microsoft in nine years now is staggering, and Microsoft is back. Microsoft has mojo again in the tech industry. But when he took over, Microsoft was still a large profitable company, but it was dead in the water. It wasn't innovating. The geek elite didn't want to go work there. The stock price was flat as a highway for a decade. It was absolutely an afterthought in anything that we care about. And so I use Nadella and I learned from him, and I try to tell the story about how he executed this comeback, and, to my eyes, he did it in a very, very geek way kind of a way.
Can you give me an example?
My point in telling that story is: I do think it's possible for organizations that find themselves in a bad spot—
Established organizations.
Established. Large, established organizations find themselves in a bad spot. Those kinds of leopards can change their spots. I firmly believe that.
Can big companies go geek? (18:33)
What are the first steps to change the corporate culture of a big company?
That's why I'm so blown away by what Nadella and his team were able to do. Let me pick out a couple things that seem particularly geeky to me that he did. One was to say that—it doesn't matter if you develop them or not—you do not own code or data at Microsoft. What he meant by that was, subject to legal requirements and safety and some guardrails, if you want to grab some of the code repository at Microsoft to go try something or some data and go try something, you have the right to do that. That just eliminates huge amounts of gatekeeping and hard and soft bureaucracy and all of that inside the company. And that led to things like Copilot. It's a very, very smart way to start dealing with bureaucracy: just saying, “No, you don't get to gatekeep anymore.”
He also did fairly obvious things like make sure that their really dysfunctional evaluation system was over. He also emphasized this thing that he called “One Microsoft,” which at first sounded like just CEO rah-rah talk. And it is to some extent, but it's also incredibly clever because we humans are so tribal. In addition to the status quo bias and the overconfidence bias, the third easy, easy bias to elicit is “myside” bias. We are tribal. We want our tribe to win. I think part of Nadella's brilliance was to say, “The tribe that you belong to is not Office versus Windows versus Bing versus… the tribe you belong to is Microsoft.”
And he changed compensation, so that it also worked that way. He worked with incentives—he took an Econ 101 class—but he also kept emphasizing that “we are one tribe,” and that makes a difference if the leader at the top keeps saying it and if they behave that way. I think one of the deepest things that he did was act in an open way and demonstrate the norm of openness that he wanted to see all over the place. He got a ton of help with it, but if you talk to him, you immediately realize that he's not this table-pounding, my-way-or-the-highway kind of a guy. He's somebody that wants to get it right, and if you have an idea, you might get a fair erring for that idea. He also embraced agile methods and started to move away from the old ways that Microsoft had to write software, which were out of date, and they were yielding some really unimpressive projects.
So as he and I were talking, I was doing my internal checklist and I kept on saying, “Yep, that's speed. That is science. That is ownership. That is openness,” and just emphasizing, as I listened to him, I just kept hearing these norms come up over and over. But one thing that he clearly knows is that this ain't easy and it ain't fast, and cultural change is a long, slow, grinding process, and you've got to keep saying the same thing over and over. And then I think, especially as a leader, you've got to keep living it because people will immediately sense if what you're doing is not lining up with what you're saying.
One bit that popped out, because obviously I'm in Washington and I see a government that doesn't work very efficiently, and you wrote, “To accelerate learning and progress, plan less and iterate more,” and to iterate means to experiment, it means you're going to fail. And boy, oh boy, failure-averse organizations, you can find that in government, you can find it in corporate America, that acceptance of: try something and if it fails, it's a learning experience. It's not a black mark on your career forever. Now let's go try the next thing.
Exactly. To me, it's the most obvious thing that the geeks do that's starkly different from Industrial Era organizations, “plan less, iterate more.” The great geek norm of speed, and there are a bunch of exemplars of that. The clearest one to me is SpaceX, where they blow up a rocket and that is a win for them, not a loss. And even if it gets written up in the press as, “Oh, Starship blew up, or whatever”—they don't care, right? They'd rather that it didn't blow up or that it stayed together longer, but if they got the learning that they were looking for, then they're like, “Great, we're going to incorporate that, we're going to build another rocket, we're not going to put any people on until we're very, very, very sure, but we're going to blow up a bunch of rockets.” From the start of the company, that has been an okay thing to do.
They also are willing to embrace pretty big pivots. The first plan for Starship was that it was going to be a carbon fiber rocket because carbon fiber is so strong and lightweight, but their method for making it was too slow, too expensive, and had a reject rate that was too high. The thing’s now made out of stainless steel! It's the opposite kind of material! But they said, “Look, the goal is the goal, and the goal is not to stick to the original plan, the goal is to build a great big rocket that can do all kinds of things. The way we get there is by trying—legitimately trying—a bunch of stuff and failing at it with the eyes of the world upon us.”
I want to draw a really sharp distinction between the process and the product, and what I mean by that is a failure-tolerant process can yield an incredibly robust, safe product. We don't need to look any farther for that than the Dragon Capsule that SpaceX makes, which is the only capsule currently made in America that is certified by NASA to take human beings into space. It's how all Americans these days get back and forth to the ISS. NASA doesn't have one. NASA gave a contract to Boeing at the same time it gave one to SpaceX. Boeing still has not had the first crude test of its capsule. This geek way of speed, it's uncomfortable, and you got to be willing to fail publicly and own it, but it works better.
Is the geek way, to some degree, an American phenomenon?
So far.
I was going to say, can the geek way be implemented in other countries? Is there something special about American culture that allows the geek way to work and to be adopted—I said universal earlier, maybe I meant, is it truly universal? Can it be implemented in other places?
Jim, you and I, as proud Americans, like to believe that we're an exceptional country, and I do believe that. I don't believe the geek way only works with a bunch of Americans trying it. I travel lots of different places, and especially the energy that I see among younger people to be part of this transformation of the world that's happening (that you and I are lucky enough to get to observe and try to think about), this transformation of the world in the 21st century because of the technological toolkit that we have, because of the amount of innovation out there, the thirst to be part of that is very, very, very widespread. And I don't think there's anything in the drinking water in Munich or Kyoto or Lima that makes this stuff impossible at all. It is true, we're an individualistic culture, we're kind of mouthy, we celebrate these iconoclastic people, but I don't think any of those are absolutely necessary in order to start following norms of science, ownership, speed and openness. I hope those are universal.
The geek way beyond tech (26:32)
We’ve been talking a lot about tech companies. Are there companies which really don't seem particularly techie (even though obviously all companies use technology) that you could see the geek way working currently?
I haven't gone off and looked outside the tech industry for great exemplars of the geek way, so I have trouble answering this question. But think about Bridgewater, which is really one of the weirdest corporate cultures ever invented, and I haven't read the new biography of Ray Dalio yet, but it appears that all might not be exactly as it appears. But one thing that Bridgewater has been adamant about from the get-go, and Dalio has been passionate about, is this idea of radical transparency, is the idea of openness. Your reputation is not private from anybody else in the company at any point in time. So they've taken this norm of openness and they've really ran with it in some fascinating directions. In most organizations, there's a lot of information that's private, and your reputation is spread by gossip. Literally, that's how it works. Bridgewater said, “Nope. We really believe in openness and everything that's important about your performance as a professional in this company, you're going to get rated on it by your colleagues, and you're going to have these visible to everybody all the time inside the company so that if you start espousing how important it is to be ethical, but your score as an ethical leader is really low, nobody's going to listen to you.” I think that's fascinating, and I think as time goes by, we're going to come across these very, very geeky norms and practices being implemented in all kinds of weird corners of the global economy. I can't wait to learn about it.
I would think that, given how every country would like to be more productive, every country's having a white paper on how to improve their productivity, and this, to me, is maybe something that policymakers don't think about, and I'm not sure if there's a policy aspect to this, but I hope a lot of corporate leaders and aspiring corporate leaders at least read your book.
Well, the one policy implication that might come up is, what happens when the geeks start unignorably beating up the incumbents in your favorite industry. When I look at what's happening in the global auto industry right now, I see some of that going on, and my prediction is that it's going to get worse instead of better. Okay, then what happens?
Save us! Save us from this upstart!
Exactly, but then there could be some really interesting policy choices being made about protecting dinosaur incumbents in the face of geek competitors. I hope we don't retreat into nationalism and protectionism and that kind of stuff. What I hope happens instead is that the world learns how to get geeky relatively quickly and that this upgrade to the company spreads.
The only thing I would add here is I would also urge business journalists to read the book so you understand how companies work and how these new companies that work, companies that look like they are—and not to keep harping on SpaceX, but so many people who I think should know better, will look at SpaceX and think, “Oh, they're failing. Oh, that rocket, as you said earlier, the rocket blew up! Apollo had a couple of problems, they're blowing up a rocket every six weeks!” And they just simply do not understand how this kind of company works. So I don't know. So I guess I would recommend my business journalists to read it, and I imagine you would think the same.
That recommendation makes a ton of sense to me. Jim. I'm all on board with that.
Andrew. This is an outstanding book and a wonderful companion piece to your other work which is very pro-progress, and pro-growth. I absolutely loved it, and thanks so much for coming on the podcast today,
Jim, thanks for being part of the Up Wing Party with me. Let's make it happen.
Absolutely. Thank you.
Thank you, sir.
If you’re looking for a smart and punchy companion piece to my new book, The Conservative Futurist: How to Create the Sci-Fi World We Were Promised, then you are in luck. Look no further than venture capitalist Marc Andreessen’s wonderful new mega-essay, “The Techno-Optimist Manifesto.”
If there’s a sentence or even a word in that manifesto that I disagree with, I have yet to find it. That’s why I am so delighted to have Marc Andreessen, a founder and general partner at Andreessen Horowitz — as well as the co-author of Mosaic, the first widely used web browser, and co-founder of Netscape — on this special episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast.
In This Episode
* The time for techno-optimism is now (1:19)
* Why has there been a downshift in innovation? (8:56)
* The importance of embracing AI (16:08)
* Slouching towards Utopia: Marc’s response to AI critics (23:27)
* The economics of techno-optimism (36:29)
* The future of domestic technology policy (44:38)
Oh, by the way, the transcript of our conversation will be posted tomorrow, November 9.
Hey, I have a new book out! The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were Promised is currently available pretty much everywhere. I’m very excited about it! Let’s gooooo! 🆙↗⤴📈
* Amazon
* Target
* Walmart
* Bookshop
From the Introduction of The Conservative Futurist:
Johan Norberg’s work revolves primarily around economic and intellictual history and attempting to learn lessons from past financial systems. In this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, Johan takes us through his version of capitalism, giving an especially interesting perspective on the economic system of his home country.
Johan is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and the author of several books. His latest is The Capitalist Manifesto: In Defense of Global Capitalism, available now.
In This Episode
* “Capitalism” and its meanings (0:55)
* The state of contemporary capitalism (2:34)
* Coordination in capitalism (7:59)
* The cyclical nature of economic systems (13:54)
* Swedish capitalism (16:56)
* The case for capitalism (21:48)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
James Pethokoukis: Let's begin with a little definitional work here. Capitalist Manifesto: “Capitalist” is a word people assign a variety of meanings to. What is the capitalism that you're talking about here?
Johan Norberg: Yeah, it's not a great word. Quite often it's misunderstood; people think it's all about capital. It's not. We can have capital in many different economic systems. To me, free-market capitalism is about a decentralized economic system with private property where decisions are made locally, decentralized, not command and control, and the prices and wages and things are set in voluntary negotiations rather than top-down.
The economist Deirdre McCloskey hates the word "capitalism." She prefers "innovism" or "trade-tested progress." Should we insist on using a different word to describe the world’s dominant socio-economic system?
Deirdre McCloskey is right. Capitalism is a bad word. I would much prefer “innovism” or something like that. But I've realized that in order to communicate with people, I'd better use some of the words that they are using. And I've realized that we're stuck with the word “capitalism” and the whole concept of capitalism, and if we don't fill it with meaning, those of us who like free markets and free trade, I've realized that somebody else is going to fill it with meaning, and in that case, we are losing the debate. Go to where the sinners are. That's my take.
Twenty years ago, it seemed like markets had won. Capitalism was changing the world and bringing people out of poverty. President Clinton declared "the era of big government is over." China was opening its economy. What happened? Why did you feel the need to write this book in this moment?
That's exactly why I wrote this book, because nowadays it seems like nobody likes free markets and free trade anymore. I've realized that, in the US, and that should be a place where people appreciate some of this, fewer people believe in capitalism than believe in ghosts nowadays. And there's this lack among politicians and governments everywhere in belief in global capitalism. There's this whole, repatriate stuff, subsidize specific businesses and sectors back home, rather than having global supply chains. So that's why I wrote this.
I think this is all based on a complete misunderstanding of what has happened in the world in the past 20 years. It's not that markets have failed. On the contrary, despite the fact that we've had 20 rough years with financial crises and wars and the Great Pandemic and stuff like that, and yet we've seen, when you look at objective indicators of human living standards, more progress than ever before over these 20 years. When it comes to the reduction in poverty, more than 130,000 people lifted out of extreme poverty every day over the past 20 years. We've seen an increase in global GDP per capita of roughly a third. We've reduced child mortality by almost half, which means that four million fewer children died last year than in 2002. And this is because entrepreneurs and innovators, they keep innovating ourselves out of problems all the time — if we give them some freedom to do that. And that's what I'm worried about: that they'll have less freedom in the future if we do not keep on pounding and keep on explaining this.
Those are some pretty impressive statistics. But people don't seem to notice. We keep hearing the same narrative of "late-stage, failed capitalism.” Why is that?
I think the financial crisis is a very important part of this. If some capitalists do bad stuff, people lose faith in capitalism and I think we saw this in the US but also around the world. There's this sense that perhaps we shouldn't imitate what America is doing if these are the consequences. And I don't think that the financial crisis was a result of unleashed market forces. And I even wrote a book on this a couple of years back, Financial Fiasco. I think there were massive regulatory failures and central banks and ministers of finance trying to make capitalism very safe by implementing a very homogenous structure on everybody, telling everybody to go into the same way, searching for the same AAA-rated securities and stuff like that. And if everybody behaves in the same way, if that fails, there's massive disaster. We need decentralization partly to minimize risks like that. But — doesn't matter, we don't have to go into history. I think this partly explains why we're in this lack of trust in capitalism right now.
But also other things. People, when they're afraid of the world, they tend to retreat. They don't want to explore. They don't want to innovate. It triggers their fight-or-flight mechanism and sometimes the societal fight-or-flight mechanism. You want to hide behind walls and tariff barriers and strong, big governments that protect you, and that is a misunderstanding of how we get out of crises. And this is what I think we've learned from these past 20 years. Yes, lots of bad stuff happened. It makes us afraid. It triggers some sort of evolutionary tendency to get away from openness and learning and discovery processes and instead we want just one instant solution to all the problems.
But what we're learning is, how did we get out of the pandemic? We did it by having thousands of entrepreneurs constantly finding new ways to rebuild supply chains and find replacements for the resources they couldn't get. And innovators who were looking for new treatments and coming up with a vaccine in a record period of time. It didn't take a thousand years as it usually does, coming up with a vaccine against polio, but more like three months. But try to tell that to our reptilian brains. When we're fearful, we want one simple solution. And as H.L. Mencken once put it, there is always a solution to every problem: it is “neat, plausible, and wrong.” And it's so dangerous because it involves replacing all that discovery, all that learning and wisdom of millions with just the preferences of a few people at the top.
Let me read a brief tweet by the right-wing populist writer, Sohrab Ahmari: “We are entering a new age of industrial war. The ‘California ideology,’ neoliberalism, Reagan-Clintonism — whatever you want to call it, it’s kaput. We’re going to see close coordination between state, enterprise, labor. It took security threats to bring us here. I’ll take it.” Why won't you take it?
That's a scary prospect to me. There is a reason why he’s talking about this Silicon Valley thing, because that worked splendidly, and one of the reasons it succeeded was that the outcomes weren't decided in advance by any kind of command-and-control thing. It was, as some criticized it in the ‘70s, it looks more like the Wild West, allowing entrepreneurs and innovators to experiment with crazy ideas, even in garages. And that's the way to … if you want to explore all possible avenues and ideas, we have to let everybody go out and look for it. I think the reason why Sohrab Ahmari is wrong is that he thinks that there is one solution to all the problems we face. Perhaps there is, but I don't know one and he doesn't know it. We have to allow more eyeballs to look at the problems and more brains to go out thinking hard about these things, and that involves not starting geopolitical divisions and nationalist temptations, but it involves having lots of people in other places helping us to find the solutions in a division of labor where we learn from what they're doing.
Why has America been so successful so far? When people say that it's failing, this American, this Washington consensus thing, please keep in mind that just 15 years ago, the American economy was slightly smaller than the European one. Now it's almost a third bigger. It's not entirely broken, but some of the fixes might break it, I'm afraid, if we continue doing things like this. Why is it successful? Well, look at different areas. Look at AI. Why is America so successful? We thought that China would come up with it. Well, one reason is that the Chinese have to teach machines not just what to say, but also what not to say, but also the fact that America is learning from others. More than half of America's top AI experts have education or background in other countries and almost a third come from China. So if we want to win against China and everybody else, we also have to allow lots of Chinese to do the work for us.
This notion of close coordination between state and business and labor, where does that work well? Is there a model? Is there an example of that kind of formula working elsewhere?
A leading European economist just published a book called, I think it's some 50 of them, called Questioning the Entrepreneurial State, where they evaluate this whole idea that we would have this close coordination between governments and businesses, and what they say is that the history of it, at least in Europe but they look around the world as well, is that it's usually a full employment program for lobbyists and for attorneys who just reformulate everything that businesses would usually do as something that fits with this new industrial policy thing. If it was successful, you would look up stuff on the internet by using Quaero, because that's the close coordination stuff in Europe with the European and German and French governments heavily funded a “European Google.” The whole idea was that we will own the digital future by heavily subsidizing this one project. It doesn't work, because you lose some of the trial and error, you lose some of the mechanisms whereby we understand what's a success and what's not.
It's okay to fail. Industrial policies fail all the time, but so does big tech. Entrepreneurial capitalism as well. But the great thing with free markets and not having the governments investing heavily in one particular model is that you replace this trial-and-error, constant experimentation and feedback and adaptation that comes when you work on markets and you're risking your own resources. Once you do that by having the government picking a winner, then, when you lose out, you spend more money on these projects instead. And you lose this learning process whereby we're constantly channeling capital and labor to more successful ones. What people would tell you is that China is the most successful place where we’ve had this…
Yes, there seems to be a cyclical component to this belief. I mean, I'm old enough to have seen the version where Japan had figured it out. That didn't turn out so well. And then I think you have people who looked at China. If you have a natural inclination to like the idea of central planning and you eschew the kind of natural chaos of capitalism, you could point to China So that's why I wonder if this is a passing phase, because China doesn't seem like they're able to pull it off either.
Yeah, but that'll keep on moving, then, and find another example where it seems to be working. Because it's always easy to find out in retrospect that something seemed to be working. And if the government is involved somewhere, they try to give it credit. But until recently, I think 49 American states tried to spend heavily to create a biotech cluster in their own state to attract businesses from other states. And if one of them succeeded, people would've said, “Look, this is because of this top-down government intervention,” but probably not, right?
And it's the same thing with China. Yes, China has been tremendously successful for 30 years, but in which sectors? In the sectors that the government didn't plan for it, in places where we saw grassroots capitalism, farmers secretly privatizing their land, starting village enterprises. And then, and only then, did the Communist Party see that, “This seems to be more successful than what we've been doing recently, so allow them to continue to experiment,” experiment in export processing and stuff like that. But they wanted to keep it elsewhere so that it wouldn't spread throughout the rest of the economy. But it was so successful that it did. That's what succeeded: when people experimented. Entrepreneurs were allowed to innovate. What was it that failed? The large, state-owned enterprises. They were less productive. They were wasting cheap credit and ruining, destroying resources over the years. And once the government gets involved, there's plenty of research into this, they find less productive businesses and they become even less productive if they get access to this cheap credit and cheap land. And I think people are coming around to that now as they're seeing that China has many problems, some of them related to demography, as well. But they would need innovation, strange new business ideas, crazy people in garages coming up with new ideas. That's exactly the thing that top-down governments don't really like, and what they've been doing over the past few years is just destroying tech businesses, [education] businesses, and the gaming industry in China because authoritarians aren't good at spotting where the true potential lies.
I wonder if you could clear up a question that confuses many Americans. Do you come from, and are you currently living in, a capitalist country?
Yes, I am.
We don't know. We're not sure. We're very confused about Sweden.
Yes, I know, and that's because lots of perceptions, just like the ideas, are stuck in the 1970s. Sweden had a brief period of some 20 years when we really experimented with socialist ideas, but this was also the moment — the only moment in modern economic history — when Sweden lagged behind other countries. So up until the early 1970s, we had a very limited government, low taxes, free markets, and free trade — that made us rich. It made us so rich in Sweden that we thought that we could experiment with these ideas. Just stop thinking about how to create wealth, just spend it, redistribute it. And that resulted in an awful 20, 25 years when companies like Ikea and Tetra Pak and the greatest entrepreneurs, they just left Sweden because it wasn't possible to do business in Sweden.
This is what people still remember: the 1970s. We did all these things: doubled the size of the government, jacking up taxes and so on. At the same time, it looked like a fairly successful place, it's a rich place. But it's like that old joke: How do you end up with a small fortune? Well, you start with a large fortune and then you waste most of it. And that's what we did. This is actually why, since that terrible economic financial crisis that we had in the early 1990s, Sweden has once again liberalized markets quite drastically compared to other places, and we're now back to a system which many Americans would actually think of as more free market in many ways than the US system.
As you know, people think of Sweden and Scandinavia more generally as big government with a giant welfare [system], cradle-to-grave welfare, all the welfare you would ever want. So in what ways is Sweden maybe more market friendly than the United States, and perhaps some ways which would greatly surprise many Americans as well as Bernie Sanders?
Yeah, I'm trying to tell the Bernie Sanders of the world that if they want to be like Sweden, they would have to do plenty of things. They would have to become more free trade-oriented in many ways. They would have to reform social security, partially privatize it with individual accounts, they would have to introduce a national school voucher system so private schools get the same funding as the public ones. They would actually have to lower taxes in many ways on the rich, and they would have to abolish taxes on property wealth inheritance and lower the corporate tax, and instead put most of the tax burdens on low- and middle-income households, because that's the dirty little secret of the Swedish welfare state. We learned in the 1970s that if you want to have a big universal welfare state that's very generous, in that case, everybody is going to have to pay for it.
You have to redistribute over people's life cycle, rather than trying to get the rich to pay for it all, because we realized that the rich are too few and the economy is too dependent on them. So if we are trying to get them to pay for it all, they will flee Sweden, they will move to other places, leave their resources elsewhere, and we won't get the new businesses, the new successful ones that we all depend upon. So for 30 years, we didn't create a single net job in the private sector, the ‘70s, ‘80s, and the ‘90s. So instead, you have to move towards more taxing consumption, 25 percent value-added tax, and making sure that the poor and middle income households pay the bulk of income taxes. So, counterintuitively — and this is something that people really don't get—Sweden has a much less-progressive tax system than the United States does, less-progressive tax system than almost any other rich country because we've learned that the poor are loyal taxpayers. They don't move, they don't dodge taxes, and they don't have tax attorneys.
What is the quick pitch for capitalism? If you're on an airplane next to someone who's heard a lot about inequality and wage stagnation and losing to the Chinese, how do you make the case for market capitalism?
It's much, much better than you think, but it could be even better. It is much better because we can see, look at the long-term indicators and the data, and perhaps this is where I lose my fellow passenger. But wage stagnation was a phenomenon in the ‘70s and ‘80s, partly because we had to rebuild the economy because it was at risk of becoming much less competitive and we were about to lose jobs everywhere. Once we did that, from the ‘90s and onwards, we've had a tremendous increase in wages, and we can measure this in wages and total compensation and increase in 60 percent. I'd say if you look at the best indicators, but even more interesting is what can you do with those resources? And then you see that all those amenities and goods and technologies that we all considered luxuries in the ‘70 and ‘80s, we're getting close to 100 percent possession in American households.
The poor people who fall below the poverty line in the US now own more amenities like that — washing machines, television sets, dryers, clothes washers, and of course cell phones and computers — than the rich did in 1970. That tells you something. If you look around the world, we've actually had the best era ever when it comes to poverty reduction, and we've even, since the turn of the millennium, reduced global inequality for the first time since the Industrial Revolution. So it's much better than the headlines. If you look at the trend lines, they're much better.
Yeah, tell me about that. Give me a little of that “could be even better.” Give me a little flavor of that.
Yeah. I think that we've lost — you know this and you just wrote a book on this — we've entered a period where we've thought that things cannot be better. We've tried to protect old business models and old ways of doing things, and often in a low interest rate environment, I think protected many businesses that should have been put out of their misery so that capital and labor could go to the new sectors, to the frontiers of the economy. We are seeing some of that happening now with everything from mRNA technology to the new space race to AI, but we're in a mindset and a regulatory situation where we don't want to experiment with the new weird stuff. But we have to do that because that's the only way where we'll get the new goods and services and jobs in the future. So here’s to the crazy ones, as Steve Jobs would put it. And in that case, we can't be too protective of our old, safe ways of doing things.
More than 20 years ago, the political scientist Francis Fukuyama characterized the Information Technology revolution as "benign" but cautioned that "the most significant threat posed by contemporary biotechnology is the possibility that it will alter human nature and thereby move us into a post-human stage of history." From Twitter to CRISPR to ChatGPT, a lot has changed since then. In this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, Dr. Fukuyama shares his thoughts on those developments and the recent advances in generative AI, as well as the cultural importance of science fiction.
Dr. Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. His books include The End of History and the Last Man, Our Posthuman Future, and 2022's Liberalism and Its Discontents, among many others. Other writings can be found at American Purpose.
In This Episode
* The consequences of the IT revolution (1:37)
* Can government competently regulate AI? (8:14)
* AI and liberal democracy (17:29)
* The cultural importance of science fiction (24:16)
* Silicon Valley’s life-extension efforts (31:11)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation
The consequences of the IT revolution
James Pethokoukis: In Our Posthuman Future more than 20 years ago, you wrote, “The aim of this book is to argue that [Aldous] Huxley was right [in Brave New World], that the most significant threat posed by contemporary biotechnology is the possibility that it will alter human nature and thereby move us into a ‘posthuman’ stage of history. This is important, I will argue, because human nature exists, is a meaningful concept, and has provided a stable continuity to our experience as a species.” But then you added, “It may be that, as in the case of 1984” — and, I think, parenthetically, information technology — “we will eventually find biotechnology’s consequences are completely and surprisingly benign.” After 20 years, and the advent of social media, and now it seems like possibly a great leap forward in AI, would you still characterize the IT revolution as “benign”?
Francis Fukuyama: That's obviously something that's changed considerably since I wrote that book because the downside of IT has been clear to everybody. When the internet was first privatized in the 1990s, most people, myself included, thought it would be good for democracy because information was power, and if you made information more widely available, that would distribute power more democratically. And it has done that, in fact. A lot of people have access to information that they can use to improve their lives, to mobilize, to agitate, to push for the protection of their rights. But I think it's also been weaponized in ways that we perhaps didn't anticipate back then.
And then, there was this more insidious phenomenon where it turns out that the elimination of hierarchies that controlled information, that we celebrated back then, actually turned out to be pretty important. If you had a kind of legacy media that cared about journalistic standards, you could trust the information that was published. But the internet really undermined those legacy sources and replaced it with a world in which anyone can say anything. And they do. Therefore, we have this cognitive chaos right now where conspiracy theories of all sorts get a lot of credibility because people don't trust these hierarchies that used to be the channels for information. Clearly, we’ve got a big problem on our hands. That doesn't mean that the biotech is not still going to be a big problem; it's just that I think the IT part has moved ahead very rapidly. But I think the biotech will get there in time.
While I think most of the concern that I've heard expressed about AI, in particular, has been about these science fiction-like existential risks or job loss, obviously your concern has more to do, as with in Our Posthuman Future, how it will affect our liberal democracy. And you point out some of the downsides of the IT revolution that weren't obvious 30 years ago but now seeing plainly obvious today.
To me, the coverage of AI has been really very, very negative, and we've had calls for an AI pause. Do you worry that maybe we've overlearned that lesson? That rather than going into this with kind of a Pollyannaish attitude, we're immediately going into this AI with deep concerns. Is there a risk of overcorrecting?
The short answer is, yes. I think that because of our negative experience with social media and the internet lately, we expect the worst from technology. But I think that the possibilities for AI actually making certain social problems much better are substantial. I think that the existential worries about AI are just absurd, and I really don't see scenarios under which the human species is going to face extinction. That seems to be this Terminator, killer, Skynet scenario, and I know very few serious experts in this area that think that that's ever likely to materialize. The bigger fears, I think, are more mundane ones about job loss as a result of advancing technology. And I think that's a very complicated issue. But it does seem to me that, for example, generative AI could actually end up complementing human skills and, in fact, could complement the skills of lower-skilled or lower-educated workers in a way that will actually increase economic equality.
Up till now, I think most economists would blame the advance of computer technology for having vastly increased social inequality, because in order to take advantage of existing technologies, if you have a better education, you're going to have a higher income and so forth. But it's entirely possible that generative AI will actually slow that trend because it will give people with lower levels of education the ability to do useful things that they weren't able to do previously. There's actually some early empirical work that suggests that that's already been a pattern. So, yes, I think you're right that we've kind of overreacted. I just think in general, predicting where this technology is going to go in the next 50 years is a fool's errand. It's sort of like in the 1880s asking somebody, “Well, what's this newfangled thing called electricity going to do in 50 years?” Anything that was said back then I think would've been overtaken by events very, very rapidly.
Can government competently regulate AI?
Anyone who has sat through previous government hearings on social media has been underwhelmed at the ability of Congress to understand these issues, much less come up with a vast regulatory structure. Are you confident in the ability of government to regulate AI, whether it's to regulate deep fakes or what have you — why should I be confident in their ability to do that?
I think you've got to decompose the regulatory challenge a little bit. I've been involved here at Stanford, we have a Cyber Policy Center, and we've been thinking about different forms of IT regulation. It's a particular challenge for regulators for a number of reasons. One of the questions you come up with in regulatory design is, “Is this something that actually can be undertaken by existing agencies, or do you actually need a new type of regulator with special skills and knowledge?” And I think, to me, pretty clearly the answer to that is yes. But that agency would have to be designed very differently, because the standard regulatory design, the agency has a certain amount of expertise in a particular sector and they use that expertise to write rules that then get written into law, and then things like the Administrative Procedure Act begins to apply. That's what's been going on, for example, with something like net neutrality, where the FCC put the different regulations up for notice and comment, and you go through this very involved procedure to write the new rules and so forth. I think in an area like AI, that's just not going to work, because the thing is moving so quickly. And that means that you're actually going to have to delegate more autonomy and discretionary power to the regulatory agency, because otherwise, they're simply not going to be able to keep up with the speed at which the technology advances. In normative terms, I have no problem with that. I think that governments do need to exercise social control over new technologies that are potentially very disruptive and damaging, but it has to be done in a proper way.
Can you actually design a regulatory agency that would have any remote chance of keeping up with the technology? The British have done this. They have a new digital regulator that is composed of people coming out of the IT industry, and they've relaxed the civil service requirements to be able to hire people with the appropriate knowledge and backgrounds. In the United States, that's going to be very difficult because we have so many cumbersome HR requirements for hiring and promotion of people that go into the federal civil service. Pay, for one thing, is a big issue because we don't pay our bureaucrats enough. If you're going to hire some hotshot tech guy out of the tech sector and offer him a job as a GS-14, it just isn't going to work. So I don't think that you can answer the question, “Can we regulate adequately or not?” in a simple way. I think that there are certain things you would have to do if you were going to try to regulate this sector. Can the United States do that given the polarization in our politics, given all of these legacy institutions that prevent us from actually having a public sector that is up to this task? That I don't know. As you can tell, I've got certain skepticism about that.
Is it a worthwhile critique of this regulatory process to think of AI as this discreet technology that you need a certain level of expertise to understand? If it is indeed a general-purpose technology that will be used by a variety of sectors, all sectors perhaps, can you really have an AI regulator that doesn't de facto become an economy regulator?
No, you probably can't. This is another challenge, which is that, as you say, AI in general is so broad. It's already being used in virtually every sector of the economy, and you obviously don't want a “one size fits all” effort to govern the use of this technology. So I think that you have to be much more specific about the areas where you think potential harms could exist. There's also different approaches to this other than regulation. In 2020, I chaired a Stanford working group on platform scale, which was meant to deal with the old — at that point it was a kind of contemporary problem — but now it seems like an old problem of content mediation on the internet. So how do you deal with this problem that Elon Musk has now revealed to be a real problem: You don't want everything to be available on social media platforms, but how do you actually control that content in a way that serves a kind of general democratic public interest? As we thought about this in the course of this working group deliberation, we concluded that straightforward regulation is not going to work. It won't work in the United States because we're way too polarized. Just think about something like reviving the old fairness doctrine that the FCC used to apply to legacy broadcast media. How are you going to come up with something like that? What's “fair and balanced” coverage of vaccine denialism? It's just not going to happen.
And what we ended up advocating was something we called “middleware,” where you would use regulation to create a competitive ecosystem of third-party media content regulators so that when you use the social media platform, you the user could buy the services or make use of the services of a content regulator that would tailor your feed or your search on Google to criteria that you specified in advance. So if you tended progressive, you could get a progressive one. If you only like right-wing media, you could get a content regulator that would deliver what you want. If you wanted to buy only American-made products, you could get a different one. The point is that you would use competition in this sphere because the real threat, as we saw it, was not actually so much this compartmentalization as the power of a single big platform. There's really only three of them. It's Google, Meta, and now X, or the formerly Twitter, that really had this kind of power. The danger to a democracy was not that you could say anything on the internet, the danger was the power of a single big platform owned by a private, for-profit company to have an outsized role over political discourse in the United States. Elon Musk and Twitter is a perfect example of that. He apparently has his own foreign policy, which is not congruent with American foreign policy, but as a private owner of this platform, he's got the power to pursue this private foreign policy. So that was our idea.
In that particular case, you could use competition as an alternative to state regulation, because what you really wanted to do was to break up this concentrated power that was exercised by the platforms. So that's one approach to one aspect of digital regulation. It doesn't deal with AI. I don't know whether there's an analog in the AI sphere, but I think it's correct that what you don't want is a single regulator that then tries to write broad rules that apply to what is actually just an enormously broad technology that will apply in virtually every sector of the economy.
AI and liberal democracy
In response to the call for a six-month "AI pause," critics of that idea pointed to competition with China. They suggested that given the difficulties of regulating AI, we might risk losing the "AI race" to the Chinese. Do you think that's a reasonable criticism?
This is a general problem with technologies. Certain technologies distribute power and other technologies concentrate it. So the old classic 19th-century coal- and steel- and fossil fuel–based economy tended to concentrate power. And certainly nuclear weapons concentrate power because you really need to be a big entity in order to build a nuclear weapon, in order to build all the uranium processing and so forth. But other technologies, like biotech, actually do not concentrate power. Any high school student can actually now use CRISPR to do genetic engineering. And they make biotech labs that will fit in individual shipping containers. So the regulatory problem is quite different.
Now, the problem with AI is that it appears that these large language models really require a lot of resources. In fact, it's interesting, because we used to think the problem was actually having big data sets. But that's actually not the problem; there's plenty of data out there. It's actually building a parallel computer system that's powerful enough to process all the words on the internet, and that's been the task that only the largest companies can do. I think that it's correct that if we had told these companies not to do this, we would be facing international competitive pressures that would make that a bad decision. However, I do think that it's still a risk to allow that kind of power to be not subject to some form of democratic control. If it's true that you need these gigantic corporations to do this sort of thing, those corporations ought to be serving American national interests.
And again, I hate to keep referring to Elon Musk, but we're seeing this right now with Starlink. It turns out Starlink is extremely valuable militarily, which has been demonstrated very clearly in Ukraine. Should the owner of Starlink be allowed to make important decisions as to who is going to use this technology on the battlefield and where that technology can be used? I don't think so. I don't think that one rich individual should have that kind of power. And actually, I'm not quite sure, I thought that the Defense Department had actually agreed to start paying Musk for the Ukrainian use of Starlink. I think that's the actual appropriate answer to that problem, so that it should not be up to Elon Musk where Starlink can be used. It should be up to the people that make American foreign policy: the White House and the State Department and so forth. And so, I think by analogy, if you develop this technology that requires really massive scale and big corporations to develop it, it should nonetheless be under some kind of state control such that it is not the decision of some rich individual how it's going to be applied. It should be somehow subject to some kind of democratic control.
On a normative level, I think that's very clear, but the specific modalities by which you do that are complicated. For example, let's say there's a gigantic corporation that is run by some lunatic that wants to use it for all sorts of asocial reasons, proliferating deep fakes or trying to use it to undermine general social trust in institutions and so forth. Is that okay? Is that a decision that should be up to a private individual or isn't there some public interest in controlling that in some fashion? I hate speaking about this in such general terms, but I think you have to settle this normative question and then you can get into the narrower technical question of, is it possible to actually exert that kind of control and how would you do that?
You've questioned in your previous writings whether liberal democracy could survive a world with both humans and posthumans and where we’re manipulating human nature. Can it survive in a world where there are two different intelligences? If we had a human intelligence and we had an artificial general intelligence, would such an entity pose a challenge our civilization, to a democratic capitalist civilization?
It's hard to answer that question. You can imagine scenarios where it obviously would pose a challenge. One of the big questions is whether this general intelligence somehow escapes human control, and that's a tough one. I think that the experts that I trust think that that's not going to happen. That ultimately, human beings are going to be able to control this thing and use it for their own purposes. So again, the whole Skynet scenario is really not likely to happen. But that doesn't solve the problem, because even if it's under human control, how do you make sure it's the right humans, right? Because if this falls into the wrong hands, it could be very, very destructive. And that then becomes a political question. I'm not quite sure how you're going to want to answer it.
The cultural importance of science fiction
You mentioned Skynet from the Terminator franchise. Do you worry that we're too steeped in dystopian science fiction? It seems like we can only see the downside when we're presented with a new technology like a biotechnology breakthrough or an AI breakthrough. Is that how it seems to you?
I actually wrote a blog post about this. I really read a lot of science fiction. I have my whole life. There's a big difference between the sorts of stories that you saw back in the 1950s and ‘60s and the stuff that has come out recently. It's hard to generalize over such a vast field, but space odysseys and space travel was very common, and a lot of that was extremely optimistic: that human beings would colonize Mars and then the distant planets and you'd have a warp drive that would take you out of the solar system and so forth. And it was kind of a paean to unlimited human possibilities. Whereas I do think that, especially with the rise of environmentalism, there was a greater consciousness of the downsides of technological advance. So you got more and more dystopian kinds of imaginings. Now, it is not a universal thing. For example, I also wrote a blog about two kind of global warming–related recent science-fiction books. One is TheMinistry for the Future by Kim Stanley Robinson. And that actually is a very optimistic take on global warming, because it's set in the 2050s and basically the human race has figured out how to deal with global warming. They do it, I think, through a bunch of very implausible political scenarios, but there's a ministry for the future that wisely…
That book seems a little too comfortable with violence and compulsion for my taste.
The other one is Neal Stephenson's Termination Shock: Basically, there's a single rich oligarch in Texas that takes it upon himself to put all this sulfur dioxide in the upper atmosphere to cool the earth, and he succeeds, and it then changes the climate in China and India. I don't know whether that's optimistic or pessimistic. But I actually do think that it's very useful to have this kind of science fiction, because you really do have to imagine to yourself what some of the both upsides and downsides will be. So it's probably the case that there's more dystopian fiction, but I do think that if you didn't have that, you wouldn't have a concrete idea of what to look for.
If you think about both 1984 and Brave New World, these were the big dystopian futures that were imagined in the 1950s. And both of them came true in many ways. It gave us a vocabulary, like, “Big Brother,” the “Telescreen,” or “Epsilons,” and “Gammas,” and “Alphas,” and so forth, by which we can actually kind of interpret things in the present. I think if you didn't have that vocabulary, it would be hard to have a discussion about what is it that we're actually worried about. So yes, I do think that there is a dystopian bias to a lot of that work that's done, but I think that you’ve got to have it. Because you do have to try to imagine to yourself what some of these downsides are.
You mentioned a couple of books. Are there any films or television shows that you've watched that you feel provide a plausible optimistic vision?
I don't know whether it's optimistic. One of my favorite book series and then TV series was The Expanse, written by a couple of guys that go by a pseudonym. It's not optimistic, in the sense that it projects all of our current geopolitical rivalries forward into a future in which human beings have colonized, not just the outer planets, but also intergalactically, figured out how to move from one place to another, and they're still having these fights between rich and poor and so forth. But I guess the reason that I liked it, especially the early parts of that series, when you just had an Epstein Drive, I mean, it was just one technological change that allowed you to move. It’s sort of like the early days of sailing ships, where you could get to Australia, but it would take you six months to get there. So that was the situation early on in the book, and that was actually a very attractive future. All of a sudden, human beings had the ability to mine the asteroid belt, they could create gigantic cities in space where human beings could actually live and flourish. That's one of the reasons I really liked that: because it was very human. Although there were conflicts, they were familiar conflicts. There were conflicts that we are dealing with today. But it was, in a way, hopeful because it was now done at this much larger scale that gave hope that human beings would not be confined to one single planet. And actually, one of the things that terrifies me is that the idea that in 100 years, we may discover that we actually can't colonize even Mars or the Moon. That the costs of actually allowing human beings to live anywhere but on earth just make it economically impossible. And so we're kind of stuck on planet Earth and that's the human future.
I wrote a small essay about The Expanse where I talked about having a positive vision. As I saw it, this is several hundred years in the future, and we're still here. We've had climate change, but we're still here. We've expanded throughout the universe. If an asteroid should hit the earth, there's still going to be humanity. And people were angry about that essay, because this is a future but there's still problems. Yes, because we're still part of that future: human beings.
Silicon Valley’s life-extension efforts
Getting back to biotechnology and transhumanism and living forever, these things you wrote about in Our Posthuman Future: What do you make of the efforts by folks in Silicon Valley to try to extend lifespans? From a cultural perspective, from your perspective as a political scientist, what do you make of these efforts?
I think they're terrible. I actually wrote about this and have thought about this a lot, about life extension. In fact, I think human biomedicine has produced a kind of disastrous situation for us right now because by the time you get to your mid-80s, roughly half of the population that's that old has some kind of long-term, chronic, degenerative disease. And I think that it was actually a much better situation when people were dying of heart attacks and strokes and cancer when they were still in their 70s. It's one of those things where life extension is individually very desirable because no individual wants to die. But socially, I think the impact of extending life is bad. Because quite frankly, you're not going to have adaptation unless you have generational turnover. There's a lot of literature now, Neil Howe has just written a new book on this about how important generations are. There's this joke that economists say, that the field of economics progresses one funeral at a time. Because, basically, you're born into a certain age cohort, and to the end of your life, you're going to retain a lot of the views of people that were born going through the same kind of life experiences. And sometimes they're just wrong. And unless that generation dies off, you're just not going to get the kind of social movement that’s necessary.
We've already seen a version of this with all these dictators like Franco and Castro that refuse to die, and modern medicine keeps them alive forever. And as a result, you're stuck with their kind of authoritarian governments for way too long. And so I think that, socially, there's a good reason why under biological evolution you have population turnover and we humans don't live forever. What’s the advantage of everybody being able to live 200 years as opposed to let's say 80 or 90 years? Is that world going to be better? It's going to have all sorts of problems, right? Because you're going to have all of these 170-year-old people that won't get out of the way. How are you going to get tenure if all the tenured people are 170 years old and there's no way of moving them out of the system? I think that these tech billionaires, it's a kind of selfishness that they've got the money to fund all this research so that they hope that they can keep themselves alive, because they are afraid of dying. I think it's going to be a disaster if they're ever successful in bringing about this kind of population-level life extension. And I think we're already in a kind of disastrous situation where a very large proportion of the human population is going to be of an age where they're going to be dependent on the rest of the society to keep them alive. And that's not good economically. That's going to be very, very hard to sustain.
Micro Reads
▶ IBM Tries to Ease Customers’ Qualms About Using Generative A.I. - Steve Lohr, NYT |
▶ Six Months Ago Elon Musk Called for a Pause on AI. Instead Development Sped Up - Will Knight, WIRED |
▶ AI is getting better at hurricane forecasting - Gregory Barber, Ars Technica |
▶ The promise — and peril — of generative AI - John Thornhill, FT |
▶ Uber Freight Taps AI to Help Compete in Tough Cargo Market - Thomas Black, Bloomberg |
▶ Why AI Doesn’t Scare Me - Gary Hoover, Profectus |
▶ A top economist who studies AI says it will double productivity in the next decade: ‘You need to embrace this technology and not resist it’ - Geoff Colvin, Yahoo! Finance |
▶ Meta is putting AI chatbots everywhere - Alex Heath, Verge |
▶ The Big AI Risk We’re Not Talking About - Brent Skorup, Discourse |
▶ Mark Zuckerberg can’t quit the metaverse - Laura Martins, Verge |
▶ This robotic exoskeleton can help runners sprint faster - Rhiannon Williams, MIT Technology Review |
▶ The bizarre new frontier for cell-cultivated meat: Lion burgers, tiger steaks, and mammoth meatballs - Jude Whiley, Vox |
▶ A power grab against private equity threatens the US economy - Drew Maloney, FT |
▶ Risks Are Growing of a Double-Dip ‘Vibecession’ - Jonathan Levin, Bloomberg |
▶ It’s Too Easy to Block a Wind Farm in America - Robinson Meyer, Heatmap |
▶ Can we finally reverse balding with these new experimental treatments? - Joshua Howgego, NewScientist |
Is climate change an impending existential threat, or a serious but manageable problem we can tackle with innovation and human ingenuity? Zeke Hausfather joins this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast to explain the basics of climate modeling and give a clear-eyed assessment of the risks we face and the measures we can take.
Zeke is a climate scientist and energy systems analyst. He is the climate research lead for Stripe and a research scientist at Berkeley Earth.
In This Episode
* Human impact on the climate (1:11)
* Global temperature forecasting (6:33)
* Low-probability, high-risk scenarios (15:07)
* Reducing carbon emissions (17:06)
* Carbon capture and carbon removal (25:25)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation
Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Thanks!
Human impact on the climate
James Pethokoukis: How do we know that our planet is warming? And secondarily, how do we know the actions of people are playing a key role?
Zeke Hausfather: That's a great question. In terms of how we know it's warming: We've been monitoring the Earth's climate with reasonably dense measurements since the mid-1800s. That's when groups like NASA, NOAA, the UK Hadley Centre, my own Berkeley Earth group, have been able to put together reliable global surface temperature estimates. And we've seen in the period…
That's since the 1980s?
1850.
1850. NASA was not around in 1850.
No. But enough measurements were being taken both at weather stations around the world and on ships in the oceans that we can reconstruct global temperatures with an accuracy of a couple tenths of a degree going back that far. We know that the world has warmed by about 1.2 degrees centigrade since 1850 with the vast majority of that warming, about 1 degree of it, happening since 1970. That isn't in much dispute in the scientific community at all. Now, going further back is harder, obviously. We only invented the thermometer in the early 1700s. There are a few locations on land that go back that far, but to go back further in time, we need to rely on what we call climate proxies: things like ice cores, tree rings, coral sediments, pollen in lakes — various natural factors that are in some way related to the temperature when those things occurred.
Those have much higher uncertainties, of course, but we do know using those reconstructions that current temperature levels are probably unprecedented in at least the last 2000 years and are at the high end of anything we've seen in the last 120,000 years or so. Certainly if current temperatures were to stay at today's levels for another century, they'd be higher than anything we've seen in 120,000 years. But it's harder to precisely make those claims because the time resolution of these indirect proxy measurements is very coarse when we go back further in time. You might have one ice core measurement reflect a hundred-year average period, for example, rather than a specific year. We know from the temperature record that the world has warmed. How do we know that human activity is playing a role? Well, we've known since the mid-1800s, due to pioneering work by folks like John Tyndall or Arrhenius, that carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas and that greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide, water vapor, methane are critical to maintain a habitable planet. Without greenhouse gases in our atmosphere, the Earth would be a snowball and life would probably not exist.
We also know that the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased pretty dramatically. We have measurements from ice cores going back about 800,000 years of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere at a reasonably high resolution. And because carbon dioxide is well mixed, knowing it in one location in one ice core gives us a good picture of carbon dioxide for the whole planet. And we know that prior to the year 1850, carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere varied between about 170 to 280 parts per million. They're lower during ice age periods; they're higher during warmer interglacial periods. But since the 1850s, that value has increased dramatically. The amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased by about 50 percent. It's gone from 280 parts per million, which was over the last 10,000 years since the end of the last ice age, up to about 420 parts per million today.
And that reflects a huge amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. I don't think people realize quite the magnitude we're talking about. The amount of carbon dioxide that humans have added to the atmosphere by digging up stuff from underground and burning it is roughly equal in mass to the entire biosphere. We took every single bit of life on Earth and burned it. That was about how much CO2 we put up in the atmosphere since the Industrial Revolution. Or to put it another way, it's equal in mass to all of everything humans have ever built: the pyramids, every skyscraper, every road. We took all that mass and put it up into the atmosphere. That's the amount of CO2 we've emitted. And so that's had a pretty big effect on what we call the radiative forcing of our climate, essentially the amount of outgoing longwave radiation — or heat, in common parlance — that gets absorbed and reradiated back toward the surface. And the estimate…
That’s the key mechanism we're talking about here, right?
Yeah. Sunlight comes in from the sun, which provides pretty much all the Earth's energy. It gets absorbed by the surface of the Earth and reradiated as heat. That heat goes back out to space. Ideally, those two things should be an equilibrium: The amount of energy entering the Earth system matches the amount that leaves the Earth system, and the Earth stays a happy, healthy temperature. What we've seen in the last century, and we can verify this over the last few decades directly through satellite observations, is the amount of heat entering the Earth system is larger than the amount of heat leaving the Earth system. So the Earth is out of thermal equilibrium and is heating up. Most of that heat is going into the oceans, about 90 percent of it. But about 10 percent of that heat that's trapped goes into the atmosphere, and that's responsible for the warming we've seen.
The climate is a hugely complex system, and when you're trying to project the response of the climate to our emissions, you're dealing with a lot of uncertainty around what we call feedbacks in the climate system.
Global temperature forecasting
Looking forward, various climate models, which is what we use to forecast what's going to happen next, look at what we've already put into the atmosphere and what we're continuing to put into the atmosphere, and they make a forecast about how that will impact temperatures going forward. Do I have that part right?
Yep.
Okay. So based on what these models are saying, what is reasonable to expect in coming decades as far as temperature increases and their impacts?
The amount of future warming we end up having depends largely on how much CO2 and other greenhouse gases we emit. If we keep emissions roughly at current levels for the rest of the century — we're emitting about 40 billion tons of CO2 per year — if we keep that steady, we don't increase it at all, we expect somewhere in the range of 3 degrees centigrade warming by the end of the century, so that would be a bit above 5 degrees Fahrenheit warming globally, relative to the pre-industrial period or 1850. We've already experienced 1.2 degrees C. We'd have another 1.8 degrees C or so on top of that by the end of the century. If we emit more, it could be higher than that. If we emit less, it could be lower than that.
That said, that's sort of the average estimate across the 40 different modeling centers around the world that do these sort of exercises. In reality, the climate is a hugely complex system, and when you're trying to project the response of the climate to our emissions, you're dealing with a lot of uncertainty around what we call feedbacks in the climate system. As an example: As we warm the surface, we get more evaporation and the atmosphere can hold more water vapor before rain falls out as the air is warmer. This is a fairly well-known physical relationship. And so for every degree of warming, you get about 7 percent more water vapor in the atmosphere. Now, water vapor itself is a greenhouse gas, and so that enhances the warming the world experiences. Because it's warmer, that water vapor can stay in the atmosphere — because usually the water vapor itself is very, very short-lived and can't force the climate by itself because it just rains out if you get too much.
There are also uncertainties in how clouds respond to our emissions. More water vapor in the atmosphere leads to more cloud formation in some regions. Higher temperatures and changing wind patterns lead to changing cloud dynamics. Our emissions of other things like aerosols, small particles from burning fossil fuels also affect cloud formation. And how that all pans out and how those clouds change the balance of heat trapped versus heat reflected varies a lot across models. And for all these reasons, we like to give a range of what we call climate sensitivity, which is essentially, how sensitive is the climate to our emissions? And we usually define that as, if we double the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere — which is roughly what we're on track for by the end of the century today, we've already increased it by 50 percent — how much warming do we get at equilibrium? And that value is generally around three degrees C per doubling of CO2, but with a pretty wide range. In the most recent IPCC report, we said it could be anywhere from 2.5 degrees C at the low end of the likely range to about 4 degrees at the high end, 2 degrees to 5 degrees is the sort of very likely range that we gave in the most recent IPCC report.
I recently watched an Apple TV+ miniseries called Extrapolations, and it looked at climate change and how it would affect us over the entire century. That was the number they really fixated on: 3 degrees Celsius. The environment they showed was pretty chaotic: lots of very, very bad heat waves, hurricanes, flooding. Civilization wasn't going to get wiped out or anything, but it seemed pretty nasty. So are we talking kind of really nasty climate effects from three degrees of warming Celsius?
When we say 3 degrees, it sounds like a very small number, especially to us Americans are used to talking about things in Fahrenheit. But even when we think about the temperature from day to day, it might change, let's say 5.5 degrees Fahrenheit tomorrow, and that's noticeably warmer; 5.5 degrees Fahrenheit is the difference between 85 degrees and a bit above 90 degrees, but it doesn't sound huge. But the problem is, that's a global average number and no one lives in the global average. In fact, the global average is mostly the ocean. It turns out that where people do live, on land, is warming about 50 percent faster than the world as a whole. So if we talk about 3 degrees centigrade — or let's talk Fahrenheit for a moment, let's say 5.5 degrees Fahrenheit — over land, increase that by 50 percent, so let's say 8 degrees Fahrenheit globally over land where we all live. Even higher than that in high-latitude regions like the Arctic. We have bigger feedbacks associated with snow melting and exposing darker surfaces, so some regions are going to see really big changes.
To put this number in perspective, the last ice age, which I think everyone would acknowledge was a very different planet than we have today, was only about 6 degrees centigrade colder than current temperatures globally. Obviously it was much colder in the northern latitudes, which were covered by ice sheets, but the tropics were not that much colder. And so it averages to about 6 degrees difference. So that would have impacts. Exactly what those impacts would be depends a lot on the systems we're talking about and the adaptive capacity of those systems.
The natural world, I think in many ways, is going to be the worst hit by these changes. There are a lot of plant and animal species that live in fairly narrow ecological niches. And particularly in a world that's very fragmented by roads and human habitation, it's a lot harder for those plant and animal species to migrate to more temperate regions to be able to survive. So certainly there's a concern around large-scale extinction of many plant and animal species that can no longer live in the ecological niches that they've adapted to over the last tens of thousands of years and can't migrate quickly enough to adapt to that.
In terms of impacts to human systems, there's a lot of different impacts from climate change and the degree to which those are catastrophic is going to depend a lot on how wealthy we are and how well we can adapt to it. If by the end of the century we're in a world that's similar to today, that has huge amounts of inequality with billions of people living at a dollar a day, I would worry a lot about the ability of people in those societies to adapt to more widespread extreme heat events, larger floods associated with more water vapor in the atmosphere, sea level rise, some of these other impacts. If we live in a world where we're all very wealthy and relatively equal on a country-by-country basis and within countries, then we have a much bigger ability to build sea walls, to have air conditioning inside, to genetically engineer crops to be more heat tolerance, the many other ways that humans can adapt to these changes.
And so I think in many ways I see climate change less as an existential risk by itself and more as an existential risk multiplier. If we are in a world of weak institutions, of failing governments, of high inequality, I see climate as something that could help push societies over the edge. But I don't necessarily think at least a 3-degree world would be one that is the end of civilization by any stretch of the imagination, if we get our act together on these other issues.
What is what you described as what is sort of the “business as usual” forecast, and then what is the, we really get serious about policy, and we can talk about what those policies are, that reduce carbon emissions?
The good news is “business as usual” has already been changing a fair bit. Nowadays, it looks like business as usual is global emissions staying relatively flat. A decade ago, it seemed like doubling or tripling global emissions by the end of the century would not be out of the question. Certainly if you extrapolated the trends from previous decades, that's where we were headed. Nowadays, global coal use has largely plateaued and arguably is going to shrink in coming years. We have cheaper alternatives. Electric vehicles are taking off. There are many other technologies that are being developed and becoming increasingly cheap. And so it's harder to imagine a world where we're still burning massive amounts of coal, oil, and gas in 2100.
We can reduce emissions, we can develop new technologies, and we can get them widely adopted. And if we do that and if we get emissions to zero by, say, 2070 or so globally, then we limit warming to below 2 degrees.
Low-probability, high-risk scenarios
Does that make the very worst-case scenarios that maybe we were talking about a decade ago just highly unlikely?
It certainly makes the worst-case emission outcomes highly unlikely. If we look at 3 degrees, for example, that could really end up anywhere between 2 degrees and above 4 degrees if we get unlucky because of the uncertainty in how the climate system responds to our emissions, because the Earth is such a complex system. Climate change is both planning for the central outcome but also trying to mitigate those risks. In some ways, we want to reduce emissions not just to get that mean down, but also as an insurance policy against the 5 or 10 percent more catastrophic potential outcomes there. I don't think we're necessarily completely out of the woods on a 4 C world by the end of the century if we roll sixes on all the proverbial climate dice, but I think we have made a lot of progress in making those outcomes less likely.
Today we're headed toward, as I mentioned earlier, about 3 degrees of warming if emissions stay relatively constant, or a little bit below 3 degrees. But we can do much better than that. We can reduce emissions, we can develop new technologies, and we can get them widely adopted. And if we do that and if we get emissions to zero by, say, 2070 or so globally, then we limit warming to below 2 degrees. If we get emissions to zero by 2050, which is going to be a much harder lift given the amount of infrastructure in place today that relies on fossil fuels, then we could limit warming to maybe about 1.6 or 1.7 degrees. And if we build lots of machines to remove carbon from the atmosphere, plant lots of trees, do other things to actually get negative emissions, models suggest we could get temperatures down to 1.5 degrees, only 0.3 degrees above where we are today, by the end of the century.
We are really on this acceleration of private sector and government spending on these technologies. But I think government does play a role here. I think most economists would acknowledge that what we're dealing with here is an externality.
Reducing carbon emissions
When I look at what our responses might be, I tend to think, what will happen to emissions in a world where our responses will be constrained by our low collective tolerance for suffering and pain and deprivation and sacrifice? To me, that's a pretty important constraint. If there's one lesson I think we learned from the pandemic, it’s people don't like shortages. We don't like to rough it in any way. In a world where, at least in the West, that's our attitude, how do we get emissions down in a somewhat timely manner?
I think a lot of it relies both on the combination of human ingenuity and governments playing a role in catalyzing that ingenuity and allowing these technologies to scale. We've seen the biggest successes in mitigating climate change in technologies that slot in nicely to replace things that we enjoy today. We don't talk about it much, but Texas is the renewable energy capital of the US today, because it's cheaper to generate electricity with the wind and sun there than it is to burn coal and gas. Similarly, we've seen an explosion of electric vehicles in places like China and Europe, and the US is catching up, not necessarily because everyone there is a tree hugger, but because they're really fun to drive and they perform better and are lower cost in some cases than conventional vehicles. The more we can follow that model of developing new technologies that don't involve sacrifice, that don't involve necessarily giving up things we enjoy today, I think the more successful we're going to be.
And that's led to a lot of money being spent on these things. In the last year, the globe spent about $1.1 trillion on mitigation technologies: renewable energy, electric vehicles, nuclear power, heat pumps, all that sort of stuff. That's up from $200 million a year or so a decade before or 15 years before. And so we are really on this acceleration of private sector and government spending on these technologies. But I think government does play a role here. I think most economists would acknowledge that what we're dealing with here is an externality. And by an externality, I mean it's something that has a social cost, but no one individually pays for it when they put carbon dioxide or other emissions in the atmosphere.
So there has to be some role of internalizing that externality, either through (as economists would like to do) a price on carbon, or in a world where you can't do that for many reasons, subsidizing the good stuff to essentially account for the benefits it has of displacing fossil fuels, both in terms of their affecting climate change, but also conventional pollution. I think we discount a lot, particularly living in a place like the US, which has done a lot of work on this, how disastrous fossil fuels are for public health. There's somewhere in the range of a couple million people dying prematurely globally from pollution, particularly outdoor air pollution. And if you go to a place like India or China and walk around outside, it's pretty catastrophic some days in terms of the brown soup that is the air. We get a lot of co-benefits by cleaning up these conventional pollutants, particularly in places like Southeast Asia or South Asia, as well as reducing emissions of greenhouse gases.
Reducing emissions, going to zero emissions, pulling emissions out of the air: Do these scenarios work with just renewable energy sources or is this a world that's using nuclear energy in some form far more than we currently are?
So I think we necessarily need a variety of energy sources here, and there's been a lot of work done in recent years by the energy modeling community on this front. Renewables are great. Solar is super, super cheap; to be honest, a lot cheaper today than any of us thought it would be a couple decades ago. Wind is increasingly cheap. But they're also intermittent. The sun doesn't shine all the time; the wind doesn't blow all the time. Batteries are part of the solution to deal with that, but they're not a perfect solution. We tend to find that you get a much lower cost in scenarios where you also have a sizable chunk, maybe 20, 30, 40 percent, of your energy coming from what we call clean firm generation. Things like nuclear, like enhanced geothermal, potentially fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage, though those have some challenges in implementation, to support large amounts of renewable energy on the grid.
You end up with a much more expensive system if you try to shoehorn in 100 percent renewables, and to be honest, it's pretty unnecessary. So I think we are going to see, and we're already starting to see, bigger investments in things like next-generation nuclear. I think we just need to figure out how to build them on time and on budget. The biggest problem with the nuclear industry in the US — certainly regulations have contributed to it — but I think it's just our inability to build these giant, bespoke megaprojects. Nuclear goes super over budget for the same reason the “Big Dig” in Boston does: You have this 10-year-long, many, many billion-dollar megaproject that has construction delays and all these other problems. The more we can learn from what renewables have gotten right, make things small, modular, pumped out in an assembly line, and less contingent on these giant construction projects, I think the better outcomes we'll see for things like nuclear.
There's an economist, he passed fairly recently, Martin Weitzman from Harvard, and he wrote about the economics of climate change. And there's one quote that always sticks in my mind. He wrote that “Deep structural uncertainty about the unknown unknowns of what might go very wrong [with the climate] is coupled with essentially unlimited downside liability on possible planetary damages” and a “non-negligible” probability of a “collapse of planetary welfare.” He's talking about, you can't write off the possibility that we get some very bad outcomes. And I guess that's what worries me: If we're doing something to the atmosphere that we've never done before, what if the models are wrong and we get something really catastrophic, that really becomes a true existential risk? How much should I worry about that?
I think we're all worried about unknown unknowns. For me, the odds of those happening, which are somewhat unknowable by definition, increase the more we push the Earth out of the climate we've seen for the past few million years. Right now we're around the range of what we saw in the Last Interglacial Period, about 120,000 years ago. If we get temperatures up to 3 degrees centigrade globally, we will be out of the range of anything we've seen for the last two million years or so, if not further back. And we know if we go further back into the Earth's history, there's some scary stuff back there. There are periods where we see very rapid increases of temperature associated with 90 percent extinction of all life on Earth, like the Paleocene/Eocene Thermal Maximum. And we don't have great explanations for all these things. A good example is, for warmer periods in the Earth’s past, we think there's a mechanism where if temperatures get high enough, maybe 5 degrees above where they were in the pre-industrial period or a bit above 4 degrees above where we are today, suddenly all the stratocumulus cloud decks that cover much of the Earth's oceans disappear. And that leads to another 4 degrees warming on top of that. That sort of behavior seems to help explain some of these rapid warming events in the Earth's more distant past.
Now, we think we're pretty far from experiencing something of that today. But maybe our models are wrong, or maybe the Earth is much more sensitive than we think. And again, rolling sort of sixes on the climate sensitivity and carbon cycle feedback dice leads us into those sorts of conditions. And so Marty Weitzman, who I did have the pleasure of knowing before he passed, had a great phrase to sum up that quote, which is that “when it comes to climate change, this thing is in the tail,” which is a very nerdy way to put it: The tails of these probability distribution functions, the low-probability but high-impact events, are really what should drive a lot of our concern around this and push us to reduce emissions more than we otherwise would if we were just planning for the most likely outcome.
But whenever we talk about carbon dioxide removal, it is always important to emphasize that this stuff is expensive and it only makes sense to do at scale in a world where we're already cutting emissions dramatically.
Carbon capture and carbon removal
People will say, “What if the models are wrong?” and they assume they're only going to be wrong to the benefit of humanity. Maybe they're wrong to the detriment of humanity.
We talked a little bit about reducing these emissions. You have carbon capture, where you pull it out of the air. How close is that technology to being something that can scale?
When we talk about carbon capture, that's often a different thing than when we talk about carbon removal. Carbon capture generally means taking an existing fossil fuel plant…
That could be trees too, right?
Yeah, but carbon capture is mostly taking an existing fossil fuel plant like a coal, oil, and gas plant, sticking a unit on that captures the carbon coming out of it, and putting that underground. And there's a lot of funding for that in the new Inflation Reduction Act. The record on that over the last few decades has been a bit mixed. It's been hard for folks to make the economics work in practice. It's really complicated technically, but a lot of folks are confident that we can get there with some of those technologies. If a coal plant with carbon capture is going to be cheaper than a nuclear plant or renewable plant is a separate question. And I'm a lot more skeptical on the economics of carbon capture there.
Now, carbon dioxide removal is a slightly different thing. And there we're talking about technologies that don't stop emissions from coming out of a smokestack, but instead take carbon that's already in the atmosphere and pull it back out. And most of our models suggest that we are going to need a lot of that down the road, in part because we can't fully get rid of all of the emissions from all of the parts of our economy. And the real challenge with climate change, or what I like to call the “brutal math” of climate change is that as long as our emissions remain above zero, the Earth continues to warm. CO2 remains in the atmosphere for an extremely long period of time; it takes about 400,000 years to fully clear out a ton of fossil CO2 we emit today through natural processes. So we end up needing a lot of carbon removal to both balance out what we call residual emissions and potentially to deal with overshoot. If we figure out that we really don't want temperatures to go above 1.5 degrees, but they're headed toward 1.7, we're going to have to pull a bunch of carbon out of the atmosphere to bring temperatures back down. It's only a small part of the solution. Maybe 10 percent of the solution to climate change writ large is carbon dioxide removal. But for a problem as big as climate change, 10 percent still matters a lot since solar is probably 20 percent, electric vehicles are probably 20 percent, heat pumps might be 10 percent.
And there's a lot of technologies people are developing to do that. Direct air capture is the one that gets a lot of press: the sort of big fans that suck carbon out of the air, though they're incredibly energy intensive. But there are a lot of ways that leverage natural processes as well. Planting trees is a good one, though it has a lot of challenges in keeping the carbon in those trees in a warming world, particularly as we see more wildfires, more pine bark beetle outbreaks that used to die in cold winter temperatures and don't anymore. And so it's hard to justify planting trees as a way of permanently taking carbon out of the atmosphere, but it's still quite valuable. There's also a lot of interesting work being done around using biomass to sequester carbon, so taking residues from commercial timber operations, burning them, and putting their carbon content underground. Something called BECCS, or bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, that a lot of people are excited about.
Then there are other interesting ways to leverage the natural carbon cycle. For example, over long periods, the weathering of certain types of rocks like basalt or olivine drives a lot of atmospheric CO2 absorption over the course of millions of years. And so a lot of scientists are trying to figure out ways to speed that up. If you take rock dust and spread it on farm fields, it can help manage the pH of soils, it can add some nutrients. And it turns out that as that basalt dust weathers, it absorbs carbon to the atmosphere, it turns it into stable bicarbonate and then flows out to the ocean and eventually forms limestone on the bottom of the ocean. Stuff like that, or adding alkalinity directly to the ocean to counteract ocean acidification, can also lead to more CO2 uptake from the air, because the amount of carbon dioxide the ocean absorbs in the atmosphere depends on how acidic the surface level of the layers of the water are.
Scientists are working on tons of different technologies here. And actually my day job these days with Stripe and Frontier is helping support companies to do that. So there's lots of exciting stuff there. But whenever we talk about carbon dioxide removal, it is always important to emphasize that this stuff is expensive and it only makes sense to do at scale in a world where we're already cutting emissions dramatically. If you keep burning fossil fuels willy-nilly and spend a ton of money on a bit of carbon dioxide removal, it's not going to make any difference.
Why are you interested in this subject?
I think it's an underexplored area. Certainly until the last few years, no one was really putting any money or resources into it at scale. And it's something that is going to have to be an important part of the solution in the next few decades, and so I think this is the decade that we should be spending resources to figure out what works and what can scale for decades to come. We probably should spend about 1 percent of the money we spend on reducing emissions, but historically we've been spending a lot less than that.
And why are you also more broadly interested in the entire topic of climate change rather than, I don't know, tax policy or something?
I come to it from a scientific background. I just find the Earth's climate fascinating. It's super complex. It's hard to fully understand. We've really made leaps and bounds in progress over the last few decades, but there's so much we still don't know. And so it's just a fascinating area from a scientific standpoint, but it's also one where the importance to the society is quite large. I try not to wade too much into the policy solutions to it, but certainly helping understand the likely impacts of our actions affects a lot of choices that policymakers and others make. There's no one right answer. To your question earlier, people debate renewables versus nuclear and all these other things. Knowing what the impacts of climate change are, what the risks are, and how we can actually get to certain outcomes based on our decisions, I feel like is really important to set the stage for people to use the science in the real world. And it's exciting to work in an area of science where there is a practical, real-world application of it. And not just studying one plant species that lives on top of one mountain in a remote part of the world. We're looking at these big questions that affect everyone over the next century.
As the cost to launch a rocket into orbit has come down over the past decade, a slew of startups have joined the emerging space economy. But is there enough business for all these companies? And what's the broad economic case for space? In this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I'm chatting about those questions and more with Michael Sheetz.
Michael is a space reporter for CNBC where he also writes the "Investing in Space" newsletter.
In This Episode
* The business case for space (1:05)
* SpaceX, Blue Origin, and the other players in space (4:03)
* How much demand is there for space services? (10:15)
* To the Moon and Mars (13:59)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation
The business case for space
James Pethokoukis: How do private companies intend on making money in space over the next decade?
Michael Sheetz: The first and foremost way is the tried-and-true way when it comes to making money in space, which is providing communications data and other services back to people here on Earth. You're talking about communication systems like Starlink, which are the next generation of communication services that have been around, from the geo-communication satellites of decades prior. That's the primary, immediate way that people are making money right now in space. The second way that people are making money in space is by launching satellites for other customers: You're talking about the rocket business, the transportation business. You see stuff like OTVs, or orbital transfer vehicles. That's a way to deliver stuff into space.
Then there's a third kind of newer way, which is just microgravity research in general. That's coming to the fore really in the last decade as NASA has really opened up the International Space Station as a testbed for commercial technologies and not just NASA's own technologies. And a lot of companies see that as really just a first foray into that ground. Some of them are trying to do it in their own way by sending capsules into orbit and bringing them back, not going to a space station. The other way is by sending it to a space station, and there are actually four or five major projects underway in the United States to build private space stations in orbit. Those are companies that are either working together or building their own solo units, and they're all just kind of vying for a future in which you don't just have one giant space station, because the International Space Station is huge, but instead of the ISS, you have lots of these little space stations that people can sign agreements with. Say a pharmaceutical company wants to test out a new drug in orbit, they'll sign a research agreement with a company that's going to fly them up there, test it out, fly it back down. They might have astronauts on board. They might not.
The other way — this is the other kind of nascent sector — is the lunar infrastructure world, and that's all very much a new space race, if you will, because there's a geopolitical element there. We’ve got India, we have China both firmly in that mix. China has been arguably one of the most successful at landing on the Moon in the last decade. And NASA, instead of trying to fly themselves to the Moon for these cargo missions and research, they've actually gone to companies and said, “Hey, bid on these contracts, deliver services to us. We'll put our payloads onto your spacecraft, your lander, your rover, and then get it down to the Moon and either get us back data or even return materials.” But mostly just, “Let's try to figure out if we can actually make use of the water that's believed to be on the surface of the Moon.” And that's a really big key point: The first round in terms of trying to make use of the Moon is all about, can we harvest the resources that are on the lunar surface?
SpaceX, Blue Origin, and the other players in space
Much of the conversation among regular people, to the extent they're aware of really what's going on, what you've just described so wonderfully, is SpaceX. Maybe they've heard of Jeff Bezos and Blue Origin. How far behind is Blue Origin of SpaceX? Do we have a feel for where that company is?
I, at this point, wouldn't even put it as really a competition, because SpaceX is very much in a league of their own. Blue Origin has so dramatically taken a different approach to development, very much more akin to the aerospace and defense contractors of the past. It's fascinating because both companies are actually very similar sizes in terms of personnel, but SpaceX has taken this approach of, let's just get one win after the other and try to just break things a little bit at a time and keep pushing further that way. Whereas Blue Origin is taking the route of, we want everything to work the first go, the first launch, the first landing on the Moon, all these other nuances in there. And so far, SpaceX's strategy has been dominant. Now, the United States is not looking at United Launch Alliance, one of the existing providers for rocket launches, as its primary source of both getting astronauts and satellites in orbit, they're looking to SpaceX. There's a flipping of the head that's happened in the last decade.
In this next decade, and even just in the next three to five years, it's a really critical point in Blue Origin's history where the company has been around longer than SpaceX, albeit they took a very different approach at the beginning and have taken a very different approach in recent years as well. But they need to show not just for the customers that they signed contracts for—such as United Launch Alliance, delivering engines for them, or different contractors like NASA, providing services to the Moon—they need to show that they can start delivering on those contracts and start actually competing. Maybe not head to head right away, but at least start to get some actual performance and execution as opposed to basically at this point saying, “Here's our grand architecture of everything that we want happen over the next 100 years,” which would be amazing. I can totally see where Jeff's vision for people in research laboratories and living in Lagrange points and all these kinds of things could happen. But you have to make some first inroads, and they haven't yet done that. It's a one-horse race right now.
Since we've been talking about those two companies: Are the goals the same but the strategies and timelines different or are they fundamentally trying to achieve different things?
They very much have distinct missions when you just look at how they think about where they're going, the trajectory of the company, the trajectory of the space industry writ large. They do have very similar fundamental steps that they have to achieve to get towards those missions. When you look at one of their main products at Blue Origin, for example, with their New Glenn rocket, you still have to do the same basics of, fly a satellite to orbit, land it a couple times successfully, start reusing it and show that you can reuse it efficiently. Those are all things that Falcon 9 did and now SpaceX is going to have to do with Starship as well. They both have similar incremental steps, even if their broader mission targets aren’t the same.
I think one really interesting thing about where the space industry is at today is that it actually really isn't about just SpaceX versus Blue Origin, but it's also Rocket Lab. It's also Maxar. It’s also Planet. There are all these different pieces of the broader architecture that are in the space economy and they're all kind of vying for different revenue streams within the space economy. But when we talk about SpaceX and Blue Origin, and I think we might be kind of oversimplifying the industry just into launch and basic transportation as opposed to what it really is in a lot of ways, which is infrastructure. And that's the kind of holistic approach, when you think about the companies that are players in that, where you start actually seeing Rocket Lab just did their 40th electron launch. Yeah, it’s a small launch. No, it's not the same service as Falcon 9. But they've carved out a really important niche in that, and they're trying to use that to not just build a larger rocket, Neutron, but also build out a very strong space systems division and then provide services.
Sort of like how SpaceX did with Starlink where they were like, “Look, we've got the rocket business down. Let's go find revenue sources.” The first one right off the bat was, “Let's get better internet service, broadband into hard-to-reach areas at low cost comparatively to years past, and we'll do it in a way that just really provides this holistic coverage: You can go anywhere in the world, plug it in, it will connect to one of our satellites.” As opposed to just the regional focus of past communication systems. I think one really important key aspect of where the industry is at today is the fact that there are all these different companies that may not have billionaire backers, but they have big investors behind them, they have big revenue coming in: Planet and Rocket Lab, we're talking about pulling over $100 million in revenue a year. That's not inconsequential. Maxar and the like and others are really trying to further establish themselves. I think of Iridium with their communication systems.
There are all these different players that have their pieces of the overall industry. Some of them compete head-to-head, some of them don't. And I think that's where you start to see an industry that isn't at a little bit of, for lack of a better way of saying it, a single-fault failure situation, where if Elon Musk or Jeff Bezos loses interest in space or something worse happens to them, all of a sudden the US progress in space evaporates. That's not the case today, and I think that's the most actually exciting thing about where the broader space economy is at.
How much demand is there for space services?
Is there enough business for all these companies? Are there enough people who want to put things in space and do things in space to justify this archipelago of companies that you've just described, or do people talk about [how] there's going to need to be a shakeout? Or is it just that there's so much potential demand, boy, it is going to be hard to fulfill it all?
I'll give an example to answer your first question, but I want to hit the second aspect of what you talked about first. There is going to be a shakeout right now, and I think there is a shakeout underway. We've seen a lot of M&A [merger and acquisition] activity this year. We've seen a couple bankruptcies. We've seen a couple of people get acquired for likely very little money, and that's because the free money of the past has gone away, especially in a high capital-intensive industry with high risk. Even as we're seeing now, Viasat, one of the most established players, had their crown jewel new satellite malfunction shortly after getting into orbit. Then the company they recently acquired, a UK company, Inmarsat, one of their recently launched satellites malfunctioned in orbit. So now Viasat has got two malfunctioning satellites that they're trying to deal with. This is a really high-risk business that we're talking about, and that opens up new potential for M&A, and it also opens up new opportunities as valuations have come down where companies that might not have been either competing with each other but could see each other as compatible are now starting to join forces effectively. And other companies that had a stronger position coming into this shakeout period are starting to take advantage of that, as well as investors who are behind those companies.
This first thing that you talked about, and I'll give the example, I think the data communications world is the perfect example of, is there enough money and is there enough demand to go around for everybody? When you look at just purely broadband services, which actually there's quite a bit of variety within how you provide those services, which kind of customers you target, that realm has seen no shortage of demand. Every single company you talk to, whether it's a company that provides regional-focused broadband service to enterprises in one location or another company that goes after transatlantic flights and providing in-flight Wi-Fi, every single executive I talk to across that data communications business says, “We need more satellites and orbits so that we can provide more supply because there's more demand than we can provide.”
And we're talking about what's already one of the most crowded parts of the space industry, from an established perspective, with multiple players around the world providing services all over the place. The fact that all of those guys are looking at this hockey stick from a demand perspective and all the different layers that they can provide service to — whether it's households, governments, businesses, shipping companies, whatever — that's where there's a lot of excitement around, this established market is even growing at a high rate, what about all these other little nascent markets? I'm not talking space tourism. That might be a fun place to watch that people always get excited about. It’s one of the lowest revenue sources in the industry. I'm talking about the lunar infrastructure that I mentioned before. Remote sensing is one of the wildest frontiers in the last decade, and when you look at the varieties of companies that are competing and the customer capture that they're getting and the new applications that are coming out of that, it's absolutely wild. And so I think those new growing verticals are just showing that, yes, there's still demand, it's still growing.
To the Moon and Mars
Assuming that the US, NASA, we're going to go to the Moon, we're going to stay on the Moon, we're going to build stuff on the Moon, over the next 15 years will most of those rockets be NASA rockets taking people and stuff to the Moon, or SpaceX rockets?
I don't even think it's just going to be SpaceX rockets. I think Starship definitely, if they continue to make progress… But mind you, it's been a little bit of a bumpy road in recent years. We have some reliability issues with the Raptor engines we’ve got to still work out. Albeit the first flight was called a success, I think rightfully so, but it's an incremental one and they still have a lot of steps to go. And when you go back to years past, just even flying humans on Starship, SpaceX has been very candid about saying, “Look, we want to do hundreds of these flights before we put people on this thing.” So maybe it's not Starship, at least in this decade, that's flying tons of people to the Moon. But you've got a workhorse in Falcon 9 that can deliver lunar payloads. It is going to deliver lunar payloads even in the next year.
You've got a number of other rockets that are coming online to deliver services. NASA's own rocket, SLS, really isn't going to fly more than once a year at best. And that's pretty optimistic. I see that as lifting the biggest stuff that we need to try to get there, such as getting Orion and Lunar Gateway and all these other things. But really the core of it is, when we're talking about building infrastructure on the Moon in a way that you have a sustained presence, that's a group effort. This is not a single company, single agency doing that. That's something where you need the services of the likes of Firefly building their lunar lander, Astrobotic out of Pittsburgh building their lander. You need Rocket Lab to get Neutron flying. You want Relativity to have Terran R flying. You want this robust ecosystem of transportation devices sort of like we do of any other method of transportation here in the United States and globally, where it's not just one company that builds all the ships. Even in airlines, Boeing and Airbus dominate; however, they're two of a broader ecosystem of several other companies that have carved out niches for them making regional aircraft and stuff like that. And that's what's going to be needed to build that broader lunar infrastructure.
I love the notion of going to Mars and colonizing Mars. What is your sense of other people in the space industry who don't work for SpaceX, what do they make of that goal that Elon Musk talks about? Do they view it as just Elon being Elon, these kind of huge aspirational goals? Or do they think this is something we can do as a space industry over the next quarter century?
One of the most fascinating things, I think, is that you would get a huge variety of answers from people in the space industry on whether or not (1) they fundamentally agree with that premise that we should be doing it, what it should look like, etc., and (2) how we're going to make it happen if they're even in favor of doing so. And I think that's an amazing reflection of the different interests and the variety of folks who are in this industry, the inspiration that they take from the different missions of either their companies or agencies or projects that they're working on. I think at its core, it's something that still feels too far out to really put a pin in it because there's not a right way to do it currently and not an effective way to do it currently. And so it's something that, sort of like with the Moon and the Artemis Accords providing this new framework of cooperation and how we use resources and space, going to Mars, it's only really going to become a question of how should we be doing this once we're actually getting closer to doing it.
I think a commercial company getting a lander on Mars is going to be a first start in that new era. But even that I don't see happening for another five to six years at least, and that's just maybe a small spacecraft. So that's a question I think is extremely open ended. But I do see us on this trajectory where it's not just the Moon, it's not just Mars, it's other planetary bodies, it's asteroids, it's all these other things of exploration where once we start getting into the realm — and you can look at any of the explorers of the past to kind of find your guide for how this happened, there were people who made that first foray into a new land and a new realm, and then after that we're like, “Okay, so we can do this. Cool. Now let's try to figure out what this should really look like and what establishing a settlement on another planet would really look like.”
My short answer is, we're so far away from it in a realistic sense that I think what I would point people to now, with the fear of them losing interest in what space can really provide to the rest of humanity and the benefits it provides, that they should be looking at the current infrastructure that we have here on Earth and how it benefits us and makes our everyday lives better, one, and two, the real near-term possibilities of what the United States putting a presence on the Moon, China putting a presence on the Moon, India putting a presence on the Moon, what that looks like geopolitically, what that looks like from a resources standpoint, how we can compete in a way that's not leading to some sort of new conflict in space. That just seems like a place where things could escalate really quickly and poorly. As opposed to what's really happening right now is, in the next couple of years we're going to see more and more spacecraft landing on the Moon, and I think that's an exciting near-term future. What we do on Mars, what we do on asteroids, what we do elsewhere, it's going to be something down the road.
Rapid progress in artificial intelligence, especially large language models such as ChatGPT, has rekindled an old debate about the feasibility of top-down economic planning. While 20th-century experiments in socialism ultimately failed, some techno-socialists have argued a new set of tools could help planners outperform markets. But today’s guest argues no amount of computing power or sophisticated algorithms can overcome the fundamental issues with socialist planning. Pete Boettke joins this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast to discuss.
Boettke is a university professor of economics and philosophy at George Mason University and director of the F.A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at the Mercatus Center. Last year, he and Rosolino Candela authored the paper, “On the Feasibility of Technosocialism.”
In This Episode
* Technosocialism in the 20th century (1:34)
* The appeal of economic planning (6:14)
* The recent resurgence of socialism (10:34)
* Can AI aid industrial policy? (24:08)
* Not wrong, just early (32:51)
Check back tomorrow at Faster, Please! for the full transcript of this interview. (Typically each podcast includes the transcript, but I’m currently traveling. So please forgive me!)
Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Thanks!
Over the past 15 years, the cost to launch a rocket into orbit has declined dramatically thanks to SpaceX. Today, we're witnessing the launch of a new Space Age — one built around billionaires like Elon Musk, but also a flowering of smaller private ventures. To discuss the state of play in the emerging orbital economy, I've brought Ashlee Vance on this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast.
Vance is the author of the new book, When the Heavens Went on Sale: The Misfits and Geniuses Racing to Put Space Within Reach. He previous wrote, Elon Musk: Tesla, SpaceX, and the Quest for a Fantastic Future in 2015.
Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
In This Episode
* How SpaceX launched a new Space Age (1:13)
* The companies building a “computing shell” around the planet (8:37)
* The proliferation of satellites (15:07)
* The downsides of the emerging space economy (24:07)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation
How SpaceX launched a new Space Age
James Pethokoukis: The book begins with a story of the first successful orbital launch of a SpaceX Falcon 1. There were three failed attempts, the whole thing is looking pretty dicey about the future of the company in this effort, and on the fourth attempt, September, 2008, they're able to get to orbit and release a payload. Before September, 2008, what does the space economy/space industry look like? Where are we starting?
Ashlee Vance: The starting point: sort of sadly, it looked a lot the same for many, many decades. We had this nation-backed space program, [which was] dominant. There were just a handful of nations, really, that were the major players in all this. Some wealthy people at various stages had come along and tried to commercialize space and make their own rockets, and had varying degrees of success, but no staying power. It ended up that it always takes longer and costs more than you think. And NASA was always sitting there really as your main competitor and undermining your business. With the Falcon 1, it really was this watershed-type moment where finally somebody had succeeded. Yes, SpaceX had people from traditional aerospace, but Elon [Musk] certainly was not from the aerospace world. He had a lot of 20-somethings on his team who had never done this before. It just signaled this new era, or the possibility of a new era, because you had people just who hadn't been part of the old guard doing this thing.
The goal here was to get a rocket into space and get it there way cheaper than what NASA was doing. What was the key breakthrough that allowed that decline in costs? And why didn't NASA just do this?
NASA, and in particular the Department of Defense, had desired this type of thing for a long time: a low-cost rocket that could get to space quickly and often. It seems like this should be doable, but they had really struggled to make it happen. The DOD had funded various efforts. There's a couple things going on. SpaceX had this huge advantage, I think, of this clean slate to this. They came at this without the usual baggage. And in this case, the baggage means a lot of military government contractors who are pricing things quite expensively. They're doing things the way they've always done them, which means you probably don't want to see any sort of failure so you're building it in a ton of redundancy and spending all this extra money to make sure you look good when this thing goes.
SpaceX comes in with this clean slate. The original pitch deck for SpaceX described it as like the Southwest for space. Cost was like at the top of [Elon Musk’s] mind and he wanted to make this cheap. They did have some breakthroughs. The physics around a rocket are the physics, and we've known this for decades. There's not much room for huge breakthroughs in engineering that nobody has thought of yet. But they did come in with this modern, Silicon Valley–style approach to software, particularly to electronics—although this kind of comes in later in SpaceX's history—where SpaceX was going to build a lot of the electronics themselves, often turning to consumer-grade electronics instead of what people call space-grade, which means it's built by a military contractor, it probably costs a thousand times what it should cost, but it's guaranteed to work in space. They had this clean slate. They did things as cheap as possible. The team was small. It wasn't this bloated contractor. That was their primary advantage at the beginning, I would argue. Over time, as they've gotten much bigger and much more money is coming in, there's a whole host of technological advantages. But on the Falcon 1, it really was that clean slate, this low-cost approach.
Obviously if you're beginning your book, which is not a history of SpaceX, but you're beginning with SpaceX, then that must have marked an important inflection point where you could sort of imagine two paths. One path: the 2010s look a lot like the 2000s, which look a lot like the ‘90s. Versus this very different path.
Why is SpaceX important in creating this new path, and what do things look like now?
Yeah. I'm so glad you called that out and you phrased it the way you did with these two paths, because a lot of people—my editors were giving me grief for, “Why are you spending so much time talking about SpaceX in the prologue of this book that's not going to be about SpaceX?” But as you pointed out…
By the way, having dealt with book editors, I can imagine that conversation quite easily.
I wanted people to know how fragile this was, and where it did it come from? You mentioned it: Three of the previous rockets had failed, SpaceX was running out of money, they were running out of credibility, people had been on this island, Kwajalein, for six years, basically losing their minds. If this rocket does not go, I think we do end up in that scenario that you were just talking about, where the 2010s look pretty much like they always had. It was important to me just to give people this history, how hard this is. I see this as this inciting incident. It's funny, because you kind of go from governments and then there were like honest-to-God billionaires. When Elon started SpaceX, he was rich, but he wasn't rich like he is now. We're talking about like a hundred million dollars he put into SpaceX. So the bar had come down quite a bit. But in that moment when this rocket flies and then in the years that follow, when SpaceX really starts to hit its stride, this unlocks all of this.
There was so much enthusiasm for space and young kids who wanted to get into this industry, and it had been slow and boring and the excitement had sort of come out of it. You had the generation of people who had grown up watching Apollo. Those people were getting older, and there wasn't something new to look at for a lot of people who were much younger. And here it is. Here's this company that's making commercial space real. And this guy, Elon, is quite eccentric and interesting, and some people sort of want to be like him. I write about it in the book: It was sort of like the four-minute mile to me. It's like, once somebody does it, then all of a sudden you see lots of people now are breaking the four-minute mile. This thing that seemed impossible, it turns out is possible. You have this unlocking in your head of what people can do. And so I just think across the world, it unlocked this passion, this latent engineering smarts and energy, and made this seem real. So you end up with startups all over the world chasing rockets and satellites.
The companies building a “computing shell” around the planet
In the book, you write, “The future that all these space buffs have already started building is one in which many rockets blast off every day. These rockets will be carrying thousands of satellites that will be placed not all that far above our heads. The satellites will change the way communications work on Earth by, for one, making the internet an inescapable presence with all the good and bad that entails. The satellites will also watch and analyze the earth in previously unfathomable ways. The data centers that have reshaped life on our planet will be transported into orbit. We are, in effect, building a computing shell around the planet.” Other than SpaceX, who are the companies building that computer shell?
The one that comes to mind is the next sort of central actor in the book, which is this company called Planet Labs, which is based in San Francisco. For people who don't know, they already surround the Earth with about 250 imaging satellites. They can take, and they do take, pictures of every spot on the Earth's landmass every day. Multiple pictures. Unlike even the world's biggest governments, China, Russia, the US, which have spice satellites obviously, but they only have a handful of spy satellites. And they tend to only look where interesting things might be happening. Planet sees everything that's happening all the time. And this is not some far-off concept. They had this full constellation up and running in 2018 and have just been adding to it ever since.
At the time they launched, in low-Earth orbit there were about [2,000] satellites. And Planet had put up about 250. They were about 10 percent of all the satellites in space, just from this small private company in California that grew out of NASA Ames, the Silicon Valley center. And so they're indicative of, today, we have many, many, several companies trying to build these space internet constellations, each of which require on the order of 10,000 to 20,000 satellites. You've got more imaging satellites along the lines of Planet that do all kinds of different things. And then you got a ton of scientific satellites. The whole premise is that there are many more ideas yet to come.
When you watch a spy movie, they're always talking about "retasking the satellite,” like there's only one satellite over all of Asia or something. But what we're talking about now is satellites everywhere, looking everywhere, any time you want.
Yeah. That movie stuff is true. That's usually what had to happen. Just as like SpaceX brought the cost of rocket launches down and created this revolution in rocketry, I argue Planet had an attendant effect satellites. I didn't mention before: A traditional satellite is like the size of a school bus, costs $500 million to $2 billion to make. People sit there working on it for like six years. It's supposed to go into space and stay there for 20 years. You can imagine the electronics on a 20-year-old satellite that's trying to do its job…
I can also imagine the tension of that launch going wrong.
Like, that can't go wrong for many reasons. And once the satellite gets up in space, it also has to work, right? That's why you're spending $2 billion, because if that thing doesn't work, a lot of people are losing their jobs at a company or a military outfit is in dire straits. Planet rethought this whole thing. They're like, “Let's make them much smaller. Let's put them closer to Earth.” Almost like a disposable sort of thing. They're sending up dozens at a time. They've had rocket launches — a couple, they had bad luck at the beginning — that blew up and they lost all their satellites on those. But it wasn't a make-or-break moment for the company, because these satellites are relatively cheap: $100,000 each.
They rethought the whole thing, and then they were able to surround the Earth. It basically like a line scanner, and the Earth just turns under these satellites, and it's just photographing all the time. It sounds a lot like what we were talking about before, espionage and spy stuff, and there are uses for that. Although the resolution on these, you can't see somebody's face or anything like that. You mostly look at something like the size of a car. These satellites are geared to what I call monitoring the real-time activity of humans on Earth. Where are we building stuff? Where is our oil being stored? Where is it going? How are our forests? How many trees are in the Amazon? Is somebody cutting them down? The sort of movement of economic activity and environmental activity on Earth.
It reminds me of, if you're trying to determine like the GDP of a country that may not be particularly honest with its government statistics, you could either accept the statistics and try to figure it out, or you could just look at it from space. How many lights are going on? Is there more activity? And try to gauge it in a more visual way. Are there companies doing that for more private-sector reasons?
This happens today. China will say, “We have this much oil in our reserves.” Well, it turns out these satellites can spot all your oil storage systems. Because of the way the oil storage systems work, where they have these floating lids that can go up and down depending on how much oil is in there, the satellites can actually measure the shadow that's being reflected on the side of this tanker. And you could calculate, people argue, very accurately how much oil is being stored. We do this with places like Saudi Arabia. China comes out with its official economic metrics, and now we have a version of the truth where people come back and say, “No, you have way more oil stored up than you've been letting on.” I think this is going to be a big deal. Not to go on a huge tangent, but China's economy appears to be slowing. I'm quite certain the government will put the best possible spin on things and how they're performing. You can look not only at oil, you can look at construction — how many buildings are going up, how many houses are going up — all kinds of economic indicators.
We are now on an exponential curve, and almost all of those satellites are commercial satellites, not military or government satellites that have been added. We're going to go from 10,000, if you look at all the launch manifests for the rocket companies, we get to 100,000 in the next decade. And quite likely 200,000 the decade after that, or maybe sooner. This is a totally new era of what it looks like right above our heads.
The proliferation of satellites
What has the growth in the number of satellites looked like in recent years? And do you have a sense of how that growth will continue over the next decade?
I can do that one. Easy. From like 1960 to 2020, in low-Earth orbit, we had managed to put up about 2,500 satellites. And it was not on an exponential curve. We kind of got a whole bunch up, and then every year you would add maybe 20 to 50 depending on what was going on. It was this very slow, steady march the last few years. So that's 2020: 2,500. Already, as we're sitting here today, there's now about 10,000. So that number has almost quadrupled. It's getting close to quadrupling by the end of this year. We are now on an exponential curve, and almost all of those satellites are commercial satellites, not military or government satellites that have been added. We're going to go from 10,000, if you look at all the launch manifests for the rocket companies, we get to 100,000 in the next decade. And quite likely 200,000 the decade after that, or maybe sooner. This is a totally new era of what it looks like right above our heads.
The astronomers can't be happy.
No. I'm sort of baffled by some of this, because SpaceX and Starlink have been the major driver of this huge increase as they're trying to build out their space internet system. Spacex is now the world's largest satellite manufacturer by several orders of magnitude. And this was no secret. They had to apply for all these licenses to put these satellites up years in advance. There were other people trying to build a space internet. The astronomers never complained until the second SpaceX did its first launch and put the satellites up and everyone could see this kind of string of pearls flying above them as the satellites start to spread out. I was amused and sort of baffled, I guess, that they waited until this was already underway to really start kind of complaining about this. But the die is cast as far as I can tell. You could argue for the Earth-bound telescopes, this is not great. On the other hand, if rocket launches are coming way down, if we're finally putting Moore's Law in space, the opportunity to put scientific instruments above this low-Earth orbit field and do a whole bunch of interesting things increases quite dramatically. If you had to build up $300 million for a rocket launch in the past just to have a go at putting your scientific instrument up, and now you can do it for anywhere from call it like $6 million to $60 million, it's a new era where more people really should get a chance.
Earlier, you talked about SpaceX as the Southwest Airlines of space. But that's really not what it is anymore. Today, it's the high-end company. And other entrepreneurs have filled that space below it. Is that right?
Exactly. SpaceX built that Falcon 1, which was meant to cost just a few million dollars to launch, and then quickly abandoned it. The second it worked, it moved to the much larger Falcon 9, in part because we didn't quite yet have companies like Planet Labs. Planet Labs came around 2012, a few years after the Falcon 1 launch, and really was the first to start thinking about all sending up thousands or hundreds of satellites. And so SpaceX retired the Falcon 1, you had kind of this gap, and then all of a sudden — some of these companies are real, some of them aren't — there's about a hundred rocket startups trying to make a rocket. Even SpaceX today, the Falcon 9 runs about $60 to $70 million a launch. Now you have dozens of companies trying to do launches starting at, if you believe these numbers, like $2 million a launch. Probably like somewhere between $5 and $12 million is a realistic figure. The leader in this category is in the book, this company Rocket Lab founded by Peter Beck. And they have made a rocket called Electron, which has flown now dozens of times and is really sort of like a perfectly engineered small rocket.
If we can have the internet everywhere for everybody, what does that enable? What do these satellites enable?
I think starting with space internet is a good one. Even though we often feel like we're connected to the internet all the time and we have our cell phones, the truth of it is there are these huge gaps all around the planet. And it probably means more on an infrastructure sense than it does on an individual not being able to check their email for a few hours. What we are creating now is a blanket of internet that will have the Earth always connected. This part makes a lot of sense to me. It's very obvious. I just think this is the next step of our technology build out. Just like in the ‘90s, we had to put data centers and fiber everywhere to sort of get the internet going; now, you want this persistent internet that can connect people and all sorts of devices all the time. And that's what we're building in space: This internet heartbeat that's washing over. Everything you've ever heard about, like Internet of Things, sensors on container ships reporting back, or things out in the farm checking the soil moisture: None of this really has worked. And the reason why, is because we haven't had this sort of persistent internet connection. If you think about like a world full of drones and flying cars and self-driving cars — all these things that have to be talking in remote spots to have all this work. It's just this glue that needs to be there. That's like case number one that I think does check out.
And then of course, you have three-and-a-half billion people that just cannot be reached by fiber optic cables today, and they're not allowed to participate in the modern economy. There’s such obvious evidence that the second high-speed internet arrives in a country, education levels go up, economic levels go up. This is just like a fairness thing in letting the whole world participate in what's going on.
That's fantastic because sometimes I think people are unaware of what's going on. Maybe they're kind of aware of SpaceX, but that's pretty much it. And when they think of SpaceX, they're probably mostly thinking of, Elon Musk wants to take us to Mars. I don't think they understand very much about the satellites, unless they've heard astronomers complain about it. I don't think they understand the economic and business case and just that it's all happening.
This is why everyone focuses on the Moon and Mars. And it's all cool and everything, and it is still just very far out. This is why I wrote the book. I was like, you people do not understand that we are building a legit economy right over our heads. And this thing is pretty well underway and I think it is going to change life here on Earth quite quickly.
Are any of the companies that you're looking at involved with creating like new space stations? There's been a lot of talk about creating new space platforms. What they'll do up there, I'm not sure exactly. There's talk about creating different kinds of products and shooting movies and doing biotechnology research. Are any of the companies cover involved with those efforts?
Yeah. In the book, I spend less time on things like space habitats and some of these other businesses. But yes, I do talk about them briefly. But more importantly, I suppose for this conversation, all this is happening. In the past, you've had the International Space Station, this multinational, huge, bureaucratic thing that actually works pretty well. But that’s who's driving it. And now we have a handful of startups making space habitats. We've got SpaceX leading the way with, I guess you could call it tourism: being able to send people to these things, private citizens. This is already happening. We've had private astronauts now going to space on SpaceX rockets. And so they'll go to those habitats. A fascinating startup called Varda launched just a couple months ago. They have put what you could argue is the first manufacturing system in space. It's making medicines. You can do things without gravity pushing on molecules in space that you can't do on Earth. They're trying to make a whole new class of pharmaceuticals and bring them back to Earth. I think that's just the earliest example. There are things like asteroid mining that I thought were total jokes and are still quite far off, but there's a startup, Astro Forge. Same thing: They set up their first test earlier this year. All this stuff is actually happening now. The business cases on these things, I think some will work and some won't, but we're going to find out.
The downsides of the emerging space economy
What's the unnerving aspect? I write about this a lot: We immediately jump to the downsides. What are the costs? So I didn't want to certainly lead with that, but are there things about this that people should be concerned about? Space junk, other things?
I am optimistic on the whole. History would tell us that when humans find a new territory in which to conquer, usually mistakes are made. It doesn't always go really well. We have a reality setting up right now where you had this handful of governments moving very slowly, launching a rocket once a month. Now we're moving to like every day and thousands of satellites, and it really is a bit of ‘whoever gets their first wins’ sort of scenario. Once you start adding a race to these things, that often that doesn't go well.
The thing that everybody is worried about is these satellites crashing into each other and creating a debris field in low-Earth orbit. And obviously none of these companies want that to happen. They're the ones spending hundreds of millions, billions of dollars to build these things. And we do have systems in place to track this stuff, but that becomes a nightmare. There is a scenario called the Kessler Syndrome, where one of these things breaks apart and it just starts ripping into everything else, and then low-Earth orbit becomes essentially unusable. That's not only bad for this new stuff that we're talking about, but there's things like GPS that make the modern world work that would no longer work if that happens. That's a huge issue I think we're going to have.
If you think about, these were nation states that had a lot of control. The rockets are essentially ICBMs more or less. You had a select group of space-faring nations. I think that's all going to change quite soon. Whoever wants a rocket blasting off from their country can have one. Almost anywhere can afford a satellite. You're talking about like a hundred grand just to kind of get going. You're going to have nation states that no longer can really be controlled the way they were or that now have access to space. Are they going to follow all the same rules that everybody else has been following for decades? Probably not.
And then I think the real wild card is Russia. This is a country whose space program was already flagging. SpaceX has eaten up a ton of their business. It's rife with corruption. The war in Ukraine has made them unusable for many, many countries as far as sending up satellites and people. And they are a wild card. Space is not just some flight of fancy for Russia. It's something that's baked deep into the national pride and is near and dear to their hearts. They have no commercial space companies, startups at all. Are they a rational actor in this new world as they see there being this dominant superpower that’s going to go away?
I'm going to finish by asking you the Mars question about SpaceX: Is that going to happen? Do you think that is a serious goal for that company that you can see happening on some sort of timeline that Elon Musk has talked about?
I'm pretty sure it will. I mean, for Elon, you’ve always got to take everything he says with a grain of salt on timelines and ambition and all that. He tends to set these goals. They usually don't happen anywhere close to what he said, but they usually do happen. And in this case, it's not just Elon, right? I know enough of the SpaceX top engineers. They are very convinced Starship is real, that it can get to Mars, I think for sure. You're going to see years of just sending industrial equipment and things like that to Mars long before you send a human. The human question is still…things have to get better. That's a long ride to Mars. And you better be sure you can come back if you want to. A lot of stuff has to happen between here and there. But will SpaceX start putting stuff on Mars in actually sort of the relatively near-ish future? Yes. I'm quite convinced of that.
On Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I've interviewed guests on exciting new technologies like artificial intelligence, fusion energy, and reusable rockets. But today's episode explores another Next Big Thing: biotechnology. To discuss recent advances in CRISPR gene editing and their applications for medicine, I'm sitting down with Kevin Davies.
Kevin is executive editor of The CRISPR Journal and author of the excellent 2020 book, Editing Humanity: The CRISPR Revolution and the New Era of Genome Editing.
In This Episode
* CRISPR advances over the past decade (1:13)
* What CRISPR therapies will come next? (8:46)
* Non-medical applications of gene editing (13:11)
* Bioweapons and the ethics of CRISPR (18:43)
* Longevity and genetic enhancements (25:48)
Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation
CRISPR advances over the past decade
When people talk about AI, for instance, they might be talking about different versions or applications of AI—machine learning being one. So when we talk about CRISPR, are we just talking about one technique, the one they figured out back in 2012? Are there different ones? Are there improvements? So it's really a different technique. So how has that progressed?
You're right. CRISPR has become shorthand for genome editing. But the version of CRISPR that was recognized with the Nobel Prize three years ago in 2020 to Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier was for one, we can call it the traditional form of CRISPR. And if I refer to it again, I'll call it CRISPR-Cas9. Cas9 is the shorthand name for the enzyme that actually does the cutting of the DNA. But we are seeing extraordinary progress in developing new and even more precise and more nuanced forms of genome editing. They still kind of have a CRISPR backbone. They still utilize some of the same molecular components as the Nobel Prize–winning form of CRISPR. But in particular, I'm thinking of techniques called base editing and prime editing, both of which have commercial, publicly funded biotech companies pushing these technologies into the clinic. And I think over the next five to 10 years, increasingly what we refer to as “CRISPR genome editing” will be in the form of these sort of CRISPR 2.0 technologies, because they give us a much broader portfolio of DNA substitutions and changes and edits, and give the investigators and the clinicians much more precision and much more subtlety and hopefully even more safety and more guarantees of clinical efficiency.
Right. That's what I was going to ask. One advantage is the precision, because you don't want to do it wrong. You don't want mutations. Do no harm first. A big advantage is maybe limiting some of the potential downsides.
In the ideal gene-editing scenario, you would have a patient with, say, a genetic disease that you can pinpoint to a single letter of the genetic code. And we want to fix that. We want to zero in on that one letter—A, C, T, or G is the four-letter alphabet of DNA, as I hope most of your listeners know—and we want to revert that back to whatever most normal, healthy people have in their genetic code at that specific position. CRISPR-Cas9, which won the Nobel Prize, is not the technology to do that sort of single base edit. It can do many other things, and the success in the clinic is unquestionable already in just a few years. But base editing and, in particular, prime editing are the two furthest developed technologies that allow investigators to pinpoint exactly where in the genome we want to make the edit. And then without completely cutting or slicing the double helix of DNA, we can lay up the section of DNA that we want to replace and go in and just perform chemistry on that one specific letter of DNA. Now, this hasn't been proven in the clinic just yet. But the early signs are very, very promising that this is going to be the breakthrough genome-editing technology over the next 10 to 20 years.
Is CRISPR in the wild yet, or are we still in the lab?
No, we're in the clinic. We are in human patients. There are at least 200 patients who have already been in or are currently enrolled in clinical trials. And so far, the early results—there are a few caveats and exceptions—but so far the overwhelming mood of the field is one of bullish enthusiasm. I don't want to complete this interview without singling out this one particular story, which is the clinical trial that has been sponsored by CRISPR Therapeutics and Vertex Pharmaceuticals for sickle cell disease. These are primarily African-American patients in this country because the sickle cell mutation arose in Africa some 7,000 years ago.
We're talking about a pretty big share of the African-American population.
This is about 100,000 patients just in America, in the US alone. And it's been a neglected disease for all kinds of reasons, probably beyond the scope of our discussion. But the early results in the first few dozen patients who have been enrolled in this clinical trial called the exa-cel clinical trial, they've all been cured. Pretty much all cured, meaning no more blood transfusions, no more pain crises, no more emergency hospitalizations. It is a pretty miraculous story. This therapy is now in the hands of the FDA and is speeding towards—barring some unforeseen complication or the FDA setting the bar so high that they need the investigators to go back and do some further checks—this should be approved before the end of this year.
There's a catch, though. This will be a therapy that, in principle, will become—once approved by the FDA and the EMA in Europe, of course—will become available to any sickle cell patient. The catch will, of course, be the cost or the price that the companies set, because they're going to look for a return on their investment. It's a fascinating discussion and there's no easy answer. The companies need to reward their shareholders, their investors, their employees, their staff, and of course build a war chest to invest in the next wave, the next generation of CRISPR therapies. But the result of that means that probably we're going to be looking at a price tag of, I mean, I'm seeing figures like $1.9 million per patient. So how do you balance that? Is a lifetime cure for sickle cell disease worth $2, maybe $3 million? Will this patient population be able to afford that? In many cases, the answer to that will be simply, no. Do you have to remortgage your house and go bankrupt because you had a genetic quirk at birth? I don’t know quite how we get around this.
Different countries will have different answers with different health systems. Do you have a sense of what that debate is going to be like in Washington, DC?
It's already happening in other contexts. Other gene therapies have been approved over the last few years, and they come with eye-watering price tags. The highest therapy price that I've seen now is $3.5 million. Yes, there are discounts and waiver programs and all this sort of stuff. But it's still a little obscene. Now, when those companies come to negotiate, say, with the UK National Health Service, they'll probably come to an agreement that is much lower, because the Brits are not going to say that they're going to be able to afford that for their significant sickle cell population.
Is it your best guess that this will be a treatment the government pays for?
What's interesting and what may potentially shift the calculus here is that this particular therapy is the disease affects primarily African-Americans in the United States. That may change the political calculus, and it may indeed change the corporate calculus in the boardrooms of Vertex and CRISPR Therapeutics, who may not want the backlash that they're going to get when they say, “Oh, by the way, guys, it's $2 million or you're out of luck.”
There are companies that are studying using CRISPR to potentially correct the mutations that cause genetic forms of blindness, genetic forms of liver disease.
What CRISPR therapies will come next?
And after this CRISPR treatment for sickle cell disease is available, what therapies will come next?
Probably a bunch of diseases that most people, unless they are unfortunate enough to have it in their family, won't have heard of. There are companies that are studying using CRISPR to potentially correct the mutations that cause genetic forms of blindness, genetic forms of liver disease. It turns out the liver is an organ that is very amenable to taking up medicines that we can inject in the blood. The other big clinical success story has come from another company in the Boston area called Intellia Therapeutics. Also publicly traded. They've developed CRISPR therapies that you can inject literally into the body, rather than taking cells out and doing it in the lab and then putting those cells back in, as in the case of sickle cell.
I’m not sure that was actually even clear: that you can do it more than one way.
Yes.
And obviously it sounds like it would be better if they could just inject you.
Exactly. That's why people are really excited about this, because this now opens up the doors for treating a host of diseases. And I think over the next few years we will see a growing number of diseases, and it won't just be these rare sort of genetic diseases with often unpronounceable names. It may be things like heart disease. There's another company—they're all in Boston, it seems—Verve Therapeutics, which is taking one of these more recent gene-editing technologies that we talked about a minute ago, base editing, and saying that there's a gene that they're going to target that has been clearly linked with cholesterol levels. And if we can squash production of this gene, we can tap down cholesterol levels. That will be useful, in the first instance, for patients with genetic forms of high cholesterol. Fair enough. But if it works in them, then the plan is to roll this out for potentially thousands if not millions of adults in this country who maybe don't feel that they have a clearly defined genetic form of high cholesterol, but this method may still be an alternative that they will consider versus taking Atorvastatin for the rest of your life, for example.
Where are the CRISPR cancer treatments?
They're also making progress, too. Those are in clinical trials. A little more complicated. Of course, cancer is a whole slew of different diseases, so it's a little hard to say, “Yeah, we're making progress here, less so there.” But I think one of the most heartwarming stories—this is an n of one, so it's an anecdotal story—but there was a teenager in the UK treated at one of the premier London medical schools who had a base editing form of CAR T therapy. A lot of people have heard of CAR T therapy for various cancers. And she is now in remission. So again, early days, but we're seeing very positive signs in these early clinical tests.
It sounds like we went from a period where it was all in the lab and that we might be in a period over the next five years where it sounds like a wave of potential treatments.
I think so, yeah.
And for as much as we've seen articles about “The Age of AI,” it really sounds like this could be the age of biotechnology and the age of CRISPR…
I think CRISPR, as with most new technologies, you get these sort of hype cycles, right? Two and a half years ago, CRISPR, all the stocks were at peak valuations. And I went on a podcast to say, why are the CRISPR stocks so high? I wasn't really sure, but I was enjoying it at the time. And then, of course, we entered the pandemic. And the biotech sector, perversely, ironically, has really been hit hard by the economy and certainly by the market valuations. So all of the CRISPR gene-editing companies—and there are probably at least eight or 10 now that are publicly traded and many more poised to join them—their valuations are a fraction of what they were a couple of years ago. But I suspect as these first FDA approvals and more scientific peer review papers, of course, but more news of the clinical success to back up and extend what has already been clearly proven as a breakthrough technology in the lab with the Nobel Prize—doesn't get much better than that, does it?—then I think we're going to start to see that biotech sector soar once again.
Certainly, there are a lot of computational aspects to CRISPR in terms of designing the particular stretches of nucleic acid that you're going to use to target a specific gene. And AI can help you in that quest to make those ever more precise.
Non-medical applications of gene editing
There are also non-medical applications. Can you just give me a little state of play on how that’s looking?
I think one of the—when CRISPR…
And agriculture.
Feeding the planet, you could say.
That’s certainly a big application.
It’s a human health application—arguably the biggest application.
I think one of the fun ones is the work of George Church at Harvard Medical School, who's been on 60 Minutes and Stephen Colbert and many other primetime shows, talking about his work using CRISPR to potentially resurrect the woolly mammoth, which sort of sounds like, “That's Jurassic Park on steroids. That's crazy.” But his view is that, no, if we had herds—if that's the technical term—of woolly mammoths—roaming Siberia and the frozen tundra, they'll keep the ground, the surface packed down and stop the gigatons of methane from leaching out into the atmosphere. We have just seen a week, I've been reading on social media, of the hottest temperatures in the world since records began. And that's nothing compared to what we're potentially going to see if all these greenhouse gases that are just under the surface in places like Siberia further leach into the atmosphere. So that's the sort of environmental cause that Church is on. I think many people think this is a rather foolish notion, but he's launched a company to get this off the ground called Colossal Biosciences, and they're raising a lot of money, it appears. I'm curious to see how it goes. I wish him well.
Also, speaking of climate change, making crops more resilient to the heat. That’s another I’ve heard…
One of the journals I'm involved in, called GEN Biotechnology, just published a paper in which investigators in Korea have used CRISPR to modify a particular gene in the tomato genome to make it a higher source of vitamin D. And that may not seem to be the most urgent need, but the point is, we can now engineer the DNA of all kinds of plants and crops, many of which are under threat, whether it’s from drought or other types of climate change or pests, bacteria, parasites, viruses, fungi, you name it. And in my book Editing Humanity, which came out a couple of years ago, there was a whole chapter listing a whole variety of threats to our favorite glass of orange juice in the morning. That's not going to exist. If we want that all-natural Florida orange juice, we're not going to have that option. We've either got to embrace what technology will allow us to do to make these orange crops more resistant to the existential threat that they're facing, or we're going to have to go drink something else.
I started out talking about AI and machine learning. Does that play a role in CRISPR, either helping the precision of the technology or in some way refining the technology?
Yeah, hopefully you'll invite me back in a year and I'll be able to give you a more concrete answer. I think the short answer is, yes. Certainly, there are a lot of computational aspects to CRISPR in terms of designing the particular stretches of nucleic acid that you're going to use to target a specific gene. And AI can help you in that quest to make those ever more precise. When you do the targeting in a CRISPR experiment, the one thing you don't want to have happen is for the little stretch of DNA that you've synthesized to go after the gene in question, you don't want that to accidentally latch onto or identify another stretch of DNA that just by statistical chance has the same stretch of 20 As, Cs, Ts, and Gs. AI can help give us more confidence that we're only honing in on the specific gene that we want to edit, and we're not potentially going to see some unforeseen, off-target editing event.
Do you think when we look back at this technology in 10 years, not only will we see a wider portfolio of potential treatments, but we'll look at the actual technique and think, “Boy, back in 2012, it was a butchery compared to what we're doing; we were using meat cleavers, and now we're using lasers”?
I think, yeah. That's a slightly harsh analogy. With this original form of CRISPR, published in 2012, Nobel Prize in 2020, one of the potential caveats or downsides of the technology is that it involves a complete snip of the double helix, the two strands of DNA, in order to make the edit. Base editing and prime editing don't involve that double-stranded severance. It's just a nick of one strand or the other. So it's a much more genetically friendly form of gene editing, as well as other aspects of the chemistry. We look forward to seeing how base and prime editing perform in the clinic. Maybe they'll run into some unforeseen hurdles and people will say, “You know what? There was nothing wrong with CRISPR. Let's keep using the originally developed system.” But I'm pretty bullish on what base and prime editing can do based on all of the early results have been published in the last few years on mice and monkeys. And now we're on the brink of going into the clinic.
One medical scenario that they laid out would be, what if two people with a deadly recessive disease like sickle cell disease, or perhaps a form of cystic fibrosis, wanted to have a healthy biological child?
Bioweapons and the ethics of CRISPR
This podcast is usually very optimistic. So we're going to leave all the negative stuff for this part of the podcast. We're going to rush through all the downsides very quickly.
First question: Especially after the pandemic, a lot more conversation about bioweapons. Is this an issue that's discussed in this community, about using this technology to create a particularly lethal or virulent or targeted biological weapon?
Not much. If a rogue actor or nation wanted to develop some sort of incredibly virulent bioweapon, there's a whole wealth of genetic techniques, and they could probably do it without involving CRISPR. CRISPR is, in a way, sort of the corollary of another field called synthetic biology or synthetic genomics that you may have talked about on your show. We've got now the facility, not just to edit DNA, but to synthesize custom bits of DNA with so much ease and affordability compared to five or 10 years ago. And we’ve just seen a global pandemic. When I get that question, I've had it before, I say, “Yeah, did we just not live through a global pandemic? Do we really need to be engineering organisms?” Whether you buy the lab leak hypothesis or the bioengineering hypothesis, or it was just a natural transfer from some other organism, nature can do a pretty good job of hurting human beings. I don't know that we need to really worry too much about bioweapons at this point.
In 2018, there was a big controversy over a Chinese researcher who created some genome-edited babies. Yeah. Is there more to know about that story? Has that become a hotter topic of discussion as CRISPR has advanced?
The Chinese scientist, He Jiankui, who performed those pretty abominable experiments was jailed for the better part of three years. He got early release in China and slowly but surely he's being rehabilitated. He's literally now moved his operation from Shenzhen to Beijing. He's got his own lab again, and he's doing genome editing experiments again. I saw again on social media recently, he's got a petition of muscular dystrophy families petitioning Jack Ma, the well-known Chinese billionaire, to fund his operation to devise a new gene editing therapy for patients with Duchenne muscular dystrophy and other forms of muscular dystrophy. I wouldn't want He Jiankui let within a thousand miles of my kids, because I just wouldn't trust him. And he's now more recently put out a manifesto stating he thinks we should start editing embryos again. So I don't know quite what is going on.
It seems the Chinese threw the book at him. Three years is not a trivial prison sentence. He was fined about half a million dollars. But somebody in the government there seems to be okay with him back at the bench, back in the lab, and dabbling in CRISPR. And I don't know that he's been asked, does he have any regrets over the editing of Lulu and Nana. There was a third child born a few months later as well. All he will say is, “We moved too fast.” That is the only caveat that he has allowed himself to express publicly.
We know nothing more about the children. They're close to five years old now. There's one particular gene that was being edited was pretty messed up. But we know it's not an essential gene in our bodies, because there are many people walking around who don't have a functional copy of this CCR5 receptor gene, and they're HIV resistant. That was the premise for He Jiankui’s experiment. But he has said, “No, they are off limits. The authorities are not going to reveal their identities. We are monitoring them, and we will take care of them if anything goes wrong.” But I think a lot of people in the West would really like to help, to study them, to offer any medical assistance. Obviously, we have to respect their privacy. The twin girls and the third child who was born a bit later, maybe they're being protected for their own good. How would you like it if you grew up through childhood and into your teenage years, to walk around knowing that you were this human experiment? That may be a very difficult thing to live with. So more to come on that.
There’s no legitimate discussion about changing that in the West or anywhere else?
Obviously, in the wake of what He Jiankui did, there were numerous blue ribbon panels, including one just organized by the National Academy of Sciences, just a stone's throw from where we're talking today. And I thought that report was very good. It did two things. This was published a couple of years ago. Two important things came out of it. One is this all-star group of geneticists and other scientists said, “We don't think that human embryo editing should be banned completely. There may be scenarios down the road where we actually would want to reserve this technology because nothing else would help bring about a particular medical outcome that we would like.” And the one medical scenario that they laid out would be, what if two people with a deadly recessive disease like sickle cell disease, or perhaps a form of cystic fibrosis, wanted to have a healthy biological child?
There are clinics around the country and around the world now doing something called pre-implantation genetic diagnosis. If you have a family history of a genetic disease, you can encourage the couple to do IVF. We form an embryo or bunch of embryos in the test tube or on the Petri dish. And then we can do a little biopsy of each embryo, take a quick sneak peek at the DNA, look to see if it's got the bad gene or perhaps the healthy gene, and then sort of tag the embryos and only implant the embryos that we think are healthy. This is happening around the country as we speak for hundreds, if not thousands, of different genetic diseases. But it won't work if mom and dad have a recessive, meaning two copies of a bad gene, because there's no healthy gene that you can select in any of those embryos. It would be very rare, but in those scenarios, maybe embryo editing is a way we would want to go. But I don't see a big clamor for this right now. And the early results have been published using CRISPR on embryos in the wake of He Jiankui did have said, “It's a messy technique. It is not safe to use. We don't fully understand how DNA editing and DNA repair works in the human embryo, so we really need to do a whole lot more basic science, as we did in the original incarnation of CRISPR, before we even dare to revisit editing human embryos.”
Longevity is interesting because, of course, in the last 18 months there's a company in Silicon Valley called Altos, funded by Yuri Milner, employing now two dozen of the top aging researchers who've been lured away from academia into this transnational company to find hopefully cures or insights into how to postpone aging.
Longevity and genetic enhancements
Another area is using these treatments not to fix things, but to enhance people, whether it's for intelligence or some other trait. A lot of money pouring into longevity treatments from Silicon Valley. Do we know more about the potential of CRISPR for either extending lifespans or selecting for certain desirable traits in people?
This sort of scenario is never going to go away. When it comes up, if I hear someone say, “Could we use CRISPR or any gene editing technology to boost intelligence or mathematical ability or music musical ability, or anything that we might want…”
Or speed in the hundred meters.
“…or speed in the hundred meters, to enhance our perfect newborn?” I would say, what gene are you going to enhance? Intelligence—are you kidding me? Half of the 10,000 genes are expressed in the human brain. You want to start meddling with those? You wouldn't have a prayer of having a positive outcome. I think we can pretty much rule that out. Longevity is interesting because, of course, in the last 18 months there's a company in Silicon Valley called Altos, funded by Yuri Milner, employing now two dozen of the top aging researchers who've been lured away from academia into this transnational company to find hopefully cures or insights into how to postpone aging. That's going to be a long, multi-decade quest to go from that to potentially, “Oh, let's edit a little embryo, our newborn son or daughter so they have the gift of 120 years on this decaying, overheating planet…” Yes, there's a lot to wade through on that.
And you have another book coming out. Can you give us a preview of that?
I'm writing a book called Curved Air, which is about the story of sickle cell disease. It was first described in a paper from physicians in Chicago in 1910 who were studying the curious anemia of a dental student who walked into their hospital one day. That gentleman, Walter Noel, is now buried back in his homeland, the island of Grenada. But in the 1940s, it was described and characterized as the first molecular disease. We know more about sickle cell disease than almost any other genetic disease. And yet, as we touched on earlier, patients with this who have not had the wealth, the money, the influence, they've been discriminated against in many walks of life, including the medical arena.
We're still seeing terribly, tragically, videos and stories and reports of sickle cell patients who are being turned away from hospital rooms, emergency rooms, because the medical establishment just looks at a person of color in absolute agony with one of these pain crises and just assumed, “Oh, they want another opioid hit. Sickle cell? What is that?” There's a lot of fascinating science. There's all this hope in the gene editing and now in the clinic. And there's all this socioeconomic and other history. So I'm going to try to weave all this together in a format that hopefully everyone will enjoy reading.
Hopefully a book with a happy ending. Not every book about a disease has a wonderful…
I think a positive note to end on is the first American patient treated in this CRISPR clinical trial for sickle cell disease four years ago,Victoria Gray, has become something of a poster child now. She's been featured on National Public Radio on awhole series of interviews and just took her first overseas flight earlier this year to London to speak at a CRISPR gene editing conference. She gave a lovely 15-minute personal talk, shaking with nerves, about her personal voyage, her faith in God, and what's brought her here now, pain-free, traveling the world, and got a standing ovation. You don't see many standing ovations at medical conferences or genetics conferences. And if ever anybody deserved it, somebody like Victoria Gray did. Early days, but a very positive journey that we're on.
"The promise of eternal life has conventionally been the dangled carrot of religion. It is now the holy grail of Silicon Valley," writes novelist Lionel Shriver in a recent National Review cover essay. In this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, Lionel joins me to discuss why some tech billionaires are chasing after immortality and the serious challenges that would accompany extended human lifespans.
Lionel is a columnist for Britain's Spectator magazine. Her books include We Need to Talk About Kevin and Should We Stay or Should We Go.
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In This Episode
* The promise and peril of immortality (1:11)
* Storytelling and optimism (6:44)
* Lifespan vs. healthspan (12:23)
* Post-humanity (19:19)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation
The promise and peril of immortality
James Pethokoukis: In the National Review essay, you make it clear you are not a medical expert, you're not a research scientist; you're a writer of fiction. Of all the things you could have written about, both as an essay and also in your book, Should We Stay or Should We Go, what originally created your interest in this topic of longevity?
Lionel Shriver: I should also clarify that, for someone who's writing about life extension, I am not immortal either. So I have no qualifications for this aside from having applied myself to it imaginatively. The book you mentioned, Should We Stay or Should We Go, is a novel about a couple that has vowed to kill themselves once they both reach the age of 80 because they don't want to fall apart. They don't want to burden others with their own crumbling. It's a parallel universe book that explores any number of different futures for this couple. And one of those futures is why I suspect I was approached to write this essay for National Review, and it's one in which there's a cure for aging. Basically, my characters live forever. Everyone in the world looks 25 and they never look any older. I have addressed myself to what that future might look like and not just look like, but feel like. What would it feel like to address yourself to a future that was potentially infinite?
In the novel, it starts out great. It was exhilarating to watch your spouse, rather than get older and older, get younger and younger and return to the age when you fell in love. And everyone is healthy. There are no limitations anymore. And all your choices are also potentially infinite. You can try out every profession. It's no longer a matter of, what are you going to be when you grow up? You can be whatever you want, and then you can change your mind. It'd be something else. You can move to any city. All your choices are just this kind of smorgasbord of what you might sample. And that seems fun to begin with.
That sounds like a near-utopian scenario.
Yeah. The trouble is that when you think about it, one of the things that gives our lives urgency is finitude, that our decisions matter because you can't undecide them. The way we choose to spend our time matters because there's a limited amount of it. There's no redo. And effectively with eternal life, there is a redo. There's infinite redo. You can just go back and do something else. You can just go in a different direction. If you marry the wrong person, you can just marry someone else and you won't have given them, say, 10 years of your precious life. I mean, yes, but there are so many years left that it doesn't matter. And the trouble is that once you remove that, then nothing seems to matter. And that is depressing. When you remove that urgency, you also potentially remove meaning. And everything becomes arbitrary.
One of the things that happens to my characters is their characters start to decay. In some ways, they trade places in terms of what kind of person they are. The wife has always been the more optimistic and reflective and joyous, whereas her husband was more programmatic and more of an ideologue. And as the hundreds of years go by, he becomes much more himself reflective and philosophical and she becomes impatient and misanthropic. Because character itself becomes arbitrary. In the essay, I'm trying to look in a nonfiction sense at, what would it really be like both emotionally and practically to have a permanent human population? And that raises huge practical problems, too. Like, you don't have any children anymore. You can't.
Storytelling and optimism
Is it easier for you to come up with the more dystopian scenarios? Oftentimes, I'll criticize sci-fi writing, television, books as overly focused on the dystopian. It’s almost like a lack of effort. In this case, is that basically justified: that it's very hard to write a scenario where everything kind of turns out okay if people are living forever?
It is hard to write. It's always hard to write positively. It's hard for me even to write characters that are purely lovable. Since I don't know any. And it's hard to write happy endings. I do write happy endings, but they're hard to get there. And I feel you have to earn them. You can't just have happily ever after and that's it. There is one chapter in Should We Stay or Should We Go which is purely positive. It’s called “Once Upon a Time in Lambeth,” which is the neighborhood in London where they live. And it's the perfect old age. It's what we would all want. They grow only more physically beautiful as they age until people are stopping on them on the street wanting to take their pictures or paint their portraits because they're so striking. They grow only more in love and they have only a better sex life. It gets more and more rich and imaginative and exciting. Young people admire them because they both started second careers and had become hugely successful. And young people flock around their dinner table and want to hear their wisdom. Meanwhile, outside in the rest of the world, the Israeli-Palestinian problem is solved at last, Africa is a thriving economic power, etc. The thing is that there's a point only a few pages into this particular chapter that you get it: This is a satire. This is the one scenario that won't happen.
It’s almost so ridiculously…
It's ridiculous. In fact, it's hilarious. Optimism can be funny. And in some ways, it's also an illustration of kind of a fictional problem. Because without bad things happening, there is no story. And what makes that particular chapter a story is your growing consciousness that this is not possible. That this is ridiculous. That you are being made fun of, basically, because this is what you want and, you know, give us a break. You're never going to get it. This is hilarity at your expense. I am sympathetic with your frustration with science fiction. And it's not just science fiction. Literary fiction has a lot of unhappy endings and tragedy and dysfunction in it. That's the nature of story. It's a requirement. No badness, no story. The genres vary in terms of what that scale of badness is going to be and whether or not it's eventually going to resolve into something more palatable. But fiction is by its nature about disaster.
Would your critique be the same if instead of talking about living hundreds of years, our lifespan was doubled? Instead of everyone living to be at least, on average, 75, 80, 85, it was 150, 175.
To a degree. Though I think that issue of urgency, of how you spend your time, once you bring it down to, for argument’s sake let's say 150 years, that's probably less of an issue. But the practical problems do become more intrusive. If we're all living to 150, then we are going to have a huge elderly population and hardly any young people. And that poses a lot of economic issues. One of the things that I posit in the essay is that living substantially longer means the end of retirement. You can't live to 150 and retire at 65. It's economically impossible. So that means working for a long time. And the irony of this whole discussion, of course, is that the real problem we are facing is people living too long. People living too long in terrible shape. That's the real economic crisis.
Lifespan vs. healthspan
In that National Review essay, you write that you’re more interested in expanding the human healthspan than the human lifespan. Extending our healthy years but not necessarily delaying death seems like a very different project.
Yes. And I try to make the distinction between different projects. A lot of the Silicon Valley people are looking at longevity from the perspective of, “Let's cure death. Let's basically try to live forever.” But a much more modest group of people, and more practical, are looking at not necessarily living any longer, but living well longer. And I'm very sympathetic with that project. I'm like anyone: I don't fancy falling apart, and I would rather keep my wits about me and still be able to totter out on the tennis court and then preferably drop dead on the baseline one day. And that would be that. That's a laudable goal. And if we can get closer to that, we'd save ourselves a fortune.
When we talk about the Silicon Valley quest to cure death, does this really all come down to a fear of death by people who maybe don’t hold traditional religious views of the afterlife? Or do they want to live longer so they can, I don’t know, start more companies? What’s the motivation here?
I drew that distinction in the essay. There are two different things that might motivate you to extend life as long as possible. And one of them is clearly fear of death. We don't know what happens. I have my suspicions — you're not there anymore. And it's possible that the actual experience of death is not that bad, although the lead-up can be pretty grim. But the other thing that might motivate you is appetite, is desire, is wanting more. And that is something I am sympathetic with. I admire people who generate enthusiasm for living, for everything that it offers, for relationships, for love, even for another good glass of red wine. That is a positive motivation for this kind of research, which is going on all over the place. There's a lot of money being thrown at it. And I admire that. I think one of the questions you have to ask yourself in this whole life extension thing is, how much appetite would I have for continuing to be here? How many years does it prospectively give me joy to get up in the morning? And what would I be looking forward to? Is there any point at which you've just had enough red wine? (A prospect I find almost unfathomable.)
If we're looking at a civilization where people are living longer and it's richer, we're solving all these other problems and we're heading out to the stars, it seems to be like there would be a lot to be curious about. There would be a lot to see and do, and I'd hate to miss it. I'd hate to miss all this really great, cool stuff by only living to 90 years old.
There's another chapter in which my couple, as in most of these chapters to keep the story going, do not kill themselves when they're 80 years old. They live to well beyond 100 in relatively decent shape. They're okay, but the rest of the world isn't. Basically they live to see the end of Western civilization. This takes place in Britain. Britain has become completely overwhelmed with migration from Africa and the Middle East, which by the way demographically is very likely and is already happening. Meanwhile, there's a homegrown anarchist movement, because young people see no future for themselves; the place is in a state of economic collapse. They burned down parliament and they've shredded all the pictures in the National Gallery, etc. Basically, Western civilization is over. And the question that chapter asks, as the house they live in is invaded by migrants and taken over and they're exiled to the attic and basically eating dog food, if they could roll back the clock, would they like to live to see this or not?
And I think that's an interesting question, because the way you describe the future as you see it, which inspires your curiosity, is more inventions, space travel, all these wonderful, fascinating things happening. Well, you know what? More than wonderful, fascinating things happen; things fall apart. And I have great difficulty on my own behalf answering the question that chapter poses. And the couple disagree. One of them would have been happier to die earlier and not see this. And the other one is so interested in the story that they've been involved in. And of course, if you're a news reader especially, you're involved in all kinds of stories all the time. I certainly am. And one of the sacrifices of dying is not finding out how some of them end. But the other one is so interested in the story that even if the ending is dark, he's glad to see it because he wants that narrative appetite to be satisfied. To me, that's one of the biggest questions on longevity. Do you want to stick around if the world takes a serious turn south? Do you want to stick around for that?
Post-humanity
The political scientist Francis Fukuyama has written about what he calls our "post-human future." If death is an important and intrinsic part of our humanity, then immortality or near immortality moves us to being something that is no longer human as we know it. And because liberal democracy is built on the idea of human equality and a connectivity among humans everywhere, through all time, he worries about life extension or other enhancements undermining that equality. Does that concern you?
Well, to a tiny degree, we've already got that differentiation based on economic profile, which does partially determine your life expectancy. People in Western countries who are themselves well off are likely to live substantially longer than either people outside Western countries or people within Western countries who are poor and generally in worse health. So we are not quite the same already. We're not looking at the same lifespan. One of the other things I did address is the likelihood that should these longevity efforts be availing, the chances are extremely high that they would be expensive and therefore available to the elite and only the elite. And therefore, that kind of division that we're living with already would grow greater. And I posited that it was not impossible that the resentment on the part of the lower classes could become homicidal.
I think if you're really talking about effectively evolving into a slightly different species, then you would be generating a huge amount of political tension. And also you'd create this sense — and this is the kind of thing that science fiction explores all the time — of an overclass and therefore a kind of overlord class that lives very much longer and is likely to be hoarding the wealth and living remotely from everyone else. And I think that's more likely than the elite uploads themselves to robots or a computer. When you were talking about the nature of humanity, what it's like to be a person: I find the disembodied versions of a human future unlikely. Were we ever to achieve it, that's where we would really part ways with the species as it has always been.
We experience the world in bodies and therefore we have all these senses and vulnerability to physical injury and disease. We have a very complicated relationship to our bodies, which I've written about at length. It's of great interest to me. And therefore, if we were in robots that you whose injured arm, you could simply screw a new one on — much less if we were in some kind of jar, effectively, like those brains in a jar in 1950s sci-fi movies — that never seems enviable, does it? To no longer have the embodied experience. The embodied experience comes with a lot of pain, but it also comes with a lot of pleasure.
Are you optimistic, meaning that you think this research is going to pay off in dramatically longer lives, whether or not it's immortal? People are taking this very seriously. Again, we have researchers who've said someone who might make it to 150 has already been born. Do you think, directionally, this is happening and we need to be talking about it seriously now and thinking about it seriously?
There's never any harm in thinking about anything. And it's interesting, so yes. My main concern would be further progress in, strictly speaking, extending longevity but not making enough progress on that business about extending healthspan. And then you've just got a bigger problem on your hands. So that, great, you've got a bunch of people who are 125 and they're drooling and don't remember their own names. This is not a future that we should be looking forward to — not personally and not socially. It's that health span thing that I think that we should be focusing on. And that means concentrating especially on dementia research, continuing to improve joint replacement. (I keep waiting on replacing my own knees, which are a complete wreck, because I just want them to inject some stem cells in them and not carve them out.)
We should be focusing on medical technology that will improve the experience of being older, rather than just make people technically able to get older. And I do think a certain amount of deliberateness here as to where you put your resources is merited. I wish that drug that the FDA just approved did better than delay dementia by five months, for example. That's a start, but it's kind of discouraging. It's so small. I personally am not planning on devoting the rest of my life to living as long as possible. There's a kind of circularity to that or an implicit pointlessness. I want to spend what time I've got doing something else rather than just trying to stick around a little bit longer. So while I get my exercise and I try to eat sensibly, I'm not going to be one of those people who is totally obsessed with diet and a
A million dollars a year on this infusion, this transfusion…
Right. Some of these people: This is what they spend all day doing. There’sone guy who gets regular transfusions from his own 17-year-old son. He obviously spends hours and hours every day at his exercise regime. He takes hundreds of supplements. (I foresee acid reflux.) I'm not going to do that. If that means that I take five years off my life expectancy and get to do something else and finally finish the last series of Succession, I'll take that. I'll take short and sweet.
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Nuclear fusion holds the potential to provide the world with cheap, clean, virtually inexhaustible energy for the future. For decades, the technology was dismissed as sci-fi fantasy. But a series of recent technological breakthroughs — including a net-energy gain ignition at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory last December — and spate of startups have made both government and investors increasingly optimistic. To talk about the state of the fusion industry, I’ve brought on Andrew Holland, chief executive officer at the Fusion Industry Association.
In This Episode
* The importance of recent fusion breakthroughs (1:17)
* What should policymakers be doing to promote fusion? (5:58)
* Environmentalism and fusion energy (14:09)
* Will fusion be the main energy source of the future? (18:57)
Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation
The importance of recent fusion breakthroughs
James Pethokoukis: Until recently, fusion energy was a government science project that you didn’t hear much about. But now we have dozens of startups involved and frequent media coverage of big breakthroughs. What happened?
Andrew Holland: It's results. Results, results, results. Science is progressing. Things have happened on both sides of the science of fusion. Plasma physics has been around for 60 years. It's really hard. It's really challenging. And they had to create a whole new area of physics, plasma physics, to be able to understand how to do fusion. They did that for 60 years, and it was continued short progress here and there, two steps forward, one step back. Until we got to the point probably about five or 10 years ago where the scientists said, “We think we know how to make this work.” But then what's happened is that startups and new thinking came in and applied all of the other technological advances that were out there—things like material science, artificial intelligence, machine learning, high-speed computing—as well as new business practices, putting those in effect onto what had been this kind of staid field of government science.
Putting those two together, and that's where the real developments and changes and things are happening. In fact, there are 38 members of the Fusion Industry Association now, with a few others around the world that are stragglers. And it's been just this almost Cambrian explosion of different technologies and ways forward and paths to get there. And everybody is competing to be the one to get there first and the one to get there best. So it is an exciting time. And we're seeing the effects of all of this other technology coming into plasma physics. Things have really changed.
So how significant was that breakthrough at Lawrence Livermore last year, both for the technology and also for investor and public awareness?
Yeah, it is significant in the kind of public awareness and public assessment of it. I can tell you that our website had its highest day ever in December when the announcement from the NIF happened. And I can tell you just kind of anecdotally a lot of that awareness came about. But the nature, I think, of an exponential curve, a Moore's law–type thing where it doubles every year, doubles every so often—is that when it's exponential, it's going straight up, but for a long time it looks pretty flat. So a long time below the level, it's been doubling and doubling and doubling over a number of years. It just started from a very low point. Those inside the field knew that something was happening, but it never broke out. It never got into the New York Times. It never got into Twitter discussions. It was all sort of inside baseball discussions.
It's been a completely new thing for the fusion community to now have a lot of interest coming into it. That said, though, the investors were a little keyed in a little bit earlier. Since the NIF announcement, we've seen some new deal flow. We've got about $6 billion invested in private fusion. Of that, most of it came in before the NIF announcement. Investors were looking at this. Investors were aware of it. We are still seeing some of the deal flow that post-NIF takes some time. There's a lot of due diligence that investors do and stuff like that, so we haven't yet seen the real explosion from NIF of investment and running. But I think we're due to pretty soon.
We're seeing this as kind of a starting gun of competition around the world.
What should policymakers be doing to promote fusion?
What is the policymaker awareness and action on this technology?
We're getting there. In March of 2022, the White House held an event calling for a “bold decadal vision on commercial fusion,” basically saying, can you get to commercial fusion in 10 years? It's an aggressive target. Our company said, yes, we can—with your help. The White House put in not an aggressive amount of budget in the scheme of billions and trillions even in the IRA and various other subsidy measures. Instead what they've started up is what's called a new milestone-based public-private partnership. The government gives pay-for-performance metrics on how to invest in fusion companies. Basically, the companies will say, “We think we can do this, this, and this.” And then the government says, “Okay, we'll pay you X amount for each of these milestones when you reach them.” Instead of the old way of doing a public-private partnership, which is you have to account for all the money you put in and we'll give you a fixed dollar amount and all this sort of stuff.
This is actually the way that NASA invested in SpaceX. It's a way to promote innovation in the companies while also protecting the taxpayer, because it is still risky in a business sense to put money into fusion. It's a really innovative new model for getting there. The DOE just put out these awards a couple of weeks ago in late May. It's gone to eight companies fusion companies, all doing work here in the United States.
We're seeing this as kind of a starting gun of competition around the world. The Brits have an aggressive program for a commercial fusion pilot plant. The Germans just put out a roadmap for how to get there. The Japanese have one. For a long time, the government science people have been cooperating together at ITER, which is the publicly funded science experiment in the south of France. It will get net energy when it turns on, and will be a significant experiment, but it's different than a commercial direction. And now we see all these countries and companies racing towards this. And honestly, we also see the Chinese making aggressive plans and moving forward on their own internal pathway as well. The NIF, in many ways, was kind of a starting gun for this process, and we're seeing it happen around the world.
You have diversity: You have government, you have the private sector, and there's also a diversity of technological approaches as well. It’s not just one thing, right?
Yes. There is a huge diversity in technological approaches. Of the 38 member companies you have of the FIA, none of them are taking the exact same technological pathway. It is, instead, a broad family tree of fusion with, at one end, laser-inertial fusion—which is like what the NIF did: taking lasers and firing them on a tiny pellet of fuel—and on the other end is magnetically confined fusion energy—which is using giant magnets to confine a plasma at extreme temperatures to get fusion out that way. And then in between, there are all sorts of other magneto-inertial types, which is a mix of one or the other. Some use electric pulses, some use giant pistons, some use plasma guns: all sorts of different ways of confining and controlling the plasma. And this is kind of what you'd expect in a new technology: We just don't quite know yet which is the one that will get there first—well, NIF got there first—but which is the one that will get there first in a commercially relevant manner. And then which one will then also show that it's the most commercially competitive as well. While you shouldn't probably expect 38 companies to all get there and all be the most successful there, there are multiple different ways forward. And they will probably all have different markets and different places that pick up each around the world. But exciting times in the technology.
We have to make sure that fusion gets the same subsidies as all the other clean-energy technologies. Fusion just needs a level playing field.
Whether it’s on the regulatory side or the funding side, what should government ideally be doing right now?
Three key things. Number one is the regulation. Because fusion is a nuclear technology, it is going to be regulated in the United States by the NRC, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. We've been engaged in a process—I've spent a lot of time on this—with the NRC in public that we've been contending that because fusion is so different from nuclear fission—just physically different, like you cannot have a meltdown, there is no long-lived radioactive waste, the fuel is isotopes of hydrogen or other not-dangerous fuels—so because of the physical differences, fusion should not be regulated in the same way that nuclear fission power plants are. And over a multi-year process, we convinced them. And the commission, a bipartisan group of Republicans and Democrats, five members, voted unanimously in April to regulate fusion separately from nuclear fission. It will be regulated like a medical isotope facility, an accelerator. This is a really important thing because it allows a lot more innovation. It should keep costs down. It doesn't mean there's no regulation, it just means it's regulated in the appropriate manner. That's number one.
Number two is the public-private partnerships that I talked about. I think it is important that our companies have access to the public programs, have access to the national labs. The researchers have been doing this for a long time, so to be able to work with them—ideally with government dollars, the government dollars would pay at least part of it.
And then number three is, we have to make sure we're not asking for special subsidies, but we have to make sure that fusion gets the same subsidies as all the other clean-energy technologies. Fusion just needs a level playing field. We think we'll compete just as well as any other technology.
Is that not the case right now?
It's not clear that it's the case right now. The IRA subsidies, for example, don't mention fusion. You wouldn't expect it to; this has come so quickly that it doesn't mention fusion. We think it will be designated as a clean technology. There's no reason it won't be. But Treasury has to make that designation. There's going to be a couple of early application programs for the tax credits for manufacturing stuff, and we're going to test that and we'll see if they give any of those competitive tax credits to fusion.
Environmentalism and fusion energy
Environmental groups: Are they pro-fusion? Are they against fusion? Do they view it like nuclear fission? What is the reaction of that community? Because obviously it would be very helpful if those groups were very positive about your efforts.
The groups at this point, I'd say most of them, are in a wait-and-see mode. It depends whether a group is a membership organization, which has kind of a grassroots membership and they have to see where their members are, or whether it's more of a “we can think of the best way forward.” We've had good interactions so far with a number of the bipartisan environmental groups. We haven't seen yet where places like Sierra Club or NRDC will come down. We think they should be positive about it. We've made some initial outreach. Some of our companies have worked directly with their local environmental groups as they do the outreach necessary to build new experiments and programs and stuff like that. It's, at this point, still uncertain. But maybe an example from Europe to see where we are: German Greens basically shut down the nuclear fission industry in Germany. On the other hand, the government of Germany now—SPD, so a left-wing government—has announced a pretty substantial investment into nuclear fusion. There is a good evidence that environmentalists won't be against it. Now, it's still mostly to be determined, and we're setting the groundwork to educate people, make them aware that this is not something they should be afraid of. Certainly we think there's no reason for them to oppose it, but it's not my choice.
It just seems like fusion has inherent benefits that will allow us to really expand faster and not have the drawbacks that fission has had.
Environmentalism and fusion energy
When people hear “nuclear,” lots of them think about radiation and meltdowns. How do you begin to educate people that fusion is different from fission and maybe shouldn’t carry that kind of baggage?
It's some work. It's some work, and education in the broad general public is really challenging on any policy issue, much less complicated science. So this is not an easy thing. We have to go in with eyes wide open. We have to be clear and direct, and we can't hide from anything. It is nuclear fusion, right? It is a nuclear reaction in which there are neutrons produced, there is radiation. You don't want to stand next to an unshielded fusion power plant. That would not be good for your health. But we know how to shield it. We know how to protect it, and it will be safe when it's running. But we have to go out in there and demonstrate that. And we can't just tell people, “This will be safe.” We have to engage with them, we have to talk to them, we have to understand what their concerns are. All this sort of stuff.
Because we're a new industry, we get to start from zero instead of, unfortunately our cousins in nuclear fission, they're starting from negative so they've got to build it back up. And many of our scientists are also in fission world, and our companies don't want to see them fail, certainly. But it just seems like fusion has inherent benefits that will allow us to really expand faster and not have the drawbacks that fission has had. It's all about speed. When you talk about our energy problems—climate, clean energy, energy security—it's not about building one power plant. It's about building tens, hundreds, thousands of these. And for that, you need speed. That's why we think it's really important to get the regulation right. And regulation is downstream of public perception, so you’ve got to get people to want this. If they want it and you get the regulation right, there's no reason you can't build these things as fast as you can roll them off an assembly line.
Will fusion be the main energy source of the future?
Should it be part of the energy mix, like solar and wind are today? Or is this the technology that will power the future like fossil fuels power the present?
If we get this right, if we get the deployment right, there is no reason that this can't be the thing that powers humanity for the rest of humanity's existence. There's a saying that once you build the first fusion power plant, the only thing you can build better is a better fusion power plant. We know that the energy system is really complicated. It's really competitive. So in the early days, fusion is going to have to compete. Fusion is going to have to get down to cost. It can't have the same problems as nuclear power or even that we're starting to see in solar or wind of deployment. You've got to be able to build these and deploy these. In the long term, once you have fusion, what you have is abundant power. And ideally abundant cheap power. When you have that, you can do all sorts of other stuff like desalinate salt water and get rid of water problems. If you've got abundant energy, you can create all sorts of energy-dense liquid fuels. That means you won't need oil anymore. You can just with feedstock do that. You can do a lot of cool stuff in space. It takes you from going to Mars in a year and a half to going to Mars in a month. And that just fundamentally changes us. You can have a shuttle going back and forth between the Earth and the Moon. Fusion power means that you have all sorts of new options for this. And it takes energy from something that you pull from out of the ground or you get from weather and turns it into something that is fundamentally a manufactured good. And that's really cool and really kind of changes our security paradigms, our environmental paradigms, and just makes it a real opportunity here to develop and move forward in a new way.
Micro Reads
▶ Big Tech’s Battle Royale Is Coming. The Winner? You. - Joanna Stern, WSJ |
▶ After Affirmative Action, We Can Still Fix the Education Pipeline - Jonathan Chait, New York |
▶ Billionaires and Bureaucrats Mobilize China for AI Race With US - Jane Zhang, Sarah Zheng, Bloomberg |
▶ The 2023 Long-Term Budget Outlook - CBO |
▶ European companies sound alarm over draft AI law - Javier Espinioza, FT |
▶ Big Tech Has a Troubling Stranglehold on Artificial Intelligence - Parmy Olsen, Bloomberg Opinion |
▶ Welcome to the big blimp boom - Rebecca Heilweil, MIT Tech Review |
▶ Genetic marker discovered for the severity of multiple sclerosis - Grace Wade, New Scientist |
▶ Stop talking about tomorrow’s AI doomsday when AI poses risks today - Editorial, Nature |
▶ The Path to Abundant Air Travel - Gary D. Leff, Discourse |
▶ Preserving Meaning in a Technology-Driven Society - Michael Westover, Profectus |
Many countries around the world have below-replacement fertility rates. And today’s today's guest says it's happening faster than we think, with world population on track to peak around 2060. That’s decades before the well-known UN model projection. What does that mean for the American and global economies, and what can we do about it — if anything? My AEI colleague Jesús Fernández-Villaverde joins this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast to discuss those questions and more.
Jesús is a professor of economics at the University of Pennsylvania, where he serves as director of the Penn Initiative for the Study of Markets. He’s also the John H. Makin Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
In This Episode
* The speed of demographic transition (1:19)
* World population prospects (5:57)
* The geopolitics of declining fertility (9:51)
* Can public policy reverse demographic trends? (15:09)
* Immigration and demographics (23:28)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation
The speed of demographic transition
James Pethokoukis: A lot of our discussion is going to be based on a paper that you co-authored, “Demographic Transitions Across Time and Space.” When you talk about a demographic transition, you're talking about a shift that countries undergo as they get richer and develop, from a high-fertility/ high-mortality demographic to low-fertility and low-mortality. Is that what you mean by demographic transition?
Why is that something economists study?
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde: Two reasons. First, because we believe that demographics are intimately linked with economic growth. Go back to the beginning of our science: [Thomas] Robert Malthus, one of the very earliest economists, already wrote very coherently about it. And second, because it helps us to think about a long list of policy questions that depend in a crucial way on demographics. When I think about the future of Medicare, when I think about the future of Social Security, those depend crucially on demographics. Understanding demographics is key to having good economic policies.
The key findings of that paper have to do with the speed and the depth of that transition? What are you saying that is different from what people previously believed about the demographic transition?
You're absolutely right: It's about the speed. If you stop any economist or demographer and you ask them what is happening with fertility on the planet, they will tell you it's falling. That's well known. What we add is a twist; we say it's falling much faster than anyone had realized before. And it's falling at a speed that is going to fundamentally transform many of our societies and the planet as a whole in ways that most policymakers are not really taking into consideration. So it's the speed. It's not that it's falling; it is falling immensely fast.
I look at the fertility of the planet as a whole in 2023. According to my calculations, it’s already 2.2. That means that the planet in 2023 is already below replacement rate. Which means that the world population will start falling some moment around the late 2050s to early 2060s. … What I want the listeners to understand is, for the very first time in the history of humanity — humans have been around for 200,000 years — we are below replacement rate in terms of fertility.
People and policymakers may have a general knowledge, but what you're saying is that they're dramatically underestimating how fast that is happening across the world.
Exactly. Let me give you a couple of numbers which personally I think are mind-blowing. Usually, we talk about the replacement rate. The replacement rate is how many children does a woman need to have on average to keep population constant in the long run? And many listeners may have heard the number 2.1. Why 2.1? Because under natural circumstances, without any type of selective abortion, there are around 105 boys born per 100 girls. And a few of the girls that are born are not going to complete their fertility age. So that's why you need a little bit more than two.
In fact, 2.1 is a very good number for the United States. It’s not a good number for the planet. Why is it not a good number for the planet? Because of two reasons. Reason one: selective abortions. You go to China, you go to India — and these are huge countries, demographically speaking — there is a lot of selective abortions. In India or China, you have around 110 kids per 100 girls. Second, because in Africa, another big part of the demographic future of humanity, infant mortalities is still sufficiently high that it makes a little bit of a difference. For the planet as a whole, the replacement rate is not 2.1. It's more like 2.2, 2.25. It’s kind of hard to know the exact number.
So I go to the planet and I look at the fertility of the planet as a whole in 2023. According to my calculations, it’s already 2.2. That means that the planet in 2023 — I'm not talking about the United States, I'm not talking about North America, I'm not talking about the advanced economies, I'm talking about the planet — is already below replacement rate. Which means that the world population will start falling some moment around the late 2050s to early 2060s. Of course, this depends on how people will react over the next few decades, how mortality will evolve. But what I want the listeners to understand is, for the very first time in the history of humanity — humans have been around for 200,000 years — we are below replacement rate in terms of fertility.
World population prospects
That doesn't mean the population's going down now, right? That means the population will be going down a generation from now.
Yes.
My argument is the United Nations is underestimating how fast fertility is falling. Instead of 2084, I'm pushing this to 2060, let's say. And instead of 9.7, I will say that we will peak around 9.2, 9.1, and then we are going to start falling.
What does that mean for the long-term estimate of peak population? Usually, you hear about the UN forecast and the forecast is usually about nine or 10 billion. So are you saying we will not reach those levels?
Exactly. First of all, let me tell you the United Nations’ population prospects, so everyone knows where I am. The most recent version is 2022. The United Nations forecasts that the peak of humanity will be 2084, and that it'll be around 9.7 billion. My argument is the United Nations is underestimating how fast fertility is falling. Instead of 2084, I'm pushing this to 2060, let's say. And instead of 9.7, I will say that we will peak around 9.2, 9.1, and then we are going to start falling.
And we’ll start declining faster than what the UN thinks?
Yes. Definitely faster. Let me give you a very simple example. The number of births that actually did happen in China in 2022 is what the United Nations forecasted to happen around 2040. So China is running 18 years ahead of the United Nations forecast. And China is a big chunk of humanity. For India, they are also five or six years ahead of the forecast. And if you go country by country, you realize that the United Nations is always behind. If you want, I can tell you why the United Nations is doing this. Basically, their model is running hot. It's forecasting way too many births for what we are actually seeing. And that's why I'm pushing the United Nations [from] 2084 to 2060.
It's a big difference. You're talking about a difference of at least half a billion people, right?
Yes.
That’s a lot. Tell me about the “Rule of 85,” because that's very fascinating. It's kind of a back-of-the-envelope way of looking at how to figure out some of these numbers.
This is something I came up with when I was trying to explain this to undergrads, and I figured out that it’s very easy to remember. Take the United States, take Canada, take Japan: the richest, most advanced economies, so the life expectancy is around 85 years. Imagine that you have a society where you have 1000 people being born every year. Since they are going to be living on average 85 years, in the long run, that's a society that is going to have 85,000 people. If you want to forecast what the level of population of a society will be, just look at the number of births that you have in any given year, multiply by 85, and that will give you kind of a middle-run assessment. It's such a simple rule of thumb. If you want to forecast China: China is slightly below 10 million births; 10 million times 85 — most of us can that in our head — it's 850 million. Well, their population now is 1.4 billion. So there you have a 60 percent reduction. South Korea, they had 240,000 births — I'm quoting from memory, a few thousand up or down — multiply by 85, you have slightly over 20 million. Current population of South Korea: 51 million.
And that’s 20 million when?
It will be 20 million in 85 more years. But in some sense, this is a very optimistic scenario because it's assuming that births are not going to continue falling down, which are probably going to continue falling down because the new cohorts will be smaller. There will be less women having fewer children. In that sense, the Rule of 85, when fertility is going down, kind of gives you an upper bound.
China is looking at a demographic abyss, and unless the Communist Party is able to change that, China is going to be a way less important economy in the middle run.
The geopolitics of declining fertility
It helps to have a lot of people in your country from a geopolitical standpoint. So you're talking about a different world of probably a much smaller China than people are expecting. Maybe relatively, then, a bigger India. And also what does, then, the United States look like? I do realize you don't have all these numbers in front of you either.
I remember many of them. China is looking at a demographic abyss, and unless the Communist Party is able to change that, China is going to be a way less important economy in the middle run. In fact, I'm just finishing a paper with a couple of co-authors where we forecast the economic growth of China. And our main statement using demographics is that the US will grow more than China by the year 2034, because China is going to have such a big falling population. In comparison with India, India has now around 24 million births a year. I told you China is below 10, India is 25 million. So it's 2.5x as many kids per year as China. So in 50 years, the geopolitics of Asia are going to look totally different from what they are now. A lot of people in Washington are very worried about China. I think that they are right to be worried about China until the year 2030, 2035. After 2035, the future doesn't look very bright for China.
Putting aside things that can change, like immigration, what would be your US population forecast?
As you say, the absolute key is immigration. But let's suppose that we go — and it's not that I'm advocating that policy, but as a mental experiment, a thought experiment — let's suppose that we have perfectly closed immigration, zero immigration from now on. The US right now is 335 million, so we will probably peak at 340 million and then start falling. In fact, the US population that has both parents born in the US is already falling.
What might change this forecast, either up or down? One thing you mentioned in another piece that you wrote is people's religious affiliation. Whether they become more religious, less religious, that seems to have an impact on their fertility rate and birth rates.
Yes, exactly.
And that can change.
That can change. For instance, let me give you a very simple example that a lot of people may relate to. When Ireland was partitioned and the 26 counties in the south of Ireland became the free state of Ireland, and the six counties in the north stayed as Ulster or Northern Ireland, Protestants were around 65 percent of the population and Catholics were around 35 percent. That's why they didn't want to join the free state of Ireland. In Northern Ireland, probably Catholics are going to become a majority. Why? Because Catholics in Ireland for the last 80 years have had a little bit higher fertility.
Why is this going to become so much more important? Let me give you a very simple example. Let's go back to 1950 and let me, in a very crude way, separate families between secular and religious. A secular family, let's say, has 2.5 kids. And a religious family, on average, has three kids. The difference is 0.5, but the base, 2.5, is sufficiently high that it doesn't make much of a difference. Now fast forward to 2023. The secular family is having one kid; the religious family is having two. First of all, the religious families have also reduced their size, but they have reduced their fertility less than seculars. And because the secular base now is so small, now we are talking about huge differences.
The question, of course, over time is going to be, how much of this religiosity will be transmitted intergenerationally? It's the case that the sons and the daughters of religious families are also going to be religious or not. But let's assume there is some persistence. That basically will tell you that in 200 years, the composition of the US population will be extremely different. And in fact, this is not a crazy point. Most historians of what is known as late antiquity — late antiquity goes from around 300 in the current era to around 700 in the current era — argue that conversions to Christianity stop around the year 370, 380. I'm talking about Western Europe. Basically what happens over the next 300 years is that Christians have a higher fertility than non-Christians. And by the early 700s, there are just not that many non-Christians left in Europe, and Europe has become a totally Christian continent. So these things happen. Small differences in fertility, you run them for 200 years and it has a huge difference. And again, going back to my point, Northern Ireland is a very different place today than 100 years ago just because Catholics have a little bit more kids than Protestants.
Aggressive policies like child subsidies, making it easier to reconcile family and work, maternity leaves, etc. can push you back to 1.7, 1.8. You are never coming back to three. You are never coming back to four. Can public policy reverse demographic trends?
Something else that could change is public policy. In countries which are already experiencing these drops, they’re giving bonuses to get people to have more kids. And there's a variety of sort of subsidies to encourage… Do those policies work? My baseline is that they probably really don't work. Maybe people have kids sooner than they would otherwise. Do we know of policies that actually have any kind of significant change on the number of kids people have at least in the rich countries?
First of all, let me be absolutely open that the jury is still a little bit out because, as you say, maybe what is happening is that people are just changing the moment where the kids are born. My reading of the evidence is that you make a little bit of an impact. Right now, think about countries like Spain or Italy where fertility rates are around 1.2, which is absolutely horrible. It's like a reduction of half of the size of the population in each generation. Aggressive policies like child subsidies, making it easier to reconcile family and work, maternity leaves, etc. can push you back to 1.7, 1.8. You are never coming back to three. You are never coming back to four. The point I have argued to policymakers is if you are in a society where the fertility rate is 1.8, you can handle a gently decreasing population. What you don't want to be is in front of a demographic abyss. So policies, in my reading of the evidence, help you to go from disaster into gentle decline. And I think the evidence supports that that can be achieved.
What do we know about societies that undergo a demographic decline? I imagine the past when that's happened, it's been because of war and disease, not because of choices people make voluntarily. There's been some sort of shock. Do we really have a good feel for what that looks like, when a country undergoes demographic decline, not because of disaster but because of just the choices people make, whether because of religious reasons or the cost of childcare or whatever?
We don't. We have never been there. I have written a piece with what I think are educated conjectures. What type of educated conjectures [do] I have? First of all, it's going to be a society that is way less dynamic. I'm a little bit older than I used to be, and I already realize that for me to adopt new technologies now is much harder than when I was 10 years younger. As the average person in society becomes older and older, you are just going to have societies that adopt fewer new technologies, you have fewer new entrepreneurs, etc.
For instance, there has been a lot of discussion that in the US there are now way less new businesses than 10, 15, 20 years ago. And there is a great economist at the University of California at LA, Hugo Hopenhayn, who has I think very convincingly demonstrated that this is completely driven by the fact that we have less 25-year-olds. Most new firms are created by people in their 20s, late 20s. We have now fewer people in their late 20s. And what he actually shows is that the percentage of people in their late 20s that create firms is the same as before. But there are less of them, so you are going to have fewer new firms.
We are going to be also societies that somehow lose a little bit of the sense of the future, because everyone tends to be very old. And then the third point that I conjecture — and this is something that we really, really want to keep in mind — is that drops in population are not going to be uniform across space. What I mean by that is, let's suppose that as I was mentioning before, things continue in the way they continue now in South Korea for another 50 years. So South Korea is going to lose 30 million people. Those people are not going to disappear from Seoul, from the capital; they're going to disappear from rural areas. And then what do we do with those rural areas? There is going to be a moment, and you already see that even in the US, but in a lot of places in Western Europe, population in a county starts to fall down, fall down, fall down.
And you know what the real problem is? One day they close the supermarket. And it's not because supermarket owner is evil. It's just because to run a supermarket, you need enough people. And suddenly there is not enough people in the county to have a large supermarket. And once you don't have a large supermarket in the county, life becomes very hard, because the only thing you have is a convenience store. So people move out. Even people who want to live in the small rural counties move out of the rural county because there are no services in the rural county anymore. I think about, who is going to keep the universities in a small rural areas open? There is just not going to be enough people to go to these colleges. And how do you go to your community and tell them that you are closing the local campus of your biggest state university just because there are not enough kids?
At least a few of the listeners are already thinking of the film Children of Men. Are you familiar with it?
I actually am not.
The premise is that for some reason 18 years ago, 18 years previous, women over the course of like a year just stopped having kids. And the movie begins where the youngest person alive ends up being murdered. He's an 18-year-old. It's a world where nobody's having kids and society's beginning to fall apart. It's like people have nothing to live for. They're already trying to gather up great works of art and preserve them. They don't know for who. It just seems like a society that's winding down.
Let's get back. Mortality could change, of course.
Yes.
CRISPR, all kinds of genetic editing — you can't really predict where technology will go, but that is something that could potentially change. Or even artificial wombs, maybe that will change people's choices as well.
Fair enough. Let me just tackle the issue of mortality. Remember the Rule of 85? You can change it to 90, to 95, 100. You know, 100 will be very easy because you just put two zeros. Let me go back to China. I told you 10 million births a year; now apply a rule of 100, that will be 1 billion. They are still losing 400 million. And do we really think that increases in medical technology can push mortality much later than 100? I'm not an expert, but from when I talk with people who are a little bit more knowledgeable that I am, they tend to be skeptical. In fact, I have been talking with economists who have been looking at mortality and the changes in mortality in the US and other advanced economies. Most of what modern medicine does for you is increasing the quality of life over the last years. It used to be the case that you would see someone in his 70s and he will be old and in very bad shape. Now, you're in pretty good shape until three days before you die. So I think that a lot of what medicine is going to do is not increase our life expectancy that much; it’s just about making our quality of life better. As a piece of a personal anecdote, if I may, both my wife and I are economists, which means that we have long sessions at home discussing investment portfolios and retirement accounts. And we include equations — I know that most of you probably don't have discussions with whiteboards at home and covariances of investment — but the age that I use for my own forecast of my own life is 90. I don't use more than 90, so at a personal level, I don't forecast myself living on expectation over 90 years old.
Immigration and demographics
One solution that's not a technological solution is immigration. But I would think there is a limit — even for the most pro-immigration country — to how many immigrants. It seems like it's not really a plausible policy for most countries, maybe for the United States more than others, but even here there's limits.
Yes, of course. First of all, every time I talk about immigration, I remind people I'm an immigrant myself, as you can probably tell from my funny accent. So it's not that I'm against immigrants. What I tried to point out in something that I wrote is, look, I was mentioning that South Korea is about to lose 60 percent of their population. That will mean that if you want to keep population constant, you will need that 60 percent of people living in South Korea who are not of Korean heritage. Have we ever seen societies that undertake such a deep demographic change in a couple of generations? Can a political system digest that change? I'm quite skeptical. One thing is to bring 10 percent of your population, 20 percent of immigrants. A very different thing is to have 60 percent.
Second point: I mentioned before that the planet as a whole is going to start losing people. And as far as we know, the net immigration to the planet is still zero. Maybe like in Men in Black there are some people coming from outside. But let's say the US in 2040 is still bringing immigrants from some developing economies, it means that demographic problem of these developing economies is going to become even more serious.
So let me give you a concrete example. If I were the minister of finance of Brazil, I would not be able to sleep at night. Brazil will probably start losing population around 2030, 2032, if not earlier. Who's going to migrate to Brazil? Brazil is still losing population. The best and the brightest of Brazilians move to the US or to Europe. You go to any good US university, and there's a lot of top Brazilian students and researchers. Brazil starts losing population, which immigrants do you bring? Who's going to move to Brazil?
Another country that, believe it or not, will probably start losing population maybe in another 20, 25 years are all Central American republics. Who's going to migrate to Guatemala? So what do you do then?
More likely that even more so people who have possibilities, who could get a job in an advanced economy, they will leave.
Exactly. So you're going to really, really be in a very tight spot. The immigration to me sounds really like I'm a US person, or I'm a German person, I'm thinking about this from a European or a North American perspective. I want the listeners to understand this is for the planet as a whole. And by the year 2055, every immigrant I'm gaining is someone else that is losing an immigrant.
But let's suppose that immigration stays at a historical level, a historical average. The US is not going to be in a very tight spot, demographically speaking, in 2040. China is going to be on a very tight spot, and that's going to really be a game changer. Which goes back to my point before about why I'm not worried about China taking over the world in the year 2050.
If you are a country who is able and has a history of accepting immigrants, it sounds like on a comparative level, that is really to your advantage. And if you think not only the size of your country, but the quality of your workforce is important, to me, you're making a case that this would be a big plus for the United States overall from a geopolitical, geo-economic position — relatively.
Sure. Coming back to our discussion about China versus the US, I think the US is still going to attract immigrants. How many immigrants we want to attract — and I say “we” now because I'm naturalized, so I can say we — how many immigrants we want to attract is a discussion we can have. But let's suppose that immigration stays at a historical level, a historical average. The US is not going to be in a very tight spot, demographically speaking, in 2040. China is going to be on a very tight spot, and that's going to really be a game changer. Which goes back to my point before about why I'm not worried about China taking over the world in the year 2050.
As I was mentioning in a previous answer, if somehow we avoid a conflict with China by the year 2030, in some sense, the war is won. It’s just an issue of waiting 10 years, handling this situation. Because China will really, really need to do something serious with their economy and their political system. Now, something that can happen is that China, you know, starts forcing people to have a lot of kids. What I will [remind] listeners is some very basic facts of nature: Even if the Chinese government starts forcing everyone to have kids, it will take nine months — and one night, I guess — and then once the kid is born, it takes, what, 22 or 23 years before this person completes college. And if we want these people to be top researchers, etc., they need to go to graduate school. It’s 20 years. Think about it in this way: If we are thinking about the top researchers among the cohort that is being born today in 2023, these people are not going to be researchers until 2051. Demographics has this enormous momentum; things that we decide today do not really show up until 30 years later. And by the way, that's one of the reasons I think that a lot of the demographic policies and a lot of economists are not very good, because most politicians do not think 30 years ahead.
Does technological progress automatically translate into higher wages, better standards of living, and widely shared prosperity? Or is it necessary to steer the development of technological improvement to ensure the benefits don't accrue only to the few? In a new book, two well-known economists argue the latter. I'm joined in this episode by one of the authors, Simon Johnson.
Simon is the Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship at MIT. He and Daron Acemoglu are authors of the new book Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity. Simon is also co-author with Jonathan Gruber of 2019's Jump-Starting America, now out in a new paperback.
In This Episode
* Is America too optimistic about technology? (1:24)
* Ensuring progress is widely shared (11:10)
* What about Big Tech? (15:22)
* Can we really nudge transformational technology? (19:54)
* Evaluating the Biden administration’s science policy (24:14)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation
Is America too optimistic about technology?
James Pethokoukis: Let me start with a sentence or two from the prologue: “People understand that not everything promised by Bill Gates, Elon Musk, or even Steve Jobs will likely come to pass. But, as a world, we have become infused by their techno-optimism. Everyone everywhere should innovate as much as they can, figure out what works, and iron out the rough edges later.” Later, you write that that we are living in a “blindly optimistic” age.
But rather, I see a lot of pessimism about AI. A very high percentage of people want an AI pause. People are very down on the concept of autonomous driving. They're very worried that these new technologies will only make climate change worse. We don't seem techno-optimistic to me. we certainly don't see it in our media. First of all, let me start out with, why do you think we're techno-optimistic right now, outside of Silicon Valley?
Simon Johnson: Well, Silicon Valley is a very influential culture, as you know, nationally and internationally. So I think there's a deep-running techno-optimistic trend, Jim. But I also think you put your finger on something very important, which is since we finished the book and turned in the final version in November, I think the advance of ChatGPT and some of our increased awareness that this is not science fiction — this is actual, this is real, and the people who are developing this stuff have no idea how it works, for example—I wouldn't call it pessimism, but I think there's a moment of hesitation and concern. So good, let's have the discussion now about what we're inventing, and why, and could we put it on a better path?
When I think about the past periods where it seemed like there was a lot of tech progress that was reflected in our economic statistics, whether it's productivity growth or economic growth more broadly, those were also periods where we saw very rapid wage growth people think very fondly about. I would love to have a repeat of 1995-2000. If we had technologies that could manage that kind of impact on the economy, what would be the downside? It seems like that would be great.
I would love a repeat of the Henry Ford experience, actually, Jim. Henry Ford, as you know, automated the manufacturing of cars. We went from producing tens of thousands of cars in the US to, 30 years later, producing millions of cars because of Ford's automation. But at the same time Ford and all the people around him — a lot of entrepreneurs, of course, working with Ford and rivals to Ford — they created a lot of new jobs, new tasks. And that's the key balance. When you automate, when you have a big phase of automation, and we did have another one during World War II and after World War II. We also created a lot of new tasks, new jobs. Demand for labor was very strong. And I think that it's that balance we need. A lot of the concerns, the justified concerns about AI you were mentioning a moment ago, are about losing jobs very quickly and faster than we can create other tasks, jobs, demand for labor in other, non-automating parts of the economy.
Your book is a book of deep economic history. It's the kind of book I absolutely love. I wonder if you could just give us a bit of a flavor of the history of what's interesting in this book about those two subjects and how they interact.
We tried to go back as far as possible in economic and human history, recorded history, to understand technological transformations. Big ones. And it turns out you can go back about 1000 years with quite reliable information. There are some things you can say about earlier periods, a little bit more speculative to be honest. But 1000 years is a very interesting time period, Jim, because as you know, that's pretty much the rise of Europe timeframe. A thousand years ago, Europe was a nothing place on the edge of a not very important part of one continent. And through a series of technological transformations, which took a long time to get going — and that's part of the medieval story that we explore — [there was] a huge amount of innovativeness in those societies. But it did not translate into shared prosperity, and it was a very stop-start. I'm talking about over the period of centuries.
Then, eventually, we get this Industrial Revolution, which is initially in Britain, in England, but it's also shared fairly quickly around northwest Europe: individual entrepreneurship, private capital, private ownership, markets as a dominating part of how you organize that economy. And eventually, not immediately, but eventually that becomes the basis for shared prosperity. And of course, that becomes the basis for American society. And the Americans by the 1850s to 1880s, depending how you want to cut it, have actually figured out industrial technology and boosted the demand for labor more than the Europeans ever imagined. Then the Americans are in the lead, and we had a very good 20th century combining private capital, private innovation with some (I would say) selective public interventions where a private initiative didn't work. And this actually carried a lot of countries, including countries in that European tradition, through to around 1980. Since 1980, it's become much more bumpy. We've had a widening of income inequality and much more questioning of the economic and political model.
Going back into the history: Oftentimes people treat the period before the steam engine and the loom as periods of no innovation. But there was. It just didn't have the impact, and it wasn't sustained. But we were doing things as a society before the Industrial Revolution. There was progress.
There was technological progress, technological change. Absolutely.
The compass, the printing press, gunpowder — these are advances.
Right. The Europeans, of course, were sort of the magpies of the world at that point. A lot of those innovations began in China. Some of them began in the Arab world. But the Europeans got their hands on them and used them, sometimes for military purposes. They figured out civilian uses as well. But they were very innovative. Some people got rich in those societies, but only a very few people, mostly the kings and their hangers-on and the church. Broad-shared prosperity did not come through because it was mostly forced labor. People did not own their labor. There was some private property, but there wasn't individual rights of the kind that we regard as absolutely central to prosperity in the United States, because they are central to prosperity and because they're in the Constitution for a reason, because it was coming out of feudalism and the remains of that feudal system that our ancestors in the United States were escaping from. So they said, “Let's enumerate those rights and make sure we don't lose them.” That's coming out of 800 years of hard-learned history, I would say, at that point. And that's one reason why, not at the moment of independence but within 50 to 70 years, the American economy was really clicking and innovating and breaking through on multiple technologies and sharing prosperity in a way that nobody had ever seen before in the world.
Before that period in the 1800s, the problem was not the occasional good idea that changed something or made somebody rich; it was having sustained progress, sustained prosperity that eventually spread out wide among the people.
Absolutely. And I think it was a question of who benefited and who was empowered and who could go on and invent the next things. Joel Mokyr, who's an economic historian at Northwestern, one of our favorite authors, has written about the sort of revolution of tinkerers. And that's actually my family history. My family, as far back as we can go, was carpenters out of Chesterfield in the north of England. They made screws for a hundred years starting in the mid-19th century in Sheffield. They would employ a couple of people at any one time. Maybe no more than eight, maybe as few as two. They probably initially polished blades of knives and eventually ended up making specialized screws. But very, very small scale. There was not a lot of formal education in the family or among the workforce, but it was all kind of relationships with other manufacturers. It was being plugged into that community. Alfred Marshall talked about these clusters and cities of regional entrepreneurship. That's exactly where I'm from. So, yes, I think that was a really key breakthrough: having the institutions, the politics, and the social pressure that could sustain that kind of economic initiative.
In the middle of the Industrial Revolution, late 1800s, what were the changes that we saw that made sure the gains from this economic progress were widely shared?
If we're talking about the United States, of course, the key moment is the mechanization of agriculture, particularly across the West. So people left their farms in Nebraska or somewhere and moved to Chicago to work for McCormick, making the reapers that allowed more people to leave their farms. So you needed a couple of things in that. One was, of course, better sanitation and basic infrastructure in the big cities. Chicago grew from nothing to be one of the largest cities in the world in period of about a decade and a half. That requires infrastructure that comes from local government. And then there's the key piece, Jim, which is education. There was what's known as a “high school movement.” Again, very local. I don't think the national government knew much about it until it was upon them. [It was] pushing to educate more people in basic literacy and numeracy and to be better workers. At the same time, we did have from the national government, of course particularly in the context of the Civil War, the land grant universities, of which MIT is very proudly one of by the way — one of the only two that became private for various reasons. But we were initially founded to support the manufacturing arts in Massachusetts. That was a state initiative, but it was made possible by a funding arrangement, a land swap, actually, with the federal government.
Ensuring progress is widely shared
The kind of interventions which you've already mentioned — education and infrastructure — these seem like very non-controversial, public-good kinds of things. How do those kinds of interventions translate into the 2020s and 2030s in advanced countries, including the United States? Do we have need to do something different than those?
Well, I think we should do those, particularly education, better and more and update it really quickly. I think people are going to agree on that in principle; there may be argument about how exactly you do that. I do think there are three things that should be on the table for potential serious discussion and even potential bipartisan agreement. The first is what Jaron Lanier calls “data dignity,” which is basically [that] you and I should own the data that we produce. This is an extension of private property rights from the right of the political spectrum. The left would probably have other terminology for it. But what's basically happening, and the value that's being created in these large language models, is those models are taking data that they find for free — actually, it's not really free, but it's not well protected on the internet, digital data — and they're using that to train these very large models. And it's that training process that's generating, already and will train even more, huge value and potential monopoly power for incumbents there. So Jaron’s point is, that's not right. Let's have a proper organization and recognition of proper rights, and you can pay for it. And then it also gives consumers the ability to bargain potentially with these large monopolies to get developers some technologies rather than other technologies.
The second thing is surveillance. I think everyone on the right and the left should be very uncomfortable with where we are on surveillance, Jim, where we've slipped into already on surveillance, and also where AI is going to take us. Shoshana Zuboff has a great book, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism on exactly this, going through where we are in the workplace and where we are in in our society. And then of course there's China and what they're doing in terms of surveillance, which I'm sure we're not going to do. In fact, I think the next division of the world may be between the low-surveillance or safeguarded-surveillance places, which I hope will include the US, and the high-surveillance places, which will be pretty much authoritarian places, I would suggest. That's a really different approach to the technology of how you interact with workers, citizens, everybody in all their various roles in life.
The third one we're probably not going to agree on right away, but I do want us to have some serious discussion about it, is corporate taxation. Kim Clausing from UCLA, a former senior Treasury person, points out that we do have a graduated corporate tax system in the US but bigger companies pay less. Smaller companies’ effective tax rate is higher than bigger companies because they move their profits around the globe. That's not fair and that's not right. And she proposes that we tax mega profits above $10 billion, for example, at a higher rate than we tax smaller profits to give the big companies that are very successful, very profitable an incentive to make themselves smaller. The reason I like Kim's proposal is I want competition, not just between companies directly in terms of what they're offering, but also between business models and mental models. And I think what we're getting too much from Microsoft and Google and the others who are likely to become the big players is machine intelligence, as they call it, which basically means replacing people as much as possible. We argue for machine usefulness, which is also, by the way, a strong tradition in computer science — it's not the ascendant tradition or ascendant idea right now — that is, focusing technology on making humans more effective. Like this Zoom call is making us more effective. We didn't have to get ourselves in the same room. We are able to leverage our time. We're able to organize our lives differently.
Find those kinds of opportunities, particularly for lower-income workers. We are not getting that right now because we lack competition, I think, in the development of these models. Jim, too much. You joked at the beginning that the Silicon Valley is the only optimist. Maybe that's true, but they're the optimists that matter because they're the ones who control the development of the technology. Almost all those strings are in their hands right now, and you need to give them an incentive to give up some of that. I'm sure we can agree on the fact that having the government break things up, or the courts, is going to be a big mess and not where we want to go.
What about Big Tech?
Does it suggest caution, as far as worrying about corporate size or breaking up these companies, that these big advances, which could revolutionize the economy, are coming from the very companies you're worried about and are interested in breaking up? Doesn't it argue that they're kind of doing something right, if that's the source of this great innovation, which may be one of the biggest innovations of our life?
Yes, potentially. We're trying to be modest and we're trying to be careful here, Jim. We're saying if you make these really big profits, you pay the higher tax rate. And then you have a conversation with your shareholders about, do we really need to be so big? When Standard Oil was broken up before World War I, it was broken into 25 or 26 pieces, Rockefeller became richer. That created value for shareholders. More competition was also good, I think we can say safely at this distance, it was good for consumers. Competition for consumers is something I think we should always attempt to pursue, but competition in mental models, competition for ideas, getting more plurality of ideas out there in the tech sphere. I think that's really important, Jim. While I believe this can be — and we wrote the book in part because we believe it is — a very big moment in sort of technological choices that we humans have made and will continue to make. This is a big one. But if it's all in the hands of a few people, we're less likely to get better outcomes than if it's in the hands of hundreds of people or thousands of people. More competition for ideas, more competition to develop ways to make machines and algorithms useful to people. That's our focus.
You have OpenAI, a company which was invested in by Microsoft, and Google/Alphabet is working on their version. And I think now you have Facebook and Amazon devoting more resources. Elon Musk is talking about creating his own version. Plus you have a lot of companies taking those models and doing things with them. It seems like there's a lot of things going on a lot of ferment. It doesn't to me seem like this kind of staid business environment where you have one or two companies doing something. It seems like a fairly vibrant innovation ecology right now.
Of course, if you're right, Jim, then nobody is going to make mega excess profits, and then we don't have to worry about the tax rate proposal that I made. My proposal, or Kim's proposal, would have bite only if there are a couple of very big winners that make hundreds of billions of dollars. I'm not a computer scientist, I’m an economist, but it seems…
Right, but it seems like those mega profits might be competed away, so I'd be careful about right now breaking up Google into eight Googlettes.
Fine. I'm not trying to break them up. I'm saying give them a tax system so they confront that incentive and they can discuss it with their shareholders. The people who follow this closely, my computer science colleagues at MIT, for example, feel that Microsoft and OpenAI are in the lead by some distance. Google, which is working very closely with Anthropic, which broke away from OpenAI, is probably a either a close second or a slightly distant second. It's sort of like Manchester City versus the rest of the Premier League right now. But the others you mentioned, Facebook, Amazon, are some years behind. And years are a big deal here. Elon Musk, of course, proposed a pause in AI development and then suggested he get to launch his own AI business — I suppose to take advantage of the pause.
That’s a little suspicious.
There's not going to be a pause. And there's not going to be a pause in part because we know that China is developing AI capabilities. While I am not arguing for confrontation with China over this or other things necessarily, we do have to be cognizant that there's a major national security dimension to this technology. And it is not in the interest of the United States to fall behind anyone. And I'm sure the Chinese are having the same discussion. That's going to keep us going pretty much full speed. And I think is also the case that many corporate executives can see this is a potential winner-take-all. And on the applications, the thinking there is that we're going to be talking very soon about a sort of supply chain where you have these fundamental large language model, the [General-Purpose Technology] type at the bottom, and then people can build applications on top of them. Which would make a lot of sense, right? You can focus on healthcare, you can focus on finance, but you'll be choosing between, right now it looks like, one or two of the large language models. Which does suggest really big upstream profits for those fundamental suppliers, just like how Microsoft has been making money since the mid-1980s, really.
Can we really nudge transformational technology?
With an important technology which will evolve in directions we can't predict, can we really nudge it with a little bit of tax policy, equalizing capital labor rates? Can we really nudge it in the kind of direction that we might want? If generative AI or machine learning more broadly is as significant as some people say, including folks at MIT and Stanford, I just wonder if we're really operating at the margins here. That the technology is going to be what the technology is. And maybe you make sure we can retrain people, and we can change education, and maybe we need to worry a bit about taxing this profit away if you're worried about corporate power. But as far as how the technology interacts with the workplace and the tasks people do, can we really influence it that much?
I think that's the big question of the day, Jim. Absolutely. This is a book, not a policy memo, because we feel that the bigger issue is to have the discussion. To confront the question, as you pose it, and to discuss, what do we as a society want? How do we develop the technology that we need? Are we solving the problems that we really want to solve? Historically, of course, we didn't have many of those conversations. But we weren't as rich then as we are now. Hopefully we're more aware of our history now and more aware of the impact of these choice points. And so it's exactly to have that discussion and to say, if this is as big as people say, how are we going to move it in various directions?
I like, as you know, to propose specific policy. I do think, particularly in Washington, it's the specifics that people want to seize. “What do we mean by surveillance? What do we mean by s safeguards over surveillance? How could you operationalize protections against excessive surveillance? By whom? By employers, by the police, by companies from whom you buy stuff? From your local government?” That conversation still needs to be had. And it's a very big, broad conversation. So let's have it quickly, because the technology is moving very quickly.
What does the more recent history of concerns about technology, what lessons should we draw? I think of, I think of nuclear technology, which there are lots of concerns and we pass lots of rules. We basically paused that technology. And now we're sitting here in the, you know, in the 2020s worried about climate change. That, to me, is a recent powerful example of the dangers of trying to slow a technology, delay a technology that may evolve in ways you don't understand, but also can solve problems that we don't understand. It's, to me, are the history of least in the United States of technology over the past half century has been one of being overly cautious, not pedal to the metal gungho, you know, you know, let's, let's just keep going as fast as possible.
As I think you may remember, Jim, I'm a big advocate for more science spending and more innovation in some fundamental sense across the whole economy because I think that generates prosperity and jobs. In my previous book, Jump-Starting America, we went through the nuclear history, as you flag. And I think the key thing there is at the beginning of that industry, right after World War II, there was over-optimism on the part of the engineers. The Atomic Energy Commission chair famously promised free electricity, and there was very little discussion about safety. And people who raised the issues of safety were kind of shunted to one side with the result that Three Mile Island a little bit and Chernobyl a lot was a big shock to public consciousness about the technology. I'm in favor of more innovation…
I wonder if we've overlearned that lesson, you know? I think we may have overlearned it.
Yes. I think that's quite possibly right. And we are not calling for an end to innovation on AI just because somebody made a movie in which AI takes over the world. Not at all. What we're saying is there are choices and you can either go more towards replacing people, that's automation, and more towards new task creation, that's machine usefulness. And that's not a new thing. That's a very old, thousand-year or maybe longer tension we've had in the history of innovations and how we manage them. And we have an opportunity now, because we're a more conscious, aware, and richer society, to try and pull ourselves through various means — and it might not be tax policy, I'll grant you that, but through various means — towards what we want. And I think what we want is more good jobs. We always want more good jobs, Jim. And we always want to produce useful things. We don't want just to replace people for the sake of replacement.
Evaluating the Biden administration’s science policy
Since you brought it up, I'm going to take the opportunity to ask you a final question about some of your other work about trying to create technology hubs across America. It seems like those ideas have to some degree made their way into policy during the Biden administration. What do you think of its efforts on trying to spend more on R&D and trying to spread that spending across America and trying to make sure it's not just Austin and Boston and New York and San Francisco and LA as areas of great innovation?
In the Chips and Science Act, there's two parts: chips and science. The part that we are really advocating for is the science part. And it's exactly what you said, Jim, which is you spend more on science, spread it around the country. There are a lot of people in this country who are innovative, want to be innovative. There are some really good resources, private sector, but also public sector, public-sector universities, for example, in almost every state where you could have more innovation in some basic knowledge-creation sense. And that can become commercialized, that can become private initiative, that can generate jobs. That's what we are supporting. And I think the Science Act absolutely did internalize that. In part, because people learned some hard lessons during COVID, for example.
The CHIPS Act is not what we were advocating for. And that's going to be really interesting to see how that plays out. That's more, I would say, conventional, somewhat old-fashioned industrial policy: Pick a sector, back a sector, invest in the sector from the public sector perspective. Chips are of course a really important sector, and the discussion of AI is absolutely part about that. And of course we're also worried, in part because of COVID but also because of the rise of China, about the security of supply chains, including chips that are produced in, let's say, parts of Asia. I think there are some grounds for that. There's also some issues, how much does it cost to build a state-of-the-art fab and operate it in the US versus Taiwan or South Korea, or even China for that matter? Those issues need to be confronted and measured. I think it's good that we're having a go. I'm a big believer in more science, more science spending, more responsible deployment of it and more discussion of how to do that. The chips industrial policy, we'll see. I hope something like this works. It would be quite interesting to pursue further, but we have had some bumps in those roads before.
I have many times written about the importance of the story we tell ourselves about the future, especially in big-budget science fiction films. But does all the doom and gloom from Hollywood even matter? And is it driven from creatives at the top or by audience demand? To discuss those questions and more, I'm talking with Sonny Bunch.
Sonny is the culture editor for The Bulwark, where he hosts The Bulwark Goes to Hollywood newsletter and podcast.
In This Episode
* Netflix’s upcoming $200 million techno-pocalyptic movie (1:06)
* Why is Hollywood obsessed with dystopia? (6:17)
* The solutionism of The Martian (8:48)
* Do sci-fi visions of the future even matter? (15:03)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation
Netflix’s upcoming $200 million techno-pocalyptic movie
James Pethokoukis: I write a lot about negative future-pessimistic media. Netflix has a big new movie in the works, a $200 million film directed by the Russo brothers, who you may know from the Marvel movies. They’ve got Millie Bobby Brown, Chris Pratt. Big production. It's called The Electric State. And this is a summary of this film: “A runaway teenager and her … robot travel west through a strange USA, where the ruins of gigantic battle drones litter the countryside heaped together with the discarded trash of a high tech consumerist society in decline.” And then it goes on about our “hollow core of civilization has finally caved in.”
This might be a fantastic film, and I have a lot of confidence in the Russo Brothers and that budget. Here we are, we have a lot of interesting things cooking in the world from the Musk rockets and AI and huge breakthroughs in biotechnology, and that's the movie they're giving us for $200 million, about the decline of consumerist society. You've been writing a bit about this topic. When does it end?
Sonny Bunch: It's interesting because I was thinking about this the other day: Really, what is the only truly utopian vision of the future? It's Star Trek. That's about it. In terms of mass popular entertainment, the only really, truly utopian ideal of the future is Star Trek. Now, there's still conflict in Star Trek. But it is at least a kind of post-scarcity society where folks are interested in exploring the world and bettering everyone. Look, part of this is it is easier to create tension and drama out of things that are bad. And what's the easiest way to look at how things might be bad? Look at what basically works about right now and say, “Well, what if this doesn't work? What if it's actually bad for us?” The idea of Netflix producing a stirring condemnation of consumerist society is kind of funny in and of itself. Netflix is the absolute peak of consumerism.
Literally, the mission statement of Netflix is to sit on your couch and consume; consume so much you don't fall asleep. The initial argument for Netflix one of the creators the company made was, “We are trying to win the war against sleep.” They're not winning the war against sleep by encouraging people to create wonderful new advancements of society. It’s just to sit there and passively consume. So it's kind of funny. I like a good dystopian action movie. I can watch those all day long, so I'm probably as much of the problem as anything else. But it's definitely a thing.
And it just doesn't seem that hard to me to have some sort of positive message, even if it's overall kind of dystopian or apocalyptic. I just don't see that there's any attempt. It's just full-throated doom.
Remember when Interstellar came out? I love Interstellar. Great movie. It is hopeful in a certain way. It's about trying to find new places for Earth to live; it's on the edge of collapse. When Matthew McConaughey's character comes back about a hundred years later because of all the time dilation, humanity has moved up to the space stations that are orbiting and people have been saved. As far as these things go, it's actually a fairly positive message. Except there was an undercurrent from some critics who were like, “You know, this means that like billions of people died, right? They didn't save more than a handful of folks up on those space stations. Most of humanity is dead or dying.” And I was like, yeah, but they didn't focus on that. It's still pretty positive.
I would counter argue that one of the themes of that movie is at some point we turned our back on progress. It's like society be has become anti-technology. To me, that movie says if we had not abandoned technological progress, maybe this huge disaster which has befallen the Earth, maybe we could have fixed it. But now it's too late. Now we have no other choice but to head to the stars, which is something we probably should have been thinking about anyways. I think a superficial viewing of that movie is that it is pessimistic. And I think you're right. I think, fundamentally, that is a future pro-progress film.
Why is Hollywood obsessed with dystopia?
But you mentioned Star Trek at the beginning. Why do you think Hollywood's sci-fi, at least, has become almost completely obsessed with the dystopian and apocalyptic? Is it just that it's easy to make that kind of film? Or is it reflecting something in our society?
I don’t know. What do we like to say? Everybody likes to think they're living in the end times. Everybody likes to think that they are important enough to see the end of the world. This is a constant through human civilization. Everybody thinks that the end is just around the corner, and they're the last generation that will see the world. And now we have the technology and the filmmaking ability to actually realize that world we have; we have the ability to destroy the world on film. (In real life, too, if somebody really wanted to get crazy, but it's much easier and safer to do on film.) And it is easier. It's an easier story to tell. It's an easier story to portray because if you live in a post-apocalyptic society, there are a lot fewer of? Extras. You don't have to fill stadiums full of people. You don't have to have crowded streets with everybody walking around. You just have somebody, oh,
You have empty streets and a little bit of trash, and you have a set.
You’ve got empty streets. This is the Russo brothers. They're doing it all on green and blue screens. You’ve just got Millie Bobby Brown walking around, kicking over a trashcan every now and again, and it's fine. I do think that there's an inherent narcissism to all of this: We have achieved the peak of civilization. What's the line in The Matrix when Agent Smith is talking about how they designed the Matrix?
We took the peak of civilization.
We took the peak of human civilization, but really once we started thinking for you, it became our civilization. And what did they pick? They picked 1999, when that movie came out. That is the constant refrain in all of this stuff: We are the peak, things are to go precipitously downhill, enjoy it while it lasts. It is inherently dramatic, in a certain way, to imagine having to come back from a fall of a sort. But the fact that it is so constant just leads me to believe that it really is quite silly.
The solutionism of The Martian
You mentioned Star Trek, but I would also say a movie like The Martian, which I also view as positive, pro-technology, pro-solutions — we can solve problems. And to me, that's what's wrong with a lot of these other films: we end up not being able to solve any problems. Probably our attempts to solve the problems only make things worse. And that is, to me, a rare example of a problem-solving movie that's plenty dramatic. There's no obvious villain, other than perhaps the planet Mars itself and space. To me, it's just a fundamental lack of effort. And again, I don't know if it's easy, it's cheaper in some ways, it also kind of reflects the views of the people who make the movies. But it's just shocking that there's not more made, because we do have a few examples of being able to do it properly.
It is interesting. I wrote a piece for the Washington Post a few years back about how environmentalists make good movie villains. And the reason that they make good movie villains is because these are the people who the writers can really identify with. The whole idea of creating a realistic villain, if you want a realistic villain, is it's somebody you can identify with, somebody whose goals you sympathize with. And many of these villains — for instance Thanos in the first run of MCU movies, his whole thing is, “I lived through environmental collapse, many people died, it drove me insane, and I'm going to eliminate half of the universe so to avoid this problem again.” Which seems to defeat the purpose, but whatever. The reason he is sympathetic to the people who are writing these movies is that they look around and they see, “Global warming. It’s happening. It's here. We're all going die. There's going to be crop collapses. The population bomb is going off. We're never going to make it.” And nevermind that none of this has come to pass in the 50 to 100 to 1,000 years that we've been talking about it. It is still an ever-present terror. And if you're a person of a certain worldview, I can see why it would be appealing to try and work through it. The Martian is interesting, too, because The Martian is kind of techno-utopian in the sense that it posits a world in which all of the world's powers can work together. There's a very specific subplot with China—which at the time was doing more space shuttle, rocket exploration-type stuff than we were—working hand-in-hand with China to kind of make it all work out. I'm curious to see how that specific subplot would play today, if that is a thing that would be in the novel or the movie, or if it would not be.
The relationship between the nations might have been portrayed a bit testier. That movie came out — the novel came out a bit earlier, but certainly the film came out just as things were starting to turn.
Also, just in terms of the business of Hollywood, it's an interesting movie. Because that's a movie that came out right when Hollywood was really trying to make inroads into China, was working hand-in-hand with the Chinese government to get script approval and make sure that their films got a release there. And of course, it is impossible — this is the one thing I say over and over again to people — it is impossible to understand the artistry of Hollywood without understanding the business of Hollywood. You cannot understand why movies get made or how they get made or how they're received by Hollywood without understanding what is actually happening in the business of Hollywood. And at that moment in time, China was a market ripe for the plucking. Again, things have changed a bit in the last few years. I would be curious to see how that played now.
If I were writing a script and I wanted it to have some sort of internal logic and I wrote that the driving force from my villain is that he needs to kill half of every living being in the universe so all of life doesn't consume all the resources, that idea would die immediately. If I brainstormed that idea, it wouldn't last 30 seconds. To me, it sort of gets at the ethos in Hollywood in which someone didn’t say, “We need to come up with a better motivation for the film, because that's ridiculous.”
Two things here. One, it's very funny, the original comic book motivation — I'm going to put on my nerd hat here for a second — the original comic book motivation for Thanos actually weirdly makes more sense: He just wants to kill half the universe to please his girlfriend, death, the manifestation of death. That's what he wants to do. I actually find that to be much more sensible than what they wound up with. But the second thing is that this is my broad case for [why] Hollywood should hire more conservative screenwriters. Because if you really want your villains to be a villainous and for the industry to kind of reflect your own beliefs, you need like oil barons who aren't cartoonishly mustache-twirling. You need people who are out there like, “Yes, we're going to frack because that's what's going to power the hospital for the children. We're going to build nuclear power plants and we're going to dump the waste in this nature preserve because that's the only way to keep the bread factory running for the orphans.” Things like that.
Do sci-fi visions of the future even matter?
Does any of this matter? Does it matter how we portray the future? Does it matter how we portray—or perhaps in this case we don't really portray—innovators or explorers? Is this something that's just confined to our media consumption habits? Or does it have a bigger impact on the world? Obviously I think it does, but I'm open to someone arguing that it doesn't.
I go back and forth on this question, honestly. I really go back and forth on this, because I do think there's a chicken and an egg issue here. I think that the art of a time reflects the sensibility of the time. I think that is mostly how the cause and effect works, but I also do think that a society chooses how to live by the stories they tell themselves in a very real way. I think this is why myth is important. This is why the stories we tell children matter. I do think that the art that we consume does help shape how we choose to live. I don't want to mush-mouth weasel my way out of this, but I do think it's a very open and interesting question. Depending on the day of the week, I can argue either side of it.
I did an interview early on in my Substack with Ronald D. Moore, who has this great series For All Mankind. It shows a space race that never ends. It creates a really interesting alt-reality, that while there are still problems, we're better off for continuing to head into space. It doesn't seem that hard. I asked him some of the exact same questions I'm asking you. He was like, “It's economics. People think that makes money and until it stops making money, we're going to keep getting more of it.” I would like to think that there'd be something more to it than that, that film studios, if they have the opportunity to make something that can make money, but also doesn't completely reflect some sort of cultural exhaustion, that they would do it. But maybe I'm just too optimistic.
This very much is my point with China: Everything that Hollywood makes is based on the last thing before that made money until none of that stuff is making money. And then they have to find something else. This is why you had a bunch of…
You're still getting more zombie movies with The Last of Us. I thought that had just about died out.
No, The Last of Us, huge hit. 30 million people watching on HBO across its various platforms. We're going to get more of The Last of Us, more zombies: The Walking Dead, 17 more spinoffs of that. We’ll see.
The conventional narrative about the economic history of World War II says that new learning from wartime mobilization jumpstarted a postwar golden age of fast economic growth. But, economist Alexander Field writes in his 2011 book, A Great Leap Forward, "It was not principally the war that laid the foundation for postwar prosperity. It was technological progress across a broad frontier of the American economy during the 1930s." Field develops that argument in his new book, The Economic Consequences of U.S. Mobilization for the Second World War, released last fall. In this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I'm joined by Alex to discuss his argument.
Alex is the Michel and Mary Orradre Professor of Economics at Santa Clara University's Leavey School of Business.
In This Episode
* Depression-era technological progress
* Economic detective work (8:04)
* What about the scientific advances of WWII? (13:23)
* The US economy if WWII never happened (17:39)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation
Depression-era technological progress
James Pethokoukis: You write in A Great Leap Forward, a book that I consult frequently and mention frequently in my writings: “The years 1929-1941 were, in the aggregate, the most technologically progressive of any comparable period in U.S. economic history. … It was not principally the war that laid the foundation for postwar prosperity. It was technological progress across a broad frontier of the American economy during the 1930s.” Your new book builds upon that argument, but could you, just for a moment, give a quick summary of A Great Leap Forward, and then how that moves into your new book?
Alexander Field: The basic argument of A Great Leap Forward was that behind the backdrop of double-digit unemployment for at least a decade, potential output was growing by leaps and bounds during the Great Depression. It wasn't really recognized until Simon Kuznets had to try to do a back-of-the-envelope calculation of what the potential of the economy could be. But the contributors to that were, I think, several. Number one was the last third of the conversion of the internal transmission of power within American factories from the shafts and belts, which was a signature of the 19th-century factory, to fractional-horsepower electric motors and electric wiring. And the second part was just an enormous amount, surprisingly, of research and development spending. Just astounding, if you think of the Depression as being so disastrous macroeconomically, but in terms of the number of people employed growing by leaps and bounds, number of labs established. And then finally, although it's widely accepted that the New Deal spending was too small in a Keynesian sense to immediately bring the economy out of the Depression, nevertheless, that spending on streets and highways and bridges and hydropower and so on had very strong positive supply-side effects. I think it's the combination of those three factors that I see as responsible for making potential output so much larger in 1941 than people thought it was.
For the layman, your finding in that book, your thesis, is extraordinarily counterintuitive. You would never expect that underneath that sky-high unemployment number and the failing banks and the breadlines, there was this sort of innovative ferment happening and foundations laid for future progress. Similarly, to the extent that people would have an economic opinion about World War II, I would guess: 1) that it brought us out of the Great Depression, and 2) that it was a period of key advances, key technologies and the fact maybe we learned how to do things more efficiently during the war, whether it's build boats or what have you. Those two things are what played a huge role in postwar prosperity—I think that might be sort of the everyman way they would conceive of it. That is not exactly what you found.
I think you've done a very good job characterizing what I see as the two key themes in the conventional wisdom about the Second World War. Basically, the argument that fiscal and monetary stimulus rapidly closed the output gap, the unemployment rate went from under 10 percent in ‘41 to unimaginably low, below 2 percent, in ‘43 and ’44. That's accepted and I'm not challenging that. But the second part of the conventional wisdom is what the economists call learning by doing: the emphasis on the decline in unit costs with accumulated output as a result of producing military durables. And the argument is exactly as you stated it. The argument is that learning spilled over into the postwar period and kind of underlined the supply side foundations for the golden age, which is ‘48 to ‘73. Now, my argument is different.
I see the Second World War from a productivity history perspective as a detour. My argument is that the progress, the growth of potential output up through 1941, that's essentially most of the reason why the US stands astride the world economy in ’48, not what happened between ‘41 and ’48. It might have been different if the US had persisted in producing a hundred thousand piston-driven aircraft a year. But we didn't. We didn't produce piston-driven aircraft. Most of the products that we got very good at making, we stopped making them fairly soon after Victory over Japan Day. And I view most of that specific human capital as not really having a great deal of relevance after the war.
As you mentioned, the things we got good at making were not just the instruments of war, but the instruments of war at a particular period. They were not going to be applicable to future conflicts, but they're also not applicable to a civilian economy that, once the war was over, began to expand very quickly. You mentioned the airplanes. I would also assume the kind of ship building that was done in the war was also not particularly applicable to the post-war era.
That's right. That's exactly right. I see basically, the success of US industry under government leadership in producing the military ordinance that supplied our armies, as well as those of Britain and the Soviet Union, our allies, and so on — I see that basically as the application of technologies that had been honed in the ‘20s and particularly in the 1930s, producing automobiles and refrigerators, and applying that management experience to mass producing military durables, rather than the view that it was experience producing military durables that laid the foundations for the postwar period in terms of the supply side.
Economic detective work
I think people would think that we didn't need to look anymore at the Great Depression or World War II, that this is, they would say, settled science. We know exactly what happened and why it happened. Apparently the role of the World War II, what happened there, is not settled science. So what were people missing previously? What did you find that presents a different perspective?
I think, as you say, it began with the findings about the Great Depression. I think what we're doing in the business of research, particularly academic research, is we're researching things: We're trying to find something new to say. But finding something new to say is only part of it; it also has to be something that actually might be true. And so it really it came out of really deep immersion in a variety of sources, both statistical and documentary: reading the minutes of the War Production Board, reading the minutes of the planning committee. And as this happened, a lot of preconceptions that I had about the war began to fall away. For example, the central empirical finding, surprising finding, in this book, or the argument, is that the productivity of American manufacturing—and it is within manufacturing that we would expect to see the effects of learning by doing—actually dropped dramatically between 1941 and 1945.
And one of the things that I kind of picked up from this immersion in the sources was, rather than a view of American industry during the war as 24/7, 365 days a year, I get a picture of really profound production intermittency. In other words, essentially the need to shut down production lines, because it's a shortage economy. You've moved from a surplus economy to a shortage economy; sub-assemblies and raw materials and ultimately labor are being rationed. And if you can't get the heat exchanger you need, then the whole line is going to sit there. It's a very different view. And then you see this being said. In [War Production Board chairman Donald] Nelson's biography he talks about destroyer escorts: “Well, they were sitting there for six months because they couldn't get the part that they needed to complete it.” And those are kind of throwaway lines. They're there, but they’re not part of the kind of standard narrative; they're kind of overlooked as anomalies. And I don't want to get too Thomas Kuhn-ian about that, but if you start kind of pulling those anomalies together and assembling them and so on, then you get a different picture. And that's what I've tried to articulate in the book.
I love your role as a kind of economic detective. It's not just about going to the BLS website and pulling up the data and then off you go. There's some real detective work as a historian, as much as an economist, going on here. It's really interesting thinking about the narrative because I think you're right that I picture December 7th, 1941, we head off to war and then it's all hands on deck, the production lines are never quiet, the steel mills are never cool, and it's all that way until August 1945. But perhaps now having gone through this pandemic, we're a little more aware of what happens when you have a shortage economy, which is what you found.
Yeah, it's absolutely the case. I mean, ‘42 was absolutely a chaotic, terrible year. I would say there was no consensus in Washington that the United States was going to win the war, and it wasn't just the problems of suddenly having to produce a radically different set of products and making all this transition. The Japanese and the Germans weren't making it any easier for us, and I talk about that in the book as well. I think also vastly overlooked: I had absolutely no idea of the severity of what I call the rubber famine in the United States. When the Japanese overran Singapore in February ’42 and then rapidly shut off all of the exports, they cut off over 95 percent of the one strategic material in which the United States had effectively no domestic sourcing. And they were panicked, absolutely panicked about this, the Rubber Survey Committee. So that was another negative supply shock. And then the Germans were enormously successful in torpedoing what I call the tanker pipeline that was bringing petroleum and petroleum products from east Texas and Louisiana to the eastern seaboard. That's how it was moved and so forth. And between January and June of ‘42, they torpedoed 400 ships in the Atlantic and the Caribbean and just completely shut that down. And there were also serious consequences about that.
What about the scientific advances of WWII?
Was the war a time of great science productivity? Or is that also a detour toward science that was not as applicable to the postwar period, and we were not able to build on the gains and science of the ‘20s and ‘30s and so forth?
The evidence is pretty clear, and I would cite James Conant, former president of Harvard and also a member of the Rubber Survey Committee, basically saying, “During the war, basic scientific research was shut down.” This was an all-hands-on-deck, we're going to essentially exploit our existing larder of scientific knowledge to fight the war. Now, sure, obviously there were developments in terms of technology and science during the war. I can talk about some of them. We could talk about jet engines. It's clear that jet-engine technology did advance during the war. But look, aircraft and aircraft-engine technology was advancing very rapidly in the 1930s. And you have to ask the counterfactual: What would've happened without that? As far as the United States, we never flew any jet engines in the Second World War.
Nuclear power: We spent $2 billion on the Manhattan project and so on. And I think the first nuclear power plant was in England in ‘56, I think. And we obviously have relied to some degree on nuclear power. I think the jury is kind of still out on the extent to which that was a big plus. And it's operated only with enormous subsidies in terms of government accepting the liability limits and so on. So we could talk about other factors. There were some significant institutional consequences of the Second World War, but from a technological perspective, I do see it as a detour. And as far as basic science, I think this is one of those areas in which there is not a lot of dispute. It was shut down as was R&D development in terms of consumer durables.
What sort of response have you gotten from other economists, other economic historians?
There have been sort of people nibbling at the edges. They're not happy with one little thing, one or the other. But I think the reality is that World War II is not something that economic historians have given that much attention to. The time series, econometricians will typically drop the observations from World War II: “Ah, it was a controlled economy. Everything was messed up. We can't run our [models].” And so on. The basic thesis I have not gotten a lot of pushback on.
When I saw that your book had come out, the first thing that popped in my head, since I write a lot about productivity growth, was a passage in Robert Gordon's book in which he very specifically writes about labor productivity in World War II and how the improved production techniques and so forth were not forgotten after the war. What you're describing is a very different view of productivity.
What Bob Gordon did in chapter 16. . .
Obviously you're familiar with it.
I read all of the manuscript in chapters, so yes, I am quite familiar with the book. And what he did in chapter 16 was, I think, absolutely crystallized and state very clearly the second key theme, in terms of the conventional wisdom, about the war. He went beyond that. He then kind of advertised it as novel. But in the book, if you read the book carefully, I have considerable documentation because whenever you're trying to say something novel, you have to persuade people that we didn't already know this and so on. And what I think Bob is doing, basically, there is just absorbing and very clearly stating what is the received wisdom by many historians and economic historians. And I just think it's wrong.
The US economy if WWII never happened
I think one of the more intriguing economic counterfactuals is what the American economy looks like in the ‘40s and in the postwar era if there was no postwar era—if all else equal, there was no need for a war. If we had not had this diversion, what does the economy of the United States in the second half of the 20th century look like?
It is a counterfactual. One thing I would say is that the war did interrupt a very strong trajectory of productivity growth, both labor productivity and total factor productivity, as the output gap closed between ‘39 and ‘41. And what you're seeing there in terms of my interpretation is, number one, just a continuation of that trend during the Depression of very strong productivity growth, secular trend, combined with a boost also from closing the output gap because of the pro-cyclicality of TFP. Now, if you just were to statistically extrapolate that through the ‘41 to ‘48 period, things look pretty good. It's a questionable kind of exercise in terms of how accurate that would be.
If you look the world in 1948, people, historians, everybody else is looking at that and they're seeing the United States is standing like an economic colossus astride the world. The Soviet Union has lost 20 million people. Germany: Dresden, Hamburg, they've been fire bombed. England has had to basically liquidate its overseas economic empire to pay for the war. Japan has had two atomic bombs and virtually all of the other major cities have been fire bombed with incendiaries and so on. And I think it's natural, particularly because the US was victorious and so on, and particularly because it was so successful in production—but of course, productivity is not the same as production; it's production per unit input—because it was so successful in that to say that was attributable to the war years. And again, I come back to my thesis, which is: No, I see essentially in ‘48, the US had a major productivity lead over Western Europe and Japan, and the next 30 years, what the French call “les trente glorieuses” and so forth, essentially saw living standards converging among the developed world as that productivity gap is closed. But my argument is that that productivity gap is already quite evident in 1941. It's not a function of the war. It's there in spite of the war.
So even without the destruction to our competitors in World War II and our lack of destruction, the US in 1950 would still be standing astride the world as an economic colossus on the technological frontier, even without the war.
Right. It's interesting to think about American industry prewar, say in the ‘30s, and postwar. Let's talk about the American automobile industry, because that was central in terms of the prosecution of the war, in terms of the conversion of those factories and the contractors operating, the automobile industry firms operating these big defense plants and so on. Economic historians basically agree that the 1930s was probably the most dynamic period in terms of innovation in American automobiles, in terms of the development of industry. Do you really want to look at the 1950s and say that those were the glory years of American US manufacturing? I mean, the tail fins and so on, and the cars lasted three years, and we essentially owned the marketplace. We weren't threatened by foreign imports yet. But I don't see a major upward progression in that direction. I do want to say, though, in terms of the legacy of the war, that there were clearly some important things that were different because of the war and maybe it wouldn't have been if we hadn't had it. Number one, we had a compression of wages. So there was essentially 30 years of reduced inequality in income and wealth in the United States. Number two, little things like, for example, the incredibly peculiar system whereby Americans provide healthcare tied to your employer. It's just an artifact of what Henry Kaiser did when, because of caps on wages, he wasn't able to raise wages, so we'll have benefits, we'll have hospitals and so on. The introduction of tax withholding, because of the high tax rates, gave the federal government greater fiscal capacity. Blacks did very well. Many American blacks essentially had the opportunity to move from unskilled to semi-skilled positions. So yes, there were some consequences. I don't want to suggest that everything was exactly the same or worse. I wanted to get that on the record. But in terms of the general trajectory of the growth of productivity and potential output, I would argue that the war was a detour.
Then to what extent was the immediate postwar boom — the ‘50s, ‘60s, heading into the early ‘70s — how much of that was based on tech progress and innovation that emerged in those decades, and how much was really building substantially on the foundations from the ‘20s and ‘30s?
There's a couple of things. First of all, the ‘50s and ‘60s did benefit from relatively high levels of aggregate demand, partly because of military Keynesianism and the Cold War. So that problem was not so great. As far as the technology overlap, I think if there was learning during the war, and in chapter nine of my book I talk about this—and it's somewhat speculative there—I don't think it was within manufacturing. It's not the traditional emphasis on learning by doing. It was on logistics. It was on essentially the efforts, particularly in the military, in terms of the enormous knowledge, the use of linear programming, the gradual diffusion of those techniques to the private sector, the development of containerization, multimodal transit and so on. So if I were to kind of say in the post-war period, “what's the productivity legacy?” I think maybe we've been barking up the wrong tree and maybe more emphasis needs to be placed there.
I read various comments from economists at the end of World War II and maybe right at the beginning of the postwar period, and there seemed to be a lot of pessimism about what would happen. Are we going to go back into a Great Depression? What's going to happen when all of these soldiers come back? Am I overstating that, that the postwar boom seemed to have been kind of a surprise to those economists?
If you're thinking about actual output, a couple of things matter. Number one, potential matters, but also the output gap matters. And the big concern among economists at the end of the Second World War was aggregate demand. In other words, they say, “Once all of this military spending stops, essentially, it's going to be back to the 1930s” and so forth. And that didn't happen. I think the conventional wisdom is probably right. It is that the balance sheets of American households were just in great shape, they couldn't buy certain stuff, they were being well fully employed. They had a large lot of deferred demand for cars and washing machines. I think you're absolutely right. There was a lot of pessimism, but it was mostly focused on aggregate demand. I mean, in one sense, who cares about potential if you're way below potential? And that was, I think, what was driving that pessimism.
My last question is about your previous book. I just want to mention again the name of your current book, which is The Economic Consequences of US Mobilization for the Second World War. A book I was delighted to see land on my desk. And as I said earlier, your previous book, A Great Leap Forward, one which is well thumbed-through by me. I have one final question about that book. The cover image is the famous Futurama ride from the World's Fair of 1939, New York City. Why did you choose that image?
I think because it captured the kind of technological optimism and just sort of unalloyed and uncritical confidence in the ability of science and technology to push the economy forward, which had been absorbed by the population in spite of the double-digit unemployment. And of course, that is consistent with my thesis of what was actually happening in spite of the unemployment. I think that's the reason why I put that there.
When it comes to Up Wing thinking, there's no better litmus test than nuclear power. Setting aside the regulatory barriers we've imposed on ourselves, the United States can tap a source of clean, reliable energy that overcomes the carbon emissions and geopolitical challenges of fossil fuels. Here to make the case for nuclear in this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, is Robert Zubrin.
Robert is a nuclear engineer and the author of the new book, The Case for Nukes: How We Can Beat Global Warming and Create a Free, Open, and Magnificent Future.
In This Episode
* Is the case for nukes contingent on climate change? (1:14)
* How the Atomic Age ended (6:39)
* A 75-percent nuclear America (15:03)
* Is a nuclear renaissance coming? (23:00)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation
Is the case for nukes contingent on climate change?
James Pethokoukis: Were it not for climate concerns, would there still be a case for nukes, or would you be writing The Case for Carbon instead?
Robert Zubrin: No, there still would be a case for nukes. The primary case for nukes is to expand humanity’s energy resources. Regardless of climate change, we have an imperative to make energy more cheap and available. The primary problem in the world today is poverty. We have poverty in America, but in America, the average per capita income is $50,000 a year. Globally, the average is $10,000 a year. And half of the world is below average. So the existence of poverty in the world is quite prevalent. And that stifles people's lives. It kills people — people die of diseases that could easily be cured. They don't get educations. They suffer from malnutrition. They suffer from lack of opportunity. This is the thing that needs to be answered. We need to increase the availability of energy to put the whole world on an American standard of living. Once again, we still even have poverty here. We'd have to increase world energy five times. And fossil fuels cannot support that. So regardless of the issue of climate change or carbon enrichment of the atmosphere, we need more energy.
And secondly, we need the energy to come from freedom, not from possession. It needs to come from the power of creation. A major problem with fossil fuels is it puts a lot of global power in the hands of people who just simply have it by force of possession, not through creativity. It gives wealth to those who take it rather than those who make it. For example the OPEC oil cartel could, as it did in 2008, constrict the world's energy supply below what it needs and send the price of oil up to $150 a barrel and cause a massive worldwide economic dislocation as a result. That's even a potential threat right now. Whereas nuclear power fundamentally comes from mind. That is, it’s the result of technological creativity: turning something that is not a resource into a resource — an incredibly abundant resource. So it moves power where it needs to be, into the hands of the creative, which is to say in the hands of the free.
Let me continue on the theme from that first question: Why isn't it The Case for Solar? I know that solar prices seem to have come way down in recent years. Why not that as the thrust of your book?
The problem is this, that solar energy, and in this I would also add wind as well, are intermittent energy sources. They are not reliable sources of power with which to power an industrial civilization. They are useful boutique energy sources. Wind power has had a major role in the development of human civilization by powering ships. Worldwide commerce was enabled by putting wind to work as a classic example of off-grid power. Solar energy is predominant in space, once again, way off-grid. But if we're talking about the production of energy at scale in a reliable way to power industrial society, they simply do not cut it.
Does solar still not cut it, even if we figure out new ways and better ways of storing that energy? That sounds like it's doable. We just need better batteries or ways of storing that solar energy for when it's cloudy out.
There are a couple of problems there. First of all, the amount of solar energy to power Manhattan would cover most of Long Island — and try buying Long Island to put the solar energy capacity there. And then you have the problem with storage. First of all, the problem with storage on a planned basis, that is just storing for a night, is bad enough. And it basically increases the cost of a solar installation by like a factor of five just to do that. But what if it's cloudy for three days going? What if there's this thing called winter that happens? Which it does. Solar energy can be inadequate for months on end. Having the capacity to deal with that is simply not possible. So, in fact, solar energy power systems have to be 100 percent backed up by reliable sources of power, which to say either fossil fuels, nuclear, or hydroelectric.
How the Atomic Age ended
Why did the Atomic Age end? Do we understand the culprits? Do we understand who the murderer was?
I think I do. First of all, nuclear power in the ‘60s was so much cheaper than fossil fuel power that in the early ‘70s, we were getting orders in the United States for two new nuclear power plants per month. That's how fast it was coming online. And in fact, it caused alarm in the oil interests, who very early on tried to stop [Admiral Hyman] Rickover from introducing the nuclear submarine. Exxon and Atlantic Richfield both gave very large grants to the Sierra Club to go after nuclear power. And in fact, part of their fear was justified because after the oil price went up in ‘73, ’74, nuclear power actually cleaned the lunch of oil-fired electricity in the United States. In 1972, 3 percent of American electricity was nuclear, 20 percent was oil. Now it's 3 percent oil, 20 percent nuclear. Oil, of course, maintained its premier position as transportation fuel. There, it couldn't be dislodged. It has unique advantages in that realm.
But what happened was in the late ‘60s and early ‘70s, there was an ideological offensive launched by Malthusians. You may remember two very important books from that period. One was called The Population Bomb by Paul Ehrlich. And another was called The Limits to Growth by the Club of Rome. That's ‘68 to ‘72. And then there were many less popular works. But they all said, “Look, we're running out of everything. We have to stop economic growth and population growth.” This was a very powerful ideological offensive, except for you may remember Julian Simon, who was an economist who said the Club of Rome was absolute nonsense. We weren't going to run out of everything, or anything, by the year 2000. But he was regarded by mainstream media as some Neanderthal from the Chamber Commerce. And if you look at the Sierra Club's statement, when they finally came out definitively against nuclear power, which was in 1974, what they said was, “We need to oppose nuclear power because it could encourage unnecessary economic growth.”
And then they went on to say, “We can do this. We can stop them by stopping the establishment of any way for them to dispose of the waste.” And so they targeted nuclear waste disposal as a key weakness of nuclear power. And at that time, there were proposals in the works to just dispose of it by subsea disposal, which is easy to do. And when they got that block, and Jimmy Carter blocked that, they then opted instead for a much more elaborate program of storing the waste under a mountain in Nevada. They then campaigned against that. It baffles the mind how someone who claims to care about health and the environment can say it's better to store nuclear waste in nuclear power plants in the suburbs of major cities than under a mountain in Nevada. And yet they did. When they say there's no solution to nuclear waste disposal, there certainly is a technical solution. And the Nuclear Navy stores nuclear waste in salt domes in New Mexico. They just don't have to put up with any of this stuff. But they managed to stop the commercial nuclear waste from safely disposing of its waste and then say, “Hey, there's no way to dispose of the waste.” And they have collaborators in the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. If the FAA was run like the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, we would have no airplanes. If you have a totally hostile regulatory structure, you can destroy any industry.
Can you think of particular regulations, perhaps, that you think played a key role? Or is it just broader than that?
If I was asked to name one thing that is the big problem and which needs to be corrected if we're going to have a nuclear renaissance, it's the regulatory structure, what was put in place by the Carter administration — which by the way, was in infested massively with members of the US Committee for the Club of Rome. They established this regulatory structure. In the book, The Case for Nukes, I show the flow chart of what you have to do to get a nuclear power plant license in the United States. And it looks like a map of the New York subway system with a million stops and intersections this way and that way. And guess what? Each of those subway stops themselves involves another subway map inside of it. And some of these are really ridiculous. One of the subway stops, just one, is the Environmental Protection Agency, which among many other things demands to know, and have proof to its satisfaction, that the utility should build a nuclear power plant as opposed to a coal-fired power plant or a gas-fired plant, or no plant at all. Imagine if you had some land and you wanted to build a log cabin on it. And so you go to the municipal authorities and say, “I want to build a log cabin on this.” And they ask you not just for your plans to show that it's going to be a safe building, but to prove that it shouldn't be a chalet, or a cape cod, or a brick house, or a gas station, or a pet cemetery, or a zoo, or anything else.
And then imagine that you actually do show that to the satisfaction of the authorities involved. But then there's now an opportunity for people who hate you to intervene in court to contest that approval. And now you have to go to court and prove to a judge and a jury that this in fact was the correct decision by the mayor. And if that court approves you, they can then appeal. That's what this is like. [Recently], we had a nuclear power plant go online in Georgia. It took 14 years to build it. Our first nuclear power plant in Shippingport, Pennsylvania, took three years to build. That is, the amount of time it takes to build a nuclear power plant has increased by a factor of five. And this is not because they've become more complicated. It's because the legal process become vastly more complicated.
And if you look at the data, as the time it has taken to build a nuclear power plant has increased, the cost has increased as the time squared. And once again, I show this in the book. It actually follows this curve. It's not even just linear, where you have to pay people for longer periods of time, you're paying all these workers to hang around doing nothing, instead of putting things together. You're paying more expensive kinds of people. Lawyers cost a lot more than plumbers, and you're paying for more and more lawyers as this thing drags on and becomes a bigger and bigger and more complex deal. So this is what has stopped nuclear power in the United States. The time to construct nuclear plants should have gone down with experience, not been quintupled.
Currently, and this is a number that's sort of holding steady, we get about 20 percent of our power generation from nuclear. What is the counterfactual? What is the right number? If the ideological war had not happened, and all those nuclear plants, those two nuclear plants a year, that kept happening. What does our energy mix look like today, do you think?
In France today, it is 75 percent nuclear and 10 percent hydroelectric. So it’s only 15 percent fossil fuels. Here you have France under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle. He put together kind of a labor-industry alliance for growth that included both de Gaulle-ists and even the communists, who had a trade union. This is jobs, this is what we want. And they did it. And it's 75 percent nuclear. Meantime, here's Germany, with this massive green party, as well as green ideology infecting the social democrats and even the Christian democrats and the rest, shutting down their nuclear power plants. Germany's carbon emissions per unit power is five times that of France. Five times. There is the green Germany. And it's even worse than that, because a lot of Germany's power comes from biomass. And you have this romanticism of “We're getting our power from the forest.” Yeah, you're getting your power by killing trees and the animals that live in the trees. So how's that being a friend of nature? The way to be a friend of nature is to get your power from things that aren't involved with the natural biosphere. The person who saved the whales was Rockefeller, by switching us from whale oil to petroleum, because petroleum has much less involvement with the biosphere than the whales do. And you'll have even less involvement with the biosphere if you switch from fossil fuels to nuclear.
A 75-percent nuclear America
How do we get that 20 percent up to 75 percent?
There needs to be, fundamentally, a societal decision. Now, one thing that very oddly works in our favor here, is that the Malthusians have oversold the case on global warming. Global warming is real. World temperatures have gone up one degree centigrade since 1870. And that's true; I don't dispute that for a minute. I dispute the fact that that is a great cause for alarm. But it's true. They have nevertheless managed to alarm people greatly, because they're trying to use global warming as a rationale for rigging up energy prices. Which is basically an extremely regressive tax. (Carbon taxes are just about the most aggressive sales tax you can have, because they don't even tax on the basis of price. They tax on the basis of mass, and a cheap cut of meat involves the same amount of carbon emissions as an expensive one. And a cheap dress involves the same amount of carbon as an expensive dress, even though one might be priced 10 times above the other.) They've oversold this. They actually got a lot of people [saying], “Oh my God, this is an existential problem. We have to stop carbon emissions.” If their primary concern actually is carbon emissions, a lot of them are saying, “Well, then why not nuclear?”
So you actually have, at this point, a significant faction in the Democratic Party, and they have an organization called the Third Way, Cory Booker is a member of this faction, who say we should have nuclear power because there's an existential problem of climate change. They actually believe this. So this is the solution. The hardcore, they hate nuclear power because it would solve a problem they need to have. But these other people actually want to solve the problem. So there's some leverage there. The Biden administration, though, has responded to this faction in only limited ways. They have allocated some money to develop more advanced types of nuclear reactors. That's good.
The nuclear reactors we have now are essentially the same thing that Rickover invented in the 1950s to power the Nautilus and the Shippingport plant. I don't think that that's a fundamental design flaw. Pressurized-water reactors, which is the Rickover reactor, is like 90 percent of all reactors, if you include the mild variations of it that are out there. It's a very good design. It is inherently safe. It cannot have a runaway nuclear reaction because the water that is the coolant is also necessary to sustain the nuclear reactor. And in the book, I explain the physics of that. So it's impossible. And there's been over a thousand pressurized-water reactors on land or sea over the past 60 years, and not a single person has ever been hurt from a radiological release from one of them. But that said, it's possible to have more advanced designs that would be cheaper, that would be more efficient.
I hear a lot about these small modular reactors.
Yeah, that's a good one. The small modular reactors are pressurized-water reactors, but it's a different kind of design where they design them to be built small so they can be built in modules in factories and literally just assembled on site. So it's not really a construction problem, it's more like a “bring a bunch of things to a place and hook them together” kind of project. That offers the chance to make them cheaper, faster to build and also to address markets not just of big cities, but maybe of towns of 100,000, 200,000, this kind of thing all over the world. That's one. There's also greener reactors, which have the capability of getting, you know, 90 percent of the energy out of nuclear fuel instead of 1 percent, which is all a pressurized-water reactor does. Thorium reactors, which [have] cheaper fuel, other things like this. I'm all for these things.
But we can't have that conversation if fundamentally there's this huge division about whether we should do it at all.
Correct. And in fact, if this regulatory structure remains in place, we won't have them because it's going to be even harder to get a new kind of reactor licensed than to get another reactor of a kind that people are very familiar with. There needs to be a fundamental overhaul of the entire regulatory structure. Whether you conduct your business should, number one, be between you and the authorities. Interveners from hostile interests should not be allowed to take part in that process at all. And the regulatory structure itself has to be greatly streamlined and made to operate within the law. By law, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is supposed to approve plants within two years of the application. They regularly take five years, and then there's a whole bunch of agencies that take more time. Once again, this argument that nuclear power is too expensive is a fiction. Any industry can be made too expensive if there are regulators making it too expensive.
Is a nuclear renaissance coming?
There seem to be some things coming together which would make one optimistic about the future of nuclear. Are you an optimist or not so much?
I'm fundamentally an optimist. Winston Churchill once said, “Americans will always do the right thing after they have exhausted all the alternatives.” We're getting there. We're exhausting the alternatives. We fell for this bunk about, you don't really need energy, or you can get it from windmills. And that this somehow would be a much better way to do it, or anything of this sort. So this is clearly the best answer. Let me give you an idea of how much energy we're actually talking about here. The nuclear reactors, we get the fuel from uranium ore, which is several percent uranium. But if you aren't interested in just getting it from ore and you're just looking around for the uranium, granite — ordinary granite that you see, buildings are built out of it, mountains are built out of — is two parts per million uranium and eight parts per million thorium. And if you converted that to energy, a block of granite would have a hundred times the energy of an equal mass of oil. So you go through New Hampshire somewhere and you see these huge granite mountains, you're looking at mountains of energy. You're talking about more energy in one of those mountains than all the oil of Saudi Arabia. That's how much energy.
And then if we talk about going the next step, which is to fusion, then one gallon of water has as much energy in fusion as 350 gallons of gasoline. We're talking about completely un-limiting the human future and the waste from it. In other words, the ironic thing about making an issue of nuclear waste is that it's the only energy source in which you actually can dispose of the waste. In other words, the waste from coal-fired power plants would be impossible to sequester it because it's literally millions of times greater in volume for a given amount of energy than nuclear power. We could easily sequester the waste. And of course, with more efficient reactors, we could actually use a lot of that waste. So there's that. It's simply the right answer, and it's being blocked by people who want there to be a limit to resources.
It's a preference of sorts. It's an ideological preference.
It's a problem for people who want to assert that human activities, numbers, and liberties must be fundamentally constrained because there isn't enough to go around.
Let me build off that by asking you a final question, which is you dedicate the book to “the Prometheans.” Who are the Prometheans?
The Prometheans are the problem solvers. There's a lot of history in this book. I talk about how we got to nuclear power, and there's a human story here that goes from Einstein and Marie Curie, Lise Meitner, and Rickover, and what they had to overcome to make this happen. Now, by the way, we do have a new generation of entrepreneurial people. There's a whole bunch of entrepreneurial startups in both the fission and fusion area right now who are attempting to continue this revolution by introducing even superior types of nuclear reactors. And these people have guts. I mean, it takes a lot of guts to go into the nuclear business right now. You're going to have a fight on your hands. But I think it's the right answer and I think reason carries a stick. And so I think, ultimately, the rational will prevail.
As space enthusiasts and entrepreneurs look to expand human civilization to the Moon, Mars, and beyond, few stop to examine the geopolitical risks of space colonization or the opportunity costs of not fixing problems on Earth. While most Faster, Please! guests advocate further expansion into space, Daniel Deudney offers a different perspective.
Deudney is a professor of political science, international relations, and political theory at Johns Hopkins University. He’s the author of several books, including Dark Skies: Space Expansionism, Planetary Geopolitics, and the Ends of Humanity, released in March of 2020.
This interview was first released in June 2021 for my AEI podcast, Political Economy, and now I’m sharing it with subscribers to Faster, Please! (Unfortunately, our chat preceded my viewing and reading of The Expanse, which does a great job suggesting Deudney’s concerns.)
In This Episode
* Space expansionism and its dangers (1:24)
* Space infrastructure (13:57)
* Hedging existential risk (18:13)
* Principles for space policy (30:40)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
Space expansionism and its dangers
James Pethokoukis: My listeners love when I read during these podcasts. I’m going to start by reading two quotes. The first quote is from Elon Musk:
“You want to wake up in the morning and think the future is going to be great – and that’s what being a spacefaring civilization is all about. It’s about believing in the future and thinking that the future will be better than the past. And I can’t think of anything more exciting than going out there and being among the stars.”
Quote two is from the Blue Origin website:
“Blue Origin was founded by Jeff Bezos with the vision of enabling a future where millions of people are living and working in space to benefit Earth. In order to preserve Earth, Blue Origin believes that humanity will need to expand, explore, find new energy and material resources, and move industries that stress Earth into space.”
Now, I think you would probably call both those visions “space expansionist”. But that is not your vision, right? So what don’t you like about those visions?
Daniel Deudney: Well, Musk and Bezos articulate a vision of space expansionism that was first articulated early in the 20th century and has been subsequently developed. Bezos was actually a student of Gerard O’Neill, who was one of the main visionaries of space colonization in the United States during the 1970s. So they’re articulating a central set of ideas that is held by a large number of people, both in the United States and globally. And my book, Dark Skies, is really a systematic evaluation of the actual impact of space activities to date and a critical assessment of the likely impacts of many of these yet unrealized projects.
So to start with the historical record, this is not a simple task because space is just a place. And so there’s a heterogeneity of activities that have gone on there. So it’s like summing up apples, light bulbs, and grenades. But the standard narrative of space activities to date, I argue, is woefully inaccurate. It leaves out one of our major space programs — and, depending on how you count, perhaps our major space program and arguably our most consequential space program — which is the use of ballistic missiles to deliver thermonuclear weapons at global distances in very short periods of time.
The standard definition of space weapons is that they are weapons used against objects in orbit or placed in orbit. That’s completely insufficient because it leaves out the use of the frictionless environment of space as a corridor for rapid bombardment at distance. And so I say that we have this major space program that we don’t acknowledge as a space program. It’s what would be called an “unknown known.” Everyone knows that these exist, but they get misplaced or miscategorized. And if we put ballistic missiles back into the ledger sheet for an assessment of space activities to date, I have to conclude that the impact has been to increase the probability of nuclear war, which would obviously be a civilizational, perhaps existential, catastrophe for humanity. Take the Cuban Missile Crisis. The fact that these weapons move so rapidly — are so difficult to intercept — has created this unprecedented situation of vulnerability.
And this really points to a more general fallacy of this very optimistic thinking about space, which is to simply neglect the violence potential and the tendencies for this violence potential to be harnessed. It’s like they think that space is good, and if something is not good, then it can’t be involved in space. The reality is that this major space program (that we don’t acknowledge as such) has been a major negative in terms of the survival of our civilization. And so the first step for the space expansionist, I think, is really to be a bit more realistic and accurate about what they’ve actually done and the inherently enormous violence potential involved in this domain.
Is that your primary critique then? I mean, those are two very attractive visions. And is your main critique that they are just utterly ignoring how it could all go wrong? That they’re only viewing this as creating a space economy, creating space hotels, creating lunar or Mars colonies, or deflecting asteroids — but they’re ignoring how all these technologies could be used for ill?
Yeah, that’s a general summation. The first key point is the ballistic missiles and space weapons. And then, looking at the larger future set of agendas that they advocate, colonization sits really at the center of it — millions, billions, or trillions of people living in space to make humanity a multi-planetary species. And their seemingly ace-in-the-hole argument is that the Earth is fragile — it’s vulnerable, it’s subject to all sorts of disasters. And therefore, we need to get all of our eggs out of this one frail basket.
Seems like a good argument.
At its surface, it does. And as they say, the reason the dinosaurs went extinct is because they didn’t have a space program.
So let’s look at what would be entailed in humanity becoming a multi-planetary species: colonization of Mars, colonization of asteroids, and so forth. This would almost certainly produce an interstate anarchy. The assumption that the advocates make, and I think it’s well-founded, is that any colony which is big enough to provide existential risk insurance will be big enough to become politically independent. And once it becomes politically independent, we have to expect the same types of dynamics that have been characteristic of Earth history and interstate anarchy.
Then we read the terrain, and we see immediately that it’s got this inherently enormous violence potential. And that’s because these objects — asteroids, even space debris — are moving so rapidly. The reason these asteroids are so destructive when they strike the Earth is not because of their mass, but because of their mass combined with their velocity. And so this is an environment that is inherently far more violent than any environment that we have dealt with on the Earth.
So I asked the question: What is going to be the likelihood that we’ll have — as we have on Earth — wars and violent rivalries in what I call the Solar Archipelago? One factor, of course, would be the issues of mutual vulnerability, which I argue would be extremely high. The ratio of destructive capacity, like on Earth with nuclear weapons, is going to greatly exceed the territorial, habited locations. So saturation of violence capacity will mark solar-orbital space. Even though, of course, there will be a recovery of distance — it won’t all be quick because Mars is tens of millions of miles away, at least.
Then you asked the question about rivalries over frontier resources. The historical record on Earth is that frontiers are very violent places. Rivalries for making claims will be very likely. So we have a war-prone argument there.
Another factor: To what degree are the units like one another? On Earth, we think that units that are like one another — particularly if they are democracies — are less war-prone towards one another, and I think that colonies in space are likely to become very different than places on Earth. The advocates all say this. It seems intuitively obvious. And the most important difference that will invariably emerge will be a very fundamental one: biological species radiation. This is to say that the human species will start branching. This will occur inevitably, slowly, through processes of Darwinian evolution. But many of the advocates insist that we will do this more quickly with genetic engineering.
And so it’s not only that we’re going to have multiple bodies in the solar system inhabited, they will be inhabited over time, almost inevitably, by intelligent species — at least as intelligent as us, with at least our levels of technology. But they will be radically different in their biological character than humans on the Earth.
Look at all of the violence which has been sparked and justified by minor cosmetic skin-color differences on Earth, and think about what would happen if we have really different species. Let your imagination go here. The biological potentials for variation are enormous. It might well be that insectoid body forms will prove more appealing in space environments.
And so we will have eventually a solar system that will be inhabited by aliens, but they will be descendants of Earthlings. And that to me is a very unappealing future. And I think that it’s almost an inevitable one once we cross over that crucial threshold to have a colony that is politically independent.
Would that be your worst-case scenario? Look, I’d like a space economy. I would like there to be some space hotels. Maybe we do some manufacturing, see what happens.
Space infrastructure
So I’m assuming that was your worst-case scenario. Do you have a positive space story? One that concerns you far less, at least?
Tourism, within the larger scheme of things, is really kind of a trivial pursuit.
In terms of space resources, we’re talking here primarily about the extraction of valuable metals from asteroids. That’s a civil technology that would require the ability to alter the orbits of masses of asteroidal material and asteroids in the solar system. Presumably, you’re going to insert these bodies into Earth orbit. So you’ll have to have highly precise capabilities to alter their orbits. And of course, we would also want to develop technologies to alter their orbits so that we can avoid them colliding with the Earth (although that’s not really a short-term problem).
And so I look at this as a civil technology and I say, “How distinctive is this from the military technology?” And the answer is, it’s almost none. It’s a question of the trajectory. Once you have the technologies to alter the trajectories of asteroid-size bodies in the solar system, you’re going to have to tap into a violence capacity that will be millions of times greater than all nuclear weapons combined. So I say that allowing private enterprise to develop asteroidal mining, as seems to be the preferred American scenario, is kind of like allowing private enterprise to develop and have hydrogen bombs. It’s just not a good idea because of the enormous destructive potential.
Many of the scenarios for near-Earth envision giant infrastructures in orbit. A favorite is collecting solar energy from orbit — we have this problem of immense importance with regard to the carbon loading of the atmosphere, and there’s lots of energy that can be collected in space and beamed down to the Earth.
But thinking about that as an economic proposition, or even an ecological proposition, is insufficient. We have to also think about it as a political and military proposition. My view is that it’s not going to be possible to develop infrastructures in near-Earth space until we have overcome interstate rivalry. Think about the Chunnel between France and Britain. It’s unthinkable in a situation of interstate rivalry.
So it could be that the creation of this apparatus — I call this Orbita — would require the pacification of interstate relations. That’s potentially good news. But the potentially bad news is that whoever controls Orbita would be able to control the Earth because these enormous quantities of energy could be readily weaponized to shoot down anything coming up from the Earth. So it’s like we have a village and we’re going to build a big castle next to it. We’re going to have to expect that the village will get dominated by the castle.
Hedging existential risk
Regarding inter-solar system conflicts, why would you be more worried about war with evolved insectoid humans than about an asteroid hitting the Earth? How do you begin to figure out which is riskier?
I’m worried about the asteroid-hitting-the-Earth scenario. I’m not sure how to figure out which of those scenarios is more likely. But I know the one has happened before, and they keep telling us that it’s only a matter of time before it’ll happen again.
That’s right, it is just a matter of time. It might be a long time before a significantly large one strikes. But you make a very good point, and you’ve asked me if I have a positive vision of space. I lay out what I call an Earth-oriented space program, which does include the development of techniques to deflect asteroids. But it should only be done by a consortium of states and should not be coupled with the development of economic exploitation.
And look, if we do have asteroidal mining, then I think it’s very unlikely that actors of magnitude on the Earth would support colonization. If this is the great bonanza of mineral resources, the last thing we would want to do is to create a rival — Mars, in particular — that would be in a much more proximate location to exploit these. So I think that as the prospect of Martian colonization starts to become a real possibility, these types of concerns are going to be increasingly evident to people. This is what I refer to as the second great debate about solar-orbital space: What should we do? And I think that as it becomes real, these objections will become increasingly compelling to large numbers of actors on the Earth.
What you’re ideally recommending is, I suppose, you would have us wait to go into space almost completely until we have a much different geopolitical situation here on Earth. And it seems like we’re going in just the opposite direction — it seems like we’re actually having intensive competition. So I would assume you would find that worrying.
Yeah. I think that the directions that we’re headed in are largely disaster-prone. And of course, one of the directions that we’re going in that never gets talked about is continuing to modernize, replace, and improve the nuclear weapon delivery system. That is, as I said earlier, this major space program that we don’t acknowledge as such. And the United States has, during the Trump era, declared the objective of dominating space. And this is something that has long been talked about by various military visionaries. But this was an important threshold that we have crossed.
The SpaceX Corporation, as I’m sure everyone listening to this podcast knows, has lowered significantly the cost of accessing near-Earth orbit — by a kind of order of magnitude, perhaps. And they have these plans to build even larger rockets that they make claims about even further reducing the cost of accessing near-Earth orbit. And this is widely hailed as a great advance.
I look at this, and I say, “Well, it’s going to lower the cost of doing stuff in space.” And the question then is: Which of this stuff is going to get done? And of course, immediately the military is interested. The idea that we can dominate space is going to depend upon having the capacity to put significant mass into orbital space.
So I think that we have been misperceiving the overall character of this environment. We’ve been misrepresenting the actual effects to date. And when we get rid of this “Oh it’s going to all be so wonderful” mentality and critically examine what has happened, what is happening, and what is likely to happen, we have a very different picture.
And I want to emphasize that I am not a Luddite. I am not opposed to technology generally, but humanity over the course of the 20th century has started to develop technologies that are extremely potent, double-edged swords. And the question that we have to confront is whether we have the ability to steer the use of these technologies so that we get the benefits without getting the downsides. And our record so far is not very promising.
But we haven’t used nuclear weapons. In fact, the United States reached agreements with the Soviet Union to reduce nuclear weapons. And you could say we’ve even over-corrected because our fear of radiation has led us to abandon nuclear power. So hasn’t the record shown that we have been able to handle these weapons and that, if anything, we’ve been overly cautious when it comes to dealing with new technologies that could have a great benefit?
Well, that would be a long conversation. And with regard to nuclear weapons, we have a fundamental epistemological problem here: What is the probability of nuclear war?
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, John Kennedy said he thought it was between one-in-three and one-in-two. And knowing what we now know about the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was clearly more likely than that. So do we look at the Cuban Missile Crisis and say, “Hey, no problem here”? Or do we look at it and say, “We were really lucky”? There’s a fundamental disagreement about nuclear weapons that we really can’t resolve by appealing to the empirical evidence. And that fact alone should be very sobering to us.
But I think that if you looked at this without any sort of theoretical presumptions and said, “Is it really a good idea to have thousands of high-yield thermonuclear weapons prepared for nearly instant use?” That strikes me as a bad idea. And, you know, some people say, “Well, that’s what saves us.” But look at this as a case study: The only way we can deal with nuclear weapons is by building large numbers of them and have them posed for immediate use? That strikes me as a very limited adjustment.
So do you think that ultimately we’re going to have to get lucky again? There seems to be a lot more interest in space. And that interest is obviously among countries who have major disagreements and who view space as both an economic opportunity and as a military necessity. So it seems like the scenario going forward is a multipolar space race with an uncertain conclusion.
That’s right. That’s clearly where we’re headed now.
One of the important things to remember about space is the basic geography. We think that we’ve left the planet when we have gone beyond the atmosphere, but I argue that this is a geographic error — the area around the terrestrial Earth that is dominated by the Earth’s gravitational and magnetic fields is really part of the planet. I call that the “astrosphere.” We have the lithosphere, the hydrosphere, the atmosphere, and also the astrosphere.
We tend to think of the astrosphere as being incredibly large. And of course space generally, even solar space, is mind-bogglingly large. But the astrosphere, and particularly the lower parts of it where almost all activities have occurred, is in practical terms actually smaller than the atmosphere. And that’s because, while the volume has gone up, the velocities that are necessary to operate there have gone up by even greater amounts. And so effective distance within the astrosphere is much lower than it is within the atmosphere. So people have fundamentally misperceived this environment — it actually is small.
And then you go back into the earlier predictions about space: No one thought about space debris. No one said, “Oh yeah, this is going to become quickly polluted in ways that will be very problematic.” It’s part of this tendency to use bad analogies. People say, “Oh well, the ocean. The Europeans went out onto the ocean, centuries of expansion occurred and great wealth and prosperity and so forth resulted.” But this is a very misleading analogy.
To start with, the ships that have existed since oceanic transportation developed are not shuttling around the ocean at high velocities. Half the satellites that have been put into orbit are still there — dead, hurtling around at very high velocities, over time breaking up and colliding with things. So if you want an ocean analogy, it’s more like the Mediterranean or the Caribbean, or maybe even the Aral Sea. For a frontier that has barely been opened, we already have this level of degradation that greatly exceeds what we have with the ocean. So there’s been this basic misperception of this domain.
Principles for space policy
To wrap up, what would you advise? You view this as the beginning stage of something that could prove very dangerous. Better to figure out now what we need to do and talk with other countries so we can figure this out sooner rather than later. So then what would you advise the United States to do as far as space policy?
Well, I lay out an Earth-oriented space program. And the first step would be to continue undoing the ballistic-missile-ization of the nuclear delivery system. One of the implications of that argument is that we have another space program that we don’t recognize as a space program: what we call nuclear arms control. It has never been primarily about nuclear weapons, per se. It’s been about delivery vehicles, most of which have been ballistic missiles. And as you say, at the drawdown at the end of the Cold War, we made important steps in this direction. What we call nuclear arms control is to a first approximation space weapons arms control. It’s our most successful space program in the sense of its benefit to avoid catastrophic and existential disasters. So the first step would be to continue that, to complete that revolution.
Then we should use space for Earth habitability studies. We should do space science on a larger scale in virtually every dimension. If we want to have humans in space, that’s built on our other important historical accomplishment, the International Space Station. Instead of a free-for-all for lunar resources, let’s build an international science cooperative base on the moon with the Russians and the Chinese involved as well.
And insofar as asteroids striking the Earth are a potential problem, we need to do better surveys. And if we want to have demonstrations, this should only be done on a cooperative basis. We do not want this technology to get weaponized. That’s something very important.
As for the colonization scenario, we should relinquish that. We should draw a red line. No colonies. We do not want to pursue them. And the reason is that we have got the story backward. The dinosaurs, they tell us, were wiped out because they didn’t have a space program. I say the dinosaurs lasted 200 million years because they didn’t have a space program. And you say, “Ah, the Earth — all of our eggs are in one fragile basket.” I say, if we have multiple space colonies, we’ll have dispersed eggs, which will be subject to rock smashing, which will be easy and likely.
So we’ve got to get the narrative right. We have to stop thinking about this in this sort of a wonder-struck manner. There’s this famous quote that the advocates are always using from Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, the great Russian visionary: “Humanity is in its cradle, and humanity cannot stay in its cradle forever.” The implication being, we have to leave the cradle of the Earth and expand into the cosmos. I look at that little quote and I say, “Well, we also recognized that the ideas that infants have in their cradle, that children have, are not good guides for adult behavior.” It’s essentially an infantile vision, and we need a much more sober vision.
Thanks to SpaceX, it’s getting cheaper and cheaper to launch stuff into orbit. But just imagine if instead of using rockets, we could send cargo and people to space on an incredibly tall elevator. This may sound like a total sci-fi idea, but it has some grounding in real-world physics. In theory, we could build a space elevator by putting a counterweight in geostationary orbit and attaching a cable between the satellite and Earth. An elevator could then climb the cable, delivering payloads to space at a fraction of the cost of propulsive rockets. As you can imagine, it isn't quite that easy, which is why I'm joined today by Stephen Cohen.
Stephen teaches physics at Vanier College in Montreal and has been working on space elevator concepts for almost 20 years. Recently, he wrote “Space Elevators Are Less Sci-Fi Than You Think” for Scientific American. Stephen also has a new book, Getting Physics: Nature's Laws as a Guide to Life, which was released earlier this year.
In This Episode
* Space elevators 101 (1:42)
* The engineering challenges (7:14)
* The economics of space elevators (11:07)
* Space elevators in sci-fi (19:21)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
Space elevators 101
James Pethokoukis: In the intro, I tried to do my best at explaining what a space elevator is. But the simple version is we have something big and heavy in orbit, a cable extends down from that thing, attaches somewhere on the Earth, and we run an elevator up and down it. That's a space elevator. Am I right?
Stephen Cohen: Sure.
Now that we have a picture in our heads, why is it something more than just an interesting engineering thought experiment? What attracts you to it, other than sort of a technical problem that would be interesting to solve on paper?
Well, it's space infrastructure, which is something we don't currently have and never have had. Right now, and for all time we've accessed space, going to space is like a one-off each time. Sometimes you have some reusable parts, but basically what a space elevator is, is a bridge instead of just a bunch of boats.
And the advantage of a bridge over boats is what?
Access. Right now, each time you want to plan a mission, to simply put something into orbit requires a lot of planning. The weather has to be right. And then you want to plan another mission, you sort of have to begin again. With a space elevator, you can just days in advance say, “Okay, we're going to send something up to a desired orbit.” And just hours later after that one would be sent, you could send something else. And you basically have a housing — that's what the climber is, effectively — that you put the payload inside and up it goes. That's the transformative part. But we haven't talked about really the cost savings, the energy savings, and that's just basic physics.
The way you get around in general is by applying forces. And that's something you do without thinking. When you walk, you push on the ground. When you fly through the air, you're basically pushing on air molecules and they push back. But in space, you have none of that. And so what rockets do is they literally are the medium. The fuel you bring is the medium you're pushing against — rather, you're throwing it out the back. It's a hugely wasteful, inefficient way to get around. It's preposterous when you think about it. But it's the only way we can get things to the speeds we need to get them to. Just as a mode of getting things into this is extremely practical. You can't compare the efficiencies. It’s orders of magnitude of difference.
It really strikes people. When they hear the general concept, they really think it's something big and it sounds like it's amazing. It's something that is science fictional, but maybe we could turn into science fact. There's something else about it, I think, that just grabs people's attention.
Yeah, for sure, because it's a physical connection to space. It's like, if you could just touch the cord at the Earth port, then you're in contact with something that's reaching out all the way into space, which is wild. But I think there's an element missing. People don't realize tethers in space are not a new thing. We've had missions since the ‘70s that are effectively two bodies orbiting earth connected by a long tether, sometimes kilometers long. Now, that's not in the ballpark of 100,000 kilometers long, which is a common number thrown out there for what the eventual space elevator might be. But a lot of the same technologies are involved. The biggest difference is of course, instead of two bodies connected by a tether, like a big spacecraft to a small spacecraft, say, this is a big structure connected all the way to Earth. The amount of tension is tremendous. That's the big difference. That's what effectively becomes the big engineering challenge about it all.
To be clear, the cable would be connected to something large in orbit, and that could be something we build, but I've also heard maybe it could be a small asteroid? Am I confusing two different things there?
It doesn't have to be something we build, but likely it won't be an asteroid. The way at least the first space elevator will likely be constructed would be you send the cable up in a spacecraft and you drop it, you sort of spool down the cable over time. And it would be a lengthy unspooling. The dynamics of that are super interesting. But the point is, at the end of it you can now connect that cable to the ground. It's good to have something functional at the other end, not just some mass. Of course, the mass you're going to have at the far end, the particular value of that mass, that depends on how long the cable will be. So to achieve an equilibrium, you can't just choose any random mass. It would have to be planned.
The engineering challenges
Let's get to some of the challenges. And as you answer those questions, we may also find out why you think this is something that can be done. You mentioned that cable. That seems to be the chief engineering issue, as you mentioned: finding an ultra-strong lightweight material to make up that cable. Is that something that needs to be invented? Are we talking an innovation? Do we need radical new science, or can you see how that cable could be manufactured in a decade if we got serious about funding that kind of research?
The key property is called specific strength. It's not just strength, but it's the strength-to-density ratio. And that property in the material existed since the mid-‘90s. But it's very costly to produce. Time consuming as well. Now, on both fronts, there have been big improvements since then.
Are these carbon nanotubes? I always hear about carbon nanotubes. Is that what you're talking about?
The two candidates that are talked about these days are carbon nanotubes and just graphene. These options, there are some issues with repeatability. So the process, you think you're doing it the same twice, but you don't get exactly the same properties each time. It still needs to mature, but the basic science is there. It's become a materials engineering kind of problem.
Is it an engineering problem that we just sort of have to work the problem, and it'd be great if we had funding, but it doesn't require a radical breakthrough? We think we know how to get there. It's just sort of resources and effort and time.
Yeah. Yeah. There are probably solutions to every problem that stand in its way. I would say as the material problem is getting solved and as time is going on, a new problem is entering that is on the same level as the material problem. And that's our very, very crowded space environment. That is only becoming a bigger issue. That problem is only going to get worse with time. And the equator is a fairly busy area. It's very likely that the space elevator will be situated slightly off-equator, and the mechanics of that are sound. That's not a big issue.
On land or in the ocean?
Probably in the ocean, is the proposals I've seen. Those are sort of the details, I would say. And it will come down to economics, won't it? We're still at the stages of design, but there's really no company that is clearly in charge and no administration, institution is pulling all the strings. What we have right now is a big project with a bunch of academics scattered around the world that are, I would say, dabbling in it. A lot of work has taken place. I would say low-intensity work. That is, you get 10 very useful studies done in the course of a year. That's peanuts for something on this scale. There needs to be probably a champion or several on the business side, I guess. But also governments need to get involved for this to really take off.
The economics of space elevators
It must be annoying that you can't find a super billionaire — they seem to be very interested in rockets. You need to find one who's interested in a space elevator. That would seem to be an important piece to the puzzle when you look at how things are going in space and rocketry.
Yeah, on the economic side of things, if you want return on investment, you probably need to work on steps to get there. So partial space elevator, that's something which is basically a larger space tether. Space tether on the order of thousands of kilometers. So it's an easier challenge, but the payoff isn't nearly as high. There need to be small aspects that are worked on that have return on investment that get you there. There are several that could be listed. If I could speak about the big investor of which you just mentioned, there's another project that really reminds me of the space elevator: something called Breakthrough Starshot that you haven't heard of it. It's an attempt to send something interstellar. To send to another star system a very small payload, on the order of grams, that we could then once we get there take a picture of, say, an exoplanet and send it back. And we’d get something way cooler than what our best satellites can do. That project also has a few major engineering challenges, but I wouldn't say science challenges. We're now at the point where there's a road to it. It's also probably decades away. It has spinoff technologies. They're really very similar. And the interesting thing is, there seem to be investors putting more money into that one than space elevators. That's my impression. Not boat loads of money.
Isn't that a Mark Zuckerberg thing? Hasn't he put money in that?
I don't think he's the only one.
Yeah.
I'm not fully aware of all the happening surrounding Breakthrough Starshot, but it's worth mentioning that the space elevator is completely transformative for life in our solar system, really. We talk about colonizing the Moon and Mars, and that would be really neat. But it's sort of a pipe dream if you can't support it. Sending a single person or several to Mars, that's a big, big undertaking. But now for them to live there in a supported way? The amount of mass you have to get there is tremendous. And you can't do this in a sustainable way without infrastructure. The point I'm making is, a space elevator [is] really transformative for the solar system. And I don't want to speak down on Breakthrough Starshot. I don't want to speak ill of that project. Totally cool. I'm on board. But that one, I would say, is transformative in the sense that you can actually send something to another star. We've never done that before. But it wouldn't change life as we know it, unless our picture happens to show something living on an exoplanet.
Someone else's space elevator, perhaps!.
It's really the economics and efficiency of getting something off the ground, into orbit. Has that economic potential calculus been changed, or would it be changed, by reusable rockets? I mean, when you first got interested it was probably either pre-SpaceX or maybe SpaceX’s early days, and those costs have come down and are expected to continue come down. At some point, does that make a space elevator irrelevant?
Before we get to the cheaper chemical rockets, there are other changes that have taken place. For example, nuclear rocketry. There's also the idea of solar sails and things like that. But of course, none of those can address the primary reason why a space elevator is useful, and that's to get out of the Earth's gravity well. That's where you need chemical rockets or, well, nothing else. Nothing else will do it, because you need a tremendous amount of power in order to reach those speeds, unless you can just climb along a cable. Of course, those chemical rockets get cheaper. It doesn't mean they necessarily become routine, in the sense that weather will always be an issue, safety always a concern. They're not green, and if you intend to get really serious about space in the way people are talking about it, we are talking about such wasteful practices there. It's just unconscionable in a way. That's not the economic side, I realize. But an economic study needs to probably be repeated regularly to see whether this is the best way forward, purely based on economics. Access, environmental considerations: Those are other elements that also need consideration. But the economic story, I'd say, is evolving. Chemical rockets will always have a certain ceiling that you just can't beat, and we're maybe getting close to it.
If I got into a space elevator capsule on Earth, how long would it actually take to get up to a space station?
In all likelihood, there will be a station at geosynchronous that's 36,000 kilometers high — so about three Earths away — and it will probably take a week to get there if you could go in the area of the high-speed trains we've become accustomed to on Earth. That would be beautiful views for a week. What's cool is as you go up, the weight you feel goes down gradually until you reach this geo place. And then you are indeed weightless, just floating there like they do in the ISS. However, you'll have passed the ISS a long, long time ago, because that's only 300 kilometers off the surface of Earth. You couldn't put a station there on the space elevator. Physically that just wouldn't work. Geostationary is the ideal place for a space station because it imposes no new tension on the cable. In any case, it would take a week, is the short answer to that question.
But that week would be a far more relaxing experience than taking a rocket.
And let's be clear, this would be way cheaper once you've got it. Operating one of these, you wouldn't pay millions of dollars a person. Not even close. I can't know exactly what the number would be, but it could be 100 times less for one person once this thing's really up and running. Plus you don't have to spend a week going to geo and a week coming back. If we're trying to recreate the experience of going up to 300 kilometers, it could be an hour up and down and you've achieved a nice view of Earth.
Space elevators in sci-fi
It's an interesting concept, but one which is probably used more in scientific literature than in movies and TV shows. I think the first time I ever saw one on a screen was in the recent TV series based on Foundation by Isaac Asimov where they had a space elevator. Now, of course, the space elevator — spoilers — the space elevator in that show, there's a terrorist attack and it falls down and just kills…
Is there a portrayal of this technology in science fiction that you're aware of or that you think is interesting?
There's some artistic license, perhaps, going on there. What would happen if it's severed, if that's the conversation we're having, the portion beyond the severance likely is gone never to be seen again. And then the portion below, its future really depends on where the severance happens, exactly what that looks like. There was a study done when I was doing my master's — in like 2005, 2006, I think — [by] someone named Paul Williams, if I remember right. He did animations on exactly this question. It flies down to Earth, the lower portion below severance. And it would, like, paint a line on the equator —whatever didn't burn up in the atmosphere on the way down. But we're talking about a cable that's like one meter wide and very thin. So don't imagine a building collapsing that's wrapping around the equator. It's a rubber band, if you want to imagine something.
The piece you wrote in Scientific American, have you gotten any feedback on that from other scientists, astrophysicists, engineers? What kind of response have you gotten, if any?
Oh, I've gotten letters from high school students. “Can you tell me this? Can you tell me that?”
It was a completely honest piece. I am not what I would even call a space elevator advocate. But the moment I start talking about it, I get excited. To be clear, a quick perusal of some of the online message boards reveals a lot of, well, trolling where some people who may be informed, some people who aren't, just write a thousand reasons why this will never happen, X, Y, Z. But most of the feedback I've gotten in the circles I would ask through are just: “That was delightful to read.”
I think it approached it with the appropriate level of seriousness for something that's interesting, it's not tomorrow, but it's possible. And let's give it some thought. That seems like a very reasonable approach to the issue.
I'm a college teacher at this point. I've worked in the space industry. But my goal is to capture people's imagination when I'm in the classroom. That's at least a big part of it. The space elevator ticks a lot of boxes in that department. Exactly where it'll go in terms of economics and all that, I don't really know. And in my day-to-day life, space elevator is something I dabble in when I have free time and when I feel like it. It is something I write about in a small part of the book that I published recently, but it's mostly a general physics book, for example. It's not the focus of my life.
Let's say we elected an American president who said, “This is something we can do. We're going devote resources. This is a new Apollo.” With enough effort, could you say within a decade we could have a space elevator, if we had that kind of enthusiasm and allocation of resources?
I think in a decade we could have a design that is pretty mature, and I think a decade after that it could be built. But again, that would take the kind of backing that is associated with serious projects. And you’d talk about many countries coming together. To go on a little tangent, there was a film that had a space elevator recently released in China. I cannot recall what it was, but a lot of the recent conversations I've had because of that Scientific American article were from that. Journalists in China wanted to know more about space elevators. Their question for me was along the lines of what you just asked me, is this realistic? And I said it’s probably true that the engineering challenge becomes a bit smaller than the challenge of getting all the groups to do this thing together. The scale of the teamwork, cooperation for a project on this scale, this is a lot bigger than the International Space Station. Not just in terms of its physical size, in terms of things like space law that come into play, all kinds of areas, some of which we haven't even considered yet.
That may sound like a bug, but maybe that's actually a feature. Get everybody together working on something.
"You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics," said Nobel laureate economic Robert Solow in 1987. A decade later, the '90s productivity boom was in full swing. Likewise, it took decades for electrification to have an impact on productivity growth in the early 20th century. Today, artificial intelligence can write a coherent paragraph or generate an image from a simple prompt. But when will AI show up in the statistics, boosting productivity and then economic growth? Avi Goldfarb joins Faster, Please! — The Podcast to discuss that question and more.
Avi holds the Rotman Chair in Artificial Intelligence and Healthcare at the University of Toronto's Rotman School Of Management. He's also co-author, along with Ajay Agrawal and Joshua Gans, of 2022's Power and Prediction: The Disruptive Economics of Artificial Intelligence.
In This Episode
* Prediction at scale (1:34)
* How AI has transformed ride hailing and marketing (5:37)
* The potential for “system-level” changes (11:26)
* When will AI show up in the statistics? (16:12)
* The impact of ChatGPT and DALL-E (19:46)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
Prediction at scale
James Pethokoukis: What this book is about—and then you can tell me if I've gotten it horribly wrong—this is a book about machines making predictions using advanced statistical techniques. 1) Is that more or less right? And 2) why is that an important capability?
Avi Goldfarb: That's more or less right. The only place where I [would offer] a little correction there is, the reason we're talking about artificial intelligence today is almost entirely due to advances in computational statistics. Yes, it is just stats and that sounds kind of unexciting. But once we have prediction at scale, it can be really transformative to all aspects of business in the economy. There's a reason why we're calling computational stats “artificial intelligence” and we didn't use to.
Prediction at scale. That's a great three-word description. Probably why you used it. To what extent is that now happening? The name of the book is Power and Prediction: The Disruptive Economics of Artificial Intelligence. Is this prediction at scale already disruptive to some degree or is it, will be disruptive?
The technology, for the most part, is pretty close to there, in the sense that we can do prediction at scale because we have the data and we have computational power to do all sorts of amazing things. For the most part, it hasn't been disruptive yet. And it hasn't been disruptive yet, just because we have the technology doesn't mean we know how to use it well and we know how to use it productively in our processes and systems in order to get the most out of it.
Are there sectors currently doing this, but they're not doing it well yet? It’s in a variety of sectors, but not enough companies doing it?
Lots of companies are already using these machine learning tools, but they tend to be using them for things they were already doing before. If you had some prediction process to predict, if you're a bank, whether somebody's going to pay back a loan. In the very old days you'd have some human, the loan officer, look the customer up and down and go with their gut. And then, starting in the 1960s and especially in the ‘90s and beyond, we started to use scoring rules, partly your credit score and partly other things, to get a sense of whether people are going to pay them back. And so we were already doing a prediction task done by a machine. And now increasingly we're using these machine learning tools. We're using what we're calling AI, over the past five to 10 years, to predict whether people are going to pay back a loan. We're seeing those kinds of things all over the place, which is: You had some prediction, maybe you’ve used even a machine prediction before, and now we're using machine learning. We're using AI to make those predictions a little bit better. Lots of companies are using that.
That sounds incremental. That sounds like an incremental advance.
It's absolutely an incremental advance. We call these point solutions, which is, you look at your workflow, you identify something that a human is doing. You take out that human; you drop in a machine. You don't mess with a workflow because it's always easier to do things when you don't mess with a workflow. The problem is, when you don't mess with a workflow, there's only so much gain you can get. We've seen AI-based point solutions, prediction point solutions, all over the place. We haven't seen real transformation in very many industries. We've seen it in a couple. We haven't seen it in very many industries because real transformation requires doing things differently.
How AI has transformed ride hailing and marketing
Do you think that it has happened in one or two industries that you think would actually meet that bar of transformational? Can you give me an example?
Absolutely. If you wanted to be a cab driver in the city of London 20 years ago, or even today, it takes three years of schooling. Learning to navigate those streets is really, really hard. And especially learning to navigate and predict where the traffic is going to be is really, really hard. And so there is a really rigorous process to screen people to be taxi drivers. In the US 30 years ago, there was something like 200 or 300 taxi drivers in the whole country. About 15 years ago, two technologies came about. The first one being digital dispatch, which is essentially tools for drivers to find riders, sometimes through prediction and sometimes through other tools. And then the second part was what's been disruptive with respect to that three years of schooling in the city of London, which is prediction tools for navigating a city. This is your GPS system.
In the early days, many people selling digital dispatch and navigational predictions were selling them into professional driving companies, into taxi companies. “Hey, your taxi drivers can be 15 percent more efficient if they know the best route at this time.” That's what we call a point solution. You’re already doing this, you take out some part of the human process, you drop in a machine, and you do it a little bit better. A couple of companies realized that digital dispatch combined with navigational prediction could create an entirely new type of industry. And this is the ride-hailing industry led by Uber and Lyft and others. That's a totally new kind of way to do personal transportation that made millions of amateur drivers as good as professional because they could navigate the city and find riders.
Example number one is the taxi industry. Personal ride-hailing, for lack of a better word, has been transformed partly through digital and really those maps are important—and a big part of those maps is machine learning tools and figuring out where the traffic is, etc. So industry number one.
Industry number two is advertising. I don't know if you've seen the TV show Mad Men. That was really how the advertising industry operated well into the ‘90s. Maybe not the soap opera aspect of it. Maybe, maybe not. I don't know. But the idea that there's a lot of wining and dining and charming people to convince them to spend millions of dollars on an ad campaign. And whether a campaign worked or not was largely based on gut feel. And which kinds of customers you targeted and which TV show and which magazine, all of that was priced based on intuition and not much else.
Digital advertising came along in the late 1990s, and the first ways we thought about digital advertising was that it was like the magazine industry. So instead of advertising in People magazine, you're going to advertise on Yahoo using the exact same processes you did in People magazine. There was a rate card and it was going to be so many dollars per thousand users. And if you were doing general search, it might be $10, and if you're looking for real estate, it might be $50. And that's exactly how the magazine industry was priced. Some magazines were more than others based on readership and topic. And it was all based on personal selling, intuition, deals, etc.
Then people realize that digital advertising created an opportunity to predict who the user was, who might see your ad. A user arrives at a publisher and an ad needs to be served, and you can predict who that user is and what they might want and when they might want it. Based on those predictions, rather than just do the magazine industry old way of doing things, you can now serve the right ad to the right person at the right time. Starting around 2000, there were all these innovations in online advertising that led to an industry that today looks almost nothing like the industry that you saw in Mad Men. Every time a user goes to a website, there is a real-time auction, in fractions of a second, between, in effect, thousands of advertisers for that user's attention. And there are all these intermediary steps, lots and lots of intermediaries—largely led by Google, but some other players that complement Google in that process—to create an entirely new kind of ad industry. The ad industry has had a system-level change because we can now predict, for a given impression or given user who's looking at a page, what they might want and when they might want it. Predictions changed the industry.
The potential for “system-level” changes
How confident are you that this technology is powerful enough that we'll see system-level changes across the economy? That this is a general-purpose technology that will be significant? And do we have any idea what those changes will be, or is it, “They'll be big, but we don't know exactly what they are.”
The technology itself is pretty extraordinary. And so in lots and lots of contexts, I'm pretty confident the technology's going to get there. There are some constraints on it, which is that you need data on the thing you're trying to predict in order for the predictions to work. But there are lots and lots of industries where we have great data. The technology barriers, I think, are being overcome. In some industries faster than others, but they're being overcome in lots and lots of places.
That's not the only barrier. The technology is barrier number one. Think of an industry that I'm particularly excited about the potential of the technology, which is healthcare. Why is it so exciting for healthcare? Because diagnosis is at the center of how healthcare operates. If you know what's wrong with somebody, it's much easier to treat them, it's much less costly to treat them, and you can deliver the right treatment to the right person at the right time. Diagnosis, by the way, is prediction. It wasn't obvious, the way we thought about that in the past. But really, what it is, it can be solved [with] statistical prediction by using the information you have, the data on your symptoms, to fill in the information you don't have, which is what's actually causing your symptoms. If you do a Google Scholar search for something like “artificial intelligence healthcare,” you'll get a few million hits. There are lots of people who've done research producing AI for diagnosis. The technology, in many cases, is there. And in lots of other cases, it's pretty close.
That doesn't mean it's going to transform healthcare. Why not? What's an AI doing diagnosis? They're doing a thing that makes doctors special. Yes, a good doctor in their workflow does all sorts of other things — they help patients navigate the stress of the healthcare system, they provide some treatments, etc. — but the thing that they went to school for all those years for, and for many of them the thing that they have that nurses and pharmacists and other medical professionals don't, is the ability to diagnose. When you bring in machine diagnosis into the healthcare system, that's going to be very disruptive to doctors. There are lots of reasons why, then, doctors might resist. First, they might be worried about their own jobs. Second, they might just not trust the machines and believe they're good enough. Because [in] the medical system doctors are a core source of power—they help determine how things work—they're going to resist many of the biggest system-level changes from AI-based diagnosis.
And so you may have regulatory barriers, you may have organizational incentive barriers, and you may have barriers from the individual people on the ground who sabotage the machines that are trying to replace them. All of these are reasons — even if the technology is good enough — that AI in healthcare may be a long way away, even though we can see what that vision looks like. In other industries, it might be closer. In lots of retail contexts, you’re trying to figure out who wants what and when — Amazon's pretty good at that in lots of ways — and in-store retailers can do that too. And so there are reasons to think that disruption in many retail industries will come faster.
I just want to be a little careful here. I see the technology is there. There are some barriers on the technology side. If the payoff is big enough, I think most of the technology-related barriers can be overcome. To give you a sense of this: We hear a lot something like, “We don't want to do AI in our company because it's just so difficult to get the data organized and get the right data to build those predictions.” Well, yeah, it's difficult. But if the payoff is going to be transformative to the company and make the company millions or billions of dollars, then they'll spend thousands or millions in order to make it happen. And so a lot of the challenges aren't tech specific. They're incentives and organization based.
When will AI show up in the statistics?
I think of the classic Paul David paper about the dynamo. It took a while before factories used electricity, and they actually had to redo how the factory was designed to get full productivity value. And you say that we are sort of in the “between times.” And that makes me think of a classic Solow paradox: We see computers everywhere but in the statistics. He said that in ’87. Are we, like, in the 1987 period with this technology? Or are we now in the late ‘90s where it's starting to happen and the boom is about to begin?
I think we're in the early ‘80s.
Not even the late ‘80s?
He said that in 1987. By 1990 it was showing up in the data. So he just missed it.
[We’re in the early 1980s] in the sense that we don't quite know what the organization of the future looks like. There are reasons to think for many industries it might take a long time, like many years or decades, for it to show up in the productivity stats. While I do say we're in the early ‘80s because we haven't figured it out yet, I'm a little more optimistic that maybe it won't be 30 years to really have the impact. Mostly because we just have the lessons of history. We know from past technologies, and business leaders know from past technologies, electricity and the internet and the steam engine and others, that it requires some system-level change. And we now have the toolkits to think through, how do you build system-level change without destroying your company?
When electricity was diffusing in the 1890s, there wasn't really any idea that this might take 40 years to figure out what the factory of the future looks like. It just wasn't on anybody's mind. The management challenges of redesign were unstudied, and there was no easily accessible knowledge to figure that out. Jump forward to the ‘80s and computing: Again, we hadn't even learned the lessons of electricity back then. Paul David's paper came out in 1990. It was a solution to the Solow paradox.
But since then, we have a much better understanding of what's required for technological change. There has been decades of economics literature Erik Brynjolfsson, Tim Bresnahan, Paul David, and others. And there's been decades of management literature taking a lot of those ideas from econ and trying to communicate them to a broader audience to say, “Yes, it's hard. But doing nothing can also be a disaster. So being proactive is useful.” Then there's another piece about optimism here, which is that the entrepreneurial ecosystem is different than it used to be. And we have lots and lots of very smart people building tech companies, trying to make the system-level change happen. And that gives us more effectively more kicks at the can to actually figure out what the right system looks like.
The impact of ChatGPT and DALL-E
ChatGPT and these text-to-image generators like DALL-E, are these significant innovations that can cause system change? Or are they toys that can't figure out how many arms people have and are able to produce B-level middle school essays?
They're both. What do I mean by that? The technology is incredible. What ChatGPT can do and DALL-E can do is really, at least to me, it's amazing. Especially what ChatGPT can do. It's much better than I… That came much faster than at least I thought it was going to come. When I first saw it, I was blown away. So far it's a toy. So far, most applications have been “Hey, isn't this cool? I can do this kind of thing.” In a handful of places, it’s moved beyond a toy to a point solution. Joshua [Gans], Ajay [Agrawal], and I wrote a piece in HBR. We drafted it out, and rather than reread it and edit it 60 times like we normally do, we sent it into ChatGPT and said, “Write this in a way that's easy to read.” And it did. We had to do some final edits afterwards. But like, we are already doing the same thing. It made a piece of our workflow a little bit more efficient. Point solution.
A lot of the talk here in universities, “Uh-oh, we have to change the way we do final exams because ChatGPT can write those exams for our students.” Sure. But that's really not thinking through the potential of what the technology can do. What we've seen so far are toys and point solutions, but I do see extraordinary potential for system solutions in both. Both DALL-E and ChatGPT, and all these generative models. ChatGPT, if you think about it, what does it do? One thing it does is it allows anybody to write well. Like I told my students, you no longer have an excuse to write a bad essay with terrible grammar and punctuation that's not structured like a five-paragraph essay. No excuse anymore. It used to be, okay, maybe there's an excuse because there was some time crunch and you had other things due. Or your language skills — you're a math person, not an English person. No excuse anymore. ChatGPT upskills all those people who are good at other things but whose opportunities were constrained by their ability to write. So what's that new system? I don't know. But there are a lot more people around the world who are bad at writing English than are good at writing English. And if now everybody is a B high school-level student, able to write an essay or able to write well in English, an email or whatever it might be, that's going to be amazing. We just have to figure out how to harness that. We haven't yet.
You’ve sort of given us a potential timeframe, broadly, for when we might see this in the data. When we see it in the data, how significant do you think this technology can be? What is, do you think, the potential impact once you can find it in the data, the productivity growth, which is kind of the end goal is here?
That’s a great question. Let me reframe it and say, the thing I'm worried about is that it won't reach its potential. A lot of people are worried about the impact of AI on jobs and what are people going to do if machines are intelligent? Jason Furman attended our first Economics of AI conference. This was in 2017. He was formerly chair of Obama's Council of Economic Advisors. And the thing I'm worried about is that there's not going to be enough AI. The productivity booms that we've had in history from way back to the steam engine and then electricity and then the computer age and the internet have been driven by system-level change, where we've figured out how to reinvent the economy. And that's led to sustained productivity growth: first the steam engine at 0.5 percent and then maybe 1 percent with electricity and then 2 percent after the war or more. I don’t know what the number is going to be. I know you wanted me to give you a number. I don’t know what the number's going to be. But this technology has potential to be like all those others, assuming we figure out what that system-level change looks like and we overcome the various sources of resistance.
To sum it up, your concern is less about, can we solve the technical problems, versus, will society accept the results?
Exactly.
It was only three decades ago that astronomers first discovered planets outside our solar system. Since then, astrophysicists have found more of these "exoplanets" — including some Earth-like worlds that exist in their star's habitable zone. Today, astronomy has moved far beyond pointing a lens at the night sky, so I've brought on Gioia Rau to describe her work on exoplanets, as well as how AI and recent declines in launch costs will change astronomy.
Gioia is an astrophysicist and program scientist at Schmidt Futures. Previous to joining Schmidt Futures, Gioia was a research scientist at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center.
In This Episode
* NASA’s exoplanet discoveries (1:19)
* Innovation in telescopes and astronomy (5:57)
* The near future for astronomy (16:02)
* Americans’ enthusiasm for space (22:04)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
NASA’s exoplanet discoveries
James Pethokoukis: When I hear that there's been a discovery, that NASA has discovered an Earth-sized world inside the habitable zone of its star, I think, are there people there? Is there intelligent life there? When you hear that, what do you think? What strikes you? What are the implications you draw? What do you want know more of?
Gioia Rau: That's a great question. As a scientist, I have many questions after this discovery. I would like to … discover which other molecules are in there. I would like to understand better what the size of this planet [is], what is its atmosphere and its surroundings. But as a human, as a person, and also as a scientist, it completely blows my mind. I'm so excited by the multiple discoveries. The James Webb Space Telescope is great to understand the atmosphere of these exoplanets, but what really kept us going from zero to 5,300—where we are now in terms of how many exoplanets have been confirmed—is first Kepler and then TESS.
What is TESS?
TESS is another telescope of NASA. It has discovered many, many exoplanets. It has scanned both atmospheres of the sky. And actually, at NASA, my group has used TESS with light curves … [and a] neural network, and so through artificial intelligence we were able to discover 181 new planet candidates. Those are incredible machines. Let's say TESS is our searcher, but then to really understand what is in there, what's the composition of this planet, we need …
How many Earth-like, in a very broad sense, worlds have we found that are in habitable zones?
That’s a very good question, and I don't have the number on the top of my head, but those are just a bunch.
At some point we had discovered none. And it wasn't that long ago that we probably had not discovered any of these?
Right. The difficulty is in defining what is Earth-like. There are multiple meanings of this. One is the distance from the parent star that is similar to the distance between the Earth and our own sun. So this is called a “habitable zone.” But another measure of Earth-like is the size of the planet, or the fact that it's rocky versus gaseous. Definitely, TESS is the telescope that has helped us a lot with such discoveries.
And even before we had found any of these, I imagine there was considerable speculation that obviously they had to exist, there had to be all kinds of planets outside our solar system. But we had not discovered them. And yet, I imagine it's been a pretty wonderful run we've had from going from pure speculation to beginning to analyze what these planets, whether they're Earth-sized or not, what other worlds are like.
Absolutely, and it's just about 30 years, 33 years, that we’ve known that, actually, other planets, exoplanets—which by definition are planets outside our own solar system—exist. Before it was, as you mentioned, just a speculation. But the first ever planet was discovered around 33 years ago. And so since then, really our revolution began. And, actually, these two scientists that co-authored and discovered the first exoplanet have just recently been awarded the Nobel Prize.
Innovation in telescopes and astronomy
It might seem to some people that NASA hasn't really done much since the Apollo program. But there's a lot more to space science than crewed missions. It seems to me like NASA’s doing a whole lot of things right now.
Absolutely. The time we are living now is a time of revolution for so many aspects in space exploration. Not only human exploration, which of course during the Apollo time peaked, and now hopefully also with the Artemis mission, named after the sister of Apollo in Greek mythology, is coming. But the James Webb Space Telescope, which is really a marvel of engineering. We never before have thought that we could put a telescope inside the rocket like an origami and then deploy it in the atmosphere. And we are discovering with Webb so many different things about the universe. Our early universe: Webb is basically a machine to look back in time. With its infrared vision, we will be able to look back over 13.5 billion years. But also with Webb we can discover galaxies over time, again, with the infrared sensitivity. So to discover even the earliest and faintest galaxies. We can discover the life cycle of the stars, as in the infrared, Webb which is able to look through the dust clouds which are otherwise opaque to the visible light. But also we are, as we mentioned before, able to see the atmosphere of these exoplanets, and so understand if in there there are building blocks of life elsewhere in the universe, but also understand how our own solar system was formed.
Currently, we're learning about exoplanets through astronomy. We aren't sending probes. Are we nearing the point where there isn't much we can learn without getting closer to these worlds? Or can you imagine further innovations which would allow us to learn a lot more about an exoplanet without sending something there?
This is a great question. We had Hubble in the past, the Hubble Space Telescope, through Kepler and TESS, now with James Webb and in the future with the Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope, we will be able to understand so many different aspects of the “zoology” of this planet, so to say, but also on the composition of the atmosphere and so on. And so basically up to now, [there are] five principle methods to discover exoplanets. For example, one of those is transit, the method that Kepler and TESS use; but another one is gravitational microlensing, which the Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope will use.
Now, what is that?
Gravitational microlensing is basically an observational effect that was predicted in 1936 by Einstein using the theory of general relativity. But this effect was never actually proved up to now in space. Basically when one star in the sky passes near or in front of another, then the light rays of the background star become basically bent due to the gravitational force, the gravitational attraction of the foreground star. And so this star then is actually acting as a virtual magnifying glass or a lens, and so it amplifies the brightness of the background source star. And so we refer to the foreground star as a lens star, and if the lens star harbors a planetary system, so an exoplanetary system, then those planets can actually also act as lenses, and so each of these planets will be producing a sharp division in the brightness of the source. And so we discovered the presence of each of the planets in this way, and we are able to measure also its mass and separation from the star. And this technique also tells us how common Earth-like planets are. This is a great method for Earth-like planets and has guided also the design of this future space mission, the Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope.
What would you like to be able to find out about an exoplanet, that you currently can't, but you think you might be able to 10 years from now or 20 years from now?
There are several aspects that are currently unknown, probably what we need the most, that the Roman space telescope will also help us understand—Roman will be launched in May, 2027, according to the forecast, and it'll be operational a few months after—but basically Roman will have a wide field instrument that will bring us a panoramic view, a wide field of view, that is 200 times larger than Hubble Space Telescope in the infrared. It will also combine the power of imaging and spectroscopy, and so in this way, we will uncover thousands of exoplanets beyond our own solar system. We will have basically a sense of the “zoology” of the exoplanets, but also, we will have in the future, hopefully, much higher resolution of spectroscopy which will really [help us] understand what molecules are there beyond what JWST is able to tell us. And also if there is water, if we can go there, considering that many of these planets are not that far away, I mean in an astronomical point of view, right? They are just a dozen or hundreds of light years away, which is not that far away.
How did you get involved in this to begin with? As a kid were you a space nut, you loved reading about it or watching documentaries? What got you interested in the field?
Since I was a little kid, I was literally dreaming about space. I was very curious about everything about science in general. But something about space was extremely fascinating for me. This feeling of looking at the universe and feeling small in comparison of the immensity of the cosmos, dreaming of exploration while watching the space shuttle launches in the ‘90s. And also, you know, this question that we are still trying to uncover: What is out there? How does the universe work? How did we get here? Those were all fascinating to me as a kid. And yes, since I [was] very little kid, I wanted to work for NASA. I even wrote NASA a letter when I was about age eight. I wanted to attend their summer camp—obviously from my accent, I was not born in the US, so unfortunately at the time, it was precluded for foreigners to attend their summer camps. But they wrote me back. They were like, “Study and one day you'll come back here.” And so I didn't give up.
And just explain a little bit about the thrust of your work now at Schmidt Futures.
At Schmidt Futures we do several things for astronomy in general and for space. Fascination of space, of course, drove me to do research. Like very hands-on research. And then of course, I evolved and I started to lead research groups and to have my own students and interns and so on, which I love. I love to mentor young students and get them inspired to do science. But then also I like this more managerial or programmatic aspect, at Schmidt Futures we are really forging what the future of astronomy and astrophysics will be in the next five, 10 years and beyond. And so this has been extremely thrilling to me.
The near future for astronomy
You were talking about how this is kind of a revolutionary period in space science. How important in this period, and let's say over the next decade, are two things? (1) Artificial intelligence to help process all this data, and (2) the fact that it's getting cheaper to put probes in space and put telescopes in space. I imagine those costs are going to continue to come down.
Absolutely. I believe that the future of astronomy and astrophysics in general will be about an accelerated timeline and about cutting, drastically, costs. And so this is where also I really want to focus, especially for future of astrophysics. Concerning artificial intelligence and its use in astronomy, this is truly revolutionizing how we do astronomy. NASA is doing a lot in this sense. As I mentioned earlier, through AI we discovered a bunch of new planet candidates. But AI in general is revolutionizing astronomy in many ways from understanding cosmology to understanding the shape of galaxies and how they form. And I'm noticing more and more AI-based applications to the exploration of astronomical data. And so this is definitely, I believe, the future of astronomy. In a decade or so there will be more AI-based applications to analyze astronomical data than manual ones.
I know there's ideas about putting a variety of telescopes on the Moon. And there's all this concern lately about our sky being cluttered with satellites, and a lot of astronomers are complaining about the Elon Musk Starlink, that it's obscuring views. But I would imagine that putting some kind of telescope—and radio telescopes, I imagine a variety of them—that would be helpful, right? Putting them on the Moon as opposed to having them on Earth?
Oh yeah, absolutely. Actually, I believe that the future of [ground]-based astronomy, as we call it, versus space-based—“space-based” are all the telescopes that [orbit] around earth or in space …, versus [ground]-based are the telescope that we build on Earth—but the future of space-based astronomy is actually from the Moon and also beyond the Moon. In particular, for the radio wavelength domain, our radio telescope on the far side of the Moon will have tremendous advantages compared to Earth-based and also Earth-orbiting telescopes. For example, such a telescope could observe the universe at wavelengths greater than 10 meters, which are reflected actually by Earth’s ionosphere and so are up to now completely, largely unexplored by humans. But also the Moon acts as a physical shield that isolates the lunar surface telescope from any radio interferences or noises from the Earth-based sources, from the ionosphere and from Earth-orbiting satellites, and also from the sun's radio noise, during the lunar night. And so, such a radio lunar-based telescope will enable tremendous scientific discoveries, for example, in the field of cosmology, by observing the early universe in this range of 10- to 50-meter wavelength span, which has been unexplored completely by humans to date.
Is there any film that you think portrays what you do at all realistically? If the answer is no, what space, science-fiction movies do you find inspirational? I'm guessing maybe Contact, but maybe there are some others?
Exactly. Contact inspired me when I was growing up for several reasons. I started during the holiday—but I didn't have the time to finish it—to watch Don't Look Up. But I watched the first half an hour, and I have to say that Leonardo DiCaprio was very much into the professor type. And so all the dynamics that happened had a scientific but also a bureaucratic level, so to say. But since we are talking about movies, a movie that I love, and it's really inspirational for very many points of view, is Interstellar. Many scientists will say that it’s a movie that is completely wrong and so forth. When I watch a movie, I like to watch a movie as a person detached from my scientific point of view, just because it's a movie and it's fiction. Many movies are completely untrue for several aspects, so why are we going to investigate how physically true it is? It’s a movie, right? We need to enjoy it.
Americans’ enthusiasm for space
When you're traveling and you tell people what you do, I imagine people are pretty enthusiastic, because my theory is that people are super interested if we popularize and we let people know what actually is happening. There's been a lot happening other than Moon landings over the past half century, and maybe a lot more happening over the next 10 or 20 years.
Absolutely, yeah. I completely agree with you. When I travel and I get to speak with people and “What do you do?” I say I'm an astrophysicist. It blows their mind just because people don't have any idea about actually what we do. They think that we look through a telescope. That’s part of what we do in the free time, maybe. But the reality is way beyond that. I believe space is such a source of huge inspiration for mankind, for all of us. And so it's definitely on us, the scientists, astrophysicists, to be a great outreach source, to be great communicators, to make space and science in general more accessible and comprehensible to society and to all people. This will benefit the knowledge of all, but also it'll benefit science as a return of making it more accessible, more comprehensible.
When was the last time that you looked into the IP of a physical telescope? Was it 20 years ago? Was it yesterday?
Fun fact: for my nephews, the sons of my brother—they’re twins—for their birthday I gave them a small, few inches refractor Newtonian telescope, and so now that they went off to college, they were like, “Hey aunt, you want it?” And I was like, “Are you sure? Because I will say yes.” And so with our very young daughter we've looked at it very recently, so it was not that so long ago. That's why I say it's something that we do in our free time, and many astrophysicists have this passion also to have more telescopes or to be astrophotographers, because this is a passion of many of us. In general, coming back to what you said before, and why space is important and why the US, with all the problems that are in the world, why we should actually invest in space and use this money there and not on other problems: First of all, I hope it was clear that all of this space can be very inspiring for young kids and to motivate them, but also for adults to look at the beauty of our universe, and also as a reminder to us all to be humble. We are just one extremely small piece in the huge cosmic puzzle of the universe. But also there are so many other benefits of space exploration: [NASA’s impact on the US economy], how when we apply ourselves to the challenges of space exploration, we make discoveries that can help the world in many ways. For example, studying how food grows in orbit or on Mars might yield insight into growing food in extreme conditions on Earth or when climate change will hit even harder.
Also, now the budget is not that expensive. It's only about 0.5 percent of the total federal budget. It's even smaller than for other nations. And also a cosmic perspective can also give us insight on the importance of protecting our own planet’s sustainability and so encouraging investments and efforts then. And not to mention, of course, that studying space may one day save us all. And so we have to explore space to find and study asteroids and comets in our cosmic neighborhoods to defend our own Earth and to understand that, actually, Earth is unique in its habitability up to now.
On previous episodes of Faster, Please! — The Podcast and in my newsletter essays, I've argued for the importance of optimistic science fiction. But what exactly qualifies as future-optimistic fiction, and how is it different from utopian literature? To discuss one of my favorite science-fiction book and TV series, The Expanse, and to consider the importance of what fiction tells us about the future, I've brought on Peter Suderman.
Peter is features editor at Reason magazine. He has written a number of fantastic pieces on science fiction including "The Fractal, Fractious Politics of The Expanse" in the December 2022 issue of Reason.
In This Episode
* Does The Expanse count as optimistic science fiction? (1:15)
* Optimistic—not utopian—visions of the future (9:10)
* The evolution of science fiction (19:30)
* The importance of the future sci-fi shows us (27:09)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
Does The Expanse count as optimistic science fiction?
French film director François Truffaut famously claimed it was impossible to make an anti-war film. He said, “I find that violence is very ambiguous in movies. For example, some films claim to be antiwar, but I don't think I've really seen an antiwar film. Every film about war ends up being pro-war.” And that quote, which has always stuck in my head, reemerged in my brain when I came across a somewhat similar observation from Jurassic Park author Michael Crichton, who said, “Futuristic science fiction tends to be pessimistic. If you imagine a future that’s wonderful, you don’t have a story.” I think some people may interpret that as meaning you cannot write optimistic science fiction.
And I think of a show that you have written a long essay about, and I've written about—not as intelligently, but I've written about it from time to time: the TV show The Expanse. And I find The Expanse to be optimistic sci-fi. It takes place in the future, a couple hundred years in the future. Humanity has spread out to Mars and the asteroid belts. There's certainly conflict. As an Expanse fan, someone just wrote an essay on it, would you agree that it’s optimistic science fiction?
I think it is, with some caveats. The first one is that it's optimistic but it's not utopian. And I think a lot of the argument against optimistic science fiction is actually not really arguing against optimism. It's arguing against utopianism and this idea that you sometimes see—there are hints of it sometimes in Star Trek, especially in Star Trek: The Next Generation—of, in the future humanity will have all of its problems solved, we won't have money, there will be no poverty. If you think about the Earth of Star Trek: The Next Generation's future, it's actually kind of boring, right? There isn't a lot of conflict. Writers eventually found ways to drive conflict out of conflicts between the Federation and other planets and even within the Federation. Because of course, they realized the utopian surface is just a surface. And if you dig down at all beneath it, of course humans would have conflict.
But I think a lot of the opposition to the idea of optimistic science fiction just comes from this idea of, “Well, wouldn't it be utopian?” And what The Expanse does is it tells a story that is, I think, inherently optimistic but really deeply not utopian, because it recognizes that progress is not an easy, straight linear line in which everybody comes together and holds hands, and there's a rainbow and My Little Ponies, and everybody just sort of sings, and it's wonderful. That's not how it works. In fact, the way that progress happens is that people have things they want in their lives, and then they seek, either on their own or in coalitions, factions, organizations—whether that's governments, whether that's the private sector, whether that's unions, whatever it is—they organize somehow or another to get the thing that they want. And sometimes they build things. Sometimes they build habitats.
And so this is something you see a lot of in The Expanse. Humans have colonized the solar system, as the story begins, and there are just all of these fascinating habitats that humans have built. Some of those habitats actually have problems with them. There are air filtration issues, where you have to constantly be supplying ice from asteroid mining. That sort of thing. Some of the main characters, when we first meet them, are working as ice haulers. Because of course, you would have to have some sort of trade of important resources in space in order to make these habitats work. And you could call this, “That’s not optimistic. In fact, a lot of these lives are sort of grubby and unpleasant, and people don't get everything they want.” But I think that misunderstands the idea of progress, because the idea of progress isn't that suddenly everything will be happy and My Little Pony-ish. It's not My Little Pony. It's actually conflict and it's clashing desires and it's clashing ideals about how humans should live. And then it's people kind of working that stuff out amongst themselves, day by day, hour by hour, through coalitions, through organizations, through institutions, through technology, through politics sometimes. And all of those sort of tools and all of those organizational forms have a role. Sometimes they also have drawbacks. All of them have drawbacks to some extent. And then it's just a matter of how are people going work out the problems they have at the moment in order to get to the next place, in order to build the thing they want to build, in order to start the society they want to have.
It's a six-season TV show based on a nine-novel series. The six-season TV show adapts the first six books, and then there are three additional books, plus there's a bunch of short stories, novellas, interstitial material. There's this moment that happens in both the TV show and in the books that's really important. And it's about it when humanity finds a way to other solar systems. There are 1300 gates that open up and they can sort of go out and colonize the rest of space. All of these colonies are settled, and each one of them takes on an idea and a culture and often technological capability. There's one of them that's really funny that you meet called Freehold. Frankly, it's a bunch of anarchist libertarian gun nuts who decide to basically ignore all the rules that the trade union that is managing a lot of the trade between the gates has put in place. And they are managing that trade for a good reason. Because if you mess with the gates, if you go through them the wrong way, it kills people, it kills ships, it destroys them. And so you have to go through in order, and you have to go through slowly, and it's this whole sort of process. In Freehold, they‘re a bunch of difficult, crazy anarchist-like libertarian gun nuts who don't want to play by the rules. And at first they're a problem. You can see why that would be a problem for the social organizational form that has come up in these books from managing the gates and making sure that they don't kill people. But later, when basically a super powerful high-tech imperial planet that has designs on controlling all of humanity and putting all of humanity under the thumb of basically one emperor who has plans to live forever—it's sort of this, become a kind of a god who is ruling over all of humanity and then basically turn all of humans into like a hive mind but for the good of humanity so that we'll survive—when you have that all-encompassing, super powerful collectivist impulse that is threatening human civilization, it turns out that the libertarian anarchist gun nuts at Freehold are actually pretty good friends to have. This series does a bunch of interesting work of noting that, yes, of course those people can be difficult at times, and they can present problems to social cohesion. At the same time, it's not bad to have them as allies when you are threatened by an authoritarian.
Optimistic—not utopian—visions of the future
You've nailed it. Well done. I view it as optimistic but not utopian—I think that's a key point—particularly compared to how the future is often portrayed. I think it's pretty optimistic because no zombies. We're still around. And the world looks like it's doing okay. Was there climate change? Sure. But New York is surrounded by barriers. Clearly there's been disruption, but we kept moving forward. Now we're this multi-planetary civilization, so it doesn't look like we're going to get killed by an asteroid anytime soon.
I think a big mistake that a lot of the pessimists about the future in politics and our culture generally, but in science fiction as well—a big mistake that they make is that they think only in terms of grand plans. They think in terms of mass systems of social control and social organization. And so when you see an apocalypse, it's “all the governments have failed and so has capitalism.” When you see an apocalypse, it's “the oceans swallowed us because we used too much energy or the wrong kind of energy.” And that's it. The grand plan didn't work. And then we're in a hellscape after that. And what you see in The Expanse, what makes it so smart, is grand plans actually do fail.
Almost any time somebody has a big sweeping theory of how we're going to reorganize human social organization, of how humanity is going to be totally different from now on—almost anytime that someone has that sort of theory in The Expanse series, it doesn't work out. And often that person is revealed to be a bad guy, or at least somebody who has a bad way of thinking about the world. Instead, progress comes in fits and starts, and it's made on a much smaller scale by these ad hoc coalitions of people who are constantly changing their coalitions. Sometimes you want something that requires building something, that requires a new technology. And so you ally with people who are engineer types, and you work with them to build something. At the end of it, you've got the thing that they've built, and your life is a little bit better, or at least you've accomplished one of your goals. And then maybe after that, those people, the engineers, actually it turns out that they have a culture that is not cooperative with yours. And so you're going to ally with a different political faction and the engineers are going to be on the other side of it, but they've still built the little thing that you needed them to build. And it's just this idea that big systems and big plans that assume that everything falls in line, those plans don't work, and they do fail. And if that's your idea of how we're going to make progress, that's a bad idea. The way we make progress is…
In a Hayekian sense, all our individual wants and needs cannot be incorporated in this grand system or grand plan. Our wants and needs today, much less how those will evolve over time. Our future wants and needs don't fit into the plan either.
Yeah, this is right. This is one of the issues I have with a lot of zombie fiction, is that it just sort of assumes that after the zombie apocalypse—the zombie apocalypse is not all that realistic, but you can imagine a scenario in which there is something environmental that really goes very bad for humanity; that's not out of the realm of possibility—but what a lot of the zombie apocalypse fiction assumes, then, is that in the decades or years afterwards no one will really find ways to work with other people towards shared goals. Or at best, they'll do so in a really ugly and simplistic way where somebody sets up a society that's walled off but it's ruled by some evil authoritarian and you're living under this person's thumb.
I grew up in Florida, and so we had hurricanes. One of the things you see when you have hurricanes is that, yes, there is a government response and they send out trucks and power company officials and all of that sort of thing. But people drive around the neighborhood with chainsaws and cut up the trees that have fallen across your driveway. And other people who may not have chainsaws go and help their friends move the stuff out of their bedroom where the tree fell into the bedroom through the ceiling and there's been some leakages. It's just sort of people working together in these informal coalitions, these little neighborhood local groups, to help each other out and to try to fix things that have broken and gone wrong. It’s not fun. It’s not like, “Oh man, hurricanes, they're wonderful. We shouldn't worry about them at all!” We should, and we should try to build resilience against them and that sort of thing.
At the same time, when disaster strikes, often what you see—not always, but often what you see—is that people come back together and they survey the problems and they work to fix them minute by minute, hour by hour in little ways. And sometimes the first thing you do is, “Well, I got a hole in my roof. I'm going to stretch garbage bags across it so that the next time it rains…” And then you got a hole in your roof with garbage bags across it for a couple of weeks. But that's a solution for the time. It's better than a hole in your roof. On the other hand, you got a hole in your roof. It sucks. But that's progress relative to the hole that's there. That’s a way that a lot of people who don't think about engineering, who don't think in a Hayekian manner, it's something that they miss. Because they only think about big systems and big plans. And big systems and big plans do have big risks, and they do often fail. But that's not how humans figure out how to move forward and how to make their life better.
An interesting aspect is that, you mentioned how at some point these gates open so we're no longer stuck in the solar system. We can go to any of these other planetary systems. And what's interesting is the devastating effect this has on the planet Mars, which is its own world, its own government, it has its own military, it's independent of Earth. But it's a society that was built around one big idea, which is terraforming Mars and creating a sustainable civilization. And when that goal didn't look important anymore, that was it. It fell apart. People left. There was no resilience, there was no ability to adapt. To me, that's one of the most interesting twists I've seen in science fiction. When the grand plan fails, the whole thing falls apart because they never assumed the grand plan wouldn't work.
The Mars example is great because it shows what I think is one of the biggest problems in political thinking and in kind of bad science-fiction storytelling. It's a great demonstration of steady state thinking, where people think that the current arrangement of power and resources is going to persist forever. And so Mars in The Expanse story was basically a competitor with Earth, which in The Expanse universe was the sort of political home of humanity as well as the bread basket. It's where of all the food was produced. And then the asteroid belt, which is sort of the rough and tumble outer world—the outer world were the resource extractors. They provided for the inner systems. They kind of had a blue-collar vibe to them. There was some terrorist activity that came out of this because they were resentful. There's sort of some interesting cultural and subcultural effects there. And then Mars was heavily military and high tech, and they thought that would be their competitive advantage.
Almost a quasi-fascist state, in a way. It was very militaristic and authoritarian.
Yes, which comes back to pay off in a big way in the final three books of the trilogy which, unfortunately, the shows don't adapt, but are in some ways, I think, the best of the books. And so much of our politics is built around that idea that this power structure, this arrangement of resources that we have right now where everybody's on Facebook, where everybody is on Twitter, where everybody uses Google search, that's going to last forever. And the only way you can dislodge it is through government and through regulation and through interventions that are designed to break that sort of thing up. I'm thinking very specifically of antitrust, and a lot of antitrust theories are predicated on this. But there are other realms in which this sort of approach to regulation and to politics is quite common as well.
And in The Expanse, you see, guess what? Those power structures—even power structures that have persisted in the case of The Expanse books at least for decades and I think for a couple of hundred years that's basically been the arrangement as we sort of enter the story—even those arrangements that seem like they're immutable facts of human organization—Oh, this is how politics has always been; this is how the arrangement of national power (effectively in this story) has always been arranged—those things can change, and they can change because of environmental changes and they can change because of technological developments that people don't foresee.
The evolution of science fiction
It seems to me that you had this period during the Space Race, the Atomic Age, ‘50s, ‘60s, in which there was lots of somewhat optimistic science fiction. You obviously had Star Trek and even I would say 2001: A Space Odyssey. You could go to the Jetsons, but then you started not seeing that. And to me, it seems like there's a pretty sharp dividing line there in the late ‘60s, early ‘70s, and I've written about that. Am I making too much out of that, that there was a change? Or has it always been like this and we started noticing it more because we started doing more science fiction?
I don't think you're wrong to notice that. And I think there was a big change in the 1970s. I think maybe one place to start, if you're thinking about that, though, is actually something like 100 years before the 1970s.
That would be the 1870s!
Yeah. In the 1870s, in the 1890s, maybe even a little bit before then. This maybe tells you how naive I was as a seven- or an eight-year-old, but I started reading science fiction when I was around eight years old. My parents were big fans, and I of course watched Star Trek even starting when I was four or five. Star Wars, that sort of thing. I grew up in a real nerd household, and something that I heard when I was I believe in fourth grade that just blew my mind—but of course, it is super obvious when you hear it—is for a long time in human history, we didn't have science fiction. We didn't have it at all. And you go back to the 1700s, to the 1800s, you start to see little bits of it. Jules Verne, even maybe some of Edgar Allan Poe. But it wasn't until the Industrial Revolution and then some of the fiction that sort of came out decades into the Industrial Revolution. It wasn't until relatively recently in human history that people had the idea that the future would be different, because that's the heart of what science fiction is. It is the idea that the future will be different because humans will organize themselves differently, and/or because we will have invented new technologies that make our lives different.
And you go back to 1000 AD or 1200 or 1500 even, and you just don't see that idea present in fiction and in storytelling because essentially no one imagined that the future would be different. They thought it would be the way it was in their time forever. And they assumed that it had basically been the same forever. That humanity’s social and technological and resource arrangements would be steady state. And something happened in the ‘30s and ‘40s with the early science fiction that really predicated on this idea that, “Oh, wait! The future will be different and it will be better.” And then you get to the 1970s and things start to look a little bit shaky in world affairs, especially in the Western world, right? And what happens is that then is reflected in a lot of popular science fiction, where you start to see this more pessimistic view, this idea that the future will be different but it will be worse. And it will be worse because all of the things we rely on for the present will fail. I don't think that that's an illegitimate mode of storytelling in any way. I, in fact, really like a lot of…
Even as I've harangued against them, those are all super enjoyable movies. I just wish there were the other kind too. And it seems to me that maybe we're starting to get more of the other kind again. I mean, we don't have a lot of examples.
So about 10 or 15 years ago, there was literally a movement in science fiction led by people like Neal Stephenson, the author of most prominently Cryptonomicon, The Diamond Age, and Snow Crash in the 1990s, but also some more recent stuff as well. And he was like, “We need ideas about the future that are, if not utopian, then at least sort of optimistic. Ideas about things that we will do that will be better, not things that we will do that will make everything worse and that will sort of contribute to suffering and to collapse.” And Stevenson has been a leading proponent both of other writers doing that but then of doing it himself.
Since we were talking about ad hoc coalitions and small-scale problem solving, his novel Termination Shock, I think from two years ago, is a quasi-science-fiction novel about global warming set in the near future in which global warming has both become a real problem and also one that people have started to find a lot of small-scale ways to, not solve exactly, but to address on a personal level. When the novel begins, there are a lot of houses on stilts in Texas because there are flooding issues. But what, they just picked up their houses and they put them on stilts. And people have to wear these sort of Dune-like suits that cool them. There are all these sort of crazy traveling caravans of people who live not in any particular place, but then there are these mega truck stops that have sprung up to meet their needs and sort of become these kind of travel hubs. And then, of course, people start trying to not solve global warming, exactly, but to mitigate global warming kind of locally by shooting stuff into the air that blocks reflections of the atmosphere. Of course, that causes some problems. He's not just sort of like, “Yeah, we can just fix this.” But he's like, “This sort of thing is how problems get solve solved. They don’t get solved through politics and grand, multi-lateral agreements.”
Of course, I would also point to another Stephenson novel, which is Seveneves, which is a novel in which things get about as dark for humanity as possible. We're down to seven people, and then we come all the way back and beyond.
And it's all through distributed solutions. There’s a great bit: You get down to the final seven people and then you flash forward, I think it's like 5,000 years. There's just a great like section header in this book. You're like 700 pages into a 1000-page book and suddenly it just says, “5,000 years later.” Okay, okay, I guess. Sure, Neal Stephenson, you can do that. 5,000 years later. And you see that humanity is flourishing again because somehow or another you have distributed rings, habitat systems around the Earth. You have the submarine people. We don't really know what they did, but the submarine people somehow or another figured it out. There are still some Earth-dwellers who survived in caves, like probably the Mars people who just like took off for Mars in the middle of the catastrophe. We think they survived somehow too. Part of this is, there's a kind of cheat in that book in which he doesn't tell you how all of these people survived, but there's also a kind of genius and a truth in that, in that we don't know how it's going to go. But what we know is that when put to the test, people have—not always, I don't want to say it just works 100 percent of the time, because sometimes there are true catastrophes in the world—but people, when put to the test, when your survival, the survival of you, your family, your friends, and the future of your race is on the line, people have figured out ways to survive that their predecessors would never have imagined because they never had to.
The importance of the future sci-fi shows us
Is it important that we have popular culture that gives us images of the future, a variety of images, to shoot for?
I think it's incredibly important. I think even people who think it's important underrate how important it is. Because most people, even the smartest, most innovative people, they're… People are modelers. They kind of do things that they've seen done, even if it's that they've seen it in a story. And I just think about my own history and my own life. I grew up in a household where there wasn't, I would say, a lot of political ideology. It was in the background, but my parents like didn't actually talk about politics that much. It was just that one of them was quite liberal and the other one was quite conservative. And there were differing radio programs that I would hear in the company of one versus the other.
But they were both, like I said, science fiction readers. And there was science fiction just all over our house. The first adult science-fiction novel I read was The Caves of Steel, which I was given when I was in fourth grade, eight-years-old. It’s like Isaac Asimov's sort of Agatha Christie murder-mystery-in-the-future, in a futuristic New York, story. I was totally hooked after that. I just didn't ever go back. Read science fiction. And like I said, what science fiction gave me was this idea that the future would be different and that maybe—maybe—it could be better in some ways. And I think that if you just listen to interviews and talk to the people who are at the head of some of the most innovative companies in the world and in the United States right now, one through-line you see is that maybe not all of them, but a surprising number of them were science fiction readers growing up as kids.
And they spent a lot of time, as a result, just sort of imagining the future. And imagining that it would be different. And I think that exercise, just being drawn into that kind of imagination of a world that is different than the one we live in now and different because people have invented things, because people have reorganized politics, because of whatever it is, but a world that is different because the future will be different—that is an exercise that we need more people to engage in. And when people do it, I think the results… I frankly think that even reading pessimistic science fiction is better than reading none at all, because again, it just constantly hammers home this idea [that] the future will be different. It's not a steady state. That progress or maybe anti-progress can be made.
I think it certainly matters on that sort of doer, elite level, where you do have all these entrepreneurs, Silicon Valley folks, who obviously were really inspired by science fiction. Also, I think it's just important for everybody else. I just can't imagine, if people have gotten more of that, not only would they be a bit more resilient to the super negativity. It would just create more dreamers among people about what the future can be. Not utopia, but better. I'll take better.
I'll take better as well. And I think that storytellers have a big role to play in that. And I think that anybody who creates images, who is an imaginer for the popular consciousness, has some influence here. Because like I said, people call to mind what they have seen before and people operate based on the ideas that have been handed to them. I certainly would like to see more of those stories. And I would also just like to say that if you're a person who tells stories and who makes images and who tries to sort of worm your way into the public consciousness, obviously you can do it through fear. But wouldn't it be better, wouldn't you feel a little more proud of yourself if you could do it through hope and through making people think that maybe there's something wonderful coming?
Star Trek and Star Wars, which is the capitalist show, which is the communist show?
Star Trek: The Next Generation's pilot episode is about how basically energy capitalism is inherently bad. The Ferengi are the super capitalists. It's really hard to make like a strong “Star Trek is a pro-capitalist show” argument. Maybe. You get a little bit into that with some of the Deep Space Nine stuff later. But even there, that's mostly just about political conflict. Does that mean that Star Wars is the pro-capitalist show? I don't know. I mean, people do seem to have jobs and buy and sell stuff and make things. I guess I’d have to go with Star Wars just because you can buy droids when you need help on your farm? That’s all I got.
If humanity is to become a multi-planetary species, we can't forever remain dependent on Earth's resources. That's where space resource extraction comes in. So how would space mining work, what problems would it solve, and how long will we have to wait? To answer those questions, I'm joined in this episode by Kevin Cannon. Kevin is a professor of space resources and geology and geological engineering at Colorado School of Mines in Golden, Colorado. He's also author of the Planetary Intelligence newsletter on Substack.
In This Episode
* How mining in space could benefit Earth (1:13)
* The basic economics of space mining (3:56)
* Space resources and multi-planetary civilization (9:32)
* Public and private sector space exploitation (14:00)
* The next steps for space resource extraction (17:56)
* The criticisms and hurdles facing space mining (26:15)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
How mining in space could benefit Earth
James Pethokoukis: You've written that building a space-based civilization is all about raw materials. Given your academic specialty, these are raw materials out there, not down here. But if I am not interested in building a space-based civilization, do I care what's out there, what materials, what elements I can find out there?
Kevin Cannon: Let me give you two examples of how this could kind of come back to Earth. One is something that's being talked about increasingly lately, and that's this idea of space-based solar power. We want to undergo this energy transition, switch to renewables. Solar power, the issue there is the scaling and the land that's available. You only have so much land that you can put up more solar panels on. So if we wanted to have a truly energy-abundant future, one way to do that is to actually put up structures, satellites, in orbit that collect solar power and beam it back to the Earth via microwaves. And it turns out the only way to really make this economic is to actually make those structures out of raw materials that are found in space, either from the Moon or from asteroids. If you try to launch everything that you need, it's just too expensive. It's too difficult. So that's one example.
A second example related to that, there's obviously a lot of talk about climate in general, and there's still this idea out there that we can get through this climate issue by just reducing emissions. I think at a higher level, the discussions out there are that that's not going to be enough, that we're not drawing down those emissions fast enough, and that we may need to use different geoengineering techniques. There are different ways to do that. You can inject stuff into the atmosphere. You can put stuff into the ocean. Those are a little bit problematic politically. One alternative is to actually just block out a small fraction of the sun's radiation with something called a planetary sun shade. You put up a structure in space at the L-1, the Lagrangian point between the sun and the Earth, and that structure blocks out, say, 1 to 2 percent of the sunlight and cools the planet and helps as a mitigation effort. And again, that structure is so large that we could not possibly launch that into the space. We would have to build that out of materials that we find. So even if you don't want to leave the Earth, you're happy here, you still have problems on Earth. And there are solutions to those that could potentially be found by using raw material on the Moon or on asteroids.
The basic economics of space mining
You're saying that even with the decline we've seen in launch costs in recent years, and even assuming some continued progress, it would be more affordable to build these two examples with the regolith — or the surface dirt from the Moon or Mars or from some other place, some asteroid — than just getting it out into space with a rocket, even if it's a rocket that goes up pretty cheaply compared to the rockets of the past.
The thing you have to understand is that as those launch costs come down, it also becomes cheaper to put the factory on the Moon that makes the components, that assembles the structure in space. And it's also the case that we wouldn't build 100 percent of the structure. You would still be launching the intricate parts, the dopants for your solar panels, the wiring, things like that. It's kind of the bulk structure that we would make, what we call the “dumb mass” as opposed to the “smart mass.” But yes, as the launch costs come down, it's easier to put things in orbit, but it's also easier to put construction material and assembly material to do this kind of space-based construction effort.
That’s always the big concern: trying to make the economics work. I find that people aren't fully aware of what possibilities have been opened up because it's gotten a lot cheaper to launch rockets into space. And hopefully it will get a bit cheaper still.
We're anticipating right now in the months ahead, the first orbital launch of the SpaceX Starship. SpaceX has brought the launch costs down dramatically just with the Falcon 9, through reuse, through the Falcon Heavy. But the possibility for Starship is really a step function. It's not just a continuation of that smooth decline, but really a potential leap in our ability to put massive amounts of stuff into space. If that design is proved out, then hopefully other competitors will start to copy that and improve on it and we'll see an even more dramatic reduction.
People have a hard time understanding the economics of going and mining an asteroid to bring back to build things on Earth. Would that be economical versus using that material to build things out in space?
There's only a very narrow case you could make for a certain class of materials. And specifically, that would be things like the platinum-group metals. Those meet a number of criteria: They're very expensive — for example, the metal rhodium sells for about $400,000 per kilogram — and we only mine a very small amount of those per year. It's measured in single-digit or double-digit tons: 20 or 30 tons of these materials per year. Possibly, you could make an economic case to bring back some of those platinum-group metals. But for something like copper, we mine millions of tons per year, and that's never going to make sense. That's kind of the big misnomer about space resources that's out there in the public perception: that what we're talking about is going out into space and bringing stuff back and selling it into existing commodity markets. And that's really not what the main focus is. The main focus is using local materials that we find to help expand civilization into space rather than bringing everything with us. But maybe, just maybe, you could make a case for something like some of these platinum-group metals.
What you're doing is not speculative. This is something that you think will have practical application and you're graduating students who are getting hired to begin to think and do this, right?
It's still in the early stages, but it's not science fiction and it's not theoretical. Let me give you a couple examples of what's been happening in the last few years. Last year on Mars, there's a small instrument on board the Mars Perseverance rover, the NASA rover, called MOXIE. And this is a demonstration that sucks up a little bit of the CO2 atmosphere of Mars and converts it into breathable oxygen. This is the first time in history we've taken a raw material on another planetary body and actually turned it into a valuable product. It's the first creation of a resource in space.
Second example: A couple months ago, we had the launch of a private lander from the company ispace. This is going to be the first attempt at a commercial landing on the Moon. And as part of that mission, they're going to try to scoop up a small amount of the regolith. And NASA has already signed a contract to purchase that material. It's a very small dollar amount. The real point of that is to set a precedent that if you go out and mine material in space, that it is yours to then sell to someone else. So if that's successful, around April that will be the first sale of a resource in outer space. There are a wide variety of companies working on this. We have the Space Resources Program at Colorado School of Mines. And just an example there, Blue Origin — not a lot of people know about this — in the past year or so they've hired about 30 full-time employees working just on space resources [in situ resource utilization].
Space resources and multi-planetary civilization
As you've been talking, I've been trying to quickly dig up a quote from one of my favorite books and TV shows, The Expanse, which touches on this issue of the resources out there. Let me just quickly read it to you: “Platinum, iron, and titanium from the Belt. Water from Saturn, vegetables and beef from the big mirror-fed greenhouses on Ganymede and Europa, organics from Earth and Mars. Power cells from Io, Helium-3 from the refineries on Rhea and Iapetus. A river of wealth and power unrivaled in human history came through Ceres.” That’s the big sci-fi dream, that there is this vast field of resources out there that we can tap into. And if we can tap into it, it will be primarily for creating this space civilization.
Yeah, that's exactly right. The atoms are out there. We know all of the atoms in the periodic table are found on every planetary body. It's a matter of concentration, and it's a matter of having the energy to separate those out and turn them into useful products. As long as we can figure out how to do that, then we have the resources available, just in the solar system, to support a massive population of people to live at a very high level of well-being. The long-term promise is that we can expand into space and have a thriving civilization that is built on top of those resources.
I love how you put it in one of your tweets. You wrote, “Space resources are optional to gain a foothold in space, but necessary to gain a stronghold.”
If you look back at what we've done so far in human space exploration, we've landed 12 people on the Moon, they walked around for a few days, and then they came back. Since then, we've sent people up to low-Earth orbit to the International Space Station or the Chinese equivalent. They stay up there for a few months, and they come back. In those cases, it makes sense to bring everything that you need with you: all the food, all the water, all the oxygen. If we have greater ambitions than that, though — if we want to not just walk around on the Moon, but have a permanent installation, we want to start growing a city on Mars that becomes self-sufficient, we want to have these O'Neill cylinders — you simply just can't launch that material with you. And that's because we live in this deep gravity well. We can just barely get these small payloads off the surface with chemical rockets. It just economically, physically does not make sense to try to bring everything with you if you have these larger ambitions. The only way to enable that kind of future is to make use of the material that you find when you get to your destination.
The question I always get is, why bother doing any of this? Is that a question you spend a lot of time trying to answer? Or are you convinced it's going to happen and you've just moved beyond the question?
I think enough people have made the case for why we need to do this. You can look at it from different perspectives, from one of scientific discovery to one of existential risk to the planet that, if we stay here on Earth, eventually something is going to come along that presents an existential risk to civilization. What I'm trying to do is work with the people, with the companies who are actually trying to do this and help them using my perspective, this kind of unique perspective that's based around the science and the composition of these planetary bodies and how to make use of these resources. I don't concern myself too much with the question of why we should do that. I'll kind of leave that to more of the philosophers, the other people who have worked on that. I agree that I'm kind of past that and I am really deep in the nitty-gritty details of how to actually do this: how to turn the regolith into metals and ceramics; how to get rocket propellant out of ice at the pools of the Moon. That's what I spend my time focused on.
Public and private sector space exploitation
There was a boom in some planetary resource startups a few years ago which didn't last. What has changed between now and back then? Is it just the drop in launch costs? The technology has gotten better? Up until very recently, we had very low interest rates, it was easy to finance things? We're in like a second wave of this. What is making this second wave possible?
I think the launch costs and technology do make a difference. I think the other thing is the way that some of these newer companies are going about it. That first wave that started back around 2012, you had these two main companies, Planetary Resources and Deep Space Industries, and they tried to do this as kind of a typical venture capital–funded endeavor where they went through their seed round, their series A, series B. And that's pretty difficult to do if you want a return on your investment in five to seven years. So what we're seeing lately are companies coming into this space who have already amassed a lot of capital. They might have founders or backers who have the money to actually put up missions without first raising capital.
I think that's what's going to start to make more of a difference and make this second wave last and have longer legs. Some of the companies that are coming into this: I mentioned one, of course, Blue Origin with Jeff Bezos, who is pumping in about a billion dollars a year, very active in this space, not talking about it a lot publicly. But there are some newcomers that have also shown up in the last couple of years. One that we're working with is called KarmanPlus. They are a new asteroid mining company who are going to be setting up shop here in Colorado. They have the money upfront to be able to make a splash without having to go through the typical kind of VC funding route at the very beginning.
How supportive is NASA of this general concept of seeing space as a resource to be extracted or exploited, whether it's to do things here on Earth or build a space civilization? Are they all on board? Do they view this as, “This is a private sector thing; we're going to focus on exploration and doing science, and this is a different thing and we really don't care”?
NASA historically has always put a little bit of money into this field and the field of space resources. They have kept it going even as interest has waxed and waned. What they've never done, though, is made it a critical part of their missions. For example, right now they're working towards the Artemis program: landing people back on the surface of the Moon. They're exploring ideas of prospecting for ice at the poles of the Moon. They have this upcoming VIPER mission. They're funding technology to extract oxygen from the lunar regolith. But what they're not doing is saying the Artemis astronauts are going to breathe that oxygen and that's going to be a critical part of the Artemis program. So they're funding it; they're bringing it along. They are supporting it to some extent, but they're not making it a key part of their missions. I think what we're going to see is continued activity in the private sector. And then what we're also seeing, though, is a lot more interest lately from the Space Force and from DARPA. Those government agencies are starting to get a lot more interested in these topics.
The next steps for space resource extraction
When you think about this, what is the timeline that is reasonable using space resources to create a permanent base on the Moon, on Mars, to go further out and extract resources, not from the regolith on the Moon, but from actual asteroids and using those resources? What is your loose timeline of how you think about it? You don't have to give months and days and dates. But just broadly.
Right now we're in the phase where we're testing and developing the technology in the laboratory space and then just starting to deploy it as these kind of demonstrations on the Moon or on Mars. I mentioned the MOXIE experiment converting the atmosphere of Mars into oxygen. In the next couple years, there are going to be a lot of these small commercial landers going to the Moon. A lot of those have demonstration payloads where they're going to do things like trying to 3D print with the regolith or trying to extract oxygen from it. The next step, I'd say maybe three to five years from now, is to get to the point where we have kind of a pilot plant. Maybe we're extracting water from the poles of the Moon or oxygen from the regolith and we have something a little bit bigger than these tiny experiments. So we’d have something like a pilot plant. Maybe 10 years out, we have full-scale production of a simple resource like rocket propellant. And then I think we're in maybe the 15- to 20-year time scale for starting some of those larger efforts: starting to land supplies on Mars that would go towards this city that SpaceX has talked about, starting to 3D print a structure on the Moon that would be a permanent installation. That's kind of the timeline that I think about.
And then in terms of the investment part of this, there is another piece to this in that a lot of the companies who are working on these technologies also have a component of it that's focused on Earth-based technologies. One example is a company in Texas called ICON Technologies. Their main business is actually on Earth, and it's to 3D print entire houses to address the housing crisis. But then they also have a segment where they're applying those same techniques to be able to 3D print structures on the Moon or Mars. So for investors looking to get into this, there are a set of companies that have those shorter-horizon terrestrial applications, but then those also feed into these longer-term space-based goals.
In 2019, you co-wrote a piece, “Feeding One Million People on Mars.” That would certainly qualify as a pretty large space colony. Can you briefly tell me how you would do that, and are we talking that being possible this century?
The thing that I think a lot of people get wrong about the food piece of this is that they assume we're going to keep this paradigm that we've had for 10,000 years of growing our food in the dirt. There's a lot of work out there that's being done — it's not always very good quality — of, “Let's try to grow plants in the regolith. Let's add fertilizer to these fake regolith samples and try to grow plants.” And that's simply not very efficient. I think that as we go into space, we're going to abandon this idea of growing all of our food in dirt. I think it's going to be all through bioreactors, through cellular agriculture. I think that's kind of the main way that we're going to produce food in space.
In terms of the logistics to do that on Mars, the challenge there is, let's say your end goal is you want a city with a million people on Mars — and that's what Elon has stated is kind of the end goal — the question is, how do you get there? And what you eventually want is for that city to be self-sustaining so that if the ships stopped coming from Earth, it would be able to persist. What you have to do is you have to transition from that city or that base making zero percent of the calories that are being consumed on Mars to eventually 100 percent. The challenge is figuring out how you scale from that zero to 100 percent. It's going to involve a massive number of ships that are sending supplies. But the question is, do you try to switch to being 100 percent self-sufficient at the beginning, or do you kind of slowly ramp up over time? That's kind of the main problem with the logistics: When do you stop sending the material from Earth and when do you send the machine that makes the material on Mars? That's a tricky problem.
I would assume you were pretty happy to hear about this nuclear fusion breakthrough, because I doubt any of this really works, probably, unless you have nuclear fusion reactors?
In space, there are some advantages to solar panels. If you are in orbit or on the Moon or near an asteroid, you don't have clouds, you don't have an atmosphere to attenuate the solar radiation. But I think, eventually, we are going to have to make that transition to something like fusion. People have talked about the potential for helium-3 on the Moon. I'm not 100 percent sold on that. There are other roots to get to fusion. But I think certainly that extra energy, that ability to scale the energy, really opens up the resources that are available. One thing we find is that on Earth we have a lot of ore bodies where certain elements have become very concentrated relative to the rest of the crust of the Earth. And that's where we set up mines and extract these materials. On other planetary bodies, those processes haven't happened to the same extent. And so we don't really have a lot of good ores that we could mine. And so what we're going to have to do is actually figure out how to extract something like rare-earth elements or copper from a raw material that doesn't have very much of those elements, doesn't have those ore minerals. And that's going to take an enormous jump in energy. Something like fusion is probably necessary to really achieve that self-sufficiency, to be able to get every element of the periodic table we need from raw materials that don't have very high concentrations.
Perhaps a question I should have asked earlier: What is there a lot of out there that there's just not very much of here? I imagine whatever that is, it’s the stuff that we're going to focus on first or potentially bring here. Is there stuff that's particularly abundant that we just don't have very much here?
If we think of this from the level of chemical elements the answer is, not really. I mean, you could make a case that Helium-3 falls into that. But that's only true if you go out to the outer planets, Neptune and Uranus, they have a lot more helium-3 than the tiny amount that's kind of sprinkled in the lunar soil. The thing that's most abundant in space in terms of solid material is just the dirt. Almost every planetary body — the Moon, Mars, asteroids — they're all covered in this layer of regolith or dirt. And that really is the raw material that is going to have to be the feedstock for all these things we're talking about: the metals, the ceramics…
We're going to have to make a lot of aluminum.
Fortunately, actually, that is one thing: If we look up at the Moon at night, you have the bright regions, those are the lunar highlands. Those are almost entirely made of a mineral called anorthite that has a lot of aluminum. So there are very good sources of those kind of light structural metals on the Moon in particular.
The criticisms and hurdles facing space mining
Do you anticipate somebody at some point saying, “We've already overexploited the Earth. Now we're going to ruin the Moon too? And we're going to ruin Mars and asteroids — is this our galactic heritage?”
Those conversations are already happening. For example, last month there was a preprint published that made the case that we should declare a moratorium on the entire north pole of the Moon, that it should be set aside for only scientific activities. Those conversations are just starting. Right now, there's no kind of legal framework to prohibit this kind of activity. Certainly, people are free to express their concerns and to propose ideas like this. But as of yet, we don't have some kind of widely ratified agreement or framework for how to responsibly use resources in space. Certainly, the people in the field of space resources, we're conscious of this. And we're not proposing to go out and strip mine the entire solar system. But I think the argument is that the potential benefits, especially in terms of well-being, just how many people could be supported with those resources, that outweighs the concerns about disturbing these natural environments.
Are there types of mining that we do here right now which are kind of proofs of concept or might resemble what we would do on the Moon or Mars or an asteroid? Or would it just be totally different and these are all new technologies that we would have to innovate?
Yes, there is a very good analogy, and it's something called heavy mineral sands deposits. These are not like your typical open-pit mines or your underground mines. These are kind of vast areas of loose sand on the Earth that have some very valuable elements locked up in these dense minerals. And so what happens is you go out and just scoop up these loose sediments and then you're sifting them to sort out those dense minerals that you want. So because almost every planetary body is covered in this loose unconsolidated regolith, I think that is a pretty good analogy for what we'll be looking at. You'll have excavators that scoop up that loose material, they bring it back to a processing site, and then you're sorting the minerals. It's kind of like a needle in a haystack to get the ones you want. And then the ones you don't want, you could still use those for other applications. You can melt them down, turn them into bricks, and do other things with them. That's probably the best analogy on Earth, these heavy mineral sands deposits
Are the biggest hurdles making the economics work? Is it getting the basic science and technology to work? Is it sort of political support, because, at least for a long time, I would imagine even if it's a private effort there’s going to be a lot of government money floating around here?
I'm not worried about the fundamental technology to take material in space and turn it into useful resources. I think that's been well demonstrated in the lab, and there's a lot of research being put into that right now. It's a tractable problem. I think on the technical side, the biggest challenge is getting Starship into orbit in the near term. The progress on that seems to have stalled a little bit. And that's getting a little bit concerning, because something like that, that kind of launch capability and the cadence that allows, is really going to be necessary to enable the kind of kinds of things we talked about. On the technology side, it's really just the launch piece of it.
The economics: I think people have made some pretty good business cases for things like propellant mined from the poles of the Moon and, I think, with some of these ideas around things like space-based solar power, planetary sunshades. So that's not too concerning. I think it's the combination of the launch piece of it and then the political support for this. If that were to really take a turn for the worse, that would not be good for these kinds of ambitions. I do think, though, this emerging space race with China…
As long as China's interested, we're going to be interested, right?
Yes. That is what's drawing in the interest of the Space Force, of DARPA. I think that's going to kind of keep things going for at least the medium term, as long as we're in that competition.
It's been more than 50 years since humans last set foot on the lunar surface. But the recent success of NASA's Artemis I mission has put the US back on track to return man to the Moon. As the Artemis program proceeds, space enthusiasts remain skeptical of NASA's timeline and its expensive Space Launch System rocket — especially as the reusable SpaceX Starship rocket comes online. To find out more about the future for NASA as well as private companies like SpaceX, I'm joined today by Eric Berger.
Eric is the senior space editor at Ars Technica and author of 2021's excellent Liftoff: Elon Musk and the Desperate Early Days That Launched SpaceX.
In This Episode
* When will the US return to the Moon? (1:19)
* How SpaceX’s Starship will change the game (5:58)
* Reusability and launch costs (12:04)
* The future of America’s space program (15:59)
* Is the window for Mars colonization closing? (24:13)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
When will the US return to the Moon?
James Pethokoukis: I think you have one of the best journalism jobs in America. I hope you feel that way too.
Eric Berger: I have a fantastic job. I love space, I live and breathe it every day, and I get to write about what I think is really happening out there. It's pretty nice.
It's almost like someone who is covering the internet in the late ‘90s, when all of a sudden there's just so much happening. I remember you at year end recounting what happened in 2022, and it was a pretty long list of space achievements.
I first got into space more than 15 years ago, and at the time it was really pretty dull — not to downgrade the space shuttle program, but it was kind of dull. They would do six or seven launches a year, go up, work on the International Space Station, come down. Everything pretty much worked like clockwork. There just wasn't a whole lot happening. It's really accelerated and accelerated since then. And you just have so much happening in the United States commercially, abroad. It is just a very vibrant field. And as you say, it feels like we're in the early days of this space flight revolution.
When will the United States return to the Moon, and what is going to take us there?
We returned to the Moon last year, right? We sent an uncrewed spacecraft, Orion, around the Moon. That really was the first step back to the Moon. And I think probably in about two years from now, we'll send the first crewed mission up there. This was going to be a mission where they fly out to the Moon, loop around, and come back. So it's not like they're going to go to the surface or anything like that. But that will be the first people going into deep space in more than 50 years. And then we're going to have a lunar landing later this decade. I don't really feel comfortable putting a date out there. I think it's probably 2027, 2028 maybe. And most likely, they're going to launch on the Space Launch System rocket built by NASA and its contractors, and go up on Orion, and land on the Moon in a SpaceX Starship.
Is there a current official target date?
It's 2025, but that's completely unrealistic.
What hasn't happened to make a 2025 mission seem highly unlikely to you?
The first thing is they have got to do the crewed flight, the Artemis II mission, around the Moon. And we're probably 22 to 24 months away from that happening. They're not going to turn around then and do Artemis III the same year. And then you've got two other really important pieces to put together. SpaceX has to fly its Starship, it has to do a bunch of orbital refueling tests, then it has to actually go and land on the Moon and take off and show that everything's ready ahead of that lunar landing. And the other big piece of this is there's a private company in Houston, Axiom Space, that is building the space suits for Artemis III. These are the suits that will allow the crew to get out on the surface of the Moon, walk around and explore. And this company has never built a space suit before, and they just got the contract last fall. It's going to take time for Artemis II to happen, and everything has to go right there. There's a bunch of planning that has to go on, and then you've got to have the Starship and the space suit pieces come together.
Is there a chance that the rocket that ends up taking Americans to the surface will end up being a Starship rocket?
There is a chance. But at this point, I would think it's a fairly low one. The fact is, the Space Launch System rocket, which took a decade and billions and billions and billions of dollars to develop, finally did fly in November of last year. And by all accounts, the flight was flawless. It's pretty impressive for the debut launch of this rocket for it to perform as well as it did. I think NASA has pretty high confidence now in that launch vehicle. And it will have more confidence in Orion after the second mission. I do think that, initially, that's how we're going to get to the Moon. I think eventually that will change. It would not surprise me to see astronauts launching on, say, a Crew Dragon and rendezvousing with Starship and going to the Moon that way. Because the fact of the matter is, if you can do that, you don't need to spend the $3 or $4 billion every mission to go to the Moon on an SLS rocket and an Orion. You can do it with SpaceX vehicles for probably one-quarter of the cost.
How SpaceX’s Starship will change the game
Based on that cost structure that you mentioned, why are we even doing this? Why are we even using a rocket that may never fly again after that Moon mission, Artemis III? It just seems like a lot of wasted money. Why don't we just wait for Starship to get out the kinks, launch, and go that way?
That's a great question. The reality is that we built the SLS rocket because in 2010 there were two senators, Kay Bailey Hutchison of Texas and Bill Nelson of Florida, who were looking at the end of the space shuttle program and all the jobs in Florida and Texas that were bound up by that and said, “Well, we've got to have a replacement for this.” There were contractors who had been working on the space shuttle program, building the solid rocket boosters, the engines, and the structures and so forth saying, “Hey, we’ve got to preserve all these jobs.”
If you look at the Space Launch System rocket, it uses the same engines as the space shuttle. It uses very similar solid rocket boosters on the sides. And the diameter of that core stage is the same diameter as the external tank of the space shuttle. All of those jobs were essentially rolled from the space shuttle into the Space Launch System rocket. Now, at the time that decision was made, SpaceX had not launched a single Falcon 9 rocket, so I don't think there was the confidence in the private sector then that there is today. The fact of the matter is SLS will continue flying for as long, I think, as Starship is not shown to be a viable vehicle. Once Starship starts flying like the Falcon 9 rocket — which by the way flew 61 times last year — once it starts flying like that, there will be no need for a rocket that costs five or 10 times as much, is not reusable, and can only fly once a year. There'll be no need for that. But 1) it's a political thing. Lots of political support for that program. And 2) as of today, there is no viable alternative, even though we all know one is coming down the line.
What is the best estimate of the Starship launch agenda, launch tempo from here on out? Do we have a good idea of what that's going to look like?
I'm happy to make predictions with the proviso that they're going to be almost certainly wrong.
Duly noted.
I do think we're getting closer to the first Starship orbital test flight. This is going to be a big moment. You're going to have a rocket with 33 very powerful Raptor engines taking off from south Texas. That's the first stage. And then the second stage is the Starship upper stage. It's going to go up and go briefly into orbit before it comes back down near Hawaii. That is going to prove that A) the rocket works. And I still think that's kind of a crapshoot because this is a rocket with 33 engines, it's never flown, we haven't seen these Raptor engines in space flight before. It's also very important to get data on bringing Starship back from orbit, if it does make it there. I think we'll see maybe two or three test flights this year. And then next year, maybe half a dozen test flights. And then perhaps in late 2024, 2025, we'll start to see some operational missions carrying Starlink. And also they'll start doing some fueling tests. One of the things that Starship has to do is … it's got enough fuel to get to orbit this massive vehicle — and it can carry like 100 tons to low-Earth orbit, and then it lands back on Earth — but to go anywhere, to go to the Moon, to go to Mars, or what have you, it needs to be refueled. And that's a technology we've never really demonstrated in space: the storage of these cryogenic propellants. Starship runs on liquid oxygen and liquid methane. And we've never shown the ability to store these propellants in space, because you have concerns like boil off. These propellant depots, if they're sitting in the sun, the temperature is much higher than is able to keep them at liquid temperatures. And then you've got to show you can transfer them from one vehicle to another. SpaceX will be doing those tests almost from the beginning of their Starship test program.
When I was a full-time journalist, I'm pretty sure that when I would use the word “game changer,” editors would hate that. They would strike that word out. But Starship seems like it would be, if all those “ifs” are solved, it would be kind of a game changer. It's a big rocket.
If you think about it, everyone remembers the Saturn V rocket from the Apollo program, this massive launch vehicle. But all that came back to Earth was that tiny little capsule at the top. The first stage, second stage, third stage all fell into the ocean. The capsule came back, but then they were put in museums because they weren't reusable. The goal of Starship is for that whole stack to be reusable. So the first stage comes back, Starship comes back, and then you fly them again at some point. I think we're probably years and years away from those kinds of operations. But if and when SpaceX gets there, it does entirely change the paradigm of spaceflight that we've known since the late 1950s when Sputnik first went to orbit, which is now 65 years ago.
It's always been a premium on size — you want small vehicles that can fit on top of rockets in the payload fairings—and mass, because it costs so much to get to low-Earth orbit. If Starship works, it completely or almost completely removes those constraints: You can launch often, and it's got this huge payload fairing that you could fit elephants inside them, you could fit just massive structures inside of this thing. All of a sudden, the problem of scarcity, of getting stuff to orbit, no longer exists. It becomes not about the one thing we can do in orbit, but all the things we can do because it costs so much less to get there. And you can bring much larger structures.
Reusability and launch costs
Right now when we look at SpaceX, we're looking at partial reusability. What you’re talking about is the whole thing: everything you can use more than once.
Yeah. Right now with the Falcon 9 rocket, which I would submit is really a modern-day miracle, you're reusing the first stage, which is about 60 percent of the mass of the rocket. You get all those nine engines back, and they're now reflying relining those first stages 15 times. I think they're going to continue to push the limits. They're also getting back the payload fairing, which is that protective structure on top that then falls away once the rocket gets to orbit and the satellite comes out and pops out like a jack-in-the-box. That payload fairing costs like $5 or $6 million. So it's not insubstantial that they're collecting those, refurbishing them, and flying again. What is not reusable right now is the upper stage. It has a single Merlin vacuum engine, and those probably cost $10 to $12 million to manufacture. So that's a significant piece that they have to build. Every time they launch, they have to build a second stage.
An SLS launch versus a Starship launch where everything is reusable: Do we have a guess at the difference of each of those launches?
The cost difference? The NASA Inspector General has put a cost on a single SLS launch with an Orion spacecraft on, and it said that's $4.1 billion. That is exclusive of development costs, which for those vehicles are now about $40 billion. So if you just say, “Okay, we're going to ignore the fact that we spent all this money,” it's still $4.1 billion to launch one of these a year. Starship, we don't know how much it's going to cost. But if it's made out of stainless steel, and you're getting all those Raptor engines back, and you're flying each vehicle like 10 times or 20 times, the incremental cost of launch is going to be on the order of $100 million or less. So that's a 40x cost difference. Again, once Starship becomes operational. It's probably at least five years away from that point. But that's the future we're headed into. And it is coming. [If] you look at what's happened with the Falcon 9, they will get there. Or get close.
We talk a lot about the reusability of these rockets. Does SpaceX also just make them cheaper than competitors? Is that the only factor in the decline in launch costs?
Yes, they also have … Musk is pretty cutthroat on costs.
I hear.
The whole Twitter experiment, right? He runs a tight ship. One of the very important things that SpaceX did, and a lot of the new space companies that have come afterward have tried to emulate, is they very much did vertical integration. And that just means that prior to 2000, the way you built your rocket in this country was, okay, you’re United Launch Alliance: You buy your engines from Aerojet, you buy your structures from someone, you buy your software from someone, you buy your payload fairing from RUAG, you buy your upper-stage engine from Aerojet. And then you sort of integrate that all together into your factory after paying a premium for all these different products. And you launch the rocket. You're the operator.
SpaceX came along and said, “No, no, we're going to build the engines. We're going to build as much of each of these rockets as we can in-house. And when we need to outsource some components, we will.” And a lot of these other companies that have come since, like Rocket Lab, have tried to do the same. Relativity Space is trying to additively manufacture, so 3D print, its entire rocket inside its factory. And so they've really changed the game. And that vertical integration has allowed them to control costs and move more quickly.
The future of America’s space program
After we land on the Moon via an SLS rocket and a SpaceX lander, is the American space program at that point government doing more science-y things and the private sector doing private sector things, whether it's, you know you know, orbiting space platforms. What does the Americas program comprehensively look like after that landing?
We don't really know. We're talking about something that's probably about four or five years in the future, and it's very difficult to say where we're headed.
I'm very glad, by the way, that you say four or five years in the future, not four or five decades. I like the fact that we keep talking years, single digits.
After the success of Artemis I, we are definitively on the way back to the Moon. This is a great time in US space policy. It's healthier than I've ever seen it, I think, in my lifetime or certainly since I've been covering this. The NASA and United States space program has problems, has difficulties, has challenges, but we are on a healthy trajectory, I think. So we can all feel good about that. It's just going to take a little longer than I think any of us would like. But the way NASA has been going, and I don't see this trend changing, is it wants to be a customer and not the customer. It is looking to buy services from companies rather than top-down build processes.
The SLS rocket was procured through a cost-plus program where NASA designed the rocket, its engineers were side by side with the contractors at Boeing and elsewhere. And it costs a lot. It takes a long time. And NASA oversees every step of the process, and it's the only customer. No one else wants to fly in the SLS rocket. The military doesn't. Private customers don't because it costs way too much. NASA’s science program doesn't want to use it. NASA would rather be a customer. SpaceX launched 60 Falcon 9 rockets last year. NASA bought like six or seven of them, and the rest of them were other customers and SpaceX’s Starlink missions. It's buying services, like this spacesuit contract it's giving to Axiom and to another company: It's basically leasing spacesuits. And the lander, it's like buying the landing service on the Moon.
It's going to private space stations next decade, and it's buying time on those space stations. It’s not going to own those space stations. NASA wants to procure services. NASA would like to see an ecosystem where it is one customer for activity on the Moon alongside maybe the European Space Agency or private companies or Hilton Hotels, I don't know. They sort of want to be one customer in that area. I think the question in my mind is, will there be more entities that want to get involved in human space flight or exploration of the Moon? Or will this be a NASA-led program for a long time, simply because it's so expensive and there's not that much there for people to do beyond collecting rocks and doing science experiments for NASA? And that's the question I don't think we've answered. It may be NASA for a long time, unless you do really get vehicles like Starship or Blue Origin’s New Glenn that come alo
ng and really do bring down the costs of transportation to and from the Moon.
How far behind is Blue Origin?
Very far behind. They were founded before SpaceX was, and they still haven't put anyone in orbit. They just move slowly. That's kind of Jeff Bezos' philosophy in space fight. He wants to go very methodically. I don't think their CEO, a guy named Bob Smith, has been particularly dynamic in terms of getting them moving forward quickly. But if they ever do get their act together, they have a large and talented team of engineers. They could really kick some butt in this field. But they're way behind SpaceX in terms of building rockets. The New Glenn rocket probably doesn't launch for at least two years. That's a massive vehicle, but then they're going to have to go through some growing pains. And it's going to take a while. I don't think New Glenn will ever be able to catch up to Starship.
I’m interested in there being a permanent Moon base. Would that be operated by NASA? Would that be operated by somebody else?
That's a great question. I think NASA would love for Lockheed, or I don't know who, to say, “We are going to build a lunar surface station.” And NASA says, “Great, we want to buy 50 percent of the capacity. And we'll give you $2 billion a year for that service.” The question is whether any private company is going to step up and do something as audacious as that. That's one of the real ways in which SpaceX has changed the game: They have sort of stepped forward with these audacious visions. And then NASA has kind of come in and bought. When SpaceX created Starship, NASA wasn't interested. NASA wasn't a customer. And now, look, they're giving them $3 billion to land on the Moon twice. I think if you had a big enough vision to do that, then you could get NASA to come on board. The problem is, if you're a publicly traded company — it's really hard for a company other than SpaceX or Blue Origin, which have these well-endowed founders — it's really hard to convince your board of directors to go along with something like that.
How many space stations will there be in orbit by the end of this decade?
It’s just all fluid. So the International Space Station comes down in 2030. That's down. China's Space Station is still flying, I think, Tiangong. And Russia is talking about a space station, but I don't think there's any way they have a replacement up by then. So then the question becomes, there are four different companies trying to build commercial space stations for NASA. And again, NASA has given them some money for development, but they're not paying for the stations. They ultimately want to be customers on them. And of those four, one is Blue Origin led by them, one is Nanoracks and Lockheed Martin, another is Axiom Space, and then a fourth is Northrop Grumman. I would put the over-under at one-and-a-half of those. And I think NASA is very happy if one was demonstrative functionable by 2030.
The skeptics will say, “Okay, so what are we going to do in those space stations? Some science?” How satisfying is the answer, “We don't know what we're going to do; we have to get there and figure it out — who knew what the internet was going to look like in 1990 versus what it looks like today”?
I think you've got to build it and see if people will come. NASA is going to continue to do scientific research, human research, astronauts living in space for long durations. But then you've got to see how much interest there is in sports or filming movies or holidays or from other countries like UAE who want to have their own astronauts up there doing research or from private astronauts. For about two years now, we've had the capability to put astronauts in a low-Earth orbit on private space missions. SpaceX has that capability. There's been some interest, but there hasn't been an overwhelming amount of interest. And so the jury is very much out on commercial potential. And I think the only real way to answer that question is when someone figures out how to make money by having people living and working and doing things in space, then that market explodes. And until that happens, it's very tenuous.
Is the window for Mars colonization closing?
I am very excited about the notion of going to Mars and humans permanently living on Mars. Is that a 2030s thing? A 2040s, a 2070s thing?
The way I would look at it is, that kind of thing is never happening without the private sector, because there is no reason at all, no good reason, for NASA to send people to Mars. The amount of science that can be done by rovers at one-100th the cost without having to worry about safety issues. The rovers can do a lot of science. They can't do it all. There are some things humans can do better and faster, but it's just not worth it to send people there. Maybe if it's like a US-China-Russia-Japan pan-worldwide mission to promote peace and go to Mars. I could see something like that. But there's just no good reason for NASA to send humans to Mars.
They will talk about it. They will say, “We're going to the Moon and Mars.” But NASA's not going to Mars before 2050, and probably not by then. So then the question becomes, is SpaceX sincere about going to Mars? Yes. Do they have the wherewithal to work together with NASA to send human missions to Mars? Not right now. But if Starlink, this internet from space, is a successful business — and there are some signs that it will be, and some signs that, no, they have a long way to go — but if that is a success, then the plan is for SpaceX to use that money to help finance Starship and take steps to building some kind of settlement on Mars. And I think if SpaceX can build a credible transportation system to Mars, then NASA comes along for those first couple of missions because there are lots of reasons for them to want to go. And there are lots of reasons for SpaceX to want NASA to go. Most notably, probably, just it clears the regulatory hurdles away for them. If it's going to happen before 2050, it would be a public-private partnership with SpaceX leading the way in terms of the vision.
It's sort of amazing how much of this seems to depend on the interest and will of one person: Elon Musk.
It’s true. If you look at the space industry today, SpaceX dominates it. They launched more rockets than all the other companies in the United States by like a factor of three, two or three. They equaled China in terms of launch output. They're one of three entities in the world that has the capability to put humans into orbit. They operate more satellites than any company or country in the world. They're building the world's largest and most powerful rocket. They are kind of at the forefront of all these areas. And they're the ones pushing and pushing. If you take SpaceX out of the equation, then NASA's Moon program looks an awful lot like Apollo, which was not sustainable. A lot of it does hinge on the success of SpaceX and their ability to push and pull this commercial space flight initiative forward. And hopefully, by lowering the cost of access to space, you can find ways to make money in space, which in turn fuels more commercial space flight activity.
Have you watched the TV show For All Mankind?
I have, yes.
Do you enjoy that television program?
Yeah. It's an interesting take on the future that's really well done.
I think Elon Musk may have said that at that SpaceX event where they showed that fantastic video, which I've used about 30 times in my newsletter, where he said the window is open but it might not be open forever, to do what we're doing. Do you think he's wrong? Do you think it is permanently open because of the advances, because of declining costs, because of the geopolitical competition from China and from other nations? Is the space window open, and it's going to just stay open?
I don't know if it's going to stay open. He's concerned that it won't stay open. And one of the reasons that he would've cited a couple years ago is this era of cheap money ending. And that era of cheap money has ended. This is going to have a profound impact on a lot of the commercial space companies that have started up over the last five to 10 years. A lot of those are not going to survive the next few years. Congress is talking about holding budgets flat, and that probably may impair space flight activity as well. That's one area of, is this funding opportunity window going to be open long enough for it to happen? And he's also worried about existential threats to humanity. Whether any of those really come up in the next five to 10 years or 50 years, I don't know. But we're a little closer to nuclear war than we were 12 months ago.
If there's an accident, another Challenger or another Columbia, do you think we're into this enough and there's been enough progress that we'll push forward? Or will we retreat?
It's a great question. I think about that a lot because if, God forbid, something happens with the Crew Dragon spacecraft or the Falcon 9 rocket with people on board and NASAs astronauts die, that really would bring out the critics of SpaceX who have been awfully quiet in the last few years. Think about it, the only way we're getting to space right now with people is on the Falcon 9 rocket. And imagine if we'd had these last 10 months or 11 months of tensions with Russian and still had to rely on them to get our people into space. A lot of the critics of SpaceX have kind of shut up because it's clear that they have done such a service for this country.
But if they have some major accent, then all those questions come again. He is reckless. Elon self-sabotages himself a lot in that regard. The way he acts on Twitter sometimes is pretty unserious. And officials at the DOD and NASA see that. That would embolden critics to say, “Hey, wait a minute. Why are we giving SpaceX all this money if they're not acting responsibly?” And especially if the accident was caused by some negligent act on SpaceX, trying to move too fast or save money or something like that. I don't think an accident like that will happen. NASA and SpaceX work very diligently to ensure it doesn't happen. But I do think that would be a setback, whether it would be an absolute killer, I don't think so, because I suspect NASA would stand by SpaceX regardless. They're very good about that when their contractors have an accident. NASA sort of stands by them and goes through the accident investigation and so forth. But if you put people’s lives at risk, then that may change. It's a great question, and I hope we don't have to find an answer to it.
Skeptics joke that nuclear fusion is the energy source of the future … and always will be. But when the Biden White House made a big announcement about the progress of fusion research last week, even diehard skeptics surely took note. My guest on this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast is Arthur Turrell, plasma physicist and author of 2021's excellent and must-read The Star Builders: Nuclear Fusion and the Race to Power the Planet.
In This Episode
* The consequences of fusion’s latest breakthrough (1:06)
* Where does fusion go from here? (3:55)
* The best path forward for fusion (8:14)
* The importance of fusion for an energy-abundant future (13:13)
* Will star power take us to the stars? (24:09)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
The consequences of fusion’s latest breakthrough
James Pethokoukis: On December 14, Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm announced that researchers at Lawrence Livermore had succeeded in generating a net-energy-gain fusion reaction. Just how consequential is this?
Arthur Turrell: Jim, I would say that we're witnessing a moment of history, really. Controlling the power source of stars, I think, is the greatest technological challenge humanity has ever undertaken. If you look back at human history, there are different stages where we've unlocked different types of energy sources. You can think about unlocking wood. You can think about when humans started to use coal, which packs in more energy than wood. You can think about nuclear fission, which has even more energy than coal. A lot more, because it's a nuclear technology instead of a chemical one. And then you can think about this moment when we have the first proof of concept of using fusion for energy. And of course, fusion unlocks huge amounts of energy: 10 million times, kilogram for kilogram, as compared to coal.
There are two main approaches to fusion as I understand it. This was what they call inertial confinement, and then there's magnetic confinement. Does it make a difference, as far as where this technology goes, that it was inertial confinement versus magnetic?
It's absolutely a huge scientific achievement. The level of precision and the level of innovation and invention that the researchers at Lawrence Livermore have had to deploy to get here is just an astonishing feat on its own, even if we weren't talking about how this could eventually change the supply of energy.
Does it get us anywhere? I think the honest answer is we don't know. We, today, don't know what version of fusion, what way of doing fusion is going to ultimately be the one that is the most economical and the most useful for society. But what I think this result will do is have a huge psychological effect because throughout fusion's history, researchers have said, “Hey, I'd really like to, you know, build a reactor, a prototype reactor.” And funders have quite reasonably said, “We don't even know if the principle works. Go off and show us that it can produce, in principle, more energy out than is put in.” And of course, fusion research has been trying to do that since the 1950s. Now we finally and absolutely have proof of that. I think that it's going to crowd in innovation, interest, and investment in all types of fusion because even though this approach got to that milestone first, it doesn't necessarily mean that this is going be the most economical or the best in the long run.
Where does fusion go from here?
I think it's Benjamin Franklin who gets the credit, at least that's what I learned in third grade, for discovering electricity in the 1700s. We didn't get the first electric motor until the 1820s, and we really didn't get factories electrifying their factory floors really until the first decades of the 20th century. So this could be an amazing discovery, but it could be a long time just based on how fast it takes advances to be modified and diffuse into an economy. It could be quite some time, if ever, before this actually gets plugged into a grid.
Right. Traditionally, these new energy sources take a long time to come onstream. One of my favorite facts, and I have to double check that I've got the year right here, but I think the first solar cell was working in 1883. And only now in the last few years has solar energy become commercially viable in terms of cost. These things take a long time, or they have historically. And here's the really important point. It's never about the amount of time. It's about the amount of investment and political will that we put behind it.
If our elected representatives choose to really push this and put lots of funding behind it, and the private sector decides that it's really going to push this, things will move much faster. Correspondingly, if we don't put lots of investment behind it, things will move more slowly. But you are absolutely right when you say that there is a gap here between what we've seen — which is an astonishing experiment, but only scientific feasibility — and what you'd have to have for fusion energy to be on the grid — which is solving some of the engineering and economics challenges that stand in the way between this one-off experiment and doing this repeatedly and economically at scale.
For decades, there was very little in the news about fusion research. And since 2019, there have been some big stories about the advances happening in government labs and about the work in the private sector. It seemed like there was already a lot of excitement before this advancement. I can't believe this won't generate even more interest.
Absolutely. I think this has been building for quite a long time. It's very tempting to say not much has happened in fusion. But I think if you look back over the decades, there have been improvements. They've been quite steady, and they've probably been coming at the rate you would expect with the level of investment and dedicated resources it's had. But the improvements have been arriving quite steadily. And looking at the history of this particular experiment, the National Ignition Facility, when they've got improvements since 2012 when they really started this type of campaign, the improvements have resulted in a five- or six-times increase in the release of energy. Back in 2019 when the book I wrote about this came out, I sort of said, “Well, they're not actually that many improvements away, so if they can carry on the same trajectory, they're going to crack it at some point.” And last August in 2021, they got to 70 percent, which at the time was a world record as well. And it’s kind of like, because fusion scales nonlinearly, especially in this type of doing fusion, this laser fusion, actually they're almost there and it's just a matter of time until they crack it. So I think it's been building for a while. And the huge successes, because things have just happened to have gotten close now after all of this time in both magnetic confinement fusion and in inertial or laser-based fusion, mean that has really stimulated the private sector as well. The whole thing is starting to build on its momentum. And I think that now this is going to cause the wave to crash over and we're going to see efforts to turn this into a power source be completely electrified by this news.
The best path forward for fusion
If what happened at Lawrence Livermore Lab does not present an obvious path to commercialization, what else is going on that seems more obvious? We differentiated between magnetic and inertial confinement fusion. Other people will point to deuterium-tritium fusion versus aneutronic fusion. Where is the most likely path, and does it come from government, from the private sector, that will lead us to a commercial reactor?
Of course, it's hard to know exactly, but we can certainly make some sensible guesses based on what we know today. To answer the second part about deuterium-tritium fusion or aneutronic fusion, just so your listeners are aware, these are about different types of fuel that we're putting into fusion reactions. So the first kind, deuterium-tritium, those are just special types of hydrogen. Frankly, all of the really serious attempts to do fusion today using these because they require much, much less extreme conditions than the other types of fusion reaction, though people get very excited about the type of fusion that doesn't produce any neutrons, aneutronic fusion, because it has less radioactivity. But it's much, much harder to do.
Would it be a better power source? Some people have said that with deuterium-tritium fusion, you would still need some sort of boiler. You'd be using a steam turbine, just like you would if it was coal. While aneutronic actually creates electricity itself.
In principle, yes. People haven't really demonstrated that principle in practice. But yeah, that's why people are excited about it, because every time you change energy from one type to another you lose some of the useful energy and you just have a more direct setup with the aneutronic fusion. But I think that's some way away. In terms of what's practical for the next steps to getting to an energy source, there are paths using both this inertial approach and using the magnetic approach.
Some of the private-sector companies are using this magnetic confinement approach. I think Commonwealth Fusion Systems, that's what they do.
That's right. And Tokamak Energy as well. There are pros and cons of both different approaches. In terms of the kind of approach that the National Ignition Facility is taking, there are some big technological gaps in terms of something that looks more like a power source. This was a single shot of a laser on a single experiment. If it was to be anywhere close to being a useful power source, they would have to do probably 10 shots on that laser a second. And instead of a gain of 1.5, so instead of getting 1.5 units of energy out for every unit of energy you put in, you'd have to probably get at least 30 units of energy out than you put in. Now, as I say, this thing scales nonlinearly, which means that you might get there faster than you think. But it's still a big technological gap.
And even if you solve all of that, of course you've then got to do what you said. Ultimately, we're extracting the heat energy and we're using it to turn water into steam, and we're powering a turbine. Now, what some of the people who are working on this magnetic confinement approach would say is that even if they haven't got to net energy gain yet, they have created a lot of gross energy. So they have generated about 30 times more gross energy than NIF produced in output energy in a single experiment. And they would say that some of the steps further down the line are a bit easier to achieve on magnetic confinement fusion. But honestly, I don't think we really know yet. And because we don't know, it's a good thing that we have both public and private sector exploring a range of different options here.
How seriously should I take anybody who gives me a date? How confident should I take any of these predictions at this point?
Well, that does depend, Jim. Was it the president of the United States who said this to you? Because I feel like he's got some control over it. I think the first question to ask when anyone says that is, at what level of investment? Because that's the thing that's going to make the difference. If we stop all funding to fusion tomorrow, if people decide to do that, then it's going to take forever. But equally, if President Biden says it's going to take 10 years, and he makes a commitment to put in the money that could potentially make that happen, then I'd take it a bit more seriously. I think 10 years is a very tight time scale. But as I've probably mentioned before we saw in the pandemic how even untested technologies can be deployed at great speeds, faster than anyone could have imagined, where there is the political will and the societal need and the money to make it happen.
The importance of fusion for an energy-abundant future
Why is this an interesting source of energy?
Nuclear fusion, it's interesting scientifically because every time you go outside on a sunny day, those rays you're feeling on your face from the sun are generated by nuclear fusion. So this is literally the reaction that lights up the universe. It's the reaction that created a lot of the elements that we are made out of, particularly bigger elements. And it was right there at the start of the universe as well, creating some of those fundamental building blocks of life. So it's an extraordinary reaction, and it's amazing to start to be able to control it. But there are practical reasons, even if you don't care about the science at all, to get excited about nuclear fusion as well.
It's potentially a very safe source of energy. There's just no chance of meltdown. It's not a chain reaction. If you turn off the laser or you turn off the magnets, the whole thing just stops. So it's hard to start, easy to stop. It also, as far as we can tell, isn't going to produce any long-lived radioactive waste. It will produce some from the reactor chamber itself, so not as a byproduct of the fuel, unlike fission. Maybe the reactor chamber at the end of the plant's life might be rated low-level radioactive for about 100 years as opposed to the potentially thousands of years in fission. So that's another advantage. I should say, though, that fission is an amazing power source and we should be doing a lot more with it. And actually, if you look at the data, it's very safe. But some people don't like it, regardless. It’s difficult to get it built. And then the other thing is that renewables are fantastic as well. They work today. They're never going to run out in any practical sense. But they do have this problem that they need to use a lot of land area or a lot of sea area to generate relatively small amounts of energy. I think you've always got pros and cons of these different energy sources.
You would need batteries, too, right? Because of the intermittency, potentially, you would need a lot of batteries. Big batteries.
Potentially you would need batteries too. Are batteries a bigger technological challenge than getting fusion working on the grid? I don't know. I'm probably a bit more relaxed about the batteries thing. Intermittency can be a problem with them, but also land is such a premium for other things — for food, for people to live — that I think that ultimately might be the bigger issue. And also people don't want to have these things built. They get blocked often. Whereas fusion and fission potentially — definitely in the case of fission, but almost certainly with fusion as well — the actual land area for the amount of energy generated is very, very attractive. So that's another reason. And finally, the fuel for nuclear fusion isn't going to run out anytime soon. There's enough of it on the planet to keep everyone on Earth…
The fuel for the kind of fusion we're talking about, deuterium-tritium, where does that fuel come from?
They're both special types of hydrogen. Ignore these quite wacky names. They're kind of special, rare types of hydrogen. But the thing is, they're not that rare. Deuterium is one of the ingredients, and about five grams of every bathtub of seawater is deuterium. So there's just absolutely phenomenal amounts of it in the sea. And chemically, it's exactly the same as normal hydrogen. So if we extract it, it doesn't really matter. It's not going to change anything, the fact that we're using it up. And then the other ingredient is a bit more tricky. It's something called tritium. It's very, very weakly radioactive. It's only harmful if you were to ingest it. But the problem is it decays over time into other things, so there's not very much of it around at any one time. But you can create it, and you can create it from another element called lithium.
Lithium is very common in the Earth both in ore and in seawater, and there's plenty of that to go around as well. Although of course, it does have some other uses, for example in batteries. So between those two, that's how you do it. Now there are problems: how do we turn the lithium into tritium, that needs to be solved on the kind of engineering side. But in principle, we've got enough fuel for thousands, if not millions, of years of energy for everyone on the planet to have the same level of consumption as people in the US, which you might be surprised to hear is quite high.
So this was net energy gain: more energy out than put in. But then you talk about wall plug energy gain in your book. Is that the next big step?
You know what, it kind of depends on where we want to focus our efforts, actually. There are a few ways we could go right now. For the benefit of your listeners, in this experiment, what they're measuring is the energy in, the energy that was carried by those laser beams to the target, and the energy that came out of that target from fusion reactions. Now, to actually power up and create those laser beams took a lot more energy. While about three megajoules of energy came out of the target, it took 400 megajoules to actually charge up the batteries, or the capacitor banks that they're called, to actually create those laser beams that had the two megajoules of energy. Wall-plug efficiency would be generating more energy than this entire system, so more than the 400 megajoules and more than the entire facility.
The thing to say about the National Ignition facility is it was built to do ignition. It was built to do the scientific bit. They never cared about the fact that their lasers are horribly inefficient, because they knew that wasn't really what they were aiming for. What I suspect they will do on this machine, which is really built for optimizing what happens at the target end, is to try and up the gain as much as they can. Perhaps to a factor of four or five times rather than one-and-a-half times as they've done here, which is probably about the limit of this particular machine.
But in the long run, of course, we've got to generate more energy than the facility as a whole. And that means probably going up to gains of at least 30 times. And eventually, if you're doing this form of fusion in a power plant, you'd use way more efficient lasers. This thing was designed 20-plus years ago and the laser efficiency is below 1 percent. There are lasers around today that can fire much faster and which have a 25 percent efficiency. And they're still not quite there in terms of energy terms. But with a bit more technological tweaking, maybe they could be. There are lots of ways to get over this wall-plug efficiency issue in the future. We haven't optimized for that. That is a good next challenge. But there are other parts of the problem that you could work on too.
When you look at what government is doing, what some of these private sector companies are doing, what ultimately is the path that you get most excited by and you're like, “I don't know for sure, but this could be it.” This is not investment advice!
No, it’s absolutely not. It really depends on what kind of a commitment… Assuming things carry on in much the way they did yesterday and the day before, which is not a given, of course, I think probably the most promising path is a big magnetic confinement fusion device called ITER, which is currently being built in the south of France. And ITER is very expensive and on a very big scale but will probably show net energy gain using the magnetic approach. We'll start to test out some of the engineering issues around a prototype power plant. Now, it is not a prototype power plant, but it will start to look at least some of those engineering challenges. I think one possible path for fusion could be ITER gets finished, they're successful in testing out net energy gain and showing it can work in the magnetic way, which I think they almost certainly will (previous experiments with magnetic confinement have got very close), and they'll test out some of the engineering things. And then the private sector could come in at that point and say, “If you're doing it on that scale, it's going to be really expensive and we're going to have really low learning rates” — the smaller you can make a technology, the faster you learn how to make it even cheaper. That could be the time when the private sector really comes in and says, “We can do it for you. We can make them smaller and cheaper, and therefore, we can make the learning rate higher, making this technology more effective.” But that's just one scenario. There are lots of other ones. If the US government, and maybe other nations too, decided to really, really push the laser-based approach, then maybe that could be the one where we see the most progress towards a prototype power plant.
Do you think some of these existing private sector companies, like Commonwealth Fusion Systems, I think another one is TAE Technologies, do you see them as legitimate players?
Absolutely. Some of them are working on really interesting approaches. And like I say, because we don't know what works, I think it makes a huge amount of sense to let entrepreneurs and innovators just see what sticks to the wall. A lot of them aren't going to get there, because a lot of the designs won't work or they'll have to pivot to slightly different designs. And that's absolutely fine. The ones that are looking at fusion reactions that aren't deuterium and tritium, I am more skeptical of, personally, because that reaction just takes so much more energy to get going. Obviously never say never. The one that I'm probably most excited about, on paper anyway, is Commonwealth Fusion Systems. What the public laboratories have done is build up this huge body of knowledge about what does work. And no one is anywhere near as far ahead as the public laboratories in the UK and the US and the international collaboration ones. They’re really the only people who've gotten anywhere close to doing this, because they're the only ones who've actually run with real fusion fuel for a start. Or at least they were until about two years ago. The thing that's quite nice about Commonwealth Fusion Systems is they're really building on tried and tested tokamak technology, but then they're saying, “Hey, the thing that really makes this work is having really powerful magnetic fields. So if we could just find a way to dramatically improve that part of the technology, we could make this dramatically smaller and dramatically easier as well.” I like that approach because they're really just doing this one change. And they've got some really promising technology to do it as well. Some of the advances they've made in superconductors are really exciting and probably stand alone as inventions.
Will star power take us to the stars?
Finally, we talked about the use case for fusion. It seems to me that there would be a strong use case, as you just mentioned, right here on Earth. But also in space, where we're going to need energy. I haven't really heard much of that mentioned in all the excitement about fusion, but I’ve thought about it, and I bet you have too.
I certainly have. Just for the benefit of people listening, once you are wanting to explore space — and I think it's part of the human psyche to want to explore unknown frontiers, so I think we want to do that; I think most people would take that as a given — if you want to go beyond the very local area, like the Moon and Mars, it's very difficult to do it with conventional rocket technology, because essentially you have to carry the fuel with you. Imagine if you are trying to have a wood-fired interstellar rocket: The amount of wood you have to carry with you is just going to make life much more difficult. It's going to be difficult to get into orbit and then to actually get the thrust you need.
Now, one of the great things about nuclear fusion is that it is the most high-energy-density, so amount of energy per kilogram, reaction that we have access to on Earth. It's the highest energy fuel stuff that we can possibly imagine, and it is basically the only one that is going to be able to do this longer-distance travel, because it can get us up to the speeds that we need to actually make some real progress across space. As I like to say, star power is literally the only energy source that can take us to the stars. So we should be doing it for that reason as well. Absolutely.
I often write about the need for Up Wing thinking. Despite the political drama that unfolds on cable news and social media, the key divide in America is not Left versus Right but Up versus Down. Up Wingers are all about acceleration for solving big problems, effectively tackling new ones, and creating maximum opportunity for all Americans. Down Wingers, on the other hand, are soaked in nostalgia, scarcity, and risk minimization. In this episode, I'm joined by Steve Fuller to discuss the political implications of Up Wing and Down Wing thinking.
Steve holds the Auguste Comte Chair in Social Epistemology at the University of Warwick's Department of Sociology. He's the author of several books, including 2014's The Proactionary Imperative.
In This Episode
* Up-Wing versus Down-Wing thinking (1:25)
* America’s emerging Down-Wing coalition (9:45)
* Towards an Up-Wing environmentalism (18:54)
* Up-Wing politics and risk (25:31)
* How Up Wingers should think of Elon Musk (31:30)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
Up-Wing versus Down-Wing thinking
James Pethokoukis: In 1973, almost 50 years ago, the futurist F.M. Esfandiary wrote the book Up-Wingers: A Futurist Manifesto, where he posited a new political axis, where future-oriented Up Wingers and more traditionalist Down Wingers would replace the existing Left Wing-Right Wing axis. You've also framed this as Green — meaning traditional environmentalist — versus Black — the sky is the limit, perhaps space is the limit.
I wonder if you could just speak for a moment or two about the tenets of being Up Wing or on the Black pole versus Down Wing, Green pole. What does that look like in the modern political environment?
Steve Fuller: I think the first thing to say, given that you started with Esfandiary, who's known as FM-2030 to his fans in transhumanism, is that the book Up-Wingers actually only talked about Up Wingers but didn't talk about Down Wingers, because he was an incredibly optimistic guy, you might say. What he was really arguing in that book back in the ‘70s was that the Left-Right political axis would just be replaced by Up Wingers. There wouldn't be Down Wingers. That's an interesting aspect of what was going on back then in the ‘70s. And in fact, what he thought about as so-called “black sky thinking” — which is what you were alluding to in your question about Black being the kind of signal color for Up Wingers — he was actually talking about something rather close to the kind of internet that we have now, basically. Especially in terms of the personalized aspects of it: social media, the world-wide web, all of this kind of stuff. That was kind of what he was getting at. He wasn't really getting at some of the more profound things that I would say is now part of the political landscape in the contemporary world, which in a way makes the Up Winger or Down Winger distinction a much more visible distinction and much more salient than it was back 50 years ago.
Now, I think there is an Up Wing or Down Wing distinction in a very clear kind of way. I'm the one who kind of brings in the Down Wing aspect of this. And so as you said in your introductory remarks, at least in the European political spectrum, Red means Left and Blue means Right. Whereas I understand the United States these days, with the way the states get mapped, it's the other way around. But the point is, in any case, that color scheme is gone. And what we instead have is Black versus Green. The idea of Black for the Up Wingers is that the sky is the limit. You're imagining sort of the “black sky” kind of thing. That's the stellar cosmos color. Whereas the Down Wingers are Green in the sense that they basically want human beings to be planted on Earth. It's a very Earth orientation. It is a sky versus Earth thing in a way, Up Wing or Down Wing, in the way I'm talking about it.
The interesting thing about this distinction, as I think it plays out now, is that it shows a fundamental instability, you might say, in the concept of the human. Insofar as we've thought about social life and political life as revolving around humanity — how to organize humanity, what humanity is about, and so forth — we generally have had a kind of common understanding of what a human being is. And that's, roughly speaking, homo sapiens. Homo sapiens, in a way, provides a kind of outer limit to what we think about as a human. But now, with a lot of things going on — not just the stuff that has to do with information technology, where we can perhaps upload our consciousness or merge with machines in some way, even in some kind of Elon Musk-Neuralink fashion where we become cyborgs in a sense — it's not just that that's going on: There are all these potential biological transformations, biomedical transformations, which in a way could really destabilize even the biological nature of the human being. For example: human beings living indefinitely. All of that stuff would have incredible knock-on effects with regard to how we organize our social and political life, which to a large extent depends on the idea that human beings are more or less upright apes who live a finite period of time and then they succeed to another generation. Up Wingers are, in a sense, open to everything like this. It kind of explodes the category of the human, and that's why the term “transhumanism” is an appropriate term for those people, because they want to transcend the limits of the human.
The Down Wingers take the exact opposite view and think the Up Wingers are completely dangerous. The [Down] Wingers think that, if anything, the problems that we have now on Earth — let's say the climate issues, but also even maybe the pandemic issue and so forth — have to do with the extent to which humans have overextended themselves on the planet. They don't know their limits. And in some sense, what human beings need to do is not to think that we're somehow above animals and nature, but rather to return, as it were, to our natural origins. And that homo sapiens may not be so special after all, and that our survival may depend on our having a more modest understanding of what our nature is. The Down Wingers basically want to get us down there. That's why these people like to talk about the precautionary principle, for example, which is to say that when you introduce any innovations or whatever, you minimize risk. You do no harm. It's like a Hippocratic Oath for the Earth. This is a view that has a lot of prominence these days. This view is even called “post-humanist,” because, in a sense, it wants to minimize the significance of the human in order to return to something that is a more stable, Earthly existence. So this is where the polarities are: some want to go into the skies and some want to really implant themselves on the Earth.
In the book 50 years ago, Down Wing was not mentioned, yet it seems as though that view, broadly speaking — concerns about scarcity, about limits, thinking going to space would be a waste of money, also looking at technological stagnation over the past half century — it seems like even though Down Wing was not mentioned, Down Wing has been winning and has been the dominant ethos.
I think there's a certain truth to that. I think the Silicon Valley people are very attuned to this point. Peter Thiel, I suppose, would be the main one who talks about the great technological stagnation that's been taking place over the past 50 years. I think he's basically right, and probably for the kinds of reasons you've just cited: that there has been this kind of latent Down Winger tendency. But I think, in a way, it has converged in very interesting ways with other kinds of movements in recent years to make it stronger so that it becomes a kind of social justice movement. It is no longer just purely about ecologists, environmentalists in the narrow sense; but rather, it has this much broader sense, because if one thinks about who would be most vulnerable to any kind of climate catastrophe or something like that, then one starts to bring in the developing world, the poor, the people who are already kind of unprotected. This gets then rolled into a very large social justice agenda, which then makes the Down Wing movement much more powerful, you might say, than it would've appeared 50 years ago.
America’s emerging Down-Wing coalition
What led me to some of your writings was really the 2016 election here in the United States, when you had this weird phenomenon of people who supported Bernie Sanders, but when he did not win the Democratic nomination said, “Then maybe we'll support Donald Trump.” At first, that seems crazy. But if you start to look at things with an Up Wing versus Down Wing perspective, it begins to make a little bit of sense. Do you see this sort of merging of the populists of the left and right coming together and making this scenario maybe actually happen?
Yes, actually, I do. This is where I think the Democratic Party is really in a very tight, difficult situation, to be perfectly honest. If we're talking about the establishment of the Democratic Party, it's still very much on the sort of Hillary Clinton, technocratic, broadly Up Winger, you might say, way. And Bernie Sanders was just seen as a throwback to the past. If you’re Hillary Clinton, you're basically planning for all of that rust belt stuff, all of that kind of traditional working-class thing, to disappear over time. I think that's the scenario. But of course, the point about Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump is in a way to keep the consciousness of the working class kind of alive. And this sort of populism isn't going to go away. To be honest with you, nowadays there's a lot of inflammatory talk, especially in the United States, about fascism. But fascism, of course, fed on this kind of connection between basically working-class disenfranchised people, who in the past would've been voting on the left of the party, but then seeing the left somehow taking off into space and not really addressing their bread-and-butter concerns. And then some leader that might be called fascist actually galvanizes and organizes this group of people. It could happen. There are a lot of different kinds of ways in which the Down Winger thing can play itself out, because I do think the environmental aspect of this is also there. But then environmentalism also has a kind of connection with fascism, too, in a certain way. It's a very complicated story, and it plays itself differently in different countries. If we're talking about the United States, it's a bit different than if we're talking about Europe.
I see these Bernie Sanders-style populists on the left who are very skeptical of corporate power. And now we have conservative populists who also seem to be against big corporations. Both groups seem to hate Silicon Valley. There's also a lot of overlap on housing density. Yet on cultural issues like abortion, for example, these groups remain divided. Is that how you see it?
I see that 100 percent. I don't know exactly what to do about it. It's a very strange situation. But I do think it does point to the fact that the conventional political parties are going to end up realigning at some point. In other words, they're both going to kind of break apart, not only in this country, but certainly in Britain, the same sort of thing is happening as well. There's an interesting thing about, what does politics look like under these circumstances? Because I think one of the things that contributes to the destabilization of people's finding a political home is the fact that the state — which typically was the thing that political parties were fighting over: control of the state and control over state power — the power that the state actually wields nowadays is diminishing.
There are so many other players, as it were, that in a way have competing powers to the state and often can kind of prevent the state from doing various things, that then when people start thinking about political identity, this is why young people, for example, don't vote. Because they don't see anything in it for them, because they're not sure that getting one set of politicians or another set of politicians is going to actually mobilize enough power to actually get things done. And so I think that's also part of the background of this story; namely, that the state isn't something worth fighting for or fighting about anymore, in a certain way. It doesn't really anchor, as it were, the common political reality that people understand.
This is also part of the world we live in, where we have so many different competing understandings of what's actually happening on the ground. And there is nothing terribly authoritative and establishment to sort of say, “No, actually this is happening. This is not happening.” So a lot of this kind of anchoring effect, this common ground stuff, that used to make actually being in one party or another party important is disappearing as well. And so this is why it all seems very blurry and people are just kind of moving around from place to place.
A typical median voter in Great Britain or the United States, do you think they're fundamentally more of an Up Wing person or more of a Down Wing person?
I think, generally speaking, they're Up Wing, actually. I think they're Up Wing if you ask them their attitudes towards stuff. But the problem is, when you put it all together as part of a political agenda, it often seems very threatening. And I think that's kind of the public relations problem that Up Wingers have. Because there are a lot of the actual things, like: Do you want to be able to live longer? Do you want innovative medicines that will be able to cure diseases that in the past, let's say, killed your parents or something? Everybody is for this. And everybody is for all kinds of technological solutions to solve all sorts of problems. People are actually for all this stuff. The problem is that when you add it all together, and then you look in a sense not simply at the economic cost — I don't think the economic cost is really the big deal here — but rather you think about what the implications would be for the kind of world we would live in if all of this wonderful stuff came together, and you see Up Wingers are very sensitive to the point that we would be in a different world. This wouldn't be a better version of the current world, but this would be a different kind of world. I think this is where it starts to seem scary to a lot of people when it's actually presented as a political package.
I'll give you an example: There’s this thing called telemedicine, which basically enables people to send in their symptoms, to look up stuff, and then they can have access to this amazing biomedical information base that would then enable them to get customized medicine in just the way they want. It would be a maximum use of the internet for purposes of healthcare. But of course, this would involve an unprecedented level of surveillance and violation of privacy. Especially if we're monitoring the effects of people who voluntarily decide to take certain kinds of experimental drugs and stuff. Everything they do would have to be monitored and checked. When you flesh out the picture of what the Up Wing view involves, then the opposition gets traction because they say, “So you're going to sell your privacy? Is that what you're going to do? And what are you selling it for? What, to take some experimental drugs that might not work and you might not even know what the side effects are?” And so it's quite easy, once you flesh out and you present the Up Winger program — as a program, not just as a set of isolated things you might want, but as an entire political program — it then becomes easy to enumerate the various implicit costs that this is going to have. And that's when you start to raise the fear factor in the electorate. “My privacy is going to be gone. This might be risky. Blah, blah, blah.” That's where we are. It's very hard to win elections when you're operating in that space.
As you’re suggesting, it's not an easy thing to poll with a public opinion survey. But I suppose if I was going to try to find a single question that might tell me where the public is, it might be nuclear energy. If you're for it, you’re probably inherently more Up Wing. If you're against it, probably more Down Wing.
This is true.
Which means the public is pretty split.
That's a good litmus test. Yes. It's the same thing in Europe, too. It's the same thing in Europe.
Towards an Up-Wing environmentalism
I sense that over the past year or two — I think it's because of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and energy shortages, and I think a growing realization that all these climate goals are going to be very difficult to meet without nuclear energy — that people are specifically rethinking nuclear, but then maybe people are going to start rethinking, “Why are we even in this situation? Why do we not already have abundant clean power? What is this bill of goods that the environmental movement has been selling us for 50 years, that we're sitting here having to think about radically changing our lifestyles to meet some climate goal, that we have energy shortages in Europe when it was all entirely avoidable?”
This is where it gets kind of interesting, because of course, nuclear is not risk free. I think this has always been the problem, especially in Europe. One thing you need to realize, especially if we're talking about the European Union, is that the European Union actually has the precautionary principle baked into a lot of its legislation. In other words, this minimization of risk is one of the things that, for example, makes it very difficult for biomedical innovations to actually get on stream in Europe. Environmental protection in Europe is incredibly high. For example: This enormous opposition to genetically modified organisms to put in the food system. All of this is very much to do with the precautionary principle being in there. The precautionary principle says above all “do no harm,” even if it means you do less good. That's going to be a killer for nuclear. The point is, yes, we could have had clean energy via nuclear many decades ago, but it would've also been risky. It was probably a risk worth taking, I would think. And I still think that now.
But nevertheless, part of what's going on between the Up Wingers and the Down Wingers is basically the attitude toward risk. Because we can do a lot of amazing things right now if we're willing to absorb just a little bit more risk. This is a tough one for politicians, because politicians, at the end of the day… One way to think about what a politician is, in terms of serving their constituency, is protecting them. So if you are in a constituency where you’ve got a lot of eco-activists raising the alarm bells — if we put a nuclear reactor here, then your water will be poisoned, you'll have three-legged cats, whatever — how's a politician going to deal with that? Because there is a small chance that might happen. So it's a very tough sell. I think we could have had a much cleaner world by now if we were willing to take a little bit more risk with regard to things like nuclear and more experimental kinds of technologies. Even genetic modification, actually, in terms of our ability to adapt to climate change and stuff like that. And risk is one of the things that often makes the difference in terms of political debate. It ends up defining the limits of plausibility for what you can put forward as a policy.
For some of the reasons I mentioned earlier, to me the environmental movement has been a very Down-Wing, limits-based movement. Do you sense that's changing because of the reality of trying to hit climate goals without technology? If there's anything we've learned during the pandemic and maybe with some of these energy shortages in Europe, it’s that people do not like scarcity. They like abundance. They don't like shortages. And I'm wondering if that revelation is going to create a more Up-Wing aspect to the environmental movement.
First of all, there are some Up-Wing environmental movements. One of them, I'm a fellow, is the Breakthrough Institute in California. And those guys have been on this ticket for a long time. But to be honest, their degree of success in getting the message across has been limited. And this has been true of other such movements — eco-modernist, as they're called, movements around the world. There is the issue of fear mongering. There's the fear element that is very difficult to deal with in political discourse. Once it gets unleashed, it's very hard to combat it. In the case of nuclear (and this is true, I would say, of a lot of this more progressive technology), if you look at the agencies that would be promoting it, obviously we would be talking about state, corporate, we would be talking pretty heavy players that would enable this kind of new technology to go on stream in a big way. And to a large extent, some of this technology is already available, but it's been prevented from actually coming on stream. The look of that to people who are already distrustful of all kinds of establishments and all kinds of authorities is not good. It’s not a good look. If nuclear energy was something that could be promoted from a mom-and-pop store, it would probably be much more palatable. This is a basic kind of problem, the kind of general distrust. As you know, one of the things that has come about as a result of the pandemic is this efflorescence of conspiracy theories. And who's involved in the conspiracy theories? Well, big business, the state: all the kinds of big players who would, in fact, probably be among the supporters of nuclear among many other of these innovative technologies. The look of the sponsors does not create an aura of trust in a populace that is increasingly distrustful of authority. I think that's a real basic kind of public relations problem that this whole issue has to overcome. I'm not sure how you do it, but I think that's a much bigger issue than, let's say, making people aware of what the benefits of nuclear energy are.
Up-Wing politics and risk
During the pandemic we've learned something about the issue of trust in society. What do you think we've learned about the issue of risk tolerance in society? More people than I would've guessed are very risk averse.
Yes, I think that's exactly right. It's an interesting picture. I think at some point, once the air has cleared on this matter, there needs to be a thorough cross-national comparison of the response to the pandemic. Nations of the world were all over the map on this in terms of the amount of social control they put on their citizenry and so forth. In that respect, it was a very interesting living experiment, the pandemic, because of the ways in which the different political systems responded to it. The state does have a lot of power in certain kinds of arenas like health. In a sense, the state shot itself in the foot by making people too risk averse. We have been living in a world where we've been promised that the risks are going to go away and that people are going to live longer, healthier lives forever. We've been expecting this kind of uninterrupted, upward trajectory, certainly since the end of the Second World War. Anything that might threaten that then becomes a source of fear. And if we lived in a world where we realized it's going to be a kind of bumpy ride up — death rates will vary; it’s not that we're going to continue to minimize death rates, but they will vary, but in the appropriate direction over time — then people would be more tolerant of situations like pandemics, where eventually people do die more than normally die. Because the pandemic was so publicized, on a 24/7 basis you could compare the death rates of all the countries of the world simultaneously as if this was some kind of sporting league where you say, “Hey, these guys are on the top of the league. They got the fewest per capita dying today.” This is a nonsense way of managing a pandemic. It does make it look like, if you avoid death, if you avoid contamination, then you're winning. That then undermines the kind of mindset that is required for any kind of technological progress, which is much more risk seeking than that.
I think that if we end up being able to cure or significantly reduce the incidence of some big key diseases, that would send a powerful message to people that technology is good. We can radically change our lives. And I wonder if something like that might really tip the scale.
I think so, actually. The public relations side of all this should never be underestimated. I think you need a big win. The polio vaccine, right? You need something like that. It's not just that it works well, but that the coverage of it, the relevance of it, to large numbers of people is immediate. It's obvious. People could see it. They don't need to know how the polio vaccine works. If they know someone with polio, they understand immediately. This is the point: You need something that has that kind of level of public salience. I think people who think about this, think that is what's got to happen. How it's going to happen, where it's going to happen — it's not obvious. But clearly, from a public relations standpoint, if you want something that's going to make this kind of a gestalt switch so that people go from being risk averse to being risk seeking, you need a big win on something that a couple of years ago you wouldn't think was possible.
If over the next 25 years, 50 years, we saw the precautionary principle replaced with a more risk-taking principle, what does that world look like?
We could have a whole half hour on this topic. One of the things I think would be necessary is that people would be allowed, at the very least, to be able to volunteer for quite risky kinds of experiments through private contracts with scientists and others, where there is some mutual understanding that one understands the terms of agreement and so forth. And so there would probably have to be a kind of insurance agency around this for compensation when things go wrong. But what that would replace is the current system, the research ethics codes that apply universally and in a blanket fashion across research establishments, especially in academia, which ends up preventing effectively a priori any kind of risky research from happening because of the possibility of harm to the subjects, even if the subject would voluntarily enter into the research.
And so that, I think, is a minimum requirement: that you would have to change the legal structure that at the moment prevents the risky stuff from being done. Because the problem is, the risky stuff does get done anyway. It gets done in China, these ethics-free zones. It gets done underground. Black market, all kinds of crazy stuff I'm sure is going on around the world at the moment, and we might even be able to learn from it. But as long as there is this kind of very prohibitionist mentality in the legal system, it is the great inhibitor. We really need to turn this into a much more contract system, not a kind of blanket ban on certain kinds of research. That would be the first step.
How Up Wingers should think of Elon Musk
How should up wingers think about Elon Musk?
If you're an Up Winger, and you're someone who in a way is all about taking risks and encouraging others to take risks, what better person to take a risk than a billionaire? In a sense, he’s a very appropriate person to be an Up Winger. He can afford to lose. He’s doing a lot of stuff. Some of it people might regard as crazy, but nevertheless, if public agencies were doing it, it would be a nightmare. But in some sense, a lot of the stuff that he's doing, you sort of believe someone ought to be doing it. And it's his money.
When we talk about all these rich people, “What do they do with their money?” I think the idea of risking the money, or at least amounts of it, in these kinds of projects is not so bad, actually. There are a lot of worse things Elon Musk could be doing. This man could be causing an enormous amount of damage in the world. He might not be saving the world's poor. He might not be vaccinating them to death. But what he's doing is he's trying various kinds of experimental, innovative things that would be beyond the financial range of most states and individuals around the world. So I'm willing to tolerate him. This is the kind of guy who is in a position to really take risks. That's what I see him doing. Is it guaranteed he's going to succeed in any of this stuff? Most of his income comes from PayPal still! And he's using that to bankroll all the other stuff.
This month, December 2022, marks the 50-year anniversary of when man last stood on the Moon. NASA's Apollo missions were an awe-inspiring triumph of human achievement, but do people really care about space anymore? To discuss the wonder of space exploration, the virtues involved, and why robotic missions just aren't enough, I'm joined by Charles T. Rubin.
Charles is a contributing editor at The New Atlantis, where he has published several excellent essays on space exploration, his latest being "Middle Seat to the Moon" in the fall 2022 issue. He's also a professor emeritus of political science at Duquesne University and the author of several books, including 2014's Eclipse of Man: Human Extinction and the Meaning of Progress.
In This Episode
* Will space become mundane? (1:29)
* The case for astronauts (10:10)
* Billionaires in space (14:29)
* Sci-fi and the future of space (19:41)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
Will space become mundane?
James Pethokoukis: In your New Atlantis essay, you write that “to make something routine is precisely to suck the wonder out of it, to make it uninteresting.” In regards to space exploration, is it important that people have a sense of wonder to it? Is it important to maintain public support for government efforts? And is it important in a higher spiritual sense, that we have a sense of wonder about the vastness of the universe outside our own little pale blue dot of it?
Charles Rubin: I think both of those are true, actually. It applies not just to government space program efforts, but also now to private space program efforts. The private ones obviously will operate in a market environment. Someday, I think it is hoped that such trips will not just be for immensely wealthy people, but will be for normally wealthy people. And they're going to have to have a reason to want to go into space. I think, as is true in many, many circumstances of tourism, it will be because there's something very cool and wondrous to be seen out there. That is certainly part of any justification — an important part, it seems to me, for both private space efforts and, of course, public space efforts. There are going to be many different reasons why people will support or be against a government-funded space program. But here also, I think that wonder plays an important role in attracting some kinds of people to those efforts who would otherwise not be attracted. The science of it, the technology of it — those are crucial things, but they're not going to appeal to everybody. But exploration and going where no human being has gone before: These are things that are going to have a broader appeal, I think.
I wonder, even if we get to the point where it's maybe not common that people take a quick trip into almost space or even at the point where they can have a vacation in orbit, even if you know people who have done that, I think there will still be a sense of wonder. I've done some traveling, probably a lot less traveling than some other people. But I'm pretty sure that when I go to Italy and see the Colosseum, or if I went to Australia and saw Mount Uluru, even though I am not the first person to do that and I know people have done that, I would still probably think those are pretty awesome.
I certainly hope that's true. It may be useful if I say something more about my concerns about routinization: I think that there are problems that will be faced as space travel gets more common and is available to more people. That will be a wonderful thing in terms of the success of the technology, but we will potentially find ourselves in a situation where it's going to be like flying in an airplane to Australia or flying in an airplane to Italy: I don't know how many people look out the window under those circumstances. And yet here you are flying at an immense height with extraordinary vistas to be seen around you, and we simply take it for granted.
I began to think about some of this in the way I do when I was going occasionally into New York City from New Jersey. I don't think this is a train ride that is known — well, I can know for sure — it's not known for its natural beauty, and I could look around me and see that people were doing almost anything other than looking out the window. But it's kind of an extraordinary ride. You're passing through suburban America, you're passing through decaying industrial areas. There's just a lot to be seen there. But of course, it's just a train ride so who really is going to be looking too carefully at what's going on around them? I'd like to see that in our space efforts we maintain that level of interest at all levels of the journey. And again, I think that's going to be an important part of both commercial and governmental success.
Is that possible? Is that an unavoidable downside? Some things are going to become common and there's always going to be a certain amount of people like yourself — I'm probably more like you in this; I always think it's cool the first time I see a New York skyline or taking a train and just seeing how one little town might be different; I enjoy that — and some people don’t, they will get lost in their phones or naps, and that's just the way we are. Different people have different preferences.
Yes, and that's fine. In fact, that's wonderful. But I don't think it's impossible to open a door that might otherwise be left shut. In other words, I think these are outlooks that can be cultivated. They're outlooks that can be encouraged. I think I was fortunate growing up: My folks took us on wonderful driving vacations, and when we started out was an era of auto suspensions where car sickness was still a major concern. We were actively discouraged from reading in the car, so we learned to pay attention to the landscape. And my mother was a great one for pointing things out, and she was never afraid to hide her own enthusiasm. And I didn't do such a good job with my kids, who became readers in the car. I kind of wish that were otherwise, but I probably could have done better. Again, I think there are attitudes that can be cultivated, there are expectations that can be created, that will perhaps allow more people rather than fewer to appreciate the wonders of space flight.
That reminded me of a book by the Nobel laureate Edmund Phelps called Mass Flourishing. And toward the end of the book, he talks a little bit about schools. And he's worried that we're not creating entrepreneurial — in the broadest sense of the word — risk-taking, adventurous children.
Are we creating with our current education system, do you think, the kind of people who can have a real sense of awe, a sense of wonder at what they see out of a window on a spacecraft or a space hotel?
That sounds like a last chapter I very much need to read. I agree. I think there are multiple tendencies in contemporary American culture that readily point us in directions that are not healthy. My hope would be something like this: that a serious, active, adventurous, risk-taking space program could serve something of the same function going forward in our time as that extraordinary, less than a decade served in the 1960s when the United States was on its way to the Moon. That really was inspiring. I look back on it and I think it's amazing. It took so short a time from the Kennedy speech to having people on the Moon. And people responded to that, it seems to me.
The case for astronauts
Frequent listeners will know that I love the TV show For All Mankind. And for those who have not watched it, it's an alt-history show where the space race never ends. The US and the USSR just keep racing, and it has all kinds of interesting side effects. And I remember, I think it was the end of season three, it flash-forwards — spoilers — to the early ‘90s. And what you see is this Martian vista, then you see an astronaut's boot take a step on that Martian vista. But some people don't get a thrill out of that. They think, “Fine. Build your space factories and space hotels and space stations, but anything beyond that, just send robots. Send robots to the Moon, send robots to Mars — do your exploration that way.” Certainly, you could do some exploration more cheaply if it was just robots. Is it worth the risk to be sending people beyond the Moon?
I want to acknowledge your point and say, yes, there are people who simply aren't going to find any kind of appeal in this. And that's okay. I just would like to see a situation where those whose heartstrings can be plucked by this sort of thing can express it that way and can understand themselves that way. An for example, NASA perhaps be a little more forthright in stressing the adventurous and the risk-taking part of its program rather than, as it has been in the past, tending to downplay the risk. I'm not talking about making things more risky. I'm talking about admitting the risks that are actually there.
We mentioned a current essay, but you had another one which was great, “The Case Against the Case Against Space.” I'm quickly going to read a few sentences from that:
“We should want heroes, but heroism requires danger. That many professed shock when the idea was floated that early Mars explorers might have to accept that they would die on Mars is a sign of how far we miss the real value of our space enterprise as falling within the realm of the ‘noble and beautiful.’ It would be better to return in triumph, to age and pass away gracefully surrounded by loved ones, and admired by a respectful public! But to die on Mars — to say on Mars what Titus Oates said in the wastes of Antarctica, ‘I am just going outside and may be some time’ — would be in its own way a noble end, a death worth commemorating beyond the private griefs that all of us will experience and cause.”
That seems to me a countercultural notion right now: that it's worth it. There are worse things than to die in that pursuit.
It is a countercultural notion, but I think it's worth trying to… And by the way, thank you for that.
I've quoted that passage in various things. I just love it.
But we can work towards creating a world where it is at least not as unusual as it might be today. I think there is to some extent a kind of natural appeal of heroism, a natural admiration of risk taking. And we can work to bring that out with respect to the space program. And yes, of course, we should pride ourselves on the fact that we are not expending lives lightly and that we do everything we can to bring our astronauts back. But there also has to be a recognition that it isn't always going to work that way. And just because lives will be lost, that does not in any way diminish the value or the meaning of the enterprise.
Billionaires in space
We have this “Billionaire Space Race.” Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk, Richard Branson: They all seem to have very different goals. Musk and Bezos, particularly, have a far more expansive vision of what they're trying to do than somebody like Richard Branson. But they're certainly describing what they're doing differently. Elon Musk has talked about how we're going to be a multi-planetary civilization, have colonies on Mars. And Bezos has not tended to talk like that. He talks about creating an orbital economy, moving heavy industry into orbit: a much more grounded description. I wonder if Bezos does that because he just wonders how much interest people really have in space exploration. I'm not sure what my question is, but certainly it seems like they've taken different stances. And I'm wondering if there's an underlying concern that even though we love science-fiction films, there's just not that kind of interest in space?
In a way, I think that the fact that interest in space is limited is actually something which Elon Musk's vision accommodates better than Jeff Bezos' vision. Jeff Bezos does imagine vast numbers of people moving up into those orbital colonies such that the Earth is significantly depopulated largely for the sake of ecological integrity. That presumes a huge interest in people moving into space. And to my mind, frankly, it’s quite unrealistic.
But what is Musk talking about? Musk is talking about something that we know well. I understand from that book I criticized that there are problems in analogizing Earthly exploration to space exploration, but there are still similarities. We're talking about sending a small number of people on our behalf for the sake of exploration, for the sake of adventure, for the sake of the expansion of knowledge. That can be done with a relatively smaller constituency than a vision like Bezos’, which requires just about everybody somehow to buy into it. Even when we start talking about colonization of Mars, as Musk likes to talk about, even that can be a minority taste and yet still lay the groundwork for extraordinary possibilities of a human future.
William Shatner recently did a quick jump into space and back with Jeff Bezos, and there was a lot of attention paid to his reaction. William Shatner said after his trip to space: “The contrast between the vicious coldness of space and the warm nurturing of Earth below filled me with overwhelming sadness. … My trip to space was supposed to be a celebration; instead, it felt like a funeral.” What do you make of that reaction?
I think that his unstudied reaction immediately following the flight — I think what you're quoting is a later reflection on his experience — was more telling. Whether or not there was an element of sadness, he was moved to an extraordinary extent by his experience. And I think that's appropriate. Of course, people are going to be moved in different ways and he is certainly entitled to reflect back on his experience and put a much darker tone on it subsequently than he put on it at the time. There was some of that in what he said at the time, but I think his vision has gotten darker over the course of the last months. People aren't all going to be moved to the same…
I love the idea of space exploration and that did not bother me at all. It made me appreciate Earth. It made me think we have to make sure Earth works right now because there's no place for us to go. I can understand that, thinking about Earth and are we taking care of it enough? That's totally fine. I don't think it means that we shouldn't explore space and try to go out there. But to me that's a totally reasonable reaction, and maybe also a reaction I might have if I was in my ‘90s and probably thinking more about having probably far fewer days ahead than behind.
Yes. That's a nice point.
Sci-fi and the future of space
Are there books, TV shows, movies, and science fiction that you think present thoughtful visions about space or even about the future of space exploration or the future in general?
Let me mention two things. I haven't gotten nearly as deeply into For All Mankind as you have, but I'm enjoying it tremendously. The show that I love so much that I haven't been able to bring myself to watch yet the last few episodes is The Expanse. I think it is actually a very thoughtful and compelling vision of a future. Lord knows, in some ways it's a terrible future. I don't want to do a lot of spoilers, but nonetheless, I think it has the root of the matter in it, that this is what a human future in space looks like. And there are going to be heights and there are going to be depths. But the opportunities for new venues in which to experience those kinds of heights and depths, there's going to be something extraordinary about it.
The other thing is, there's this wonderful coffee table book. It's called Apollo Remastered by a photographer named Andy Saunders. And he has taken some familiar and some hitherto-unseen NASA footage and processed it using modern techniques. And so the pictures are beautiful in themselves, but he also has done interviewing of some of the surviving astronauts. He has, I think, a wonderful eye and ear for the adventurism aspect of space exploration. And he gets some astronauts talking and commenting on things which I was a little surprised to hear. It made me think differently about some of those Apollo astronauts than I had up to that time. It's a lovely book visually and also just quite stimulating in terms of its vision of what was actually going on among the astronauts of that period.
Since you mentioned The Expanse and it's a show I really like: I've written a little bit about it, and I got into a little bit of a back-and-forth with people because I described it as a “future-optimistic” show. And people are like, “How could you say that? There's still conflict and war, and there's inequality?” Yes, because we're human beings, and whether we have fusion drives, that's going to be there. My idea of a better future isn't about creating a race of perfect near gods. It’s that we keep going on.
When I think about how much conversation is about the ecological destruction of the Earth and that we're not going to have a future, to have a show that says, “A lot of things went wrong, but we're still here.” In The Expanse, it’s clear there has been climate change. I think there's a giant sea wall protecting New York. There are problems, and we solve problems. And maybe our solutions cause more problems, but then we'll solve those and we just keep moving forward. Humanity keeps expanding and we keep surviving. And that's pretty good to me. That’s my kind of future-optimism. As much as I love Star Trek, I don't require an optimistic future to be one where there's absolute abundance, no poverty, we all get along all the time.
I think that's beautifully observed. I agree 100 percent. I don't think I would like to live on the Mars of The Expanse. I don't think it's my kind of place.
A lot of tunnels. You're living in a lot of tunnels.
But Bobbie is just an extraordinary person. She's very Martian, but she isn't entirely limited by her Martianness. She's so competent and capable and just admirable in all these ways which a future person, one hopes, could turn out to be admirable. That's very beautiful. And yes, there are terrible traitors on Mars, traitors to humanity on Mars, too. But just as you say, it allows us to continue to lead human lives in these new and extraordinary settings and stretches. If that were to be the future, it stretches our capacities, it stretches our minds, it challenges us in ways which I think are good for us.
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Also, I’m making all new content free without a paywall. In December, however, everything will be back to normal: typically three meaty essays and two enlightening Q&As a week, along with a pro-progress podcast like this one 👇 several times a month (including transcript). And, of course, a weekly recap over the weekends.
Melior Mundus
Here at Faster, Please!, I write a lot about the need for optimistic, inspiring science fiction. As I’ve put it before:
It’s important that our culture create aspirational and inspirational visions of the future. Underlying the rapid advance of human progress over the past quarter-millennium has been a powerful optimism about tomorrow combined with what sociologist Elise Boulding has described as a “utopian sense of human empowerment.” We have to believe that the inevitable disruption caused by progress will be worth it — if we make the right decisions.
We also need to believe that we can invent, broadly, the future we want. Right now, however, it seems we think that we’ve carelessly created a future that our kids and grandkids won’t want — a future of rising temperatures and rising inequality. And since the early 1970s, Hollywood has both reflected and encouraged that gloomy belief. But sci-fi could again be pro-progress and future-optimistic (what I call “Up Wing”). It could have plenty of dramatic tension while also showing a path toward a better, although still imperfect, world.
I'll often ask my podcast or 5 Quick Questions guests/interviewees to point to an example of that kind of science fiction. And perhaps no film, book, or TV show gets held up as the standard for sci-fi more than Star Trek. To learn more about the history of the franchise and to discuss its future-optimism and cultural importance, I'm speaking with Ryan Britt.
Ryan is the author of the tremendous new book Phasers on Stun! How the Making and Remaking of Star Trek Changed the World, out earlier this year. Previously, he wrote Luke Skywalker Can’t Read and Other Geeky Truths. Ryan is also an editor at Fatherly and a contributing writer for Inverse; both BDG brands. In addition, he also writes regularly for Esquire, Den of Geek! and Star Trek.com.
In This Episode
* The Original Series and ‘60s sci-fi (1:19)
* The mainstream appeal of Star Trek (5:44)
* Star Trek’s future-optimism (12:06)
* The essence of Trek (21:24)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
The Original Series and ‘60s sci-fi
James Pethokoukis: When originally broadcast, Star Trek did not have great ratings. Obviously it has become an institution since then. Why didn't it do better when it was first on regular television back in the ‘60s?
Ryan Britt: It's a little bit of a matter of debate. One of the people that I interviewed for my book, Marc Cushman, did these deep dives into the ratings for his books, which were these very, very in-depth books called These Are The Voyages. And his contention is that if you look at it by today's standards, five or 10 million people is a lot. Now we have all these streaming services that target these niche audiences and stuff like that. It would no longer be considered a failure. But at the time, you only had three networks. You had NBC, CBS, and ABC. And Star Trek was on NBC, and it didn't compete in the way that NBC wanted it to long term.
That said, it had a very strong start. And Lucille Ball who ran Desilu Studios that produced Star Trek sent a note of congratulations to Gene Rodenberry when it started, saying they were off to a great start. But the flip side of that is we forget that Star Trek introduced mainstream American television audiences to all this stuff in science fiction that they had no exposure to before. On the one hand, five, 10 million people, 20 million people, might not seem like a lot compared to today's viewership, but back then it was a huge explosion.
When talking about the original series, people often will say it was really a piece of its time with a “New Frontier” spirit. You had the Cold War analogies between the Federation and the Klingons; you could even look at Captain Kirk as a John F. Kennedy kind of character. But those are really things of the early ‘60s. And granted, it's the same decade, late ‘60s. But there was a big difference between the America of 1960–62, then getting into the heart of the Vietnam era, civil rights, the late 1960s by the time the show aired. I wonder if you think that had a role, that already by that time it seemed maybe out of step with the America of that era?
It's funny because science fiction in general—this is true of all science fiction, whether it's print or film—it always is oddly a little behind. Star Trek was taking this imagery that you would see on the covers of pulp science-fiction magazines from two decades prior. The way in which it kind of looks reminds you of old issues of Astounding or Amazing Stories and things like that. But its sensibilities were coming from these ‘60s writers who were part of what was called the New Wave. People like Harlan Ellison and Norman Spinrad. And they were people that were pushing back against those more conservative science-fiction print traditions. So you've got this collision.
In the book, I talk about how the oldest person that wrote for the original Star Trek was born in like the 1900s because of the time it was made. But then the youngest person was like born in the ‘40s, David Gerrold who was writing for the original series. So I think you have a lot of collision of generational viewpoints in the original series. You have really young writers and really old writers. And Roddenberry is somewhere in between. He's in his 40s when this is all happening, and he had a big television career before that. I think that Star Trek is a lot of different generational styles and sensibilities happening at once. I think that's also true of the later shows. Like the cliche goes, it's not a bug, it's a feature. Maybe that's why it's good: because there are these different competing ideologies. But I do think that it may mean that the original series has a little bit of a muddled message sometimes for a contemporary viewer.
The mainstream appeal of Star Trek
I started doing kind of a rewatch not so long ago. So, of course, I started with the original pilot, which did not have William Shatner. And that original pilot was criticized by the network as too cerebral. It was a little chilly. It kind of reminded me more of late-‘60s science fiction, something like 2001, which was also kind of chilly, very cerebral. The Star Trek we know was different. They added William Shatner, they had a captain who would hit something. (I think that was one of the notes from the studio: We want there to be fistfights.) If we had stuck with that original feeling from the very first pilot episode, I wonder if that would've made a difference, if the show would have been more popular, less popular…
I think there are a lot of things going on in there, and you're right about everything you just said. Roddenberry also wanted fistfights. That's the thing that people forget. Roddenberry sort of cast himself as this person who was a pacifist and didn't want a lot of conflict by the time The Next Generation happened in ‘87. But in the original series, Rodenberry came from writing westerns. He wrote Have Gun—Will Travel. He came from writing those fisticuffs. He wanted his morality tales in an action-adventure show. The way Roddenberry talked about Star Trek to the fans is not the way Roddenberry talked about Star Trek to the writers and the producers. He sold it as an action-adventure show. There is nothing in the series bible that says anything about it being a progressive, politically peace-making show. There is nothing. And many of the writers who I spoke to who are still alive, like Judy Burns who wrote “The Tholian Web.” She was like, “There's nothing in the writer's bible that is the Star Trek that we know today. It was an action-adventure show. It was a western in space.”
To your direct question, had “The Cage” with Jeffrey Hunter and the mind experiments with the Telosians and all that kind of philosophy: No, that show would not have worked. It's great that we have Anson Mount and Rebecca Romijin doing this kind of rebooted version now on Strange New Worlds of Captain Pike and those characters. That episode is great as a thought experiment. But it's not very diverse, for one thing. There's no Sulu, there's no Uhura, there's no Scotty. Those characters aren't that fun. Jeffrey Hunter's Captain Pike is depressed. He's talking about quitting in the first episode. And to your point, it does feel a little bit closer to the kind of late-‘60s sci-fi movies. But it's also closer in tone to what was in print science fiction, like a sort of cranky white guy hero who sort of has to fix something. Whereas when they got Kirk… They needed Kirk, they needed Shatner. The show needed that. The show needed the diversity. It needed Uhura and Sulu, it needed Scotty, it needed Bones. Boyce, who's the doctor in “The Cage,” is funny. But he's not Bones. When you watch “The Corbomite Maneuver,” which was the first episode they filmed of the original series with the regular cast after “Where No Man Has Gone Before,” the first scene Bones is saying, “What am I, a doctor or a moon shuttle conductor?” and he's hilarious. And Kirk's got his shirt off and he's working out, and Spock's saying something is “fascinating.” It's great. You don't have that in “The Cage.” So no, I don't think it would've connected with people, because the characters weren't as, for lack of a better word, romantic and fun as they became.
Let me read something my friend, the journalist Virginia Postrel, recently wrote about Star Trek: “Star Trek’s fundamental appeal was not about the future or technology per se. The show portrays a setting in which smart people have new experiences and learn new things, solve important problems, and forge deep friendships. Nobody worries about money or office politics. The show’s values are humane. Everyone’s job is important and the boss deserves respect. … [F]or many of its fans, Star Trek represents an ideal workplace. Star Trek’s vision of a nerd-friendly universe made the future glamorous, but only to the select few for whom that vision resonated.”
I believe her point was, and also to your point, that that kind of nerd-friendly universe may not have resonated enough when there were only three channels. But it certainly would resonate if we had today's streaming services. Her general point [is] that it's not about the future or technology; it's about something else, that gets to its enduring popularity.
Something that also gets left out a little bit, which is a little bit more fundamental and perhaps sounds kind of boring when you say it, but there had never been a science-fiction program for adults with recurring characters. Ever. Doctor Who debuted in 1963, but it was a family show. Lost in Space debuted in 1965, but it was a family show. The Outer Limits, Twilight Zone: These were anthology shows, and they were also off the air by the time it was 1964. Just the idea that if you were interested in, as you say, this kind of setting—or as Virginia says, a science-fiction setting that allows for all this—there were just no characters to latch onto for a TV audience. I think that that is part of it: It’s just that it was novel. This is something people forget, because now there are a million science-fiction shows and they’re a dime a dozen. But that was novel at the time.
Norman Spinrad, who wrote “The Doomsday Machine,” who I interviewed for the book, was like, “This was like for science fiction when Dylan went electric.” It brought these things out to a bunch of people. And science fiction before that is kind of like folk music. I think it was geek friendly or nerd friendly or whatever, but I think what people forget is that relative to the rest of science fiction, Star Trek is ridiculously mainstream. It only was in the ‘70s where Star Trek suddenly became niche relative to Star Wars. And that's only because George Lucas actually said, and he's quoted in the book saying this, Star Trek made that possible. It proved that you could do big, mainstream, science fiction for adults and for everybody if you had the right sort of zip to it—and he wasn't talking about philosophy or science. I think that's the impact, too. It’s just the idea that science fiction became mainstream, is because of Star Trek.
Star Trek’s future-optimism
I would like to think that the enduring popularity and the various other incarnations and spinoffs have something in common, which is, I guess superficially you could say, optimism. But more really, the idea that the future is not going to be perfect. This is not a show about a utopia, though maybe it seems like utopia compared to where we are right now. It's a world where there are still problems, but we can solve those problems. And maybe how we solve those problems could create more problems, then we'll solve those. But again, I like to think that the popularity is really about not just that, yes, tomorrow will be better, but it'll be better because we can fix it and just keep solving one problem after another until things get better.
I've been watching a lot of Star Trek: The Animated Series with my five-and-a-half-year-old, this 1973 animated series, which is really interesting because I did watch a bunch of it while I was writing the book in 2020 and 2021. But now she's even older and we have a Star Trek night and we watch the animated series together. And my daughter is already hip to how this works: When the conflicts are introduced in an episode of Star Trek: The Animated Series or a few of the episodes of the original series that we've watched, she always knows. She'll turn to me and be like, “But they're going to become friends with it in the end.” There's a giant cloud that's going to envelop this planet in this animated series episode called “One of Our Planets Is Missing”—sounds exactly like the plot of the motion picture because it is. My wife was overhearing the dialogue. She's like, “Oh my God, this sounds terrible. All these people on this planet are going to die.” And my daughter calls to my wife from the kitchen. She goes, “Spock's going to talk to it and make it nice.” And I think that's the thing: There's always an understanding. Even a five-year-old can pick up on the pattern of Star Trek: This looks like a monster; it's not a monster. This looks like a bad person; they can come to an understanding with it.
And there's not a lot of action-adventure shows from the ‘60s or now, really, that are like that in general. I was making a joke that in 2020 you had a debut of The Mandalorian (which I love) season two and Star Trek: Discovery (season three) within a week of each other, two weeks of each other, something like that. Both episodes had characters fighting against what was kind of a giant space worm creature. And in The Mandalorian they just blow it up. They just kill it. They put bombs in it, they blow it up from the inside. And in the Discovery episode, the character Cleveland Booker, played by David Ajala, literally empathizes with it and calms it down. And that's the difference. That's the difference between Star Trek and almost everything else except for maybe Doctor Who.
I think it's important that we have optimistic, problem-solving science fiction. I’ll ask some guests, “Can you give me an example of something that you watch that you think meets those criteria?” And then I finally had to say, “other than Star Trek,” because I kept getting Star Trek as the same answer.
Doctor Who.
Doctor Who would also be an excellent answer. Why isn’t there more? You mentioned Doctor Who and Star Trek, two long-running, successful franchises. Why are there so few examples of that, while there's a lot more apocalyptic, zombies, “we're doomed in the end,” that aren't problem solving and, you could say, optimistic?
I don't know. It's a good question. That's an interesting question. I think that sometimes I actually am surprised that even we have Star Trek and Doctor Who! Sometimes I go in the opposite direction where I'm like, we're so lucky to even have these things. I just did a big essay on early Sherlock Holmes stories a couple weeks back for Esquire. And something that I always like pointing out to people that might not read Sherlock Holmes is that most of them aren't murders. Most of the good stories are not murder mysteries, they're kind of something else. And Sherlock Holmes is another kind of interesting example of a sort of really ethical but flawed person who's always trying to see like, “Oh, maybe this person's not the villain. Maybe it's the other way around.” And of course Sherlock Holmes has influences on Star Trek because of Nicholas Meyer who directed The Wrath of Khan and because of Michael Chabon, who is creator of Star Trek: Picard—and many other Sherlock Holmes connections to Star Trek, Spock in particular.
But why are there not more? I suppose it's just because it's easier to write conflict… You have to have conflict in fiction, and it is easier to have just James Bond or something, which is something I know a lot about. I know a lot about Bond. Even those books though, he doesn't have a gun as often as you might think, not as much as he does in the movies. When it comes to adventure fiction, violence is embedded into that, whether it's a western or whether it's a detective story or something like that. When you don't do that—like with Star Trek, they make a choice: The phasers have a stun setting. With Doctor Who, they made a choice: He doesn't have a gun. And when the Doctor does have a gun, it's a big deal. And the same thing with Star Trek. Kirk in “A Taste of Armageddon”: “I will not kill today.” They have to make it part of the storytelling to almost subvert the rest of adventure fiction in a way.
I'm a fan of The Expanse, and there's a great scene—I forget if it's also in the book, I know it's for sure in the TV series—where it looks like there's going to be a war and fighting is going to break out. And the main character, Holden, says, “Let's try something else.” To me, Star Trek is everybody constantly thinking, “Can we try something else other than blowing something up?”
The Expanse is great. Of course, the showrunner of The Expanse is Naren Shankar, who worked on The Next Generation and Deep Space Nine and was Ronald Moore's friend. And then you've got Ron Moore doing For All Mankind, the Apple TV series. And For All Mankind is another example where in the season two finale—that's a couple years ago now, season two of For All Mankind, I'll spoil it—where Ed has the choice of whether or not he's going to blow up these Russian ships that are going to the Moon. And Sally Ride has got a gun on him, and he decides not to. And then Danielle can abort the handshake in space with the Russians, and she quotes Captain Kirk and then she does the handshake. And that's Ron Moore's Star Trek optimism coming through this alternate-history sci-fi show. I think For All Mankind is a good example of those Star Trek-ish ideals working out in what's basically a prestige drama, which is basically Mad Men with NASA. And that's hard to do, to make that upbeat. That's a dark show, but it has a lot of optimism in it.
The essence of Trek
One of my little ideas here is that it's important that at least some slice or sliver of our science fiction be optimistic and problem solving. You can point to Silicon Valley people who say they were inspired by Star Trek. But do you think, more broadly, that it's important to have that kind of science fiction, showing a future worth making and a future worth living in? Or is it just science fiction?
I think that it's also like important that the stories are contemplative in a very specific way. I love Star Wars, but there's not a lot of different kinds of Star Wars stories. It's generally a hero's journey, good versus evil, which is fine and not negative. They're kind of unpacking that a bit with the Andor show and trying to be like, if you were a member of the rebellion, would you kind of be a terrorist? And that's an interesting sort of moral experiment, which is subversive. But it's only subversive for Star Wars, right? Because Star Wars has always been very black and white for the most part. And the morality plays don't have a lot of variety. I'm working on a book about Dune right now, and Dune is very moral and ethical in its considerations. It's just kind of like things didn't go well. The purpose of that storytelling is like, here's when it doesn't go well and here are the various intricacies of why, and then how that's connected to politics and ecology. It's not dark for the sake of being dark. I would say that something like Westworld, to me, is kind of dark for the sake of being dark. (I don't hate Westworld or anything like that. I always end up on podcasts being like Westworld!) But I do think that there tends to be a little bit of a one-note-ism is there, and even aspects of the Battlestar [Galactica] reboot would sometimes go that direction of like, wow, aren't people messed up? And then you'd kind of be like, “Yeah, but where's the hope in there?” I think something that kind of strikes that balance of it is the new Foundation show. I think that's another Apple show. I think that strikes a little bit of an interesting balance. I just think that the ideas have to be unpacked in a way, because I think you can go too sugar coated. Star Trek at maybe its worst moments, or maybe its less potent moments, would be a little too on the nose. That's about what I would say.
Of the more recent Star Trek, for some reason the new one Strange New Worlds—which is a riff on the original “The Cage,” as you mentioned earlier—people seem to have connected with that. I keep seeing versions of, “Well, that's finally real Trek. Do you know what people mean by that? Is that your impression? I don't if they mean that it's optimistic or what it is, exactly.
Part of it. It definitely is a little bit more upbeat, but Strange in the Worlds is also still significantly darker than The Next Generation. Everything is kind of relative. I think that I'm a pretty big supporter of all the new shows—Discovery, Picard, I'm talking to the Lower Decks showrunner Mike McMahan in about an hour today. I love him. That show is actually very upbeat and funny and talks about the workplace aspect of it that you were talking about. But I think that what people are responding to—and Strange New Worlds objectively has better reviews; it had like 100 percent or 98 percent on Rotten Tomatoes for a while; you can't argue with the reviews, they exist; and the reviews were more mixed for some of the other shows—I think it's about the format, frankly. I think that the serialization of Discovery and Picard was emulating the prestige style of other shows: The Expanse, Breaking Bad, Battlestar, Sopranos, whatever. And I don't know if that's the best way to do Star Trek. Deep Space Nine had a lot of serialization, and that was very risky at the time, particularly in the ‘90s. But it's not like you want to randomly watch one episode of that arc in Deep Space Nine of the Dominion War. You suddenly have to watch like two seasons. If you're going to watch one episode of Deep Space Nine, it will be a standalone episode. If you're going to watch one episode of The Next Generation, it will be a standalone episode or a two-parter. The original series, the same. Enterprise, even Voyager. Serialization, I think, tends to not age as well.
But even Battlestar, which is brilliant, I couldn’t watch just one episode of the 2004 Battlestar. I have to watch all of it. Strange New Worlds are standalone episodes for the most part. And I think that is what's connecting with people. I just watched “Spock Amok,” which is the fifth episode, again for like the fourth time the other day. And it's great. It's this great body-switch episode with Spock and T’Pring. Ethan Peck is hilarious in it. It’s great.
It's excellent.
To me, that is the main thing about it. If you want to knock Discovery and Picard for being dark, if you actually watch those and you actually see what those shows are about, it's not really true. Those shows are about optimism, about hope. The conflicts are just a little rowdier. But those shows are not about that. Those shows are about those redemptions, they just take longer. Whereas in Strange New Worlds, it's kind of a given. Some of that optimism was kind of a given in a way that was also true of The Next Generation. So I think that's the difference.
I did also ask Ronald D. Moore this question. It's the Peter Thiel question: Star Trek is the communist show; Star Wars is the capitalist show. I want to get your opinion on that. What do you think of that characterization? Is that actually an insight?
I don't know. I think it's a little reductive. I think it's a bit reductive. You could also flip it. You could just flip it around and you could easily just make the other argument. I'm not saying I agree with either viewpoint, but you could easily be like, “No, Star Wars is the communist show because the rebels want to dismantle capitalism, and the empire is capitalistic. So that's the communist show. And Star Trek is capitalistic because the Federation has a monopoly, and they just don't have money within their own government, but they screw over these other planets economically” (which we know is true). Star Trek has criticized itself, like in Discovery season three the Orions are like, “You guys still have capitalism. You just don't have it in your own space.” And then in Strange New Worlds season one, Pike goes to this planet where they're like, “Hey, you guys still trade with us.” It sounds like a dorm room argument to me. It doesn't seem that deep to me. I know there are a lot of folks who are like progressive socialists that are like, “Star Trek has got all these great examples of like how communism could work in the future.” And it's not really my deal. I'm like a pop culture critic who thinks about how Star Trek affects art and culture now. People have written books about the economy and Star Trek and stuff like that. It's not really my bag is what I'll say.
Sometimes I like to guess if the title of the book was the one the author really wanted, or if the book publisher suggested it. I'm wondering if the title of your book, in your heart, should've been Live Long and Prosper! rather than Phasers on Stun! Or was this your preference?
I had a lot of different titles. The subtitle was mine always: “How The Making and Remaking of Star Trek Changed the World.” That was the subtitle. That was completely mine, and my agent was like, “That's a winner. That's the subtitle.” We always knew, because I really liked the idea of saying that it wasn't just the making of Star Trek, but the remaking, that the book was about metamorphosis. We wanted, then, a catchphrase. I had pushed for “Spock Lives,” or “Spock Rocks” for a long time. And then we ended up having Spock on the cover, so I got that. But I was on the fence about Phasers on Stun! But then I interviewed Walter Koenig, who played Chekov of course, for a long time, not long after the January 6th thing. And Walter was so nice and thoughtful about everything, and conflicts in society and how to think and unpack all of them from all sides of the political spectrum and wasn't reductive and just a smart guy. And I mentioned to him the working title at that time. He goes, “I love that, because it means we don't have to kill each other.” And so after that, I was like, “Well, if it's good enough for Chekov, it's good enough for me.”
➡ Reminder: I will be writing much less frequently and much shorter in November — and November only. So for this month, I have paused payment from paid subscribers.
Also, I’m making all new content free without a paywall. In December, however, everything will be back to normal: typically three meaty essays and two enlightening Q&As a week, along with a pro-progress podcast like this one several times a month (including transcript). And, of course, a weekly recap over the weekends.
Melior Mundus
“Generations of people throughout the world have been taught to believe that there is an inverse relationship between population growth and the availability of resources, which is to say that as the population grows, resources become more scarce.” That’s how Marian Tupy and Gale Pooley open their new book, Superabundance: The Story of Population Growth, Innovation, and Human Flourishing on an Infinitely Bountiful Planet. It’s also the central premise of much of today’s Down Wing, zero-sum thinking. And it happens to be wrong. Tupy and Pooley:
It is free people, not machines or deities, who generate new ideas, and it is free people who test those new ideas against other people’s ideas in the marketplace. The process of knowledge and value creation is at the heart of humanity’s moral and material progress. It is what enables our civilization to bend towards goodness and superabundance.
What is superabundance? The authors again: “[A]bundance occurs when the nominal hourly income increases faster than the nominal price of a resource,” meaning resources become cheaper (more abundant!) in real terms. Superabundance occurs “when the abundance of resources grows at a faster rate than population increases.” And that’s exactly what we see in the world today.
Cato Institute senior fellow and HumanProgress.org editor Marian Tupy joins me in this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast to discuss superabundance, Hollywood’s Malthusianism, and more.
In This Episode
* Will we ever run out of Earth? (1:33)
* Can our planet sustain billions of people living like Americans? (5:13)
* The burden of proof is on the doomsayers (12:12)
* The more people, the better (18:04)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
Will we ever run out of Earth?
James Pethokoukis: There's only so much Earth, so eventually, aren't we going to run out of Earth and its bounty?
Marian Tupy: It's certainly true that the Earth has a finite number of atoms, but the amount of value that we can get from those atoms is basically infinite. Look at something as simple as sand that has been on Earth for billions of years. At some point thousands of years ago, people realize that they could turn sand into glass jars and later into windows. And now we are using sand in order to create fiber optic cables, which are carrying information around the world at very high speeds and a lot of volume in order to power our civilization's communication networks. So from something as simple as a grain of sand, you can get ever more value.
If you are somebody who thinks economic growth is a good thing, who wants the global economy to keep growing—and, gee, it'd be great if it grew even faster—at some point it's going to hit a limit. Aren't we already seeing that with lithium shortages? I hear that lithium shortages are going to slow the green transition. So aren't people who are pro-growth, pro-progress, or pro-abundance—even pro-superabundance—isn't that just kind of a temporary state and eventually, I don't know, 50 years, 100, that's not a tenable position over the really long, long run?
No, because knowledge continues to expand. As long as we have more people on Earth, and hopefully one day in cooperation with AI or advanced computing, we'll be able to create evermore knowledge. And it is that knowledge which allows us to get around problems of scarcity. Lithium is a perfect example. Lithium-ion batteries are a massive advance in terms of storage of electricity. But who is to say whether batteries in the future will be powered by lithium? Maybe we'll come up with a different compound, which will allow us to store energy at a much cheaper price. In fact, people are already working on basically creating batteries out of, not lithium-ion, but sodium-ion, which apparently is going to last even longer and will be massively cheaper. So it's not only a question of efficiency gains—instead of using three ounces of tin or aluminum for a can of Coke, you are now using only half an ounce—and it's not just about technological breakthroughs like, for example, GMO foods so that you can increase the yield of plants for an acre of land; it's also about substitution. This is very important. It's about substitution. You are using something in order to get to a certain goal, but you may realize 10 years, 100 years from now that you don't actually need it, that you need something completely different. And humanity has been through this very often. Two-hundred years ago, the great discovery was of course coal and steam. And people immediately started wondering, what is going to happen by the year 1900 or 1950 when we are all going to run out of coal? And then oil and gas came on board and displaced coal to a great extent. So substitution will play its role, and lithium is not going to be a problem.
Can our planet sustain billions of people living like Americans?
There was certainly a time where people were—and some people still are—worried very much about overpopulation. This really became a thing in the early 1970s, where we worried that we had too many people. We were worried about natural resource constraints. We were going to be running out of oil and just about everything else. How much is your thesis is based on the idea that global population will continue to grow to maybe 10 or 11 billion and then it stops? Would you still have this thesis if we were going to have a population of 30 billion people, all of whom would like to live like Americans do today, if not better? Is the idea of a constrained population key to this forecast?
You started by pointing to the 1970s, and whilst it is true that many academics have departed from the basic Malthusian premise that more people will lead to an exhaustion of resources, what we found writing this book was very disturbing, which is that Malthusian ideas are much more widespread than we originally thought amongst the common public, amongst the ordinary people. In fact, as far as we can tell, a disproportionate number of mass shooters in America and also around the world, especially in developed countries, have been people driven by Malthusian ideas. This goes back to Anders Breivik in Norway, then the guy called Tarrant in New Zealand, all the way to the mass shooters in the United States, the guy who killed 22 people in El Paso in Walmart a couple of years ago—all of these people have been driven by the notion that there are far too many people in the world using far too many resources. The Malthusian notions are still very much present. You can also get them from multi-national organizations like the United Nations. You have these websites like the Overshoot Day and things like that still. So people still buy into it, and that's deeply worrying because obviously we think that population growth is…
Overshoot, meaning that we're overshooting the capacity of our resources and that for everyone to live like Americans, we would need 10 Earths—and obviously we don't have 10 Earths.
The current calculations say that we are already using 1.7 planets in order to maintain our standards of living, which is ridiculous because we still only have one planet. How can we already be using 1.7 planets? It doesn't make any sense.
Wouldn’t they say this isn't sustainable? People who are very worried about running out of everything, when they talk about growth, it's never just growth, it’s “sustainable growth.” What they mean is sustainable environmentally.
And when it comes to that, then of course we have to ask, how would this unsustainability present itself in the real world? People are living longer. People are living richer lives. The very fact that longevity had been expanding until COVID suggests that we are also living healthier lives. We are better fed. And not just that: As countries become richer, they have much more money to spend on environmental protection. The extraordinary lengths that Western societies go through in order to protect their oceans and their land and their biomass and biodiversity—nothing like this has been done by humans before. Where is this apocalypse going to come from? Another way of looking at it is the question of existential threat. Well, existential threat to whom? Existential threat to humanity? But how are we going to measure it? The only way we can measure it is by looking at how many people a year are dying due to extreme weather. And that particular statistic has been reduced by 99.8 percent over the last 100 years. So even though the language of the extreme environmentalist movement is getting more and more apocalyptic, the number of people who are dying due to extreme weather is continuing to collapse.
Let me ask that question in a simpler way: Do we have the ability, do we have the resources, for everyone on this planet to have at least the standard of living as Americans and Western Europeans do today? Can we do that? That's the response I often get on social media: They’ll say that we cannot afford to have eight billion people living the way 300 million Americans do. Is that possible?
If the basic premise of the book is correct, then yes, not just for eight billion, but potentially substantially more for the following reason: Ideas are not constrained by the laws of physics. Yes, the planets, atoms are constrained by the laws of physics, but not the ideas produced by the human brain. So long as you have more people living in freedom, communicating together, exchanging ideas—in the words of Matt Ridley, “ideas having sex”—then you can always come up with a solution to shortages, which would be, in that case, temporary, driving up prices, therefore incentivizing people to look for solutions. The essence of the book is, there are no physical limits to abundance; and therefore, it should be possible for the world to have the living standards of Americans.
Is this a faith-based premise, based on a fairly short period in human existence? That you're assuming that we can still do it, that humanity is ingenious enough that we can continue to be more efficient and come up with new ways of doing things infinitely?
Is it faith-based? Thomas Sowell has that great quote that the caveman had exactly the same amount of resources that we have in the world today. And the difference between their standard of living and our standard of living is the knowledge that we bring to bear onto the resources that we have. In fact, you might argue that the only reason why any resources are valuable is because of the ability of human beings to interact with them and produce value out of them. If you think about the immense difference between our standards of living and those of people in the Stone Age—again, the resources haven't gone anywhere, they're still with us; except for a few tons of metal that we have shot into space, everything else is still here: the same amount of copper, the same amount of iron—there is no reason to think that people 200 years from now who are much richer than us couldn't utilize those resources in a similarly beneficial fashion.
The burden of proof is on the doomsayers
Let me ask you this: Who should the burden of proof be on? People who are worried about the sustainability of growth, who think there's no way this Earth can tolerate eight or 10 billion people living like Western Europeans: Should the burden of proof be on them, or should the burden of proof be on you to say that, yes, we've done it in the past and we can continue to do it in the future?
I think the burden should be on them in the following sense: This is not the first time that this particular concept has been proposed. The famous wager between Simon and Ehrlich was essentially…
Explain that wager just very briefly for people. What is that wager?
Paul Ehrlich is the famous biologist from Stanford University. He wrote the 1968 Population Bomb book, which became an international bestseller. He was on Johnny Carson's show like 20 times, scared and scarred generations of Americans into believing that the world was going to end because of lack of natural resources. In fact, it was based on his work that you've got Soylent Green, the famous 1973 movie with Charlton Heston. And that movie basically culminates in 2022—it's this year that the movie is supposed to happen. And of course, we never got anything like that. On the East Coast, Julian Simon at the University of Maryland basically challenged him to a bet. He said, “Look, Ehrlich, you pick any commodities you want and a time period of more than a year. We are going to put $1000 on it, and if the prices go up whilst the population expands, I'm going to pay you. If the prices go down, then you pay me.” And in fact, Ehrlich lost that bet and had to write Simon a check for $576. These believers in the apocalypse have been at this for so long that I feel that it's time for them to start convincing us that the apocalypse is coming, rather than us trying to remind them of all the previous predictions of apocalypse which didn't come true. I'm willing to go and do a bet like that.
The other thing that you ask is, is this possible? Is it feasible for us to continue like that? I believe that it is feasible so long as we have at least part of the world that is still free economically and politically. I don't think that we can expect cutting-edge research from China, which is increasingly restrained politically and economically where people are not free to speak, interact with ideas. But so long as we are free in Western countries, be it the United States or some other country if freedom of speech comes to an end here, then we can still produce research, we can still produce progress. But of course, my belief, part of the book, is that the more people who are free, the better. It's not just about population, it's population times freedom. Freedom is incredibly important. China has been the most populous country for a very long time, but they were dirt poor until they started liberalizing. So the freedom component is very important.
Why is this belief so persistent? I still hear people who still think that we are headed toward a population of 30 billion, who think that's a big issue, who are very surprised to learn that there are countries where if the population isn't already shrinking, it's very close. Do we naturally want to believe these kinds of stories? Was Julian Simon ever on the Tonight Show with Johnny Carson?
No, of course not. He never got any professional award in his entire life. And you are right to say that there was always an opposition to these Malthusian thoughts. Shortly after Malthus died, there was a big debate in Britain over who was right. Then they revisited the whole concept of shortage of natural resources in the late 19th century. So it goes through ups and downs.
But there's something in that story. Have we identified what that is?
There’s something in that story, and the big question is what it is. I think that this particular problem could have many fathers, so to speak. One of them is that people have been traditionally not numerate. And we have a problem with the notion of exponential growth and compounding. Paul Romer put his finger on it, and that is that ideas do not add up; they multiply. And so he's got that famous example of the periodic table. Once you start interacting with compounds consisting of 10 elements on the periodic table, which has 100 elements in it, you're talking about more possible combinations, more possible calculations, more possible recipes for future progress, than there are number of seconds since the beginning of the Big Bang, 14.5 billion years ago. There's just so much knowledge which can still be discovered. We have only scratched the surface of knowledge. I think that's part of the reason why people are so pessimistic: They do not understand the potential for creation of new knowledge. The other reason, probably, is that the world really is finite. That is absolutely true. It's also irrelevant, because it's what you do with those resources that matters. As I’ve mentioned with the example of sand and fibers, you can use resources in evermore valuable ways.
The more people, the better
I know this isn't key to your thesis, but we do live in a universe. So if you say, “Maybe you're right today, but in 1000 years you'll be wrong.” Well, a lot can happen in 1000 years. If I'm betting on 1000 years, I would also guess that if we somehow hit some constraint here on Earth, we have a whole universe of stuff that we could draw upon.
Well, absolutely. Can you imagine, if wealth continues to expand at the current rate, what sort of species we would encounter in 1000 years and their technological abilities?
A lot of asteroids out there!
What worries me is actually that there won't be enough people to explore all those possible avenues for creation of new knowledge. You mentioned population growth: Population is below replacement level in 170 countries out of 190. We are going to peak in 2060 and then start declining. Instead of worrying about 30 billion people, we are going to have to worry about a population that is going to be basically as big in 2100 as it is today. And that really constrains the knowledge horizon and how fast we get there. And that brings with it all sorts of other problems. When people say—and I was actually speaking to somebody yesterday about this—that perhaps we have enough wealth, I cannot help but think, imagine all the possible problems that we could encounter in the future, all the other existential threats: be it asteroids, or a new pathogen, or something like that. I want our society to be super rich so that if we need to shut down the economy for another year, we can afford to do so rather than do it with that. Or if we do encounter an asteroid that's hurling towards Earth, we have a super powerful laser powered by mega fusion power stations that can blast it out of the sky. We never know what the future is going to hold, but I would much rather have a wealthier society deal with it than a poorer and more technologically primitive society dealing with it.
Despite the fact that these predictions that were made a half century ago have not panned out, that these bets have been lost, if there’s any example of the continued power of this idea, it’s really the movie Avengers and the Infinity War series. The key villain, Thanos—and this is a multi-billion-dollar franchise—and his entire plot is to kill half of all life everywhere in the universe because we're running out of space. Apparently plenty of people signed off on the idea and said, “Yes, the audience will accept that.” And the audience did accept that.
In the book we talk about that movie, and I think that one in five Americans saw it. But it was just one of the movies made based on Malthusian principles. There was Kingsman and there was also Inferno, and they were all based on Malthusian ideas.
I believe that one of the James Bond films was based on the peak oil theory, too. I would doubt that there was anyone at a Hollywood studio who said “This is an absurd idea.”
I don't know whether you would call it genetic or cultural, but this notion of limits must be deeply embedded in our psyche. And the key to breaking with that thinking has to be the embrace of knowledge, understanding that knowledge can solve all of our problems. Just about everything that you see around you in the world today that you bemoan is due to lack of knowledge. People are dying of cancer because of lack of knowledge. Babies are dying in Africa from malaria because of lack of knowledge, although that's being fixed already by vaccines. The more knowledge, the better. Currently it's only the human mind that is capable of producing new knowledge, so we still need people. Maybe at some point in the future we are going to have a super smart AI that is going to produce its own new knowledge. But right now that's not a realistic option. I think that there is something to be said for population growth. Now, what we are certainly not suggesting is that people should be forced to have more babies. The book’s goal…
Are there people who suggested that's what you're saying?
I hope not. That’s certainly not something. The goal of the book is much less ambitious. The goal of the book is to say to all those parents around the world who are worried about bringing a new child into the world because it'll be a drag on resources, because it'll be a cancer on the planet: You don't have to worry about that. Your child has the potential of contributing to the scope and stock of human knowledge. We are basically just tackling one aspect of this anti-nativist, anti-natalist, and anti-humanist worldview, which is the issue with resources. If we can convince people that it's still okay to have children, the question famously posed by Alexandria Ocasio Cortez, then we will have done something good.
We’ve all heard the stories and statistics about the supposed death of American manufacturing. But America's industrial sector never truly went away. Many, many companies are thriving, and today's guest argues we're experiencing an outright renaissance. In this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I’m joined by Gaurav Batra, who previously co-led McKinsey & Company’s Advanced Electronics Practice in the Americas. Along with Asutosh Padhi and Nick Santhanam, he's the author of the new book, The Titanium Economy: How Industrial Technology Can Create a Better, Faster, Stronger America. This from the book:
The Titanium Economy is the secret weapon of American industrial revival—the key to ensuring the country’s economic vitality as the Fourth Industrial Revolution progresses and we face steep competition from global rivals. The next few years will be critical, as the future growth of the Titanium Economy sector in the United States is far from assured. Investors, policy makers, and the public at large must appreciate the importance of providing more robust investment in these companies, as well as how their growth brings so many positive ripple effects for individuals and communities, providing more high-quality jobs and boosting the economic prosperity of communities and whole regions.
So what is the Titanium Economy? Listen in to find out!
In This Episode:
* The US industrial renaissance (1:14)
* The businesses of the Titanium Economy (7:48)
* American industry and technology (12:29)
* Workers in the US manufacturing sector (16:20)
* Finding America’s next-generation industrial workers (21:26)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
The US industrial renaissance
James Pethokoukis: I think there's a caricature or perhaps a misperception about the US economy—I think you see it in the media—that the US economy is basically Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and big box stores. And that's basically your American economy, and it's certainly an economy that doesn't really make stuff in the physical world—with atoms—anymore. And the book, I think, is a corrective to that view. Why is that view wrong and, as you state, that the US is in the middle of an industrial renaissance?
Gaurav Batra: Jim, you very accurately represented the perception of what's happened in the US economy over the last couple of decades. I think the story, whenever anybody tells it, is mostly about technology companies. It's mostly about financial services, mostly about Wall Street. As we started digging in, not just with the book but our work in the industrial sector, we realized that the reality is actually very disconnected with this perception. The reason we say that is, if you look at just pure numbers, still 20 percent of the US economy is completely dependent on US manufacturing. That number has not gone down. It may not have increased, but that number has sustained pretty well. If you look at employment, this sector still employs the bulk of the US economy's workers today. In terms of pure numbers, in terms of relevance, the sector never went away. It definitely slowed down because other sectors started growing, but manufacturing as a sector in the US still remained pretty staunch. That is at the sector level.
As you unveil that a little bit and go under the hood, you realize that whenever we talk about Wall Street, we talk about the Facebooks, the Alphabets, the Apples of the world delivering incredible stock market growth. Everybody talks about how much of that you own in your portfolio. But the moment you start unraveling the industrial landscape, you actually see several—and the number is actually north of 20, 30—companies who have done actually fairly well over a much longer time period in terms of even delivering value to their shareholders. And these companies have done it not necessarily leveraging outsourcing, but they've done it by just strong, sensible business practices: how they run their companies internally, how they work with their customers, how they potentially create a niche for themselves in particular markets. For us, at least as we started (and I spent about a decade in this particular industry), as I looked at that perception, which was exactly what my idea was coming into the sector, versus what I took away from it after being a practitioner in the segment for about 10, 12 years: the perception and the reality don't match. I think the perception, as you rightly said, is all about Wall Street, all about technology, all about financial services. But the reality tells us that manufacturing has never gone away. Given what's happened over the last two years with the pandemic and the geopolitics of the globe around us, it is only telling us a flashing red [light] that this is actually going to get even more critical for all of us here in the US in the next couple of years.
These are industrial companies. While they may not be classified as technology companies, they use technology. Consultants like talking about 5G and AI and cloud computing. But they're more than buzzwords. Those technologies are diffusing into the economy, and not just at places like Google or Amazon or Apple. Correct me if I'm wrong, I think what we're seeing in this industrial sector is these technologies are part of how they do what they do.
Absolutely right. We think it's an essential ingredient to success going forward. To give you one example, there's a company called Bulk Handling Systems. It's based in Eugene, Oregon. They basically are recycling cardboard, cans, and plastic. Essentially stuff which has food in them. I think if you looked at them a decade earlier, they would tell you about all the manual processes, which is fairly unhygienic, about how somebody would have to pull that piece of food out of a cardboard can or a plastic can, and then put it in the recycling. Today, if you look at that company, it's using artificial intelligence, it's using latest-version technologies, it's using robots to find where these sediments are, getting them off the cardboard can and the plastics, and then essentially putting them through recycling. That's a very tangible example of how technology and the progress we've made there is really impacting the industrial landscape—and for the good. I think while this one might be on a production line—there are several others about how people are using similar techniques to ensure quality and efficiency on the production line—technology actually is also making these companies go to the next level of performance on pure, I would say, business processes.
To give you another example, a place where I've seen technology help a lot of such companies is pricing. A lot of these companies create a lot of complicated engineering equipment. Equipment could be a boiler or a heat exchanger or a mixer for a food processing plant. It's not a standard thing you can buy off of Amazon. There's a lot of specifications going into it: temperature controls, material composition, process tolerances. People used to do all that work manually, in terms of negotiating with the customers, letting them design those kind of products. Today, they can go to a website. There's an electronic configurator, you can click and choose what kind of parameters it wants and it gives you a right outcome. And then similarly, it quickly tells you how much it's going to cost. A process which would have taken multiple weeks, in some cases months as well, is now getting compressed to a matter of days. I think technology will get pervasive. And the good part is, I think there's a very good fusion between what our industrial landscape does and what technology can provide to them to really make them go to the next level of performance, both in terms of meeting customer needs and satisfaction, and then, candidly, being much more robust [financially].
The businesses of the Titanium Economy
In those two examples, you've given two very different kinds of businesses. And in the book, you really give a sense of the span of the kinds of companies we're talking about. I wonder if you could give me a sense of the span of sectors that we're talking about.
I think that's very relevant to discuss because I think a lot of times industrial is discussed as a monolith. It's very much discussed as a singular segment. But it's probably the worst articulation or the most inaccurate articulation of the segment we probably can come up with. Everybody has their own way of looking at it, the way we looked at it there are close to 90-plus what we call “micro-verticals.” And they essentially, as you rightly said, cover the whole spectrum.
We wake up in the morning, we have a cup of tea or cup of coffee. The beans, which are being sent to us, have come from a food processing plant, which is either utilizing equipment or products which are being manufactured by companies, many of them here in the US. We pick up the phone in the morning to check our text messages, check our emails. The chips behind those phones—this has been obviously in the news of late quite a bit—come from semiconductor manufacturers. And the whole semiconductor industry, which is $400, 500 billion in size today, relies on innovations in precision manufacturing, which have been gaining over the last multiple decades. We get in our cars to go to work, automotive industries are now playing a big hand in it. We come to the office and we start writing on a piece of paper. The paper industry is there. Lunch is delivered to the office. It's packaged in specific packaging that's coming from companies like Sealed Air, where they're working on top-of-the-line packaging to keep the quality and the hygiene of the food high. And similarly, they're looking at packaging pallets of machinery and equipment, which is getting transported from one part of the country to the other part of the country.
Anything I literally can touch is influenced by manufacturing in a meaningful way. So the spectrum is wide, and I think it's very important for us as members of society, as investors, as executives, to understand how complicated and how heterogeneous this segment is. Because once we start realizing that, not only do we see the importance of it in our daily lives, but then we also as executives, as colleagues, as workers, as investors in the segment, we are able to then understand the true value of these companies. A great example which always comes to my mind is a company called Graco. It’s based out of Minneapolis. What they specialize in is high propulsion of fluids. So they get spray painting fluids in a can. They figured out how to get peanut butter in a jar. If you look at their segment, I can call them industrials, but it’s nowhere related to tapping the automotive space or tapping the aerospace space, but they're looking at a particular niche in the market, and then having that change in mindset, having that change in how they view or how we view them then helps us appreciate that they're a market leader and they're a market leader in a need, which is not going to go away. We will be spray painting cars or spray painting something else. We will be eating peanut butter for a while.
I think that's a great example because I don't think people think about flow control and fluid management very often. It's not a strict consumer name that people understand, nor is it manufacturing where you think of some sort of big factory, necessarily. But that is modern manufacturing that is essential to the modern American economy.
Absolutely. I think there are countless examples like this, where companies are serving a very critical need. They're just not consumer brands, so we don't know their names. We can look them up if we wanted to. I think that's where they start suffering a little bit, in terms of both our mindset and our perception of these, and to the first question you asked: I think that's what then perpetuates at least our feeling that the whole economy is about the Facebook and Alphabet and Apples of the world, when actually there's a lot more innovation and value coming from the manufacturing sector as well.
American industry and technology
Talking about technology and how these companies are using it. Again, I think there's a stereotype that this technology is employed by companies just to replace workers with some machine. I don't think that's probably the whole story.
I think that's definitely not the full story, at least as well as my experience is concerned. Because I think there's definitely displacement. I think if anybody says that there is no displacement, then I think they're wrong. There is displacement in terms of what people are doing today. When technology comes in and makes it more efficient, then obviously as a responsible financial operator of a company, you would think about, “Hey, there is capacity opening up, so what should I do with it?” I think in the long term, there are definitely much more benefits, in my opinion. One is that the companies become much more healthier-going concerns, that they're able to invest in their own growth. And they can grow through investing in their own company’s expanding markets, they can go acquire somebody else. So there is, in the end, a greater good coming out of the fact that the company has not become healthier concerns.
Then number two is, I think it does create a new job category. How many people would've been thinking about hiring data analysts or digital product managers in industrial companies 10 years earlier? Probably not many. But today, if you go on any job board, there are so many of these employment opportunities existing out there, which will create a new set of workers, a new set of employment opportunities for the economy. So my sense is, at least given what I've seen from my vantage point, there will be short-term displacement, which I think, again, with the companies getting to be more healthier concerns, we'll probably minimize the short-term displacement aspect of it. But in the longer term, there is a lot of value to be driven out of this. It will improve our productivity. It will make everything better. And then as that happens, what we have seen also, and we catalog in the book through what we call the Great Amplification Cycle, as companies become healthier concerns, the communities and the workers which work there become more prosperous. And with the workers becoming more prosperous, the local economies benefit. And we genuinely believe, just given how manufacturing is—it's not localized, it has to be dispersed, it has to be all over the country—that's one very effective level we have to bring down the inequality we are seeing today in our country. So going to the Midwest, going to some of the “rust belt” and re-invigorating manufacturing here, will really have great-second order effects to the communities there.
That's a good point. So where are these companies? Where are they located?
They are everywhere. Funny enough, when we started compiling the research for the book, our impression was they were in the “middle coast.” Not the east coast, not the west coast, mostly in the middle coast. But interestingly enough, they're actually on the east coast and the west coast as well. Tesla is a very good example of a manufacturing company running in Fremont, California, in the heart of Silicon Valley. But these companies are everywhere. I think HEICO, if you look at it, based out of Florida, their businesses are in 80 cities across the country. Simpsonville we've cataloged in the book as a great example on the east coast where it's benefited from the tire industry and Sealed Air being in that particular region. Obviously the Midwest has a bunch of these around Milwaukee, and a lot of clusters are coming up around the Texas area. So they literally are everywhere, and that's why I think they are actually a great vehicle for ensuring the economic prosperity of the country, because just the reach is so vast.
Workers in the US manufacturing sector
Do we have a sense of sort of the employment numbers? How many companies are we talking about, and do we have a sense of the employment?
If you look at the industrial structure itself, I think it employs, at least from my last count, close to 18 to 20 percent of our overall labor base. I think if you look at it purely from a perspective of the number of companies, there are nearly 4,000 companies in the US which are industrial or manufacturing something or the other. Now, the cool part about all this is, in my opinion, most of them—I think three out of four of those 4,000 companies—are actually private companies. So you'll not find them on the NASDAQ or the Dow Jones. They're not traded publicly. They're held by private and mostly are family-owned companies which gives them a sense of resoluteness, which is very unique.
And then number two is, close to 80 percent of these folks are actually fairly small in size. So south of $5 billion of revenue. These are, in the end, in numbers, tremendous. We hear about all of the big ones, but more than 75 to 90 percent, depending on what metric you look at, are companies which are not being publicly traded, are much smaller companies, and they are all over the country. That gives them the reach and the numbers. As I mentioned, they are close to about 18, 20 percent of the employment base. I think the coolest part about these guys, as we think about their impact on employment, is the two factors about this industry, which are pretty different and unique. Number one: You don't necessarily need a college degree to be a participant in this industry. People with vocational training, welding, fabrication training, can go join this industry that has really healthy careers. That's one. The labor market they cater to is much broader than other sectors, like if you take service or technology for that matter. And then number two: Compared to several other sectors, the pay in this sector, given that it's a fairly stable sector, is, depending on what analysis, anywhere between 40 to 100 percent higher than the average. More people get the chance to get employed. Over time, they all learn more than what their potential alternatives might be, and their reach is pretty high. All these factors have contributed to a huge engine for employment. And then, in turn, economic growth.
How big a challenge is finding all those workers for these companies? That seems to be a big one.
That's a huge one. And I think as we looked at least for the book and looking down [at] the things we need to change, the things which executives need to change about how they talk about their companies, how they run their companies. But I think the biggest change we need is in the labor supply area. And I think this is where the government and the public agencies have to come in and play a more active role. We're seeing some of that happen now with the CHIPS Act recently where obviously the government is putting a lot more emphasis on the local manufacturing industry. But I think this is the biggest challenge. Even if you compare the US with some of the other countries like Germany or China for that matter, that's where I think there is a big scope of improvement for us to essentially enable some of these public agencies, through funding, through programs with community colleges, through programs with vocational institutes, to essentially get more and more of that supply up. I think if you look at COVID times certainly when demand for a lot of these products like PPE or some of the home equipment went up because everybody started staying at home, the biggest challenge actually was to get workers to get to the factory, to be able to run these factories on more than one shift, to be able to cater to the increased demand. So far what we've seen, the government is headed in the right direction. I'm assuming more will come, which I think will be really fantastic.
In the meantime, what we've seen is just companies doing things by themselves. I think one [thing] I really enjoy and I feel is encouraging is if you look at a company called IDEAL Industries, they have what they call an IDEAL Olympics. That's the place where they basically bring in talent, which is like welding talent, which is like machinist talent, and really attract people to that job category and job family and try to increase supply locally for them, for labor. So you’re absolutely right, it’s a huge problem. I think a lot more needs to be done urgently, because this is not something which gets solved overnight. So any move we make today will give benefits in a few years’ time. But just given the importance of the sector and the fact that this is among the biggest bottlenecks today, I think requires immediate attention on fixing this problem.
Finding America’s next-generation industrial workers
How much of that talent problem is just a cultural problem where kids think, “Boy, I'd love to work for Google,” or, “I'd like to be a social media manager. I don't want to be a welder,” even though that might be a more satisfying job over the long term than being a social media manager. And that's where the jobs are; those aren't just 1950s jobs. Those aren't just middle-20th-century jobs. Those are 21st-century jobs still.
You're right. I think that mindset from our side, what we teach our kids and how we inform them about what their options and career trajectories might be, I think is critical. And I think that comes back to our homes and comes back to our societies. I remember, we were interviewing a CEO for the book, and the quote that stuck with me was, “I have a harder time getting people in my factories because they much rather would be baristas at a Starbucks than actually come work in my factory when they would literally earn at least two times that amount within a few months already.” I think that really points to the fact that there is an element of training people, but I think the first step starts at home and first step starts in our minds: how we can get to our kids and our families the value and the purpose a manufacturing job can provide them. I think this is where we should get ahead of it as industry executives to talk about how prosperous lives can be in this particular segment, and then also change the image of the segment. Even before I started working in the segment intensely, my picture of a factory was, you are greased up, you are dirty, it's high temperatures, it's not exciting.
Loud. Very loud and hot.
Very loud. In some specific areas that might be true, but if you go through, I would venture 90 percent of the factories, they are spick and span. There is automation everywhere. There is safety. Working conditions are much different than what our perceptions are. So I think there has to be an element of that teaching, which the executive needs to do, about what kind of careers would manufacturing be able to afford folks. And then there's teaching at home also, I think, which we need to at least give to our kids, that there are multiple options: social media and retail and whatever, but we should also then be making sure we are talking about manufacturing as a real alternative given what it can afford.
We talked a little bit about training. Is there anything else you’d like to see the federal government do?
I think one thing which has always been an interesting topic for me is, I think if you bring focus and we bring transparency and accountability to what we do, we typically make good progress. So I would love to see—I don't know how best you put it… We have the surgeon general for the US. Why is there no chief manufacturing officer for the US? Somebody whose job is to ensure that the sector is being done in as healthy a state as possible, somebody whose job is to make sure we're not surprised, for example, with what we saw at COVID. Suddenly we had shortages of critical things at home. Obviously dollars will help, funding will help, policy will help. But I think to make sure that we don't play catch up all the time, one thing I would love to see, and this is my personal opinion, is something like a CMO for the United States. It's his or her job to make sure that they are thinking about the sector, what the sector needs not just today and five years down the line, 10 years down the line, and to make sure we don't kind of fall back. We always are proactively ahead of the curve on that. So that's one idea at least as we were doing our research that kind of stuck with me.
When Japan suffered an earthquake and tsunami in 2011, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant melted down, resulting in one of the worst nuclear accidents in history. In response, the Japanese government shut down all of its nuclear reactors. But subsequent economic research reveals that the unintended consequences of abandoning nuclear energy have been worse than the accident itself.
In this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I'm joined by Matthew Neidell, an economist in the Department of Health Policy and Management at Columbia University's Mailman School of Public Health. In 2021, Matt coauthored a paper on those unintended consequences called “The unintended effects from halting nuclear power production: Evidence from Fukushima Daiichi accident.” From that paper:
This paper provides novel evidence of the unintended health effects stemming from the halt in nuclear power production after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. After the accident, nuclear power stations ceased operation and nuclear power was replaced by fossil fuels, causing an increase in electricity prices. We find that this increase led to a reduction in energy consumption, which caused an increase in mortality during very cold temperatures, given the protective role that climate control plays against the elements. Our results contribute to the debate surrounding the use of nuclear as a source of energy by documenting a yet unexplored health benefit from using nuclear power, and more broadly to regulatory policy approaches implemented during periods of scientific uncertainty about potential adverse effects.
In This Episode:
* The Fukushima meltdown (1:30)
* The consequences of Japan’s shift away from nuclear (7:30)
* Japan’s nuclear reversal (17:15)
* Public perceptions of nuclear risks (20:43)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
The Fukushima meltdown
James Pethokoukis: The title of the [working] paper is "Be Cautious with the Precautionary Principle: Evidence from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident." Let's start with a quick explanation. What is the precautionary principle?
Matthew Neidell: One thing I should clarify first: The title of the paper ended up changing. We do talk about the precautionary principle, but it ended up not being the title in the published version. We got a lot of pushback on the use of “precautionary principle” in the title. That said, I'm happy to talk about it, because I think everything in here is relevant to the precautionary principle.
You could teach a whole intro to econ class from this paper. Two things that pop out to me are the precautionary principle and also the idea of trade-offs, because this paper is very much about trade-offs. Starting with that, in what way do you think those principles are illustrated by the Fukushima accident?
I think what's really important here is that—this is almost anytime we think about nuclear but especially when big accidents happen, like Fukushima—we tend to focus on the one thing that happened and we don't think about the alternatives. That's the important thing. We think about nuclear as “nuclear carries risk.” And it does carry risk. There are dangers associated with nuclear. Just about anyone should know that who is following this. But it's “How do the dangers compare to something else, to the alternatives that we can use?”
One of the problems is that we tend to think of nuclear in isolation. Like people are just saying, “Nuclear is bad, therefore we shouldn't do it.” And that's the kind of precautionary principle aspect of things. It says, “Unless we are fully informed about the risks associated with something, there's no uncertainty associated with the risks with something, we shouldn't do it.” And that's hampering because there are so many opportunities that are out there that carry risk. And if we just say, “Let's not engage in these opportunities because there's a chance of risk,” we end up cutting back on so many things that we might otherwise do.
There's a scale of nuclear accident severity. It's a seven-point scale, and so far there have only been two level-seven—the worst—accidents: One was Chernobyl, and the other was Fukushima. In our experience in the nuclear age, Fukushima was one of the absolute two worst accidents that we've had. If you're looking for an example, this would seem to be a fantastic test case about just how dangerous it is, and also just how dangerous the counterfactual is.
Yeah, I think that's right. They are the two most dangerous, the third one being Three Mile Island.
That's actually down the list. I think that’s a five. We'll start with the actual accident: What do we know about the fatalities and the damage from the accident itself?
The biggest thing that people focus on are the radiation deaths. We have the meltdown, there's radiation that's getting out in the environment that's not contained, and how many people are being exposed to that and dying from cancer as a result? That is, I think, the biggest fear to most people. So far we only have estimates of that. We don't know that precisely because people are dying from cancer, unfortunately, all the time. So how we trace those back to this particular accident is hard to know precisely. But we have ways of estimating that, and the estimates out there—and these are not just estimates of how many radiation deaths we've seen so far, but also how many we expect to see over the next 10 or 20 years because of this accident. And the kind of leading number out there that we reference in the paper is 130. That's the number of estimated radiation deaths because of the Fukushima accident.
You're right, that's what people would mostly focus on. What was the impact of just evacuating because of the meltdown?
With the evacuation, interestingly, that's where more deaths were. Some of the exact numbers are kind of fuzzy what exactly they are, but estimates put it around probably 1000, 1200 deaths or so because of the evacuation process. What's interesting about that is, like you said, that's not the first line of effects that we're expecting to see. Certainly, when it came to the evacuation, there was mayhem when this is happening, but maybe a little bit too much mayhem that led to extra accidents from the evacuation that we shouldn't have seen.
Is that because you're moving sick people from hospitals or there are auto accidents? Why do so many people die during evacuations?
That's a good question, because I think it was a little bit mysterious why the numbers were so high. I think it's the kind of things that you could imagine. We're shuffling people away who maybe weren't the most mobile people to begin with, and were moving them away and that's wreaking havoc as a result. Or you have this mass evacuation and there are accidents along the way. All of that could be contributing to it.
The consequences of Japan’s shift away from nuclear
Those are the deaths that we can calculate from radiation, from the evacuation. But then the Japanese government responded. It responded with a change in energy policy and that had consequences. What did the Japanese government do? And then what did you find about the consequences of their actions?
What the government did—I'd say it was in response to a lot of protests that were happening at the time, at least that was one important contributing factor—was they halted the use of nuclear power as a source of energy in the country of Japan. Until Fukushima happened, about 35 to 40 percent of their energy was coming from nuclear power. And then after Fukushima, it went to zero percent. They weren't using nuclear power for any of their energy. And a couple of other countries that weren't directly involved took similar paths. Germany started phasing out nuclear power, is one big example as well.
Talk about unintended consequences from Germany.
Yes. And that leads to another can of worms that opens up with Germany
Your paper is not even about geopolitics. We could go into that, too. In Japan, no nuclear, which I assume was the cheap energy source for Japan at the time—and the cleanest.
It was. The important thing is that it was a cheap, reliable, and clean source of energy. We don't focus so much on the clean aspect of it in this paper, but I think that's important too. What we really focus on was that it was a relatively inexpensive source of energy. There are all kinds of questions about providing nuclear power. It's very expensive to build these plants, but once they're up and running, they provide energy at pretty low costs. They had a really reliable source of low-cost energy, and all of a sudden they said, “We're going to get rid of 40 percent of our country's energy supply.”
They’ve still got the energy demands that they need to meet. People still need to heat their homes. They need to cool their homes in the summer. Not to mention all of the other basic functions in your home—keeping the lights on and the fridge running. So they had to figure out how to meet those energy demands, and what they did in meeting those energy demands was they started importing fossil fuels. Mainly from mainland China is where they started importing those fuels.
I assume that's coal, mostly.
Coal, gas — those were the two main things that were coming in. And when they were coming in, they were now providing the energy to fill that gap in demand. But they were now more expensive than using nuclear. People's energy bills were going up. Depending on the area of Japan, we're talking about some places were seeing energy bills going up 30 to 40 percent. If you think about during times of the year when you're using energy the most, the middle of winter when you're heating your home to try to keep a nice comfortable environment at home. And now your bill has gone up by 30 to 40 percent—a lot of people ended up cutting back on their energy use.
And this is another economics 101 principle: As the price of a good goes up, people are going to consume less of it. So we saw people cutting back on their energy use, and they're cutting back on their energy use during the coldest time of the year. What's important about that is that's when energy use is really important for your health. One of the things that a climate-controlled environment is doing is it's protecting you from the elements. It's protecting you from freezing temperatures that, most people can relate to, don’t feel good on a regular basis. But also if you have people who might be experiencing heart disease or other kinds of more frail states to begin with, if they're now experiencing colder temperatures for a prolonged period of time, this could be pretty harmful to their health.
And what you did is you looked at a section of large cities to try to figure out those health consequences?
That's what we did. After we found the areas where we saw the decrease in energy usage, we also asked, “Did we see increases in mortality in those areas as well?” And that's precisely what we found. We found that when it was cold out, in the winter—temperatures hovering around 30, 40 degrees, think zero degrees Celsius, right around freezing—when temperatures were falling into that range and energy prices were higher, we saw increases in mortality compared to times where we had similar temperatures but before the increases in energy prices.
You looked at about the 20 or so largest cities over the early 2010s, from 2011 to 2014, and you calculate about 1300 additional deaths.
Because of the higher energy prices, we estimate there are an extra 1300 deaths in the cities where we were able to estimate the effects here.
(1) I assume there would be more if you looked at the entire country; (2) to what extent do you believe this has been an issue beyond 2014?
Both of those are reasons that we think the number is even higher than the 1300. Our study only focused on about 30 percent of the Japanese population, just because that's where the data was available to do the analysis. But if we project our estimates onto other areas, we have every reason to think that there are effects there as well. We think those numbers can be even larger than the 1300. And then also our analysis ended in 2014. There's always a lag on when you can get data and it takes some time to do the analysis. But those effects very likely persisted beyond 2014 as well. So we think the number of deaths is certainly greater than the 1300. It’s hard to put exactly what the number is on it, but we'd say easily it should be several thousand more.
I don't know if you examined this, but do you know if that potential consequence was part of the shutdown debate? Or was the debate just about “This is too dangerous of a technology, we need to shut it down”?
Unfortunately, I think the debate is mostly around just the risks. This is getting back to what we were talking about earlier with the precautionary principle and just focusing on one aspect and losing sight of the whole picture. It was really just saying “This is the risk that we face from using nuclear, so we shouldn't do it,” instead of thinking “These are also the benefits that nuclear brings.” And we haven't even touched on some of the other benefits that nuclear brings. We've just talked about the price benefits right now, that it brings lower energy costs. And we talked a little bit about the potential air quality and greenhouse gas impacts as well. But that's mostly lost at least in the protests that are against it. They're really focusing on the risks and not thinking about the benefits from it.
Matt, I don't know how much time you spend on Twitter. I spend too much. Sometimes I get the impression that there's a certain segment on Twitter who thinks economists are too involved in public policy. But this seems like an absolutely perfect example of where you actually need somebody talking about economics, about trade-offs, about other potential consequences and counterfactuals.
Yeah, I think that's right. Obviously as an economist I'm going to promote what I do as being useful. But it gets back to, I think it was Truman who said, “Give me a one-handed economist,” because all the economists say, “On one hand this, but on the other hand that.” And that's really thinking about the trade-offs here. But it's hard to imagine any situation where there isn't a trade-off, where any decision we're making, there's not also an alternative decision that we can make that has impacts as well. I know that is maybe a bit self-serving and that's what economists do. That's how we approach every problem. We think about not any one thing in isolation, but try to think about the whole problem and everything that's happening in the problem, the costs and the benefits.
Japan’s nuclear reversal
Just to stick with Japan for another moment, they have now reversed course. Japan is now re-embracing nuclear. To what extent have you followed that policy reversal? Part of it seems to be about climate change. I don't know how much also has to do with the kind of findings that you have in the paper.
I don't know the details behind what's driving them to make that decision. But yes, they're planning on bringing back—what is it, seven or nine plants that they're going bring back online? I think a lot of that has to do with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. I think that's a big thing because right now we see gas prices going up everywhere. Whether you're directly relying on Russian gas or not, it's still world markets that are determining prices there. And we see energy prices are going up, and we're especially fearing this winter. The Russian invasion started at the tail end of the winter last year so we had some time to prepare. The hope was things wouldn't go on as long as they are. But they are going on as long as they are, and now we have to think about this winter ahead where we're going have to think about higher energy prices for a lot of people, and how are we going to deal with those higher energy prices?
One way to deal with those higher energy prices is to increase the supply of energy, and that will hopefully bring down the price of energy. I think that's a big part of bringing the nuclear plants back. I think the same thing is happening in Germany as well. They were slowly decommissioning all of their nuclear plants. They hadn't fully phased them out. I think it was actually supposed to happen this year, 2022. And I think maybe now they're putting the breaks on that and saying “We need to keep some of those plants alive,” especially because Germany in particular is very dependent on Russian natural gas.
There was a somewhat similar study done looking at excess deaths in Germany from switching from nuclear to more coal-fired plants, looking at air pollution, dirtier air causes deaths. That is not something you looked at, though I imagine it would be a factor.
That's not something we looked at directly, but it's absolutely another factor. And this is one that we just looked at the price differential between nuclear versus coal or gas. Another super important benefit from nuclear is that when it's actually producing the energy for people to use, it's not emitting any pollutants locally. So it doesn't have an effect on air quality. When the alternative is coal or gas, that's leading to emissions that contributes to particulate matter, which is this really small fine pollutant that gets deep in our lungs, gets into our circulatory system and causes significant number of deaths. I believe particulate matter is the leading environmental cause of mortality around the globe.
Public perceptions of nuclear risks
Do you have a sense that people overestimate the fatalities from nuclear accidents? I don't know if you watched the Chernobyl miniseries on HBO. It would be very easy for someone kind of watching that and maybe half on their phone to think that hundreds of thousands of people died. And I recently watched a documentary, I think it was on Netflix, about Three Mile Island. They also tried to give the sense that many, many people died, even though the evidence seems pretty anecdotal, what they did give. They didn't bring a lot of experts and economists talking about deaths. In political decision-making, it's easy for politicians to focus on highly visible costs and highly visible benefits. But it seems like with nuclear, they're also looking at costs that perhaps don't even exist, that there's just the sense that it's a lot more dangerous than what it is.
I think that's right. Part of it is about salience. When we think about a nuclear meltdown, it's a shot heard around the world. Everyone knows about Fukushima and everybody knows about Chernobyl. Even if we have the opportunity to forget about Chernobyl—not that we should forget about Chernobyl, we should still remember and learn from Chernobyl—we still have reminders about Chernobyl and the miniseries coming out and telling us how bad it was. If we had a Chernobyl-like incident every five years, we'd be having a different conversation. Then we could say, “Maybe nuclear should be off the table. Maybe it's not worth it.”
But we have very different calculations. We've had one Chernobyl, the worst incident we've had. And then the second-worst incident we've had is Fukushima, where we have 1200 or so deaths. It's orders of magnitude better, and that's only the second-biggest accident that we've had. And if that's what things are like going forward, that's much safer, clearly much safer than Chernobyl. I think the interesting thing embedded in the question you're asking me is about the salience, that we hear about the deaths from these accidents. But the deaths from coal and the deaths from gas, you don't hear about them. They're just in the background. Every day there are people dying from particulate matter, but we're not saying, “It's because of the burning of coal we now have this person dying from particulate matter.” It's just that we know there are some people that are dying and we can later statistically attribute it to the burning of fossil fuels. But it's not reaching salience the same way that a nuclear accident is reaching salience.
An analogy that comes to mind is thinking about flying versus driving. Flying, statistically speaking, is so much safer than driving. The amount of airplane-related deaths in a given year is very small, but the amount of deaths from car accidents is, again, orders of magnitude higher. Car accidents are happening every day, and the only way you really hear about car accidents, other than if it's a really famous person who's involved, is your local news. They're not making national news. But when a plane crash happens, it's national news—it's international news. But when was the last big plane crash that happened? I don't know. I couldn't tell you. It has to have been at least several years away. I know COVID put a lot of pause on a lot of travel, but it has to be years away from when that last accident happened. Yet I think a lot of people are more scared of flying than they are of driving, even though the risks of death from driving are much higher than the risks of death from flying.
Where did the precautionary principle come from? Are there philosophers or economists that have been pushing this idea since the 1970s? Or is this a much old idea that has found new salience?
I don't know enough of the history of it going back in time. It definitely gained prominence in the last 50 years. With a lot of the environmental movement that was growing out of the ‘60s and ‘70s, the precautionary principle took more kind of formal definitions and became, in some cases, an official part of policy. That said, the definition of it has changed over time, the precise way that the precautionary principal is defined. Before then, I'm sure it's been used at least unofficially. This is where the precautionary principle gains traction. You can almost think of it as “better safe than sorry.” This is how it gets pushed: “Let's be safe first rather than learn we made a mistake and be sorry later.” It's probably a good way to think about your daily life as an individual, thinking about “better safe than sorry” when you make decisions.
But it's not clear that suddenly becomes a good tool for making decisions for millions of people. It now starts to take a different flavor to it, because as an individual, when you're making this better-safe-than-sorry decision, you're thinking about one thing, one step at a time. In front of you, you have a cup of water, and you say, “I don't know what's in this cup of water. I don't know how long it's been sitting there. Maybe it has some bacteria because it's been sitting there for too long and I could get sick.” So then you say, “Better safe than sorry. I'm not going to drink this cup of water and later I'm going to do something else that's going to quench my thirst.” That's fine, that's perfectly reasonable. I make decisions like that for myself and for my family.
But when you're sitting there making that decision when you have lots of choices in front of you, it becomes different, because then it gets back to like what we talked about before. You have to think about the trade-offs associated with any decision that you make, that if you're not choosing this, you're now choosing something else. And we’ve got to think about the benefits and risks with all the alternatives that we face. And the precautionary principle just gets us away from thinking about those alternatives.
If you were to rank the papers I've mentioned in my writings over the past five years, this paper probably ranks pretty high. It embodies these principles. It provides, I think, a very easy way for people to understand some important principles and concerns a pretty important topic: energy. How much publicity have you gotten from mainstream media about your paper? What kind of response have you gotten, either from environmentalists or economists? I think it is a pretty important piece of research.
Thanks for the kind words. I'd say we've gotten some media exposure from this, but not a tremendous amount. I'm doing this podcast and I did another podcast recently and it's gotten written up in a couple of places, but I'd say it hasn't really hit mainstream media. Some of that, to be fair, is I don't do much self-promotion of my work. You said you spend too much time on Twitter. I spend probably too little time on Twitter. More promotion might have helped with that, so some of that is a result of our choices too.
It seems like, at least as applied to energy because of climate change and more immediately because of the Russian invasion, people are thinking a lot about past decisions and about trade-offs. Do you think views about nuclear energy are changing, as far as the riskiness and more importantly the riskiness compared to other decisions like becoming dependent on a potential enemy for your energy?
I do think it's changing a little bit. And it's interesting how other factors make you change your viewpoint on this. The risk from nuclear hasn't really changed at all, but it's the risk from the other thing has changed. We have to be thinking about the alternative options. We talked about Japan and Germany now changing their tune on nuclear, we also see in the Inflation Reduction Act that was signed recently that now nuclear is being promoted in that as well, encouraging the development of nuclear power. We see Diablo Canyon, the nuclear plant in California, which they were going to decommission. It now looks like they're reversing course on that. I think there is a change.
The question always becomes: How long does this last? If there's another nuclear accident, that could quickly change things. There's a lot of uncertainty when it comes to nuclear and that uncertainty is different than the uncertainty when it comes to other energy sources. If another accident happens, it could be that all of a sudden we change course on nuclear. I hope that doesn't happen, because I feel like we learn from the mistakes. We know with Chernobyl there were just a lot of missteps that happened that led to that accident. And I just heard something recently that they actually had a safety inspection the night before the actual meltdown happened, which is kind of amazing that that could happen. A lot of the information there is behind lock and key with the Russian government, so we don't know a lot of the details. But we've learned over time how to make it safer and safer. Our ability to detect problems is just greater and greater. Hopefully what's happening is that we're learning how low the risk is from nuclear.
And what's important is for everyone to think of it in context to the alternative. That is where we're at a hard point with—we probably don't want to go too far down this path of information and misinformation—what do people know about the risks and how big they are? I don't know that number offhand, what people think about nuclear. But a lot of people think that the risks are worse than they are, and that doesn't help public discourse if people are misinformed about the dangers.
Welcome to part two of my conversation with Michael Mandel, vice president and chief economist at the Progressive Policy Institute. In the last episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, we considered the capital investments and job-creating power of America's major tech companies. In this episode, we discuss the Biden administration's CHIPS and Science Act, industrial policy, and whether we should expect an uptick in US productivity growth.
In This Episode:
* Innovation and industrial policy (1:14)
* Looking at productivity numbers (4:14)
* How technology affects jobs (7:19)
* The future of productivity (12:38)
* Investing in bioscience and materials science (15:00)
* Policy for societal resilience (19:29)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
Innovation and industrial policy
What do you make of this recent CHIPS and Science Act and perhaps a move in the United States toward what some people call industrial policy—a phrase that can mean a lot of things. I think in this case it means subsidizing sectors that government thinks are important, especially in competition with some other countries.
I have to say, quite honestly, that I took my eye off the semiconductor industry for a couple of years because I assumed we were in good shape. And then when I looked over, I said, “Wait a second, something happened here. All of a sudden, we're not in good shape anymore.” I support investment in this sector. I don't consider this to be classic industrial policy at this point. I just consider this to be doing what we've done in the past. We did this with memory chips: There was government intervention with SEMATECH. You sort of say, “Here's a sector, we need to fix it. Let's just go ahead and spend some money here.” We haven't gotten to the point of being strategic yet. This was not really a strategic investment. We're just saying, “Let's throw money at this problem.” We know that at the margin, throwing money at this problem is going to get us further along than we need to be.
Do I think that more of this is needed? The country you didn’t mention, of course, was China. I do think China's innovation policy is a really interesting question because we haven't had an experience with authoritarian countries that were successfully innovative. For a lot of reasons, because it seems that capitalism works better to produce good innovation. If it turns out that authoritarian innovation works, many countries around the world will want to imitate that model because it's much more comfortable for governments to run innovation from the top. The only reason why they allow innovation to bubble up from the bottom is because doing it the other way doesn't work.
What I would expect to see in the US is a combination of the two, a lot that is bubble up from the bottom. We will be faced with technological and social and environmental challenges that we can't imagine. And we have to have invested the money in the new technologies before we get there. We don't know what the problems are going to be. We don't know what the technologies are going to be. We discovered this in the pandemic, where it turned out that mRNA technology, which was sitting on the shelf for 20 years, was a solution to a problem that we didn't even know it was a solution to. But if we hadn't been investing in it so it wasn’t there, it wouldn't have been available as quickly as it was.
Looking at productivity numbers
Statistically, we had this productivity boom during the pandemic, at least in 2020, 2021. And people read about a lot of technologies happening: maybe AI spreading, mRNA, CRISPR, rockets. The first half of this year, statistically, was not so good with productivity. These numbers tend to jump around a lot. What's the reality going forward?
As you know, productivity numbers, especially total factor productivity numbers, are useless over any period less than 10 years. We mentioned earlier the shift of hours from the household sector to the market sector as part of e-commerce. Remember: Hours in the household sector are not measured as part of the productivity basis. If you actually include them, it significantly adds to the productivity growth in this period. Because what's happened is, if we take the total amount of hours being put into consumer distribution, which is both the market hours and the non-market hours, market hours has gone up, which is what shows up in the official productivity numbers. If you look at retailing, you don't actually see very much productivity gain because, in fact, the hours have gone up a lot. But they're not counting the fallen hours in the household sector. What has happened is when you count the fall of hours in the household sector, productivity growth—I haven't done these calculations recently, but it goes up a lot: quarter percentage point a year, half a percentage point a year. It’s actually a significant increase.
In the sector or economy-wide?
Economy-wide. Because it's a lot of hours. The degree to which telehealth, for example, removes the necessity of people to drive to the doctor's office, if we are not including those hours in our calculation of productivity growth, we're missing the big effect. And you can go through the economy like that: places where there were movements outside of the hours in the market, in the household sector, just not being counted. That even leaves out increases in output in the info sector that's not being measured. I need to go back to something else that you said, which was the productivity boom that we saw in the past: My belief is that a lot of that was mismeasured, too. But over-measured.
When? What period?
I'm talking about the early 2000s. There was the apparent boom from 2000-2007, increase in productivity.
How technology affects jobs
We had the ‘90s boom, and then we had the pop of the internet stock bubble. But, statistically, we still saw a lot of productivity growth after that.
My belief, looking at the numbers, is that a lot of that is mismeasurement of a shift in purchasing from US manufacturing firms to, say, overseas manufacturing firms, which were being picked up as a productivity gain rather than a price drop. Now we're getting to really abstruse stuff, but it doesn't really matter.
That doesn't make me feel good, because I like seeing years of high productivity growth and we haven’t seen as many as I would like since 1973.
I understand, but that actually explains why it is that people are so pissed.
Because in the ‘90s we had high productivity growth driving high wage growth.
That’s right. And then you did not have high wage growth after that … Retailing was in some sense a bellwether industry. Originally McKinsey was writing reports about retailing being a high-productivity industry. And then they realized it was a low-productivity industry. And in fact, real wages stayed low for many years and did not start increasing until Amazon and the other e-commerce companies came in and started taking away the really low-wage jobs which were moving out of retail, into e-commerce and fulfillment as much higher-wage jobs. What I look for is wage growth. If I'm not seeing real wage growth, I assume that I'm not seeing productivity gains, because I'm seeing real wage growth in the areas that I think real productivity gains are happening—whether or not they're being measured or not.
Do I think it's going to spread to the rest of the economy? I do. We know what it looks like. The question is, are we ready for this? Are we ready for telehealth? Let’s just stick with telehealth for a second. You could eliminate big chunks of healthcare workers and costs on the consumer side by shifting as much as you could to telehealth. That becomes a byproduct of the money that's invested in broadband and 5G. And then the question is, are you measuring this correctly? And are you doing what you need to do to make this work? And the case of telehealth, of course, is a licensing problem: being able to get healthcare connections in a state that's different than yours isn't always the easiest thing.
Some people who listen to this will say, “That economist is being flippant about job loss. This is another job-killing technology.”
I think what you want to think about is that we have not seen any evidence of job killing at all. Let’s go to the autonomous vehicle and the truck drivers. Your autonomous truck is going to have to be kept in really good repair. It’s going to have to be kept highly tuned, because it's out there by itself. If you want to do this, you want to run it all night. You’re either going to have somebody sleeping in the cab or you actually have to have something that is kept in as good repair as the average airplane is. Which is really a lot. And so you're talking about having a very large repair force, and you're shifting truck drivers from a dangerous job to a less dangerous job that is better paid.
You also might need more road maintenance people. If you imagine a future where you’ll have cars driving 80 miles an hour, six inches apart from each other, you better not have too many potholes.
That's exactly right.
Some people don't want to switch jobs, though.
I think that's important for us to respect. But I also think people like their lifestyles and they don't want to necessarily switch from a job that is partly physical to a job that's all nonphysical. What the e-commerce example tells us is that we can actually produce a lot of jobs that are of varying types, that are technologically enabled. What the telehealth tells us is that we have a lot of telehealth maintenance people that we didn't have before that are very practical. I think that if we stay on the track that we are, I'm not scared of [inflation]. I find it really weird when people say, “We produced too many jobs this month in the job report, because we’re scared of inflation.” You shouldn't be scared of inflation. You should be scared of low productivity. Jobs are good. Productivity is good.
The future of productivity
I like both. When we look back on this decade from 2030 or maybe 2035, will we say, “That was a high-productivity gain where we sort of stepped up,” or we still be having this conversation of “What do we need to do to boost productivity growth?”
I'm going to take a step back here. I think we're going to discover that a lot more people are being kept out of the labor force by long COVID than we think right now, and that we're going to be running into labor shortages. And as we run into labor shortages, there is going to be incentive for companies to invest in technology in a way that they didn't do before. We are going to start seeing real growth and productivity as investments in technology spread from the digital sector and in a few other sectors into the rest of the economy. And we'll circle back around to healthcare. What we want from healthcare…
Look at those capital investment numbers.
If you look at capital investment over the last 10 years, it's been running at about half the rate as it was in the previous 10 years. Not just in the US, but in Europe—not in China, though. That's really what the big distinction is. China did not have the capital investment slowdown that the developed world had. We need investment in technology. We need a willingness to change. We need investment, not just in information technology, but in the biosciences. And that we need a regulatory structure that is flexible enough to adjust to this.
What’s your best guess? I've brought this up several times in this podcast: Erik Brynjolfsson and Robert Gordon, the economists, have a public bet about productivity growth.
In the end, I've got to go with Erik. Erik has been excessively sanguine up to this point. I think the numbers have, up to this point, leaned in favor of overestimating productivity growth. But I do think that coming out of this pandemic the combination of information technology and biosciences and whatever more investment we do in materials sciences, is going to be extremely important.
Investing in bioscience and materials science
I understand how IT might affect productivity growth. How would the biosciences? Because we would be healthier and work longer?
That is one thing. Another thing has to do with agriculture. And related to that, energy.
I know [CRISPR pioneer] Jennifer Doudna has an agricultural startup.
The agricultural stuff is really important at this point, because if we're moving into a period of changing climate and we're moving into a period where food and water supplies are really important, then anything we can do to increase the productivity of the agriculture sector and also its ability to adjust quickly is just really important. The fact is that we collectively as a global economy have survived the worst pandemic in 100 years, basically without touching the growth rate of the economy. I mean, it touched it, whatever it did, but mainly we kept going. And the reason why we kept going is that we had invested so much in biosciences, especially in the US. We had the technology on the shelf that we needed fully operational. We could say, “Well, it doesn't do exactly what we wanted to do.” That's not important. It was there, it was ready to the degree that people were willing to roll it out.
I think what we're going to find is that we're going to have a lot of other challenges that come up for which having a strong biosciences capacity is absolutely essential. Information technology is great, but it doesn't cover the full range of innovations. The place where we're missing is materials sciences. Other countries have spent more on materials sciences than we have. If you go back to your question about industrial policy, I would say that the main thing that we have to do is actually with semiconductors because semiconductors is basically about materials sciences, is more investment in materials sciences.
The old nanotechnology initiative, despite that people had thought this was going to create tiny machines that built things, it was basically materials sciences.
It was basically materials science. Once again, that's something that we spent some money on, then we stopped spending money on it. It’s still lurking out there as a possibility we may have. There may be stuff on the shelf right now that we can reach out for when we need it. The glass on smartphones was originally a Corning glass that they had made.
They didn’t know what they could do with it.
It was not good. They had designed it to be shatter-proof auto windows. And it was just bad for that. But it was in their drawer. And the thing about Corning, of course, is that they had such continuity in their research capabilities they actually remembered it. I'm on the plus side of this. I think that I'm of the school of, the future happens slowly then all at once.
It's also how we go bankrupt.
Let me tell you a little bit about my theory about innovation, both positive and negative black swans. We have very little ability to predict technology. We have very little ability to predict what the problems we're going to face are. What we do have is the ability that when we have something bad happen, can we ameliorate the negative consequences? And when we come up with a positive, good surprise, can we take advantage of that? We had a big negative happen with the pandemic and we managed to deal with it. The question is, can we take advantage of new technologies to push things forward, or are they going to languish on the shelf? And that's really the answer to your question: chop off the bottoms of the down rungs, boost the top rungs and the overall growth is higher.
Policy for societal resilience
What you've also described there is kind of a societal resilience, the ability to do that. Since I work at a think tank, you work at a think tank, what is the five-point policy plan there?
Let's actually just go back to manufacturing, because that's the one that I've thought about the most. In the broader sense, in terms of regulating technology, don't destroy the goose that is laying the golden egg. You can regulate it and you should regulate it. If you see the things that are wrong, if you have definitive things that you think are wrong and you can say, “Don't do that. We can punish you.” And then you can sort of judge for yourself whether or not people have followed that or not. If companies are doing well, encourage them to expand. Encourage them to expand because that's the best way to make sure that the higher productivity is in more places of the economy rather than fewer. In terms of manufacturing, which is so crucial, make sure that the technology is available at a local level for anybody to use so that they have a chance to experiment with it. The problem is we don't have enough experimentation going on.
How does government do that?
On the state level, you can imagine setting up centers that anybody could come into and use the latest—not a consumer model 3D printer, but the latest production model one, or have access to the latest-model robot, not an older one—and be able to say, “What could you do with this that is different?” Because you want to be able to throw smart people at the technology. One of the great things about information technology, the personal computer, is that it was available to everybody.
What you've described almost reminds me of a World's Fair, where technology can be presented to people and they can interact with it.
We haven't had a World's Fair in a long time, have we?
We've covered this topic in the newsletter. What you're describing is maybe kind of World's Fair, but for small business.
You can imagine that, with spinoffs for it. I'm not talking about industrial policy in the classic sense. There are a lot of technologies that are out there that don't have enough people working with them, that don't have enough financing available at the entrepreneurial level that we want to be able to make sure that they have available to them because then we'll have the creativity that we need to move to the next stage. But having said that, I'm feeling more positive going forward. In the next 10 years, I'm not going to put a number on productivity growth because I'm really getting more and more doubtful of our ability to measure it…
If you did, remember: a number and a date, but not both. That's the classic stock market strategist.
As you know, Jim, I’ve been at this a long time. What I usually forecast is big ups and downs, with the ups being bigger than the downs. How could that be wrong?
Technology and e-commerce companies have a reputation for being drivers of creative destruction, sometimes at great cost to local communities. Economic nostalgia tells us to lament those jobs and fear the changes that come with technological progress. But it's worth remembering that tech companies are also a major source of high-wage job growth in the US economy. On this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I'm joined by Michael Mandel to consider the role of tech companies in the American economy.
Michael is vice president and chief economist at the Progressive Policy Institute. He's also the author of "Investment Heroes 2022: Fighting Inflation with Capital Investment," co-authored with Jordan Shapiro.
In This Episode:
* Tech sector job growth (1:23)
* How technology affects the labor market (6:08)
* Job-replacing tech vs. job-creating tech (10:46)
* Encouraging the digitization of US manufacturing (15:00)
* America’s tech firms: investment heroes (18:34)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
Tech sector job growth
James Pethokoukis: Last year you said, “We’ve seen in recent years [that] the tech/broadband/e-commerce sector has been the main source of job growth in the economy.” Do you think this is a widely understood fact either among the public or among policymakers here in Washington?
Michael Mandel: That's such an excellent question. No, it's not a widely understood fact. I've just calculated the latest numbers, and if you look at full-time equivalents, all of the job growth since the pandemic started has been in what I call now the “tech/e-commerce” sector. And the rest of the economy and job growth has been much, much weaker.
Is this purely a pandemic-era phenomenon, or do you expect it to continue to happen?
It was happening before the pandemic. It is going to continue after the pandemic, too. I think what we've learned in the past is that whichever sectors grow during a recession tend to lead the next recovery as well. The fact that we've had all this growth in the tech/broadbrand/e-commerce sector during the pandemic suggests that's going to be the job leader going forward as well. The Bureau of Labor Statistics has just released its occupational projections for the next 10 years. I haven't had a chance to look through them yet. I suspect that they will understate the future job impact of the tech/broadband/e-commerce sector as they have in the past.
Is that an accurate forecast that they put out?
It is about as accurate as just extending long-term trends. In terms of looking forward [at] telecom-related jobs or app-economy jobs or computer-related jobs, it has consistently under projected. They actually make no real claims. They don't say it's a forecast. They say it's a projection. Probably, if you ask them privately, they would tell you they really don't want to do it. But it's really widely read.
The part of that sector I think people might be surprised by is e-commerce. I'm guessing that a lot of people view e-commerce as a jobs killer: It's replacing all the people who work at in-person stores with kiosks. Is that your perception? That is wrong, though.
That is my perception, and that is wrong. The way that I think about e-commerce is it doesn't pull jobs out of brick-and-mortar retail. It actually pulls hours out of the household sector. So what happened is that people used to put an enormous amount of hours into driving to stores, parking, walking around, and standing on line, and so forth. And if you look at the data that comes out of the Bureau of Labor Statistics on the American Time Use Survey, you see a really sharp drop in the number of hours that people spend shopping for goods. It's gone down by about 20 percent over the last 15 years. And it dropped about 10 percent just over the course of the pandemic. All of these hours, which is an enormous number of unpaid household hours, are being moved into the paid market sector. Instead of you going into a store and picking out the stuff yourself, somebody else is doing this using robots in an e-commerce fulfillment center. And instead of you driving to the store by yourself and spending all that time parking, somebody else is putting the stuff in a big truck and delivering it to you, using more capital, doing it more efficiently. There's been a very sharp drop in the number of hours that households are spending on shopping, which (A) creates a lot of jobs in the market sector, (B) really distorts the productivity numbers, and (C) leads us to misunderstand the sources of growth in the economy: what the effect of productivity is, what the effect of technology is.
I know you and I have talked about this in the past, for many years we used to wonder, when was technology going to start generating jobs for the ordinary person? And that's what e-commerce has done: generate tech-enabled jobs in e-commerce fulfillment centers, in the entire supply chain, that pay better than the old retailing jobs, that pay a lot better than the non-paid jobs in the household sector where people used to spend this. You're creating a lot of income that wasn't in the economy before.
How technology affects the labor market
People don’t think about those warehouse fulfillment center jobs. If they do, they probably think they pay worse than they actually do. And they probably underestimate how many there are and figure it's just all robots or something.
I think we've managed to break the “all robot” canard, because what we've seen here is that the ability to put robots into the fulfillment centers has lowered the cost of doing e-commerce so much that it's actually made it open to all consumers for everything, basically. There are no restrictions on it. You're producing enough surplus that you can actually do returns correctly. There's a big economic surplus being generated by the automation of the fulfillment centers that enables us to hire a lot more workers.
That's a classic case of technology affecting the labor market, right?
If you look back historically, this is very much the same sort of thing that happened with Henry Ford and the assembly line, which is that you think that when you have an assembly line, your adding productivity that’s going to reduce the number of jobs. But it lowered the cost of cars so much that all of the sudden the ordinary person was able to buy them. That created a lot more demand for workers. And if you think about, why were people buying cars as opposed to just using horses? It's a time thing. The thing that's in most scarcity for households is time, because they can't create more of it. Anything that saves people time, they're going to be willing to pay a lot for. In that one case, this was the automobile creating jobs. In this case, it's less shopping time creating jobs in e-commerce fulfillment and delivery.
If you've never been in one of those fulfillment centers, there was a wonderful movie Nomadland that starred Frances McDorman, and she would work during the busy season at an Amazon fulfillment center. It did not seem like a miserable job, but it seemed like a busy job.
It's a busy job. I think about these as the equivalent of manufacturing jobs for the technological age. They're mixed physical-cognitive jobs, just the way that assembly line jobs were mixed. They actually required some skill, and at the same time they required manual labor. They pay about the same as entry-level manufacturing jobs. In many areas of the country they are in fact becoming the substitute entry-level job that manufacturing once was. If you look at the data for occupational health, they're kind of where they should be. They're physical jobs, you can't deny that. Which actually kind of gives a lot of people problems because they think, “Well, what is an ideal job? Is an ideal job an office job?” It turns out for a lot of people, it’s not. It’s something that involves some measure of physical labor, too. Let me give you a number here: Since July 2019, the tech/broadband/e-commerce sector has produced about 1.3 million jobs out of a total of 2.2 million for the economy as a whole. And that's pretty amazing. That's more than a majority and much more than healthcare and social assistance, which should be your next question: What's going to happen to healthcare jobs with automation?
What's going to happen to healthcare jobs?
If you think about the shift to telehealth during the pandemic, people are realizing that there are less expensive ways of doing what they were doing before. Better ways of communication. One of the biggest phenomena I think we're going to see going forward is that the long healthcare job boom may be over. We may actually end up with a surplus of healthcare workers. Rather than retraining manufacturing workers to go into healthcare, we may be retraining healthcare workers to go into technology.
Job-replacing tech vs. job-creating tech
On that issue, I know there's been some research by Daron Acemoğlu about how technology is affecting the modern job market. Are we producing the kind of innovation and automation that replaces jobs? Are we producing the kind that creates new things for people to do? Are we creating the kind that helps people do their jobs better?
I think there's some concern that we've produced too much of the job replacing rather than the job creating/enabling.
We're going to have both types. We haven't actually had any of the job replacing yet—at least not in the measure that people were worried about. Remember, we were worried about all the losses of jobs for truck drivers from autonomous trucks. Instead, we have shortages of truck drivers.
I was told there'd be riots.
If you look back historically, you see that some technologies generate jobs and some technologies replace jobs. I think what we've seen, which we hadn't seen before in the e-commerce sphere, is we know this is a case where we've created new jobs. If you actually add together e-commerce jobs and the brick-and-mortar retail jobs, what you see is that there has been a 650,000 job increase since the beginning of the pandemic in the combined retail/e-commerce sector. There's a net job increase from technology here. And there's a wage increase because the e-commerce jobs pay about 30 percent more than brick-and-mortar retail.
And they are more diverse, which is really interesting. Diverse racially and diverse ethnically. People usually think of retailing being poor people of color. But in fact, you look see that there's a lot of discrimination in brick-and-mortar retail. I think, in the end, the retail sector broadly extended, including e-commerce, is going to be a net job gainer from technology. The real interesting question is going to be, what's happening to manufacturing? I'm watching this very closely. Of course, we've lost a lot of manufacturing jobs.
We still make a lot of things, though.
We make a lot of things, but the non-high tech manufacturing capacity peaked in 2000 and has been coming down since then. The actual size, however you want to measure the manufacturing sector in the US, has actually been shrinking. What we need to be able to do is adopt more advanced manufacturing techniques, more automation, more digitization: drive down the cost of making goods, drive it down in a way that starts increasing the ability of people to buy them, increasing the capacity, and increasing the jobs associated with them. This kind of goes to your question about, is it job replacing or job creating? What happened was that people got scared. We’ve been replacing manufacturing jobs with technology up to now, but there's nothing that says that has to keep going that way.
I actually think that's really a crucial question for the US economy going forward: Are we going to actually invest in manufacturing digitization, not just on large scale but on a small scale as well, on entrepreneurs? One of the things that I watch really closely is this new census data on business formations. You don't see the business formation growth. You see a lot of business formation growth across the economy, but not manufacturing yet. That's going to be a crucial turning point for the economy.
Encouraging the digitization of US manufacturing
How do we make that happen, that will have manufacturing here in the US using the latest technology, robotics or what have you?
One of the things we have to realize is that our small businesses are still cash poor and credit poor. And they also don't have access to the latest technology. The way that I think about this is if you go back to the auto industry and auto dealer franchises, which created a lot of wealth on the local level. We have to think about manufacturing franchises on the local level where the technology is prepackaged, where people start small businesses and do a lot of creation and production on the local level, in a lot of different places. There may be some signs that could be happening; there may be some signs that it isn't. But this would be one of the big turning points for the US economy in terms of moving towards a really strong, sustainable future.
You're not just talking about big companies with big factories, you're talking about far smaller companies able to use the latest technology: an off-the-shelf robot or something who could do things. Is the technology almost there? Is there a role for government? Do we just need the technology to keep progressing? What's the key?
We need the technology to keep progressing, but it's almost there. The real question is financing for small entrepreneurs and exposure to the technology.
They're just unaware that this is out there?
They're just unaware. They have to be able to experiment with it. Right now the small manufacturers are scared.
Who is a small manufacturer? What do small manufacturers manufacture in this country?
There are far more small job shops out there than you might think, and there’s potential for far more than you might think to grow up. For example, suppose you had an old appliance that was missing a part. In theory, there's no problem producing that part with 3D manufacturing or some other technology, if you had the plans for it. And if you had that set up. What you have right now is manufacturing networks so you could contact a manufacturing network company and give them your plan and they would find a job shop around the country that could do that. You could set up a manufacturing operation tomorrow. A lot of this is not difficult. There are some areas that are more difficult. The art of automating a lot of apparel manufacture is still not all there. It's getting there, too. You've got apparel manufacturing, small tools, small objects. You should be able to have the ability to make customized furniture much cheaper than you do. You go through the different lists of things. It becomes harder the more complicated that things get, but things that are really simple should be able to be manufactured with these new technologies in ways that are less costly and more customized.
America’s tech firms: investment heroes
Every year, you folks at PPI put out an Investment Heroes report showing who are the companies really investing. A lot of very well-known tech companies. Not just tech companies on that list, but there are a lot of tech companies. If technology companies are creating a lot of jobs, if they're investing a lot, why do they seem to be so wildly unpopular here in Washington?
Let's actually say some more of the good things they do as well. They also pay their workers well. They did not participate in the inflationary surge. Inflation in the digital sector was accelerated a little bit, but much less than the rest of the economy, which is what you would expect if you had high productivity growth. I think that when push comes to shove, people just don’t like “big.” Big worries them. If you compare these companies to the big manufacturing companies in the past, if you compare them size-wise to the global economy, they're about the same size, relatively speaking. They're not out of scale. But what happens is that there's a regulatory push. And that's only natural.
When you're regulating, you want to avoid throwing out the baby with the bath water. As you know, at PPI we believe in light-touch regulation. We think that regulation is an important part of a market economy, but you really want to make sure you don't go overboard with it. In this case, I think about regulating large tech companies as the big bear theory: If you're sleeping in a bed with a big bear and it rolls over, it's going to crush you, whether it wants to or not. So you have to distract the big bear with a stick every once in a while to keep it alert and say, “No, don't roll over.”
What is true if you look historically at the way productivity growth spreads, productivity growth doesn't spread from technology moving from big companies to small companies, or from highly productive companies to less productive companies. It comes because the highly productive companies expand their share of the market. They are good at doing productivity and they expand. That's kind of where we are in this process. The highly productive companies look around and they see other areas of the economy that they think they know how to fix. They see a market opportunity and historically that's what usually happens. What we're seeing now from my perspective, as long as it doesn't go overboard… which some of the bills in Congress did. Some of the bills in Congress made no sense whatsoever. You want to have a kind of push and pull, which is that these companies are highly productive, great for workers, great for consumers, great for suppliers. And so you want to see them expand and you want to see them take cognizance of some of the side effects of what they're doing.
Thanks for listening to part one of my two-part interview with Michael Mandel. Next time, we'll discuss US productivity growth, industrial policy, and more.
When does economic policy become industrial policy, and has the Biden administration crossed that line? In this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I'm talking with industrial policy skeptic Scott Lincicome about the CHIPS and Science Act, how competition with China complicates the argument for free markets, and more.
Scott is the director of general economics and the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. He is the author of numerous reports on industrial policy and international free trade, including "The (Updated) Case for Free Trade" with Alfredo Carrillo Obregon and “Questioning Industrial Policy” with Huan Zhu. He’s also the author of Capitolism, a Dispatch newsletter.
In This Episode:
* Is Bidenomics really about boosting productivity? (1:19)
* We’re all industrial policy enthusiasts now (3:37)
* The climate change exception (9:34)
* Thinking about China (17:29)
* Can the US play the semiconductor game and win? (21:35)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
Is Bidenomics really about boosting productivity?
James Pethokoukis: The Biden administration has been doing quite a bit: this infrastructure bill, we've had a chips and R&D bill, now we have the Inflation Reduction Act. The president has said that one thing he's trying to do is boost the productive capacity of the economy. Do you view that as the main thrust of these bills?
Scott Lincicome: No. I think it's actually much more about picking and choosing specific sectors. You can maybe argue for infrastructure: to the extent that roads and bridges are going to actually lead to the expansion of the national productive capacity, okay. But particularly with semiconductors and the IRA, this is just classic industrial policy. “The market has failed. We don't like the sectoral composition of the United States economy. In particular, we are not making enough semiconductors. We are not making enough solar panels and wind turbines and electric vehicles, and government needs to get involved. We need to not only encourage the consumption of these goods, but we need to actually forcibly, or through a lot of subsidies and sweeteners, incentivize onshoring of these critical industries.”
I know that there are some attenuated ideas that this will then boost the overall productive capacity after several years. This is the whole idea that the Inflation Reduction Act will actually reduce inflation by spending all this money. But let's be clear: the immediate effects, the ones that don't require stretching the economic imagination beyond all recognizable length, are about a sectoral composition. It's about changing the shape of the US economy.
We’re all industrial policy enthusiasts now
A more market-oriented approach would focus on things like creating a favorable tax code that's neutral to sectoral composition and funding basic research. But with industrial policy, you care about sectoral composition. You care about what the economy looks like, rather than just GDP growth. Is America now doing full-throated industrial policy?
No, but we definitely have pushed the envelope. That actually gets to one of the big myths that is pushed by industrial policy advocates here in the United States: this idea that we lived through this grand or terrible — depending on your viewpoint — era of free market fundamentalism in which Milton Friedman got a hold of the economy and ran it like a textbook. That's absolute nonsense. We have experimented with industrial policy for ages, going back to the ‘60s, the ‘70s, then into the ‘80s. We really liked it in the ‘80s and ‘90s. We backed off a little bit in the ‘90s and 2000s but still had tons of industrial policy initiatives to encourage certain types of manufacturing, certain types of jobs, to protect certain sectors. And some of this was new; some of it was longstanding stuff like the Jones Act. So the idea that we weren't engaging in industrial policy is pretty silly.
But we certainly have pushed the accelerator down a little bit in the last few months, starting with the infrastructure bill which has local content provisions: “Buy American” this, “Use these American workers,” “Produce these types of charging stations,” that kind of stuff. Specific things, not just infrastructure as we normally consider it. But then really ramping up with the CHIPS Act, which certainly has some basic research stuff in it. But throws $80 billion — potentially more, depending on how these tax credits shake out — to domestic semiconductor manufacturers to actually put more fabs in the United States
It's a subsidy to build these plants in the United States.
Correct, and with several strings attached even further. But the idea, generally, is (so the argument goes) the United States has experienced a dramatic collapse in semiconductor productive capacity over the last 30 years — thanks, again, to the Milton Friedmanites, us at Cato, we libertarians always run Washington so it's all our fault. And we need to tilt the scales. We need to do industrial policy like the Koreans and the Taiwanese and the Chinese are doing, and we need to get more fabs, semiconductor manufacturing facilities, here in the United States. That’s the idea. And then the IRA basically turned the knob to 11. The IRA went and did very much the same thing with tens of billions of extra dollars — hundreds of billions, really — looking into renewable energy: all sorts of programs, advanced manufacturing, tax credits, grants, you name it. Again, this is not new. Most of the stuff that the IRA did was expand Obama-era programs that went on during the 2009 stimulus bill, essentially revitalizing some of these programs, for example at the Department of Energy, that had been in place for more than a decade.
Industrial policy can refer to a lot of things: protecting industries from foreign trade, cutting checks to businesses or sectors deemed "important," or offering strategic tax breaks and the like. Is what we're doing now closer to classic industrial policy?
This is classic industrial policy. And in a sense, I'm relieved. Because for the last two years, before the CHIPS bill and the IRA and a little bit on infrastructure, we had this very painful debate that we wonks have to have about definitions. If you listen to some industrial policy advocates out there, like Mariana Mazzucato, the Italian economist who's all the rage in Europe with industrial policy, to them — and there are some folks here in the United States who do this too — industrial policy is anything and everything. WTO reform was industrial policy, basic research gets thrown in, military spending … You get these ridiculous statements like, “Everything that goes into an iPhone was the result of government industrial policy.” That's a lot of nonsense. There’s plenty of free-market, market-oriented, libertarian, whatever you want to call it, stuff that just does not meet the traditional definition of industrial policy, meaning targeted and directed government action — tariffs, subsidies, whatever — to achieve a specific microeconomic advantage over what the market could produce within national borders. And always pursuant to some strategic plan. This is not the NIH just giving out some grants. No, you have a big plan, a strategic plan, and you're going to go out and determine winners and losers. That is very much what we're doing in the CHIPS Act and the IRA. It's nice in the sense that we're getting back to a discussion of traditional industrial policy.
The climate change exception
Certainly some would argue, even if they're generally skeptical of industrial policy, they would say, “Well, sometimes we have to do it. Maybe for defense-related reasons we need to do it. Maybe there's some other emergency. People think climate change is that kind of thing: We can't wait for the market to figure it out. It’s a pressing emergency, as much as a geopolitical conflict would be. It's that kind of thing. Therefore, we must act.
Even zany libertarians like me acknowledge a national defense exception to all of this stuff. There's actually a lot of literature I've written about, about how national defense is quite different from socially related industrial policy. And for those reasons, and for very legitimate national security reasons, you tend to push defense-related stuff over the side. Even I am not going to say we should be outsourcing our nuclear weapons technologies to China. That kind of stuff is obvious. Just as importantly, or almost as importantly, there are pretty huge differences between defense procurement and commercial industrial policy. One is, there's no other buyer for defense-related stuff. The market is the government's market. That makes the government uniquely positioned and attuned as the consumer to care about how it's spending its money, to actually have sophisticated, detailed information about the sector. The government knows a lot more about tanks than basically anybody else, because the government is in the tank consumption business. Finally, the public tends to give the government a lot more of benefit of the doubt about failures, about dollar figures and the rest. It's kind of the government's unique, constitutional responsibility. National defense works.
Climate change, though, I think is a problem. Because climate change is very much a consumption issue as much as it is a production issue. And it's very little of a domestic production issue. Of course we care about coal-fired electricity plants and the rest. But at the end of the day, all we really care is that we want to increase domestic consumption of renewable energy. With respect to all of these products, there's no need that solar panels be made in America. Quite frankly, there's a very strong argument that by raising the prices of our renewable energy goods — by slapping tariffs on them, by localization mandates like Buy American policies — we're actually raising the prices of these goods and then discouraging consumption of renewable energy. So there's a really tough tension between classic economic nationalist industrial policy and environmental goals. You don't have to take it from me. A big initiative of the Obama administration was to liberalize trade in environmental goods. The Obama administration quite rightly observed that production of these things is not nearly as important as consumption of these things. And what helps maximize consumption? Free trade. That deal never got finished. It's been shelved because, of course, everybody hates trade these days. But I think that it's a lot tougher argument on the climate change side that we need industrial policy, because it just doesn't have the same dynamic as something like national defense.
Let me frame it somewhat differently. What if the policy was, “Here’s how we’re going to deal with climate change: We need to pull carbon from the air”? Carbon removal technology is something that doesn't really exist right now, other than in some very experimental forms. “We're going to fund it, just like Apollo, just like the Manhattan project.” Would you favor something like that, assuming you thought there was the actual need to pull carbon from the sky?
This is a great example of where you have the industrial policy approach and the more market-oriented approach. The industrial policy approach is that we need that carbon capture technology to be made by Americans in America. And not just deployed by Americans; we need it made in America. Whereas the more free-market approach would be a prize: We don't care how it's made. We don't care who makes it, with a few security-related exceptions. If tomorrow the Korean government or Samsung or whatever comes up with the most amazing carbon capture technology in the world — it's like Mr. Fusion from Back to the Future, you just slap it on a power plant and suddenly we're zero emitters — you win the prize. We don't care that it was made by a Korean company. We don't care that they are going to be Korean jobs and not American jobs. No, the industrial policy side says, “We care a lot about who makes this stuff and that it's made in America, using American materials.” The pandemic, for all of its terribleness, provided us a pretty good example of the industrial policy approach to pandemic stuff and the market approach. And that's in the vaccines. The more free-market approach, essentially a prize but a procurement contract, was we went to Pfizer and BioNTech, and if you look at the contract for those vaccines, it said we have nothing to do with your supply chain. “We don't care how you do it. We don't care what you do. Just get an FDA-approved vaccine and we are all in, we're going to pay.” That's it. There are clauses in that contract that literally say we will have no control over how you make this whatever. A ton of global collaboration, of course. BioNTech is a German company, blah, blah, blah.
Totally different approach: There's another company in Maryland called Emergent BioSolutions. Emergent BioSolutions is a heavily government-connected contract manufacturer that has been essentially put here for pandemic preparedness. Lots of government involvement over the years. Emergent was the kind of all-American government contractor model. It is very much similar to a lot of the stuff we hear today about what we need, not just for pandemics, but for other stuff as well: We need to put this factory in America; we need to put it right outside of Washington. Well, Emergent hasn't made a handful of finished doses, and in fact has had a ton of problems with sanitation issues. They've had to destroy a bunch of doses. It's a nice contrast between a more market-oriented approach and a very domestic-oriented approach, one being much more industrial policy than the other. We can argue on the margins about how we funded mRNA research back in the day… But look, comparatively, there are two very different approaches to economic policymaking.
Thinking about China
It was kind of easy to defend free markets during the Cold War, but have things become more complicated with China given the interdependence of our economies? How easy is it for you to maintain your pro-market views on industrial policy questions with China?
China certainly makes it a little bit harder, and the nature of technology makes it a little bit harder. But we have existing laws and processes for a lot of that. You used a word there that sets off my libertarian Spidey senses. You said “important.” The issue there is, who decides what's important? The idea is not that we allow mass proliferation of dual-use technologies, we rely on China for weapons systems or critical inputs to weapon systems. But it's also that we have to have a lot of skepticism about what is and isn't important. I have very little problem allowing the Office of Foreign Assets Control and all the guys that commerce and whatever to apply the export control regime. We have US laws that require the Department of Defense to look at defense procurement and look at weak links in the chain. In fact, the Defense Production Act, before it was used to make baby formula, used to be used correctly. DOD used to look at its defense supply chain and say, “We don't have a stable producer of widgets that are important for our weapon systems. We need to subsidize that. We're going to give them $20 million.” You know what? No problem.
The problem is that now the word “important” has become so distorted from its original meaning that steel rebar is being restricted on national security grounds. Not to mention all of the other areas. Certainly there is a need to consider China, to consider the natures of technologies and all that. But we've gone way, way beyond what is in any way a rational policy. And you have to be very concerned about politics. One of the little-known secrets about the global chip shortage is how American export control policy contributed to the global chip shortage. The Trump administration started restricting pretty basic semiconductor technologies to China and Huawei and the rest. That reduced the global supply of bulk semiconductors. I'm not talking about the fancy three nanometer or whatever stuff. I’m talking about the junky stuff that we put 100 of them in a car for not a great reason, but we do. Not only did that reduce global capacity, but it also caused all these Chinese companies to start hoarding chips because they were scared to death of being cut off from these chip supplies.
Believe it or not, China remains very dependent on the United States for a lot of semiconductor stuff. That, of course, made things worse. The Biden administration quietly rolled some of that back in response to shortages. But that's the type of stuff we need to be really worried about. We also need to be concerned about, if we restrict these exports, is that just going to harm American tech champions like Qualcomm or whatever while bolstering French competitors, European competitors, Korean competitors, that are still going to sell to China anyway? There needs to be a very rational, skeptical approach to all this stuff. You can't just scream “China!” and then suddenly protect, subsidize, and do the rest. Of course, there are going to be exceptions. The goal is to get back to a saner approach to those exceptions.
Can the US play the semiconductor game and win?
How do you see this experiment with semiconductor subsidies playing out? When we look back at it in 10 years, will we say, “We learned that we can do that; we learned the United States can play that game and win,” or are we going to say, “It didn't really quite work out the way we'd hoped”?
It's always hard, because any time there's a new industrial policy announcement, you're going to get companies that are beneficiaries making all these investment announcements. The goal and the hard part is then tracking and determining whether those announcements were made because of the subsidy or whether they were already going to do it and they're just trying to get government cash or curry favor with the administration and the rest.
The other problem is determining what would've happened in the absence of the program. One of the things I was yelling about before the CHIPS Act was implemented was that semiconductor companies and big consumers, like Apple and Ford and GM, had realized years ago that they needed to rebalance a little bit. That, because of the pandemic, geopolitical stuff, and just other reasons, they were a little top heavy in Taiwan or in Asia. They started planning to invest back in the United States. Apple was saying, “We're willing to pay more to have Samsung right next to our big facility in Austin,” for example. All these investments were already planned before the CHIPS Act ever became a thing. Of course, the government is going to take credit for all of this. “We did all of this. Feast upon our works.” That's a challenge. I'm pretty confident, quite frankly, that they're going to run into a lot of problems. One problem is, like I said, they've attached strings to this stuff. There are prevailing wage requirements and other rules and regulations about favoring disadvantaged communities and all the usual stuff. These things always tend to gum up the works a little bit.
The other big issue is that we run into preexisting policies that didn't fix: immigration bottlenecks, other labor supply problems. There was a big story in the AP last week that Intel in Ohio can't find construction workers. That's because we didn't liberalize immigration along with all this industrial policy money we just threw at the economy. We have, of course, plenty of tariffs on stuff that you need to build factories. We have tax policy with respect to expensing that discourages long-term investments in capital-intensive manufacturing. I can go down the list. We didn't fix any of that. At the end of the day, will we move the needle a little bit? Maybe. Government is very powerful; we're throwing a lot of money at this. But will there be a great global rebalancing? Color me quite skeptical.
The other thing we have to consider are the risks. If we are successful and there is suddenly a glut in global semiconductors — reading the news right now, the semiconductor industry is actually kind of in some trouble globally right now. Gluts are popping up, people stockpiled, like I mentioned. And now they realize that actually Americans' consumption or the world’s consumption of chips isn't insatiable. There are concerns there. If we have a chips-related glut, because the United States and Europe and Korea and others all threw subsidies at this, what are we going to do with all those extra chips? If you look back at the ‘80s and ‘90s, we had trade wars. We slapped tariffs on Japanese semiconductors and then Korean semiconductors, which caused all sorts of ripple effects throughout the US economy. It pushed the computer industry offshore, for example. Being a libertarian ideologue, but also a student of history and industrial policy, I remain pretty confident that we're going to look back on this and go: “Eh, that was not the greatest idea.”
In this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I'm continuing last week's discussion with Robin Hanson, professor of economics at George Mason University and author of the Overcoming Bias blog. His books include The Age of Em: Work, Love and Life when Robots Rule the Earth and The Elephant in the Brain: Hidden Motives in Everyday Life.
(Be sure to check out last week’s episode for the first part of my conversation with Robin. We discussed futurism, innovation, and economic growth over the very long run, among other topics. Definitely worth the listen!)
In part two, Robin and I talk about the possibility of extraterrestrial life. Earlier this year, the US House of Representatives held a hearing on what Washington now calls "unexplained aerial phenomena." While the hearing didn't unveil high-def, close-up footage of little green men or flying saucers, it did signal that Washington is taking UAPs more seriously. But what if we really are being visited by extraterrestrials? What would contact with an advanced alien civilization mean for humanity? It's exactly the kind of out-there question Robin considers seriously and then applies rigorous, economic thinking.
In This Episode:
* The case for extraterrestrial life (1:34)
* A model to explain UFOs (6:49)
* Could aliens be domesticating us right now? (13:23)
* Would advanced alien civilization renew our interest in progress? (17:01)
* Is America on the verge of a pro-progress renaissance? (18:49)
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
The case for extraterrestrial life
James Pethokoukis: In the past few years there have been a lot of interesting developments on the UFO — now UAP — front. The government seems to be taking these sightings far more seriously. Navy pilots are testifying. What is your take on all this?
Robin Hanson: There are two very different discussions and topics here. One topic is, “There are these weird sightings. What's with that? And could those be aliens?” Another more standard, conservative topic is just, “Here's this vast empty universe. Are there aliens out there? If so, where?” So that second topic is where I've recently done some work and where I feel most authoritative, although I'm happy to also talk about the other subject as well. But I think we should talk first about the more conservative subject.
The more conservative subject, I think, is — and I probably have this maybe 50 percent correct — once civilizations progress far enough, they expand. When they expand, they change things. If there were a lot of these civilizations out there, we should be able to, at this point, detect the changes they've made. Either we've come so early that there aren't a lot of these kinds of civilizations out there … let me stop there and then you can begin to correct me.
The key question is: it looks like we soon could go out expanding and we don't see limits to how far we could go. We could fill the universe. Yet, we look out and it's an empty universe. So there seems to be a conflict there.
Where are the giant Dyson spheres?
One explanation is, we are so rare that in the entire observable universe, we're the only ones. And therefore, that's why there's nobody else out there. That's not a crazy position, except for the fact that we're early. The median star will last five trillion years. We're here on our star after only five billion years, a factor of 1000. Our standard best theory of when advanced life like us should appear, if the universe would stay empty and wait for it, would be near the end of a long-lived planet. That's when it would be most likely to appear.
There's this power of the number of hard steps, which we could go into, but basically, the chance of appearing should go as the power of this time. If there are, say, six hard steps, which is a middle estimate, then the chance of appearing 1000 times later would go as 1000 to the power of six. Which would be 10 to the 18th. We are just crazy early with respect to that analysis. There is a key assumption of the analysis, which is the universe would sit and wait empty until we showed up. The simplest way to resolve this is to deny that assumption is to say, “The universe is not sitting and waiting empty. In fact, it's filling up right now. And in a billion years or two, it'll be all full. And we had to show up before that deadline.” And then you might say, “If the universe is filling up right now, if right now the universe is half full of aliens, why don't we see any?”
We should be detecting signals, seeing things. We have this brand new telescope out there sitting a million miles away.
If we were sitting at a random place in the universe, that would be true. But we are the subject of a selection effect. Here's the key story: We have to be at a place where the aliens haven't gotten to yet. Because otherwise, they would be here instead of us. That's the key problem. If aliens expand at almost the speed of light, then you won’t see them until they’re almost here. And that means if you look backwards in our light cone — from our point, all the way backwards — almost all that light cone is excluded. Aliens couldn’t be there because, again, if they had arisen there, they would be here now instead of us. The only places aliens could appear that we could see now would have to be just at the edge of that cone.
Therefore, the key explanation is aliens are out there, but everywhere the aliens are not, we can't see them because the aliens are moving so fast we don't see them until they're almost there. So the day on the clock is the thing telling you aliens are out there right now. That might seem counterintuitive. “How's the clock supposed to tell me about aliens? Shouldn't I see pictures of weird guys with antennae?” Something, right? I'm saying, “No, it's the clock. The clock is telling you that they're out there.” Because the clock is saying you're crazy early, and the best explanation for why you're crazy early is that they're out there right now.
But if we take a simple model of, they’re arising in random places and random times, and we fit it to three key datums we know, we can actually get estimates for this basic model of aliens out there. It has the following key parameter estimates: They're expanding at, say, half the speed of light or faster; they appear roughly once per million galaxies, so pretty rare; and if we expanded out soon and meet them, we'd meet them in a billion years or so. The observable universe has a trillion galaxies in it. So once per million galaxies means there are a lot of them that will appear in our observable universe. But it's not like a few stars over. This is really rare. Once per million galaxies. We're not going to meet them soon. Again, in a billion years. So there's a long time to wait here.
A model to explain UFOs
Based on this answer, I don't think your answer to my first question is “We are making contact with alien intelligence.”
This simple model predicts strongly that there's just no way that UFOs are aliens. If this were the only possible model, that would be my answer. But I have to pause and ask, “Can I change the model to make it more plausible?” I tried to do this exercise; I tried to say, “How could I most plausibly make a set of assumptions that would have as their implication UFOs are aliens and they’re really here?”
Is this a different model or are you just changing something key in that model?
I’m going to change some things in this model, I'll have to change several things. I'm going to make some assumptions so that I get the implication that some UFOs are aliens and they're doing the weird things we see. And the key question is going to be, “How many assumptions do you have to make, and how unlikely are they?” This is the argument about the prior on this theory. Think of a murder trial. In a murder trial, somebody says A killed B. You know that the prior probability of that is like one in a million: One in 1000 people are killed in a murder and they each know 1000 people. The idea that any one of those people killed them would be one in a million. So you might say, “Let's just dismiss this murder trial, because the prior is so low.” But we don't do that. Why? Because it's actually possible in a typical murder trial to get concrete, physical evidence that overcomes a one-in-a-million prior. So the analogy for UFOs would be, people say they see weird stuff. They say you should maybe think that's aliens. The first question you have to ask is, how a priori unlikely is that? If it was one in 10 to the 20 unlikely, you'd say, “There's nothing you could tell me to make me believe this. I'm just not going to look, because it's just so crazy.”
There are a lot of pretty crazy explanations that aren't as crazy as that.
Exactly. But my guess is the prior is roughly one in a thousand. And with a one-in-thousand prior, you’ve got to look at the evidence. You don't just draw the conclusion on one in a thousand, because that's still low. But you’ve got to be willing to look at the evidence if it’s one in a thousand. That’s where I’d say we are.
Then the question is, how do I get one in a thousand [odds]? I'm going to try to generate a scenario that is as plausible as possible and consistent with the key datums we have about UFOs. Here are the key datums. One is, the universe looks empty. Two is, they're here now. Three is, they didn't kill us. We’re still alive. And four is, they didn’t do the two obvious things they could do. They could have come right out and been really obvious and just slapped us on the face and said, “Here we are.” That would’ve been easy. Or they could have been completely invisible. And they didn’t do either of those. What they do is hang out at the edge of visibility. What’s with that? Why do that weird intermediate thing? We have to come up with a hypothesis that explains these things, because those are the things that are weird here.
The first thing I need to do is correlate aliens and us in space-time. Because if it was once randomly per million galaxies, that doesn’t work. The way to do that is panspermia. Panspermia siblings, in fact. That is, Earth life didn't start on Earth. It started somewhere else. And that somewhere else seeded our stellar nursery. Our star was born with a thousand other stars, all in one place at the same time, with lots of rocks flying back and forth. If life was seeded in that stellar nursery, it would've seeded not just our Earth, but seeded life on many of those other thousand stars. And then they would've drifted apart over the last four billion years. And now they're in a ring around the galaxy. The scenario would be one of those other planets developed advanced life before us.
The way we get it is we assume panspermia happened. We assume there are siblings, and that one of them came to our level before us. If that happened, the average time duration would be maybe 100 million years. It wouldn't have happened in the last thousand years or even million years. It would be a long time. Given this, we have to say, “Okay, they reached our level of advancement a hundred million years ago. And they're in the same galaxy as us; they're not too far away. We know that they could find us. We can all find the rest of the stellar siblings by just the spectra. We all were in the same gas with the same mixture of chemicals. We just find the same mixture of chemicals, and we’ve found the siblings. They could look out and find our siblings.
We have this next piece of data: The universe is empty. The galaxy is empty. They've been around for 100 million years, if they wanted to take over the galaxy, they could have. Easy, in 100 million years. But they didn't. To explain that, I think we have to postulate that they have some rule against expansion. They decided that they did not want to lose their community and central governance and allow their descendants to change and be strange and compete with them. They chose to keep their civilization local and, therefore, to ban or prohibit, effectively, any colonists from leaving. And we have to assume not only that was their plan, they succeeded … for 100 million years. That's really hard.
They didn't allow their generation ships to come floating through our solar system.
No, they did not allow any substantial colonization away from their home world for a hundred million years. That's quite a capability. They may have stagnated in many ways, but they have maintained order in this thing. Then they realize that they have siblings. They look out and they can see them. And now they have to realize we are at risk of breaking the rule. If they just let us evolve without any constraints, then we might well expand out. Their rule they maintain for a hundred million years to try to maintain their precious coherence, it would be for naught. Because we would violate it. We would become the competitors they didn't want.
That creates an obvious motive for them to be here. A motive to allow an exception. Again, they haven't allowed pretty much any expansion. But they're going to travel thousands of light-years from there to here to allow an expedition here, which risks their rule. If this expedition goes rogue, the whole game is over. So we are important enough that they're going to allow this expedition here to come here to try to convince us not to break the rule. But not just to kill us, because they could have just killed us. Clearly, they feel enough of an affiliation or a sibling connection of some sort that they didn't just kill us. They want us to follow their rule, and that's why they're here. So that all makes sense.
Could aliens be sort of “domesticating” us right now?
But then we still have the last part to explain. How, exactly, do they expect to convince us? And how does hanging out at the edge of our visibility do that? You have to realize whoever from home sent out this expedition, they didn't trust this expedition very much. They had to keep them pretty constrained. So they had to prove some strategy early on that they thought would be pretty robust, that could plausibly work, that isn't going to allow these travelers to have much freedom to go break their rules. Very simple, clean strategy. What's that strategy? The idea is, pretty much all social animals we know have a status hierarchy. The way we humans domesticate other animals is … what we usually do is swap in and sit at the top of their status hierarchy. We are the top dog, the top horse, whatever it is. That's how we do it. That's a very robust way that animals have domesticated other animals. So that's their plan. They're going to be at the top of the status hierarchy. How do they do that? They just show up and be the most impressive. They just fly around and say, “Look at me. I’m better.”
You don’t need to land on the National Mall. You just need to go 20 times faster than our fastest jet. That says something right there.
Once we're convinced they exist, we're damn impressed. In order to be at the top of our status hierarchy, they need to be impressive. But they also need to be here and relatively peaceful. If they were doing it from light-years away, then we'd be scared and threatened. They need to be here at the top of our status hierarchy, being very impressive. Now it would be very impressive, of course, if they landed on the White House lawn and started talking to us, too. But that's going to risk us not liking something. As you know, we humans have often disliked other humans for pretty minor things: just because they don't eat the kind of foods we do or marry the way we do or things like that.
If they landed on the White House lawn, someone would say, “We need to plan for an invasion.”
The risk is that if they told if they showed up and they told a lot about them, they gave us their whole history and videos of their home world and everything else, we're going to find something we hate. We might like nine things out of 10. But that one thing we hate, we're going to hate a lot. And unfortunately, humans are not very forgiving of that, right? Or most creatures. This is their fear scenario. If they showed too much, then game over. We're not going to defer to them as the top of our status hierarchy, because they're just going to be these weird aliens. They need to be here, but not show very much to us. The main thing they need to show is how impressive they are and that they're peaceful. And their agenda — but we can figure out the agenda. Just right now, we can see why they're here: because the universe is empty, so they didn't fill it; they must have a rule against that, and we'd be violating the rule. Ta-da. They can be patient. They’re in no particular rush. They can wait for us to figure out what we believe or not. Because they just have to hang around and be there until we decide we believe it. And then everything else follows from that.
As you were describing that, it reminded me of the television show, The Young Pope. We have a young Pope, and he starts off by not appearing because he thinks part of his power comes from an air of mystery and this mystique. In a way, what you're saying is that’s what these aliens would be doing.
Think of an ancient emperor. The ancient emperor was pretty weird. Typically, an emperor came from a whole different place and was a different ethnicity or something from the local people. How does an emperor in the ancient world get the local people to obey them? They don't show them a lot of personal details, of course. They just have a really impressive palace and impressive parades and an army. And then everybody goes, “I guess they're the top dog.” Right. And that's worked consistently through history.
I like “top dog” better than apex predator, by the way.
Would advanced alien civilization renew our interest in progress?
I wrote about this, and the scenario I came up with is kind of what you just described: We know they're here, and we know they have advanced technology. But that’s it. We don't meet them. I would like to think that we would find it really aspirational. That we would think, “Wow. We are nowhere near the end. We haven't figured it all out. We haven't solved all we need to know about physics or anything else.” What do you think of that idea? And what do you think would be the impact of that kind of scenario where they didn't give us their gadgets, we just know they're there and advanced. What does that do to us?
All through history, humans haven't quite dared to think that they could rule their fate. They had gods above them who were more in control. It's only in the last few centuries where we've taken on ourselves this sense that we're in charge of ourselves and we get to decide our future. If real aliens show up and they really are much more powerful, then we have to revise that back to the older stance of, “Okay, there are gods. They have opinions, and I guess we should pay attention.” But if these are gods who once were us, that's a different kind of god. And that wasn't the ancient god. That's a different kind of god that we could then aspire to. We can say “These gods were once like us. We could become like them. And look how possible it is.”
Now, of course, we will be suspicious of whether we can trust them and whether we should admire them. And that's where not saying very much will help. They just show up and they are just really powerful. They just don't tell us much. And they say, “We're going to let you guys work that out. You get the basics.” I think we would be inspired, but also deflated a bit that we aren't in charge of ourselves. If they have an agenda and it's contradicting ours, they're going to win. We lose. It's going to be pretty hard.
Is America on the verge of a pro-progress renaissance?
We've had this stagnation relative to what our expectations were in the immediate postwar decades. I would like to think I'm seeing some signs that maybe that's changing. Maybe our attitude is changing. Maybe we're getting to more of a pro-progress, progress-embracing phase of our existence. Maybe 50 years of this after 50 years of that.
There are two distinctions here that are importantly different. One is the distinction between caution and risk. The other is between fear and hope. Unfortunately, it just seems that fear and hate are just much stronger motives for most humans than hope. We've had this caution, due to fear. I think the best hope for aggression or risk is also fear or hate. That is, if we can find a reason, say, “We don't want those Russians to win the war, and therefore we're going to do more innovation.” Or those people tell us we can't do it, and therefore you can. Many people recently have entered the labor force and then been motivated by, “Those people don't think we're good enough, and we're going to show we're good enough and what we can do.”
If you're frightened enough about climate change, then at some point you'll think, “We need all of the above. If that’s nuclear, that’s fine. If it’s digging super deep into the Earth…”
If you could make strong enough fear. I fear that's just actually showing that people aren't really that afraid yet. If they were more afraid, they would be willing to go more for nuclear. But they're not actually very afraid. Back in 2003, I was part of this media scandal about the policy analysis market. Basically, we had these prediction markets that were going to make estimates about Middle Eastern geopolitical events. And people thought that was a terrible sort of thing to do. It didn't fit their ideals of how foreign policy estimates should be produced. And one of the things I concluded from that event was that they just weren't actually very scared of bad things happening in the Middle East. Because if so, they wouldn’t have minded this, if this was really going to help them make those things go better.
And we actually saw that in the pandemic. I don't think we ever got so scared in the pandemic that we did what we did in World War II. As you may know, in the beginning of World War II we were losing. We were losing badly, and we consistently were losing. And we got scared and we fired people and fired contractors and changed things until we stopped losing. And then we eventually won. We never fired anybody in the pandemic. Nobody lost their job. We never reorganized anything and said, “You guys are doing crap, and we're going to hand the job to this group.” We were never scared enough to do that. That's part of why it didn't go so well. The one thing that went well is when we said, “Let's set aside the usual rules and let you guys go for something.”
We got scared of Sputnik and 10 years later there’s an American flag on the Moon.
Right. And that was quite an impressive spurt, initially driven by fear.
Perhaps if we're scared enough of shortages or scared enough of climate change or scared enough that the Chinese are going to come up with a super weapon, then that would be a catalyst for a more dynamic, innovative America, maybe.
I'm sorry for this to be a negative sign, but I think the best you can hope for optimism is that some sort of negative emotion would drive for more openness and more risk taking.
Innovation is a fantastic free lunch, it seems like. And we don't seem to value it enough until we have to.
For each one of us, it risks these changes. And we'd rather play it safe. You might know about development in the US. We have far too little housing in the US. The main reason we have far too little housing is we've empowered a lot of local individual critics to complain about various proposals. They basically pick just all sorts of little tiny things that could go wrong. And they say, “You have to fix this and fix that.” And that's what takes years. And that's why we don't have enough housing and building, because we empower those sorts of very safety-oriented, tiny, “if any little things go wrong, then you’ve got to deal with it” sort of thinking. We have to be scared enough of something else. Otherwise those fears dominate.
Few economists think more creatively and also more rigorously about the future than Robin Hanson, my guest on this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast. So when he says a future of radical scientific and economic progress is still possible, you should take the claim seriously. Robin is a professor of economics at George Mason University and author of the Overcoming Bias blog. His books include The Age of Em: Work, Love and Life when Robots Rule the Earth and The Elephant in the Brain: Hidden Motives in Everyday Life.
In This Episode:
* Economic growth over the very long run (1:20)
* The signs of an approaching acceleration (7:08)
* Global governance and risk aversion (12:19)
* Thinking about the future like an economist (17:32)
* The stories we tell ourselves about the future (20:57)
* Longtermism and innovation (23:20)
Next week, I’ll feature part two of my conversation with Robin, where we discuss whether we are alone in the universe and what alien life means for humanity's long-term potential.
Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
Economic growth over the very long run
James Pethokoukis: Way back in 2000, you wrote a paper called “Long-Term Growth as a Sequence of Exponential Modes.” You wrote, “If one takes seriously the model of economic growth as a series of exponential … [modes], then it seems hard to escape the conclusion that the world economy will likely see a very dramatic change within the next century, to a new economic growth mode with a doubling time perhaps as short as two weeks.” Is that still your expectation for the 21st century?
Robin Hanson: It's my expectation for the next couple of centuries. Whether it's the 21st isn’t quite so clear.
Has anything happened in the intervening two decades to make you think that something might happen sooner rather than later … or rather, just later?
Just later, I'm afraid. I mean, we have a lot of people hyping AI at the moment, right?
Sure, I may be one of them on occasion.
There are a lot of people expecting rapid progress soon. And so, I think I've had a long enough baseline there to think, "No, maybe not.” But let's go with the priors.
Is it a technological mechanism that will cause this? Is it AI? Is it that we find the right general-purpose technology, and then that will launch us into very, very rapid growth?
That would be my best guess. But just to be clear for our listeners, we just look at history, we seem to see these exponential modes. There are, say, four of them so far (if we go pre-human). And then the modes are relatively steady and then have pretty sharp transitions. That is, the transition to a growth rate of 50 or 200 times faster happens within less than a doubling time.
So what was the last mode?
We're in industry at the moment: doubles roughly every 15 years, started around 1800 or 1700. The previous mode was farming, doubled every thousand years. And so, in roughly less than a thousand years, we saw this rapid transition to our current thing, less than the doubling time. The previous mode before that was foraging, where humans doubled roughly every quarter million years. And in definitely less than a quarter million years, we saw a transition there. So then the prediction is that we will see another transition, and it will happen in less than 15 years, to a faster growth mode. And then if you look at the previous increases in growth rates, they were, again, a factor of 60 to 200. And so, that's what you'd be looking for in the next mode. Now, obviously, I want to say you're just looking at a low data set here. Four events. You can't be too confident. But, come on, you’ve got to guess that maybe a next one would happen.
If you go back to that late ‘90s period, there was a lot of optimism. If you pick up Wired magazine back then, [there was] plenty of optimism that something was happening, that we were on the verge of something. One of my favorite examples — and a sort of non-technologist example, was a report from Lehman Brothers from December 1999. It was called “Beyond 2000.” And it was full of predictions, maybe not talking about exponential growth, but how we were in for a period of very fast growth, like 1960s-style growth. It was a very bullish prediction for the next two decades. Now Lehman did not make it another decade itself. These predictions don't seem to have panned out — maybe you think I'm being overly pessimistic on what's happened over the past 20 years — but do you think it was because we didn't understand the technology that was supposedly going to drive these changes? Did we do something wrong? Or is it just a lot of people who love tech love the idea of growth, and we all just got too excited?
I think it's just a really hard problem. We're in this world. We're living with it. It's growing really fast. Again, doubling every 15 years. And we've long had this sense that it's possible for something much bigger. So automation, the possibility of robots, AI: It sat in the background for a long time. And people have been wondering, “Is that coming? And if it's coming, it looks like a really big deal.” And roughly every 30 years, I'd say, we've seen these bursts of interest in AI and public concern, like media articles, you know…
We had the ‘60s. Now we have the ‘90s…
The ‘60s, ‘90s, and now again, 2020. Every 30 years, a burst of interest and concern about something that's not crazy. Like, it might well happen. And if it was going to happen, then the kind of precursor you might expect to see is investors realizing it's about to happen and bidding up assets that were going to be important for that to really high levels. And that's what you did see around ‘99. A lot of people thought, “Well, this might be it.”
Right. The market test for the singularity seemed to be passing.
A test that is not actually being passed quite so much at the moment.
Right.
So, in some sense, you had a better story then in terms of, look, the investors seem to believe in this.
You could also look at harder economic numbers, productivity numbers, and so on.
Right. And we've had a steady increase in automation over, you know, centuries. But people keep wondering, “We're about to have a new kind of automation. And if we are, will we see that in new kinds of demos or new kinds of jobs?” And people have been looking out for these signs of, “Are we about to enter a new era?” And that's been the big issue. It's like, “Will this time be different?” And so, I’ve got to say this time, at the moment, doesn't look different. But eventually, there will be a “this time” that'll be different. And then it'll be really different. So it's not crazy to be watching out for this and maybe taking some chances betting on it.
The signs of an approaching acceleration
If we were approaching a kind of acceleration, a leap forward, what would be the signs? Would it just be kind of what we saw in the ‘90s?
So the scenario is, within a 15-year period, maybe a five-year period, we go from a current 4 percent growth rate, doubling every 15 years, to maybe doubling every month. A crazy-high doubling rate. And that would have to be on the basis of some new technology, and therefore, investment. So you'd have to see a new promising technology that a lot of people think could potentially be big. And then a lot of investment going into that, a lot of investors saying, “Yeah, there's a pretty big chance this will be it.” And not just financial investors. You would expect to see people — like college students deciding to major in that, people moving to wherever it is. That would be the big sign: investment moving toward anything. And the key thing is, you would see actual big, fast productivity increases. There'd be some companies in cities who were just booming. You were talking about stagnation recently: The ‘60s were faster than now, but that's within a factor of two. Well, we're talking about a factor of 60 to 200.
So we don't need to spend a lot of time on the data measurement issues. Like, “Is productivity up 1.7 percent, 2.1?”
If you're a greedy investor and you want to be really in on this early so you buy it cheap before everybody else, then you’ve got to be looking at those early indicators. But if you’re like the rest of us wondering, “Do I change my job? Do I change my career?” then you might as well wait and wait till you see something really big. So even at the moment, we’ve got a lot of exciting demos: DALL-E, GPT-3, things like that. But if you ask for commercial impact and ask them, “How much money are people making?” they shrug their shoulders and they say “Soon, maybe.” But that's what I would be looking for in those things. When people are generating a lot of revenue — so it’s a lot of customers making a lot of money — then that's the sort of thing to maybe consider.
Something I've written about, probably too often, is the Long Bets website. And two economists, Robert Gordon and Erik Brynjolfsson, have made a long bet. Gordon takes the role of techno-pessimist, Brynjolfsson techno-optimist. Let me just briefly read the bet in case you don't happen to have it memorized: “Private Nonfarm business productivity growth will average over 1.8 percent per year from the first quarter of 2020 to the last quarter of 2029.” Now, if it does that, that's an acceleration. Brynjolfsson says yes. Gordon says no…
But you want to pick a bigger cutoff. Productivity growth in the last decade is maybe half that, right? So they're looking at a doubling. And a doubling is news, right? But, honestly, a doubling is within the usual fluctuation. If you look over, say, the last 200 years, and we say sometimes some cities grow faster, some industries grow faster. You know, we have this steady growth rate, but it contains fluctuations. I think the key thing, as always, when you're looking for a regime change, is you're looking at — there's an average and a fluctuation — when is a new fluctuation out of the range of the previous ones? And that's when I would start to really pay attention, when it's not just the typical magnitude. So honestly, that's within the range of the typical magnitudes you might expect if we just had an unusually productive new technology, even if we stay in the same mode for another century.
When you look at the enthusiasm we had at the turn of this century, do you think we did the things that would encourage rapid growth? Did we create a better ecosystem of growth over the past 20 years or a worse one?
I don’t think the past 20 years have been especially a deviation. But I think slowly since around 1970, we have seen a decline in our support for innovation. I think increasing regulations, increasing size of organizations in response to regulation, and just a lot of barriers. And even more disturbingly, I think it’s worth noting, we’ve seen a convergence of regulation around the world. If there were 150 countries, each of which had different independent regulatory regimes, I would be less concerned. Because if one nation messes it up and doesn’t allow things, some other nation might pick up the slack. But we’ve actually seen pretty strong convergence, even in this global pandemic. So, for example, challenge trials were an idea early voiced, but no nation allowed them. Anywhere. And even now, hardly they’ve been tried. And if you look at nuclear energy, electric magnetic spectrum, organ sales, medical experimentation — just look at a lot of different regulatory areas, even airplanes — you just see an enormous convergence worldwide. And that's a problem because it means we're blocking innovation the same everywhere. And so there's just no place to go to try something new.
Global governance and risk aversion
There's always concern in Europe about their own productivity, about their technological growth. And they’re always putting out white papers in Europe about what [they] can do. And I remember reading that somebody decided that Europe's comparative advantage was in regulation. Like that was Europe’s superpower: regulation.
Yeah, sure.
And speaking of convergence, a lot of people who want to regulate the tech industry here have been looking to what Europe is doing. But Europe has not shown a lot of tech progress. They don't generate the big technology companies. So that, to me, is unsettling. Not only are we converging, but we're converging sometimes toward the least productive areas of the advanced world.
In a lot of people's minds, the key thing is the unsafe dangers that tech might provide. And they look to Europe and they say, “Look how they're providing security there. Look at all the protections they're offering against the various kinds of insecurity we could have. Surely, we want to copy them for that.”
I don't want to copy them for that. I’m willing to take a few risks.
But many people want that level of security. So I'm actually concerned about this over the coming centuries. I think this trend is actually a trend toward not just stronger global governance, but stronger global community or even mobs, if we call it that. That is the reason why nuclear energy is regulated the same everywhere: the regulators in each place are part of a world community, and they each want to be respected in that community. And in order to be respected, they need to conform to what the rest of the community thinks. And that's going to just keep happening more over the coming centuries, I fear.
One of my favorite shows, more realistic science-fiction shows and book series, is The Expanse, which takes place a couple hundred years in the future where there's a global government — which seems to be a democratic global government. I’m not sure how efficient it is. I’m not sure how entrepreneurial it is. Certainly the evidence seems to be that global governance does not lead to a vibrant, trial-and-error, experimenting kind of ecology. But just the opposite: one that focuses on safety and caution and risk aversion.
And it’s going to get a lot worse. I have a book called The Age of Em: Work, Love, and Life when Robots Rule the Earth, and it’s about very radical changes in technology. And most people who read about that, they go, “Oh, that's terrible. We need more regulations to stop that.” I think if you just look toward the longer run of changes, most people, when they start to imagine the large changes that will be possible, they want to stop that and put limits and control it somehow. And that's going to give even more of an impetus to global governance. That is, once you realize how our children might become radically different from us, then that scares people. And they really, then, want global governance to limit that.
I fear this is going to be the biggest choice humanity ever makes, which is, in the next few centuries we will probably have stronger global governance, stronger global community, and we will credit it for solving many problems, including war and global warming and inequality and things like that. We will like the sense that we've all come together and we get to decide what changes are allowed and what aren't. And we limit how strange our children can be. And even though we will have given up on some things, we will just enjoy … because that's a very ancient human sense, to want to be part of a community and decide together. And then a few centuries from now, there will come this day when it's possible for a colony ship to leave the solar system to go elsewhere. And we will know by then that if we allow that to happen, that's the end of the era of shared governance. From that point on, competition reaffirms itself, war reaffirms itself. The descendants who come out there will then compete with each other and come back here and impose their will here, probably. And that scares the hell out of people.
Indeed, that’s the point of [The Expanse]. It's kind of a mixed bag with how successful Earth’s been. They didn't kill themselves in nuclear war, at least. But the geopolitics just continues and that doesn't change. We're still human beings, even if we happen to be living on Mars or Europa. All that conflict will just reemerge.
Although, I think it gets the scale wrong there. I think as long as we stay in the solar system, a central government will be able to impose its rule on outlying colonies. The solar system is pretty transparent. Anywhere in the solar system you are, if you're doing something somebody doesn't like, they can see you and they can throw something at you and hit you. And so I think a central government will be feasible within the solar system for quite some time. But once you get to other star systems, that ends. It's not feasible to punish colonies 20 light-years away when you don't get the message of what they did [until] 20 years later. That just becomes infeasible then. I would think The Expanse is telling a more human story because it's happening within this solar system. But I think, in fact, this world government becomes a solar system government, and it allows expansion to the solar system on its terms. But it would then be even stronger as a centralized governance community which prevents change.
Thinking about the future like an economist
In a recent blog post, you wrote that when you think about the future, you try to think about it as an economist. You use economic analysis “to predict the social consequences of a particular envisioned future technology.” Have futurists not done that? Futurism has changed. I've written a lot about the classic 1960s futurists who were these very big, imaginative thinkers. They tended to be pretty optimistic. And then they tended to get pessimistic. And then futurism became kind of like marketing, like these were brand awareness people, not really big thinkers. When they approached it, did they approach it as technologists? Did they approach it as sociologists? Are economists just not interested in this subject?
Good question. So I'd say there are three standard kinds of futurists. One kind of futurist is a short-term marketing consultant who's basically telling you which way the colors will go or the market demand will go in the short term.
Is neon green in or lime green in, or something.
And that's economically valuable. Those people should definitely exist. Then there's a more aspirational, inspirational kind of futurist. And that's changed over the decades, depending on what people want to be inspired by or afraid of. In the ‘50s, ‘60s, it might be about America going out and becoming powerful. Or later it's about the environment, and then it's about inequality and gender relations. In some sense, science fiction is another kind of futurism. And these two tend to be related in the sense that science fiction mainly focuses on an indirect way to tell metaphorical stories about us. Because we're not so interested in the future, really, we're interested in us. Those are futures serving various kinds of communities, but neither of them are that realistically oriented. They're not focused on what's likely to actually happen. They're focused on what will inspire people or entertain people or make people afraid or tell a morality tale.
But if you're interested in what's actually going to happen, then my claim is you want to just take our standard best theories and just straightforwardly apply them in a thoughtful way. So many people, when they talk about the future, they say, “It's just impossible to say anything about the future. No one could possibly know; therefore, science fiction speculations are the best we can possibly do. You might as well go with that.”
And I think that's just wrong. My demonstration in The Age of Em is to say, if you take a very specific technology scenario, you can just turn the crank with Econ 101, Sociology 101, Electrical Engineering 101, all the standard things, and just apply it to that scenario. And you can just say a lot. But what you will find out is that it's weird. It's not very inspiring, and it doesn't tell the perfect horror story of what you should avoid. It's just a complicated mess. And that's what you should expect, because that's what we would seem to our ancestors. [For] somebody 200 or 2000 years ago, our world doesn't make a good morality tale for them. First of all, they would just have trouble getting their head around it. Why did that happen? And [what] does that even mean? And then they're not so sure what to like or dislike about it, because it's just too weird. If you're trying to tell a nice morality tale [you have] simple heroes and villains, right? And this is too messy. The real futures you should just predict are going to be too messy to be a simple morality tale. They're going to be weird, and that's going to make them hard to deal with.
The stories we tell ourselves about the future
Do you think it matters, the kinds of stories we tell ourselves about what the future could hold? My bias is, I think it does. I think it matters if all we paint for people is a really gloomy one, then not only is it depressing, then it's like, “What are we even doing here?” Because if we're going to move forward, if we're going to take risks with technology, there needs to be some sort of payoff. But yet, it seems like a lot of the culture continues. We mentioned The Expanse, which by the modern standard of a lot of science fiction, I find to be pretty optimistic. Some people say, "Well, it's not optimistic because half the population is on a basic income and there's war.” But, hey, there are people. Global warming didn't kill everybody. Nuclear war didn't kill everybody. We continued. We advanced. Not perfect, but society seems to be progressing. Has that mattered, do you think, the fact that we've been telling ourselves such terrible stories about the future? We used to tell much better ones.
The first-order theory about change is that change doesn't really happen because people anticipated or planned for it or voted on it. Mostly this world has been changing as a side effect of lots of local economic interests and technological interests and pursuits. The world is just on this train with nobody driving, and that's scary and should be scary, I guess. So to the first order, it doesn't really matter what stories we tell or how we think about the future, because we haven't actually been planning for the future. We haven't actually been choosing the future.
It kind of happens while we're doing something else.
The side effect of other things. But that's the first order, that's the zeroth-order effect. The next-order effect might be … look, places in the world will vary in to what extent they win or lose over the long run. And there are things that can radically influence that. So being too cautious and playing it safe too much and being comfortable, predictably, will probably lead you to not win the future. If you're interested in having us — whoever us is — win the future or have a bright, dynamic future, then you’d like “us” to be a little more ambitious about such things. I would think it is a complement: The more we are excited about the future, and the future requires changes, the more we are telling ourselves, “Well, yeah, this change is painful, but that's the kind of thing you have to do if you want to get where we're going.”
Long-term thinking and innovation
If you've been reading the New York Times lately or the New Yorker, the average is related to something called “effective altruism,” is the idea that there are big, existential problems facing the world, and we should be thinking a lot harder about them because people in the future matter too, not just us. And we should be spending money on these problems. We should be doing more research on these problems. What do you think about this movement? It sounds logical.
Well, if you just compare it to all the other movements out there and their priorities, I’ve got to give this one credit. Obviously, the future is important.
They are thinking directly about it. And they have ideas.
They are trying to be conscious about that and proactive and altruistic about that. And that's certainly great compared to the vast majority of other activity. Now, I have some complaints, but overall, I'm happy to praise this sort of thing. The risk is, as with most futurism, that even though we're not conscious of it, what we're really doing is sort of projecting our issues now into the future and sort of arguing about future stuff by talking about our stuff. So you might say people seem to be really concerned about the future of global warming in two centuries, but all the other stuff that might happen in two centuries, they're not at all interested. It's like, what's the difference there? They might say global warming lets them tell this anti-materialist story that they'd want to tell anyway, tell why it's bad to be materialist and so to cut back on material stuff is good. And it's sort of a pro-environment story. I fear that that's also happening to some degree in effective altruism. But that's just what you should expect for humans in general. Effective altruists, in terms of their focus on the future, are overwhelmingly focused as far as I can tell on artificial intelligence risk. And I think that's a bit misdirected. In a big world I don’t mind it …
My concern is that we'll be super cautious and before we have developed anything that could really create existential risk … we will never get to the point where it's so powerful because, like the Luddites, we'll have quashed it early on out of fear.
A friend of mine is Eric Drexler, who years ago was known as talking about nanotechnology. Nanotechnology is still a technology in the future. And he experienced something that made him a little unsure whether he should have said all these things, he said, which is that once you can describe a vivid future, the first thing everybody focuses on is almost all the things that can go wrong. Then they set up policy to try to focus on preventing the things that can go wrong. That's where the whole conversation goes. And then people are distancing themselves from it. He found that many people distanced themselves from nanotechnology until they could take over the word, because in their minds it reflected these terrible risks. So people wanted to not even talk about that. But you could ask, if he had just inspired people to make the technology but not talked about the larger policy risks, maybe that would be better? It might be in fact true that the world today is broken so much that if ordinary people and policymakers don't know about a future risk, the world's better off, because at least they won't mess it up by trying to limit it and control it too early and too crudely.
Then the challenge is, maybe you want the technologists who might make it to hear about it and get inspired, but you don't want everybody else to be inspired to control it and correct it and channel it and prepare for it. Because honestly, that seems to go pretty bad. I guess the question is, what technology that people did see well ahead of time, did they not come up with terrible scenarios to worry about?
For example, television: People didn't think about television very much ahead of time. And when it came, a lot of people watched it. And a lot of people complained about that. But if you could imagine ahead of time that in 20 years people are going to spend five hours a day watching this thing. If that's an accurate prediction, people would've freaked out.
Or cars: As you may know, in the late 1800s, people just did not envision the future of cars. When they envisioned the future of transportation, they saw dirigibles and trains and submarines, even, but not cars. Because cars were these individual things. And if they had envisioned the actual future of cars — automobile accidents, individual people controlling a thing going down the street at 80 miles an hour — they might have thought, “That's terrible. We can't allow that.” And you have to wonder… It was only in the United States, really, that cars took off. There's a sense in which the world had rapid technological progress around 1900 or so because the US was an exception worldwide. A lot of technologies were only really tried in the US, like even radio, and then the rest of the world copied and followed because the US had so much success with them.
I think if you want to pick a point where that optimistic ‘90s came to an end, it might have been, speaking of Wired magazine, the Bill Joy article … “Why the Future Doesn't Need Us.” Talking about nanotech and gray goo… Since you brought up nanotech and Eric Drexler, do you know what the state of that technology is? We had this nanotechnology initiative, but I don't think it was working on that kind of nanotech.
No, it wasn’t.
It was more like a materials science. But as far as creating these replicating tiny machines…
The federal government had a nanotechnology initiative, where they basically took all the stuff they were doing that was dealing with small stuff and they relabeled it. They didn't really add more money. They just put it under a new initiative. And then they made sure nobody was doing anything like this sort of dangerous stuff that could cause what Eric was talking about.
Stuff you’d put in sunscreen…
Exactly. So there was still never much funding there. There's a sense in which, in many kinds of technology areas, somebody can envision ahead of time a new technology that was possible if a concentrated effort goes into a certain area in a certain way. And they're trying to inspire that. But absent that focused effort, you might not see it for a long time. That would be the simplest story about nanotech: We haven't seen the focused effort and resources that he had proposed. Now, that doesn't mean had we had those efforts he would've succeeded. He could just be wrong about what was feasible and how soon. But nevertheless, that still seemed to be an exciting, promising technology that would've been worth the investment to try. And still is, I would say.
One concern I have about the notion of longtermism, is that it seems to place a lot of emphasis on our ability to rally people, get them thinking long term, taking preparatory steps. And we've just gone through a pandemic which showed that we don't do that very well. And the way we dealt with it was not through preparation, but by being a rich, technologically advanced society that could come up with a vaccine. That's my kind of longtermism, in a way: being rich and technologically capable so you can react to the unexpected.
And that's because we allowed an exception in how vaccines were developed in that case. Had we gone with the usual way vaccines had been developed before, it would've taken a lot longer. So the problem is that when we make too many structures that restrain things, then we aren't able to quickly react to new circumstances. You probably know that most companies, they might have a forecasting department, but they don't fund it very much. They don't actually care that much. Almost everything they do is reactive in most organizations. That's just the fact of how most organizations work. Because, in fact, it is hard to prepare. It’s hard to anticipate things.
I'm not saying we shouldn't try to figure out ways to deflect asteroids. We should. To have this notion of longtermism over a broad scope of issues … that's fine. But I hope we don't forget the other part, which is making sure that we do the right things to create those innovative ecosystems where we do increase wealth, we do increase our technological capabilities to not be totally dependent on our best guesses right now.
Here's a scary example of how this thinking can go wrong, in my mind. In the longtermism community, there's this serious proposal that many people like, which is called the Long Reflection.
The Long Reflection, which is, we’ve solved all the problems and then we take a time out.
We stop allowing change for a while. And for a good long time, maybe a thousand years or even longer, we’re in this period where no change substantially happens. Then we talk a lot about what we could do to deal with things when things are allowed to change again. And we work it all out, and then we turn it back on and allow change. That's giving a lot of credit to this system of talking.
Who's talking? Are these post-humans talking? Or is it people like us?
It would be before the change, remember. So it would be people like us. I actually think this is this ancient human intuition from the forger world, before the farming era, where in the small band the way we made most important decisions was to sit down around the campfire and discuss it and then decide together and then do something. And that's, in some sense, how everybody wants to make all the big decisions. That's why they like a world government and a world community, because it goes back to that. But I honestly think we have to admit that just doesn't go very well lately. We're not actually very capable of having a discussion together and feeling all the options and making choices and then deciding together to do it. That's how we want to be able to work. And that's how we maybe should, but it's not how we are. I feel, with the Long Reflection, once we institutionalize a world where change isn't allowed, we would get pretty used to that world.
It seems very comfortable, and we'd start voting for security.
And then we wouldn’t really allow the Great Reflection to end, because that would be this risky, into the strange world. We would like the stable world we were in. And that would be the end of that.
I should say that I very much like Toby Ord's book, The Precipice. He's also one of my all-time favorite guests. He's really been a fantastic guest. Though, the Long Reflection, I do have concerns about.
Come back next Thursday for part two of my conversation with Robin Hanson.
Almost 50 years ago, in December 1972, the Apollo 17 astronauts splashed down in the Pacific Ocean, marking the end of the Apollo program. In the half-century since, no crewed mission — not Americans nor anyone else — has ventured beyond low Earth orbit. Despite a series of presidential promises, NASA has yet to return to the Moon, let alone venture to Mars. And despite recent declines in launch costs, thanks in large part to SpaceX, NASA remains in many ways committed to the old, Apollo-style way of doing things. To learn more about why NASA's manned missions always seem to run over budget and behind schedule — and to get a sense of the way forward with commercial space companies — I'm speaking with Lori Garver.
Garver was previously Deputy Administrator of NASA during the Obama administration, from 2009 to 2013. Previously, she worked at NASA from 1996 to 2001 as a senior policy analyst. Garver is the founder of Earthrise Alliance, an initiative to better use space data to address climate change. She also appears in the 2022 Netflix documentary Return to Space. Her fascinating memoir, published in June, is Escaping Gravity: My Quest to Transform NASA and Launch a New Space Age. Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
James Pethokoukis: In December of this year, it will mark the 50th anniversary of the Apollo 17 splashdown and the end of the Apollo program. Humanity has been stuck in low Earth orbit ever since. And for a while, the United States couldn't even get to low Earth orbit on its own. What happened to all the dreams that people had in the ‘60s that just sort of disappeared in 1972?
Lori Garver: I think the dreamers are still out there. Many of them work on the space program. Many of them have contributed to the programs that we had post-Apollo. The human space flight program ended and took that hiatus. [But] we’ve been having, in the United States a very robust and leading space program ever since Apollo. For human space flight, I think we got off track, as I outline in my book, by really trying to relive Apollo. And trying to fulfill the institutions and congressional mandates that were created for Apollo, which were too expensive to continue with more limited goals. The Nixon administration actually had the right idea with the Space Shuttle. They said the goal was to reduce the cost of getting to and from space.
Money was no object for a while.
When you have your program tied to a national goal, like we did in Apollo of beating the Russians and showing that a democratic system was a better way to advance society and technology and science, we built to a standard that tripled the budget every couple years in the early days. We [NASA] then had to survive on a budget about half the size of the peak during Apollo and have never been able to really readjust the infrastructure and the cost to sustain it. So I'd say our buying power was greatly reduced.
We'll talk about government later in the interview, but to some degree, isn't this a failure of society? If politicians had sensed a yearning desire from the American public to continue moving out further in space, would we have done it?
It's hard to know how we measure public support for something like that because there's no voting on it per se. And there are so few congressional districts whose members are really focused on it. So the bills that come up in Congress are funding bills. NASA is buried among many other agencies. And so I think the yearning on the part of the public is a little more diffuse. What we want to see is the United States being a leader. We want to see us doing things that return to our economy, and we want to see things that help our national security. Those are the ways space contributes to society. And I think what we got off track in doing is delivering hardware that was built in certain people's districts instead of being a purpose-driven program as it was in Apollo.
Even though the Space Shuttle wasn't going to fly to the Moon, people were really pretty excited by it. I'm not sure polls always capture how interested people are in space.
We don't really gauge based on people who are attending launches. As someone who's been to a lot of launches, there are lots of people enthused. But that's not 300 million people in the country. I think that polls tend to show, as compared to what? And NASA tends to be at the bottom of a list of national priorities. But, of course, its budget isn't very large. So these are all things that we try to evaluate. I think if you believe that network news was able to track public interest, by the time of the Challenger accident — which was only the 25th shuttle launch — they weren't showing them live anymore. So that's the kind of thing that you can look into. We really like things the first time. And those first couple missions were very exciting. Or if we did something unique, like fix the Hubble Space Telescope, that was interesting. But we had 134 missions, and not every one of those got a lot of publicity.
I saw you in the fantastic Return to Space documentary, and you had a great statistic saying that basically it cost about a billion dollars for every astronaut that we sent to space. Was there just fundamentally not an interest in reducing that cost? Did we not know how to do it? Was it just how government contracts [worked]? Why did it stay so expensive for so long?
A combination of all those things plays into it. It's about the incentives. These were government cost-plus contracts that incentivize you to take longer and spend more, because you get more money the longer it takes. If you’ve worked in any private sector, they want to expand their own profits. And that's understandable. The government wasn't a smart buyer. And we also really like to focus on maybe doing something exquisite or a new technology instead of reducing the cost. [It’s a] really interesting comparison to the Russian program where they just kept doing the same thing and it costs a little less. The Space Shuttle, we wanted it to be reusable. But it cost as much to refurbish it as it would have to rebuild. It wasn't until recently that we've had these incentives reversed and said, “We will buy launches from the private sector, and therefore they have the incentive to go and reduce the cost.” That's really what's working.
If you look at what presidents were saying, they certainly still seem to be interested. We had the George H.W. Bush administration: He announced a big plan to return us to the Moon and Mars. I think it was like about a $500 billion plan. What happened to that? That was the Space Exploration Initiative?
SEI, yes. I go into this in the book because, to me, it is really important that we not forget how many times presidents have given us similar goals. Because you come in, and I was the lead on the Obama transition for NASA. I was outgoing in the Clinton administration for NASA, leading the policy office, and supported lots of those Republican presidents in between in their space proposals. Never met a president who didn't love NASA and the human space flight program. They have various levels of success in getting what they want achieved. I think the first President Bush tried very hard to reduce the cost and to be more innovative. But the NASA bureaucracy fought him on that quite vociferously.
Why would they? Wouldn’t they see that it would be in NASA's long-term interest for these missions to be cheaper, more affordable?
It was not dissimilar to my time at NASA in that the administrator was a former astronaut. And they didn't really come there with a mandate to do much other than support the existing program and people at the agency. When you're at NASA and you just want to do the same thing, you don't want to take a risk to change what you're doing. You want to keep flying your friends, and you have really come to this position because other people did the same thing as well. I call it, in the book, the “giant, self-licking ice-cream cone,” because it's this sugar high that everyone in it has. But it doesn't allow for as much progress.
So no one anywhere really had an incentive to focus on efficiency and cost control. The people in Congress who were super interested, I imagine, were mostly people who had facilities in their districts and they viewed it as a jobs program.
Yes. And they want contracts going to those jobs. Really, the administration, the president, is the one who tends to want a more valuable, efficient, effective space program. And within this, throughout the last decades, they've had a bit of tension with their own heads of NASA to get them to be more efficient Because Congress wants more of these cost-plus contracts in their district, the industry likes making the money, and the people at NASA tend to say, “Well, I might be going to work in one of those industry jobs down the road. So why do I want to make them mad?”
It's really a fairly familiar story, despite sort of the interesting, exotic nature of space. It could be … banking and financial regulation, where you have the sort of a revolving door…
That's what's difficult. And for me, I think writing the book was challenging for some of the people within the program to have this out there, because NASA is seen as above all that. And we should be above all that. What’s a little ironic is to the extent that we're above all that, it's because we've now finally gotten to a point where there are some private-sector initiatives and there's more of a business case to be made for human space flight. Whereas previously, it was just the government so the only reason was this self-licking ice-cream cone.
So we had the first Bush administration, they had this big, expansive idea. Then … canceled— right? —by President Clinton?
Really by Congress. Congress did not fund president H.W. Bush's Space Exploration Initiative. But the tension was between what his space council wanted to do — which was led by Vice President Quayle — and what NASA wanted to do. A couple years in, he fired his head of NASA, brought in someone new, Dan Goldin. Dan Goldin was the head of NASA then for 10 years. The Clinton administration kept him, and the second Bush administration kept him for the first year. He drove a lot of this change. And as I talk about in the book, I worked there under him and eventually was his head of policy. And really, he was trying to infuse these incentives well before we were successful in doing this with SpaceX.
So then we had the second Bush presidency, and we had another big idea for space. What was that idea, and what happened to that?
We had the Columbia accident, which caused the second President Bush to have to look at human space flight again and say, "You know, we need to retire the shuttle and set our sights, again, farther." And this was the Moon-Mars initiative, it was referred to as the Vision for Space Exploration. Again, we had a change of NASA administrator under him. And I truly believe if you look, the changes aren't as much driven by presidents as they are heads of NASA. So it's who do you appoint and how long do they last? Because President Bush, it changed with his second administrator to be this program called Constellation, which was a big rocket to take us back to the Moon. Government owned and operated.
So we were talking about how the legacy of Apollo has just loomed large over the program for decades. And this is another good example of that?
This was referred to as “Apollo on steroids.” That is what the head of NASA wanted to do, and for a lot of good reasons, including because he knew he could get the congressional support for the districts, for the contracts that were typical for the time. You could use the NASA centers that already existed. This was never going to be efficient. But this was going to get a budget passed.
Was there a real expectation that this would work? Or was this fundamentally a way of propping up this sort of industrial jobs complex infrastructure?
I struggle with this question because I believe that the people creating these programs are very smart and are aware that when they say they're going to be able to do something for this amount of money and so forth, they know they can't. But they clearly feel it's the right thing to do anyway, because if they can get the camel's nose under the tent, they can continue to spend more money and do it.
“Let’s just keep it going, keep the momentum going.”
Yes.
When did we decide that just kind of redoing Apollo wasn't going to work and we need to do something different and we need to try to bring in the commercial [sector]?
I take it back to the 1990s under Dan Goldin. As head of NASA, he started a program that was a partnership with industry. It was going to be a demonstration of a single-stage reusable launch system. Lockheed Martin happened to win it. It was called the X-33. They planned to develop a fully reusable vehicle that would be called VentureStar, but it ran into technical problems. They were trying to push doing more. And the Space Shuttle was still flying, so there weren't these incentives to keep it going. They canceled the program. Lockheed wasn't going to pick it up. The dot-com bubble burst. The whole satellite market that was going to be where they got most of their money — because the premise is “NASA just wants to be one customer, not pay for the whole system.” So really, the second Bush administration in the same post-Shuttle Columbia accident policy initiative said, “We are going to …” — again, very consistent with previous presidents, but again said — “… use the private sector to help commercialize and lower costs.” And the first Bush administration did that with a program — not for people, but for cargo — to the International Space Station. SpaceX won one of those contracts in 2006. So when I came back in 2008, and then 2009 with our first budget request, we asked for money for the crew element, meaning taking astronauts to the space station to also be done privately. Most people hated that idea at first.
I've seen a video of a hearing, and a lot of senators did not like this idea. Apollo astronauts did not like this idea. Why did people not like this idea?
Well, let's see: There were tens of billions of dollars of contracts already let to Constellation contractors. And this meant canceling Constellation. Because the first part of that, although it was designed (at least in theory) to go back to the Moon, it was going to take us to and from the space station. But the program in the first four years, had slipped [to] five years. It was costing a couple billion dollars a year. And again, we're still sort of doing that program. And maybe we'll get to that.
I don't think it ever really goes away.
The Commercial Crew Program, we were able to carve out enough dollars to get it started. And this was not something that was easy. It was not something I think most people in the Senate, or the former Apollo astronauts who testified against us, thought was possible. I think there was just this sense — and again, Elon and SpaceX was very, very likely to be the winners of these competitions. People just didn't believe he could do it.
They thought only government could do something this spectacular. Elon Musk encountered a lot of skepticism from astronauts. And he found this personally and emotionally really hurtful, to see these astronauts be skeptical. To be charitable, they were skeptical.
I did too. I knew them, and I knew that they thought the policies I was driving were wrongheaded. Gene Cernan said it would lead to the end of America as we know it, the future of his grandchildren were at stake. So these were not easy things to hear. And I'm often asked, why did I even believe it would work? Well, let's face it, nothing else had worked. It had been 50 years since Apollo! And we hadn't done it, as you said in the opening of the program. We also know that in every other aspect of transportation or large initiatives that the government takes on, the idea isn't to have the government own and operate them. We didn't do that with the airlines. So this was inevitable, and the private sector was launching to space. They had been since the ’90s. We had turned over management of the rocket systems. So I didn't necessarily know SpaceX was going to make it, but I knew that was the way to drive innovation, to get the cost down, and to get us to a place where we could break out of this giant, self licking ice-cream cone.
But now we have a system that's sort of betwixt and between. The next sort of big thing is this moon mission, Artemis, that is a little bit of the old way and a little bit of the new way. We're going to be using a traditional Apollo-style developed rocket, the SLS. I think a SpaceX lander. Why aren't we going to launch this on a very big SpaceX rocket? Why are we still doing it a little bit of the old way?
Because I failed, basically. This grand bargain that we made with Congress, where we got just enough money to start a commercial crew program, kept the contracts for Constellation.
SLS is Constellation, for the listeners.
It is. It’s the same. They protected the contracts and the rocket changed a little bit, but the parts — again, the money; follow the money — all are still flowing to Lockheed, Boeing, Aerojet. The Space Launch System is often called the “Senate Launch System.” I don't happen to agree, because it wasn't just the Senate that did this. The call, as I say, was coming from inside the house: NASA people wanted to build and operate a big rocket. That's why they came to NASA. They grew up seeing Apollo. They wanted to launch their version of the Saturn V. And they ultimately were willing to give up low Earth orbit to the private sector, if they could have their big rocket. So that's back in 2011 that this is established, this bifurcated system. They were supposed to launch by 2016. It's now 2022. They haven't even launched a first test flight. This first test flight, now at $20 billion-plus — the capsule on top, called Orion, is exactly from Constellation, so it's been being funded at more than a billion a year since 2006. This is not a program that should be going forward, and we are about to do a big test of it, whether it works or not. We'll have a bigger decision, I think, when it's over if it's successful than if it's not. I think if it's not successful, we ought to just call it.
Even if it's successful, is this the last gasp of this kind of manned space exploration? I mean, even if we get to the Moon by … when? I'm not sure when the current moving target is.
Well, I believe we're continuing to say now, 2025, the current NASA administrator.
Any program that expensive is not going be sustainable, even if it should work technically.
This is my view. This is the whole premise of Escaping Gravity, is we have to get out of not just our gravity well of Earth, but the system that has been holding us back. And I'd love to say it's the last gasp, but I thought that about Constellation. And it should have been true about the shuttle.
Can you give me a sense of the cost difference we’re talking about?
The Space Launch System with Orion, which is the rocket and capsule, together have cost us over $40 billion to develop. Each launch will also cost an additional $4 billion, and we can only launch it once every two years. So in Apollo, we launched I think 12 times in five years, once we started the program. If we start now with the program, in next five years the most we can launch is three times. This is not progress. And those amounts of money, compared to the private sector… It hasn't launched something bigger than SLS yet, but let's just take the Falcon Heavy, which launches about 80 percent of the size of payload that the SLS can. SpaceX developed that without any public money. And the per launch costs are in the $100-150 million range. It's just not comparable.
Does the current head of NASA understand these cost calculations?
Well, he recently said — Administrator Bill Nelson, former Florida senator — that he thinks that this cost-plus system that NASA has been using is a “plague” on the agency. So this is fascinating, because he's basically patient zero. He required us to do the SLS. He's very proud of that to this day. So he can brag about the monster rocket, he calls it that, and yet still say the way we are doing it is a plague. So you'd think he doesn't want to do things this way anymore. And as you said, SpaceX is developing the lander for the Moon program. So it's really hard to know what the outcome will be because, like you, I don't believe it's sustainable to spend so much for something we did 50 years ago that isn't going to be reusable, the costs aren't coming down, we aren't going to be able to do it more often. All the things that mean “sustainable.” But yet, that is the government's plan.
It just seems hard to believe that that plan is not just sustainable to go to the Moon and develop a permanent moon facility … and then to Mars, which obviously is going to cost even more. It seems like, if as a country we decide this is something we want to do, that inevitably it's going to be a private-sector effort.
You know, it's really related to, as a country deciding what we're going to do. Because if there was some compelling reason, as there was in the ‘60s, the nation's leaders felt to go to the Moon for the first time. If that came together for Mars, maybe the public would be willing to spend trillions. But if you can reduce the cost through the private-sector use of vehicles, you can still advance US goals. I try to make the case. This isn't an either/or. This can be a NASA-led and industry-developed program, just as we have done with so much of our economy. And to me, that is inevitable. It's just, how much are we going to waste in the meantime?
Is the threat of China enough of a catalyst to give more momentum toward American efforts in space?
China is certainly a threat to the United States in many ways — economically, politically, and so forth — and therefore, I think, seen as a big reason for us to return to the Moon. (We say it's a race with China. I'm like, “Okay, for the 13th person. Because don't forget, we won.”) But doing that in a way that drives technology and leaves behind a better nation, that's how you win in these geopolitical races. And so to me, yes, we are making the case (I think NASA, in particular) that we need to beat China, in our case, back to the Moon. It's about leadership. And I don't think we lead or help our nation by protecting industries that then aren't competitive. I still see the need to evolve from the system, and I fully believe we will be back on the Moon before the Chinese. But they are someone we have our eye on. They are really the only other nation right now with an advanced human space flight program.
One of my favorite TV shows, which I probably write too often about, is the Ronald D. Moore show For All Mankind. And for listeners who don't know, the premise is that the space race never ends because the Soviets get there first. They beat us to the Moon, and then we decide that we’re going to keep going. And the race just keeps going through the ‘60s, the ‘70s, and the ‘80s. I'm sure somewhere in NASA there were great plans that after Apollo we were going to be on the Moon. … Can you imagine a scenario where all those plans came true? Was it inevitable that we were going to pull back? Or could we at this point already have Mars colonies or Moon colonies? That the wildest dreams of the people in the ‘60s, that we actually could have done it, there was a path forward?
Of course. I could be on a much longer show about For All Mankind, because I, too, am really invested in it.
We did a great podcast with Ronald D. Moore.
Oh good. I know of the astronauts who advise. And of course, I find it hilarious what they take out of it. And the astronauts' perspective about how things are actually run in Washington is just hilarious. And one of the reasons I wrote Escaping Gravity, all astronauts should understand that presidents don't sit there at their desk, wondering what NASA's doing today.
If I was president, I would be wondering that.
And they have, of course, a former astronaut becoming the president. They want it to go well. Like I said, all presidents love it. But of course NASA's plan, and really from von Braun, was Moon on the way to Mars and beyond. Science fiction really wrote this story. And I think people who were drawn to NASA are all about trying to make that a reality. And in many ways we're doing it.
What would things look like right now without SpaceX? I’m sure you know that SpaceX, as well as Blue Origin, there's a certain criticism that this is some sort of vanity effort by billionaires to take us to space. But I'm assuming that you don't view this whole effort as a vanity effort.
Yes. My book is called Escaping Gravity: My Quest to Transform NASA and Launch a New Space Age. And I'm very clear in it that there wouldn't be much transformation going on without SpaceX. So yes, they are absolutely critical to this story. It would've taken longer without them. We don't even have Boeing, their second competitor, taking astronauts yet to the station. But we would've had competitors. There were people before Elon. I think Bezos, and Blue Origin, is making progress and will do so. There are other companies now online, the Dream Chaser, to take cargo to the space station, private sector. But make no mistake, without them, without Elon and his vision and his billions, Artemis wouldn't be even more than a great name for a human space flight program. Because we didn't have the money for a lunar lander that anyone else bid, except for SpaceX. They have overachieved. They have set the bar and then cleared it. And every time they compete, they end up getting less money than the competition and then they beat them. So it's impossible, really, to overstate their value. But I still believe that the policies are the right ones to incentivize others in addition to SpaceX. And if they weren't here, we would not be as far along for sure.
I am now going to ask you to overstate something. Give me your expansive view of what a new space age looks like. Is it just humans going out into deep space? Is it a vibrant orbital space economy? What does that new space age look like?
To me, it is a purpose-driven space age so we are utilizing fully that sphere beyond our atmosphere. So that's in lower Earth orbit, using that to help society today, we can measure greenhouse gases in real time, the emissions. We can, as we look forward, go beyond certainly Mars, to places where humanity must go if we want to be sustained as a species. I think the purpose of space is like saying, “What was the purpose of first going into the oceans?” It's for science. It's for economic gain. It's for national security. Similar to the atmosphere and now space. It's a new venue where we all can only just imagine what is possible today, and it we will be there. I personally like that Jetsons future of living in a world where I have a flying car on another planet.
Lori, thanks for coming on the podcast.
Thank you for having me.
What if the Roman Empire had experienced an Industrial Revolution? That's the compelling hook of Helen Dale's two-part novel, Kingdom of the Wicked: Rules and Order. Drawing on economics and legal history, Helen's story follows the arrest and trial of charismatic holy man Yeshua Ben Yusuf in the first century — but one with television, flying machines, cars, and genetic modification.
In this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I dive into the fascinating world-building of Kingdom of the Wicked with Helen. Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
James Pethokoukis: Your Kingdom of the Wicked books raise such an interesting question: What would have happened if Jesus had emerged in a Roman Empire that had gone through an industrial revolution? What led you to ask this question and to pursue that answer through these books?
Helen Dale: There is an essay in the back of book one, which is basically a set of notes about what I brought to the book when I was thinking. And that has been published elsewhere by the Cato Institute. I go into these questions. But the main one, the one that really occurred to me, was that I thought, what would happen if Jesus emerged in a modern society now, rather than the historic society he emerged in? I didn't think it would turn into something hippy-dippy like Jesus of Montreal. I thought it would turn into Waco or to the Peoples Temple.
And that wasn't necessarily a function of the leader of the group being a bad person. Clearly Jim Jones was a very bad person, but the Waco story is actually much more complex and much messier and involves a militarized police force and tanks attacking the buildings and all of this kind of thing. But whatever happened with it, it was going to go badly and it was going to end in violence and there would be a showdown and a confrontation. And it would also take on, I thought — I didn't say this in the essay, but I thought at the time — it would take on a very American cast, because that is the way new religious movements tend to blow up or collapse in the United States.
And so I was thinking this idea, through my head, “I would like to do a retelling of the Jesus story, but how do I do it? So it doesn't become naff and doesn't work?” And so what I decided to do was rather than bring Jesus forward and put him now, I would put us back to the time of Jesus — but take our technology and our knowledge, but always mediated by the fact that Roman civilization was different from modern civilization. Not in the sense of, you know, human beings have changed, all that kind of thing. We're all still the same primates that we have been for a couple of hundred thousand years or even longer. But in the sense that their underlying moral values and beliefs about the way the world should work were different, which I thought would have technological effects. The big technological effect in Kingdom of the Wicked is they're much better at the biosciences and the animal sciences. They're much weaker at communications. Our society has put all its effort into [communication]. Their society is much more likely to put it into medicine.
To give you an idea: the use of opioids to relieve the pain of childbirth is Roman. And it was rediscovered by James Young Simpson at The University of Edinburgh. And he very famously used the formula of one of the Roman medical writers. So I made a very deliberate decision: This is a society that has not pursued technological advancement in the same way as us. It's also why their motor vehicles look like the Soviet-era ones with rotary engines. It's why their big aircraft are kind of like Antonovs, the big Ukrainian aircraft that we've all been reading about since the war has started in Ukraine. So, in some respects, there are bits of their culture that look more Soviet, or at least Britain in the 1950s. You know, sort of Clement Attlee’s quite centralized, postwar settlement: health service, public good, kind of Soviet-style. Soft Soviet; it's not the nasty Stalinist sort, but like late-Soviet, so kind of Brezhnev and the last part of Khrushchev. A few people did say that. They were like, “Your military parades, they look like the Soviet Union.” Yes. That was deliberate. The effort has gone to medicine.
It's an amazing bit of world-building. I was sort of astonished by the depth and the scale of it. Is this a genre that you had an interest in previously? Are there other works that you took inspiration from?
There's a particular writer of speculative fiction I admire greatly. His name is S.M. Stirling, and he wrote a series of books. I haven't read every book he wrote, but he wrote a series of books called the Draka series. And it's speculative fiction. Once again, based on a point of departure where the colonists who finished up in South Africa finished up using the resources of South Africa, but for a range of reasons he sets out very carefully in his books, they avoid the resource curse, the classic economist’s resource curse. And so certainly in terms of a popular writer, he was the one that I read and thought, “If I can do this as well as him, I will be very pleased.”
I probably didn't read as much science fiction as most people would in high school, unless it was a literary author like Margaret Atwood or George Orwell. I just find bad writing rebarbative, and a lot of science fiction struggles with bad writing. So this is the problem, of course, that Douglas Adams famously identified. And one of the reasons why he wrote the Hitchhiker’s books was to show that you could combine science fiction with good writing.
In all good works of speculative fiction of the alt-history variant, there's an interesting jumping-off point. I would imagine you had a real “Eureka!” moment when you figured out what your jumping-off point would be to make this all plausible. Tell me about that.
Well, yes. I did. Once I realized that points of departure hugely mattered, I then went and read people like Philip K. Dick's Man in the High Castle. The point of departure for him is the assassination of Roosevelt. I went and read SS-GB [by] Len Deighton, a great British spycraft writer but also a writer of speculative fiction. And in that case, Britain loses the Battle of Britain and Operation Sea Lion, the putative land invasion of the UK, is successful. And I really started to think about this and I'm going, "Okay, how are you going to do this point of departure? And how are you going to deal with certain economic issues?"
I'm not an economist, but I used to practice in corporate finance so I've got the sort of numerical appreciation for economics. I can read an economics paper that's very math heavy because that's my skill based on working in corporate finance. And I knew, from corporate finance and from corporate law, that there are certain things that you just can't do, you can't achieve in terms of economic progress, unless you abolish slavery, basically. Very, very basic stuff like human labor power never loses its comparative advantage if you have just a market flooded with slaves. So you can have lots of good science technology, and an excellent legal system like the Romans did. And they reached that point economists talk about of takeoff, and it just never happens. Just, they miss. It doesn't quite happen.
And in a number of civilizations, this has happened. It's happened with the Song dynasty in China. Steve Davies has written a lot about the Song dynasty, and they went through the same thing. They just get to that takeoff point and then just … fizzled out. And in China, it was to do with serfdom, basically. These are things that are very destructive to economic progress. So you have to come up with a society that decides that slavery is really shitty. And the only way to do that is for them to get hooked on the idea of using a substitute for human labor power. And that means I have to push technological innovation back to the middle republic.
So what I've done for my point of departure is at the Siege of Syracuse [in 213-212 B.C.]. I have Archimedes surviving instead of being killed. He was actually doing mathematical doodles outside his classroom, according to the various records of Roman writers, and he was killed by some rampaging Roman soldier. And basically Marcellus, the general, had been told to capture Archimedes and all his students and all their kids. So you can see Operation Paperclip in the Roman mind. You can see the thinking: “Oh no, we want this fellow to be our DARPA guy.”
That's just a brilliant leap. I love that.
And that is the beginning of the point of departure. So you have the Romans hauling all these clever Greek scientists and their families off and taking them to Rome and basically doing a Roman version of DARPA. You know, Operation Paperclip, DARPA. You know, “Do all the science, and have complete freedom to do all the…” — because the Romans would've let them do it. I mean, this is the thing. The Romans are your classic “cashed up bogans,” as Australians call it. They had lots of money. They were willing to throw money at things like this and then really run with it.
You really needed both. As you write at one point, you needed to create a kind of a “machine culture.” You sort of needed the science and innovation, but also the getting rid of slavery part of it. They really both work hand in hand.
Yes. These two have to go together. I got commissioned to write a few articles in the British press, where I didn't get to mention the name of Kingdom of the Wicked or any of my novels or research for this, but where people were trying to argue that the British Empire made an enormous amount of money out of slavery. And then, as a subsidiary argument, trying to argue that that led to industrialization in the UK. … [So] I wrote a number of articles in the press just like going through why this was actually impossible. And I didn’t use any fancy economic terminology or anything like that. There’s just no point in it. But just explaining that, “No, no, no. This doesn’t work like that. You might get individually wealthy people, like Crassus, who made a lot of his money from slavery.” (Although he also made a lot from insurance because he set up private fire brigades. That was one of the things that Crassus did: insurance premiums, because that’s a Roman law invention, the concept of insurance.) And you get one of the Islamic leaders in Mali, King Musa. Same thing, slaves. And people try to argue that the entirety of their country’s wealth depended on slavery. But what you get is you get individually very wealthy people, but you don’t get any propagation of the wealth through the wider society, which is what industrialization produced in Britain and the Netherlands and then in Germany and then in America and elsewhere.
So, yes, I had to work in the machine culture with the abolition of slavery. And the machines had to come first. If I did the abolition of slavery first, there was nothing there to feed it. One of the things that helped Britain was Somerset’s case (and in Scotland, Knight and Wedderburn) saying, “The air of the air of England is too pure for a slave to breathe.” You know, that kind of thinking. But that was what I realized: It was the slavery issue. I couldn't solve the slavery issue unless I took the technological development back earlier than the period when the Roman Republic was flooded with slaves.
The George Mason University economist Mark Koyama said if you had taken Adam Smith and brought him back to Rome, a lot of it would've seemed very recognizable, like a commercial, trading society. So I would assume that element was also pretty important in that world-building. You had something to work with there.
Yes. I'd read some Stoic stuff because I did a classics degree, so of course that means you have to be able to read in Latin. But I'd never really taken that much of an interest in it. My interest tended to be in the literature: Virgil and Apuleius and the people who wrote novels. And then the interest in law, I always had an advantage, particularly as a Scots lawyer because Scotland is a mixed system, that I could read all the Roman sources that they were drawing on in the original. It made me a better practitioner. But my first introduction to thinking seriously about stoicism and how it relates to commerce and thinking that commerce can actually be a good and honorable thing to do is actually in Adam Smith. Not in The Wealth of Nations, but in Moral Sentiments, where Adam Smith actually goes through and quotes a lot of the Roman Stoic writers — Musonius Rufus and Epictetus and people like that — where they talk about how it's possible to have something that's quite base, which is being greedy and wanting to have a lot of money, but realizing that in order to get your lot of money or to do really well for yourself, you actually have to be quite a decent person and not a s**t.
And there were certain things that the Romans had applied this thinking to, like the samian with that beautiful red ceramic that you see, and it’s uniform all through the Roman Empire because they were manufacturing it on a factory basis. And when you come across the factories, they look like these long, narrow buildings with high, well-lit windows. And you're just sort of sitting there going, “My goodness, somebody dumped Manchester in Italy.” This kind of thing. And so my introduction to that kind of Stoic thinking was actually via Adam Smith. And then I went back and read the material in the original and realized where Adam Smith was getting those arguments from. And that's when I thought, “Ah, right. Okay, now I've got my abolitionists.”
This is, in large part, a book about law. So you had to create a believable legal system that did not exist, unlike, perhaps, the commercial nature of Rome. So how did you begin to work this from the ground up?
All the substantive law used in the book is Roman, written by actual Roman jurists. But to be fair, this is not hard to do. This is a proper legal system. There are only two great law-giving civilizations in human history. The Romans were one of them; the English were the other. And so what I had to do was take substantive Roman law, use my knowledge of practicing in a mixed system that did resemble the ancient Roman system — so I used Scotland, where I'd lived and worked — and then [put] elements back into it that existed in antiquity that still exists in, say, France but are very foreign, particularly to common lawyers.
I had lawyer friends who read both novels because obviously it appeals. “You have a courtroom drama?” A courtroom drama appeals to lawyers. These are the kind of books, particularly if it's written by another lawyer. So you do things like get the laws of evidence right and stuff like that. I know there are lawyers who cannot watch The Wire, for example, because it gets the laws of evidence (in the US, in this case) wrong. And they just finish up throwing shoes at the television because they get really annoyed about getting it wrong.
What I did was I took great care to get the laws of evidence right, and to make sure that I didn't use common law rules of evidence. For example, the Romans didn't have a rule against hearsay. So you'll notice that there's all this hearsay in the trial. But you'll also notice a mechanism. Pilate's very good at sorting out what's just gossip and what is likely to have substantive truth to it. So that's a classic borrowing from Roman law, because they didn't have the rule against hearsay. That's a common law rule. I also use corroboration a lot. Corroboration is very important in Roman law, and it's also very important in Scots law. And it's basically a two-witness rule.
And I did things, once again, to show the sort of cultural differences between the two great legal systems. Cornelius, the Roman equivalent of the principal crown prosecutor. Cornelius is that character, and he's obsessed with getting a confession. Obsessed. And that is deeply Roman. The Roman lawyers going back to antiquity called a confession the “Queen of Proofs.” And of course, if confessions are just the most wonderful thing, then it's just so tempting to beat the snot out of the accused and get your bloody confession. Job done.
The topic of the Industrial Revolution has been a frequent one in my writings and podcasts. And one big difference between our Industrial Revolution and the one you posit in the book is that there was a lot of competition in Europe. You had a lot of countries, and there was an incentive to permit disruptive innovation — where in the past, the proponents of the status quo had the advantage. But at some point countries realized, “Oh, both for commerce and military reasons, we need to become more technologically advanced. So we're going to allow inventors and entrepreneurs to come up with new ideas, even if it does alter that status quo.” But that's not the case with Rome. It was a powerful empire that I don't think really had any competitors, both in the real world and in your book.
That and the chattel slavery is probably why it didn't finish up having an industrial revolution. And it's one of the reasons why I had to locate the innovation, it had to be in the military first, because the military was so intensely respected in Roman society. If you'd have got the Roman military leadership coming up with, say, gunpowder or explosives or that kind of thing, the response from everybody else would've been, “Good. We win. This is a good thing.” It had to come from the military, which is why you get that slightly Soviet look to it. There is a reason for that. The society is more prosperous because it's a free-market society. The Romans were a free-market society. All their laws were all sort of trade oriented, like English law. So that's one of those things where the two societies were just really similar. But in terms of technological innovation, I had to locate it in the army. It had to be the armed forces first.
In your world, are there entrepreneurs? What does the business world look like?
Well, I do try to show you people who are very commercially minded and very economically oriented. You've got the character of Pilate, the real historical figure, who is a traditional Tory lawyer, who has come up through all the traditional Toryism and his family's on the land and so on and so forth. So he's a Tory. But Linnaeus, who he went to law school with, who is the defense counsel for the Jesus character, Yeshua Ben Yusuf, is a Whig. And his mother was a freed slave, and his family are in business in commerce. They haven't bought the land.
A lot of these books finished up on the cutting room floor, the world-building. And there is a piece that was published in a book called Shapers of Worlds: Volume II, which is a science-fiction anthology edited by a Canadian science-fiction author called Ed Willett. And one of the pieces that finished up on the cutting room floor and went into Shapers of Worlds is a description of Linnaeus's family background, which unfortunately was removed. You get Pilate’s, but you don't get Linnaeus's. And Linnaeus's family background, his dad's the factory owner. The factory making cloth. I was annoyed with my publisher when they said, “This piece has to go,” and I did one of those snotty, foot-stamping, awful things. And so I was delighted when this Canadian publisher came to me and said, “Oh, can we have a piece of your writing for a science-fiction anthology?” And I thought, “Oh good. I get to publish the Linnaeus's dad story in Shapers of Worlds.”
And I actually based Linnaeus's dad — the angel as he's referred to, Angelus, in the Kingdom of the Wicked books, and his personality is brought out very strongly — I actually based him on John Rylands. Manchester's John Rylands, the man who gave his name to the Rylands Library in Manchester. He was meant to be the portrait of the entrepreneurial, Manchester industrialist. And to this day, authors always have regrets, you don't always get to win the argument with your publisher or your editor, I am sorry that that background, that world-building was taken out of Kingdom of the Wicked and finished up having to be published elsewhere in an anthology. Because it provided that entrepreneurial story that you’re talking about: the factory owner who is the self-made man, who endows libraries and technical schools, and trains apprentices, and has that sort of innovative quality that is described so beautifully in Matt Ridley's book, How Innovation Works, which is full of people like that. And this book as well, I've just bought: I've just bought Arts and Minds, which is about the Royal Society of Arts. So this is one of those authorial regrets: that the entrepreneur character wasn't properly fleshed out in the two published books, Kingdom of the Wicked book one and book two. And you have to get Shapers of Worlds if you want to find out about Linnaeus's industrialist dad.
Is this a world you'd want to live in?
Not for me, no. I mean, I'm a classically trained lawyer. So classics first, then law. And I made it a society that works. You know, I don’t write dystopias. I have a great deal of admiration for Margaret Atwood and George Orwell, who are the two greatest writers of dystopias, in my view, in contemporary, and not just contemporary fiction, probably going back over a couple of hundred years. Those two have really got it, when it comes to this vision of horror. You know, the boot stamping on the human face forever. I greatly admire their skill, but those are not the books I write. So the society I wrote about in Kingdom of the Wicked is a society that works.
But one of the things I deliberately did with the Yeshua Ben Yusuf character and what were his early Christian followers, and the reason I've taken so much time to flesh them out as real characters and believable people [is] because the values that Christianity has given to the West were often absent in the Roman world. They just didn't think that way. They thought about things differently. Now some of those Christian values were pretty horrible. It's fairly clear that the Romans were right about homosexuality and abortion, and the Christians were wrong. That kind of thing. That's where they were more liberal. But, you will have noticed, I don't turn the book into Gattaca. I try to keep this in the background because obviously someone else has written Gattaca. It's an excellent film. It's very thought provoking. I didn't want to do that again. It's kept in the background, but it is obvious — you don't even really need to read between the lines — that this is a society that engages in eugenics. You notice that all the Roman families have three children or two children, and there's always a mix of sexes. You never have all boys or all girls. You know what they're doing. They're doing sex-selective abortions, like upper-class Indians and Chinese people do now. You've now dealt with the problem of not enough girls among those posh people, but they still want a mixture of the two. You notice that the Romans have got irritatingly perfect teeth and their health is all very good. And people mock Cyler, one of the characters, because his teeth haven't been fixed. He's got what in Britain get called NHS teeth. He hasn't got straightened teeth, because he genuinely comes from a really, really poor background. I have put that in there deliberately to foil those values off each other, to try to show what a world would look like where there are certain values that will just never come to the fore.
And as you mentioned, industry: how those values also might influence which areas technology might focus on, which I think is a great point.
I did that quite deliberately. There is a scene in the first book in Kingdom of the Wicked where Linnaeus — who's the Whig, the nice Whig, the lovely Whig who believes in civil rights and justice and starts sounding awfully Martin Luther King-ish at various points, and that kind of thing; he’s the most likable form of progressive, Stoic Roman ideas — and when he encounters a child that the parents have kept alive, a disabled child, which in his society would just be put down at birth like Peter Singer, they have Peter Singer laws, he's horrified. And he doesn't even know if it's human.
I actually wrote a piece about this couple of years ago for Law & Liberty, for Liberty Fund. I did find that people wanted to live in this sort of society. And I just sort of thought, “Hmm, there are a lot more people out there who clearly agree with things like eugenics, Peter Singer laws, a society that has absolutely no welfare state. None.” There are people who clearly find that kind of society attractive. And also the authoritarianism, the Soviet-style veneration of the military. A lot of people clearly quite like that. And clearly like that it’s a very orderly society where there are lots of rules and everybody knows where they stand. But even when the state is really, really very powerful.
I deliberately put a scene in there, for example, where Pilate’s expectorating about compulsory vaccinations — because he's a Roman and he thinks compulsory vaccinations save lives and he doesn't give a s**t about your bodily integrity. I did try to leave lots of Easter eggs, to use a gaming expression, in there to make it clear that this is a society that's a bit Gattaca-ish. I did that for a reason.
I don't know if there's a sequel in mind, but do you think that this world eventually sort of Christianizes? And if this is what the world looks like 2000 years ago, what would that world look like today?
I haven't thought of the answer to the first one. I must admit. I don't really know the answer to that. But in the second one, I did discuss this in quite a bit of detail with my then partner. And she said, “I honestly think that with that sort of aggressiveness and militarism, they will finish up conquering the planet. And then it'll start looking like a not-nice version of Star Trek. It won't be the Federation. It will be much more likely to be Khan and the Klingons and they'll start looking really, really Klingon basically.” That was her comment at the time.
Like a more militaristic version of Star Trek.
Yeah. But sort of very militarized and not the Prime Directive or any of that. Obviously Star Trek is very much an American conception of Americans in space. My Romans in space would look much more like the Centauri out of Babylon 5 or the Klingons in Star Trek. They would be much more aggressive and they’d be a lot more ambiguous…
I don't know how much of a Star Trek fan you are, but of course there's the mirror universe, which kind of looks like that. We have the evil Kirk and the evil Spock. There's still advance, but there's like a Praetorian Guard for the captain and…
All of that. Yes. I hadn't really thought about the first question, but the second question I thought, “Yeah, if this persists into the future, imagining a hypothetical future, then I think you are going to be dealing with people who are really, really quite scary.”
Apparently you're not working on a sequel to this book, but what are you working on? Another book?
Yes. I'm actually being pursued at the moment by a British publisher, who I won't drop into it because otherwise, if I say the name, then I will never, never be forgiven. And then they will insist on me writing a book. I'm never going to be the world's most super productive novelist. I think that I may finish up in my life writing maybe another two. I look at Stephen King. That man writes a door stopper of a book every time he sits down to have a hot meal. Incredible. How does he do it? I'm not that person.
Helen, thank you so much for coming on the podcast.
Thank you very much for having me.
What is progress and how do we get more of it? It's a core question here at Faster, Please! and something Jason Crawford thinks a lot about. Jason is the founder of The Roots of Progress, a nonprofit dedicated to establishing a new philosophy of progress for the 21st century. He writes about the history of technology and industry and the philosophy of progress.
In this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, Jason explains how progress is about more than just economic growth, discusses where it comes from, and distinguishes progress from utopianism. Below is an edited transcript of our conversation.
James Pethokoukis: You are part of a growing intellectual movement that aims to understand two big things: why human progress happens and how to speed it up. First of all, why is this of interest to you?
Jason Crawford: Most of my career for almost 20 years was in the tech industry. I have a background in computer science. I was a software engineer, engineering manager, and tech startup co-founder. And about five-plus years ago, I got really interested in progress. It began as an intellectual hobby, and I just came from the perspective that, like, the progress in material living standards over the last couple of hundred years—I mean more than an order of magnitude improvement in industrialized countries—is basically the greatest thing ever to happen to humanity, or at least way up there. You know, in the top three. And if you care about human wellbeing and you look at this fact of history, I think you have to be a little awestruck about it. And I think you have to ask three basic questions: First, how did this happen? Second, why did it take so long to really get going? And three, how can we continue it into the future?
What do we mean by progress? Are you talking about spending power or are you talking about human lifespan? Leisure time? People could define it differently. When we use the word progress during this conversation, what are you talking about?
Yeah, there's at least two basic and important meanings to progress. So one is progress in our capabilities, our ability to understand and control the world: science, technology, industry, infrastructure, wealth accumulation, and so forth. But then there's …
I love that wealth accumulation part. Oh man, I love hearing about that.
Surplus wealth is very important, and infrastructure is a form of wealth, right? But then there's an even deeper—I think the ultimate meaning of progress, the true progress of human progress is progress in human wellbeing: the ability to live longer, happier, healthier lives, lives of more freedom and choice and opportunity with more things open to us, more ability for self-actualization. Ultimately, it's that human progress that matters, and it’s why we care about this.
I think a lot about choice and opportunity, the human freedom aspect. Sometimes when I talk about it, people will kind of condense it down to “stuff.” Like, “You just want more stuff. How much more stuff do we need?” But I think there is that deeper meaning, and I don't think most people who are interested in progress and these questions are interested in it just because they just think we want more stuff.
First off, stuff is underrated. People like to dismiss it as if material comforts don't matter. They matter a lot. And I think people just take the current level of affluence for granted and they don't think about how life could be way better. You know, people in 1800 if you could ask them, they would probably say they were fairly satisfied with their lives as well. They had no idea what was possible.
But you're right that it's not just about stuff. I mentioned choice and opportunity. Think about the ability that the average person has (at least the average person in a reasonably wealthy country) to live where they want, to have the kind of job that they want instead of having to be a farmer or just having to accept the trade that their father had, the ability to marry whom they want when they want, to have children or not and how many children to have and when to have them, the ability to go on vacation.
There are a lot of these things that we take for granted now that people did not always have. So it's not just about a full belly and a roof over your head and a warm bed to sleep in at night. Those are great things. And, again, they're underrated. But it's also about romance and knowledge and exploration and excitement and adventure and self-actualization, and self-expression—all of those very human values, which are psychological values. Those are also supported and enabled by material progress.
Do we still not know how progress happens, for the most part? We know institutions are important. Deirdre McCloskey talks about the Bourgeois Deal, in which innovators said, “Let me creatively destroy the old and bad ways of doing things, the scythes, ox carts, oil lamps, propeller planes, film cameras, and factory lacking high-tech robots, and I will make you all rich.” Do we need to know more than that?
Those questions that I posed earlier, I'm obviously not the first person to ask any of them or even to deeply study them. So two things: First off, I think that while the knowledge is out there and is maybe well known to academic experts who study this stuff, I don't think it's ever been given really great popular treatment. And definitely not one that goes into … remember the very first question that I posed was literally, how did it happen? So when I started, I went into this study and I'm now writing a book because there was a book that I wanted to read five years ago and I couldn't find it. It didn't exist. I don't think it does exist. I wanted to learn in one volume, in one summary, what were the major discoveries and inventions that created the modern world, and that gave us this standard of living?
And I wanted to really understand what were we doing wrong that made agricultural productivity so low? What were we doing wrong that made disease so rampant, right? What were we doing wrong such that most people were stuck going not very far outside their village their entire lives? And I mean, doing wrong: I say that a little tongue in cheek. Obviously we were doing something wrong. We just didn't know how to do it better, but what did we have to learn? So I don't think that that has ever been put together in a very accessible summary for the general public in a single volume.
You said a lot of this information is out there, but it's more academic so we need to popularize it. Though, for sure, we're not just talking about old papers that we're going to refer to. There's plenty of new research on the Industrial Revolution; on how you create today a modern, fast-growing economy; how you increase productivity growth. It's a well-researched topic on which the research is definitely ongoing.
Yeah, absolutely. So that's the other part of it, which is that even within academia, even at the frontiers of knowledge among the experts, there are open questions and there's still, frankly, a fair bit of disagreement. If you want a good summary of the academic literature and where the state of the discussion is at this point, there's a new book that just came out, How the World Became Rich, by Koyama and Rubin. It does a good job of summarizing [of] the academic literature. I do think there's a fairly good consensus, or at least among most folks in the field, that institutions and culture somehow are at the root of a lot of both how the original Great Enrichment began and also why some nations have caught up and others haven't.
I think there are still a good amount of open questions at a sort of fine-grained detail level: If it's institutions and culture, which institutions exactly? And which aspects of culture really make the difference? You can look at Britain and you can say they were able to create the Industrial Revolution, in part, because they had a great deal of economic freedom among other things. But then you can also look at various Asian countries that have caught up in a large part in terms of economic growth with some economic freedom, but certainly not the level that Britain had.
And even Britain was sort of weirdly missing things. Like, for more than a century after the South Sea bubble in 1720 it was extremely difficult to create a corporation, let alone a limited liability corporation, right? So you could make a partnership like Boulton and Watt, but to do a corporation I believe required an act of Parliament for over a hundred years. Now, making it easy to create corporations is sort of a key institution and ultimately a key part of economic freedom. Britain was able to start the Industrial Revolution without that. So if you want to really understand what's going on here, you have to get to a pretty fine-grained level. And I think that is still an open area of research.
I think that's an interesting point. You bring up corporations. It's not just technology; it's not just the steam engine or the combustion engine or Moore's law and the microchip. It's not just these bits of technology that somehow happen and thank goodness they did. And maybe in the future will get more. It's broad; it's really kind of a holistic, whole-society thing where you have culture, you have institutions, you certainly have innovators and entrepreneurship. So it's figuring out all these things. Why I find it so fascinating is that it provides a lens to examine all parts of human activity. In my newsletter on Substack, I write about movies and TV shows and books: the cultural aspect. I'll also talk to technologists and I'll talk to economists because all those pieces added together are what create progress.
You can look at economic freedom as one thing that happened in Britain that helped create the Industrial Revolution. But I also think it is not at all a coincidence that Britain was the land of Locke and Bacon and Newton. There was something much deeper than just laws and politics going on, something at the level of philosophy and culture, I think, that enabled them to break out the way they did.
Part of this is the belief that you can solve problems. Your solution may create some other problem, but we can solve that one, too. It's about a belief that we can make tomorrow better. But it's not about creating utopia, because some of those solutions are going to create new problems.
I do like the term “solutionism,” and in fact, I adopted that term in an opinion piece I wrote for MIT Technology Review a little while ago, where I was talking about optimism versus pessimism—I tend not to use the term “optimist” because there are different types of optimism, and you can have complacent optimism, where you just assume that there aren't going to be any big problems or that everything will go fine, no matter what we do.
And that is a big mistake. But you can also have more prescriptive optimism that says, “Look, we may or may not be facing large challenges. Maybe the world is even not heading in a good direction, but we have some agency. We have some ability to work and to fight if necessary and to create a better world. And so let's go about it.” Blind optimism is just complacency, but blind pessimism is just defeatism. And neither of those are good. In that editorial, I use the term “solutionism” to try to get at this mentality that both acknowledges the reality of problems, but then also acknowledges the possibility of solutions. I think that's the mindset we need.
I'm not a big believer in utopia, as long as those utopias are populated by flawed humans. But I don't think this is the best of all possible worlds. It can be better without being utopian.
I think the mistake in utopian visions is the notion that utopia is a sort of static end state and then we stop and we don't progress beyond. And I have a much more dynamic view of what even utopia is or could be and of the future. My view is one of continuous progress where we keep getting better. And then we get better after that. And then we get better after that. And, and by the way, David Deutsch points out in his book, The Beginning of Infinity, that every step of progress along the way will create new problems. And that is not an indictment of progress. It's simply the nature of progress, the same way that advancements in science open up new questions that we don't know how to answer. Advances in material progress or in technology will open up new problems that we don't yet know how to solve but can solve with the next iteration of progress.
There was a nice BBC profile of this progress movement that you were featured in. And it said that among progress thinkers, "There is an entrepreneurial bias towards action. The prospective benefits of a new technology dominate considerations of what a bad actor might do with it. The fear of missing out overwhelms the fear of losing everything." Do you think that's a blind spot? Are we too dismissive of how things might go wrong?
I think that could easily become a blind spot for the progress community. And that's part of why I don't like the term “optimist” or why I think it can be misleading. That's why I talk about complacent optimism as being not the mentality we want. We want to acknowledge and engage with many of these very real risks and concerns. If we don't, the future will go badly and that's not what we want, and there are good examples of this. Early in the development of genetic engineering, some people started to realize, "Hey, if we're not careful with this, we could be creating dangerous new diseases." And they actually put a moratorium on certain types of experiments. They called for this and got together about eight months later at a conference, the famous Asilomar Conference—1975, I think it was—to discuss safety procedures.
And they came up with a set of danger levels or risk levels for different types of experiments. And they came up with a set of safety procedures, matching those levels: “If you're at bio risk level three, you should be doing safety procedures X, Y, and Z.” So at the simplest, maybe you don't even need a mask or gloves or whatever. And then at the absolute highest level, you're in an extremely controlled room. You've got a full suit on and the room has negative pressure so that if the door accidentally opens the air blows in, not out, etc. You've got all of these things, right? And so that was a pretty effective method—proactively, by the way. Very importantly, this was not in response to an outbreak.
It wasn't like they created the disease first and killed a bunch of people and then said, “Whoops. Let's figure out how to not do that again.” They actually anticipated the potential risk, but they did so not on kind of like vague fears that were motivated by just some sort of anti-science or anti-technology sentiment. They did so by just very hard-headedly, rationally, logically looking at what could happen and, how do we prevent this? And how do we make progress and also have safety? So I think, ultimately, safety has to be a part of progress. In fact, historically, getting safer is one of the overall aspects of progress. If you set aside potential tail risk but just look at day-to-day safety, we are much safer today than we were in the past. That is an accomplishment. And really a world of progress ought to be a world in which we are getting continually safer, right? If we're not, we're missing some important aspect of it.
Of course, then there's the other side who assume any more technological progress will just make the world worse. I wrote this piece about a movie and its sequel I love. I love Blade Runner. I love the sequel, Blade Runner 2049. But it occurred to me that there's a lot of amazing technological advances in that movie. You have human-level AI, fully sentient robots. We have space colonies. You have flying cars, yet it's a terrible world. It's a world where it seems like most people don't live particularly well. The climate is horrible. But there wasn't really a mechanism in the film to say why things are bad other than, well, it works for the film, because it creates drama. Do you feel like you're making the contrarian argument in this society or you're making the argument which maybe most people believe, but maybe they forgot that they believe it?
I think it has become contrarian to think that continued scientific and technological and industrial progress will actually lead to human wellbeing. I think that was not contrarian, say, a little over 100 years ago. Certainly before World War I, that was pretty much assumed, and you could just sort of take it for granted. And then ever since then, the wars and the Depression, and everything—that was a major shock to the Western world. Everything seemed to be going really well. In fact, people were even optimistic that technology would lead to an end to war. They thought maybe technology and industry and this economic growth and everything and free trade was all leading to a new era of world peace. And then it absolutely did not. And so that was a very rude awakening, that it turns out moral progress and technological progress don't actually necessarily go hand-in-hand. We can have stagnation or even regress on moral issues at the same time as technology is racing ahead. And I think that was a shock to the Western psyche, and maybe in some sense we have not fully recovered.
At the heart of progress, is it essentially a capitalist, democratic philosophy? Or is it not necessarily either of those things? I write that I'm not going to create a better world that I want to live in that is not fundamentally democratic-capitalist. Now it doesn't have to be capitalist exactly like the United States. Maybe it's going to be capitalist like Scandinavia, but I think something that would be recognizable as capitalist and be recognizable as a democracy. In my image of the future, that's at its very heart. Is that part of progress studies or is that a different issue? Is that what you think?
Look, I love the notion of a capitalist future, personally, but that doesn't mean that everybody shares that view. So historically certainly …
Are there pro-progress socialists?
Yeah. Well, so historically, I mean the early Marxists and in the early Soviet era, so we're very …
Yeah, utopian. It's inherently utopian. I love retweeting images from the Soviet space program. You know, Soviet lunar bases. So that was part of it. But I wonder if it is still the same?
It wasn't just space. I mean, they wanted to industrialize the farms. They wanted to have huge power plants. There was this ethos that technology was going to bring us into the future. Unfortunately, it was a collectivist future. And it didn't turn out so well. But, today, there are still a few folks who believe in progress and want some sort of full socialism or communism. There's this notion of fully-automated luxury communism.
But mostly I would say the proponents of progress are more general proponents of, broadly speaking, the liberal order or liberal democracy or whatever you want to call it. Within that, there's definitely a broad range of political ideologies. On the one hand, you've got libertarians who say, "Look, the way to make progress is to get the government out of the way." On the other hand, you have a spectrum from that to the progressives who say "The way to make progress is to have massive government investment in progress." But what I like about the progress movement is that the very notion of progress gives us a shared goal and a value and some common ground to actually have these discussions about. And we can now actually debate all of our preferred policies on the basis of what's actually going to cause progress. And let's bring history and data and evidence and logic to the discussion. And I think that would be a healthy discussion to have.
What's the biggest reason that you think you are not utterly wasting your time here? Some people would say, “Listen, we have a half century where progress seems to have slowed down.” There are a lot of theories that all the easy gains have been made. Yes, things will get better, but it's going to be very, very slow. People who are talking about leaps and acceleration forward, that is the world of science fiction. Why do you think that things could not just be better in the future, but that pace of improvement could be such that people notice it? What I'm imagining is a pace of material progress, of health, where it is noticeable. Where people would say, "Yeah, I think something's happening here." Do you think that's possible? And why are you confident, if so, that that is possible?
The pace of progress is already such that people see lots of progress in their lifetime, if they are able to notice it. What are we doing right now? Recording a podcast. That's not a thing that existed 20 years ago. Wikipedia didn't exist or barely existed. The entire explosion of the internet has happened within living memory, right? Not to mention, we didn't have mRNA vaccines. Soon hopefully we'll have supersonic airplanes again and rockets to the Moon and Mars. And I think there's plenty of progress to find if you look for it.
One reason why I started the newsletter was I really felt for the first time really since the ‘90s like something was happening. Even with the pandemic, I felt something was happening. It seemed like AI wasn't just about better search algorithms or something. But AI was going to be used in healthcare to create better drugs. You have what's going on with SpaceX. And then the vaccines, which seemed to come really, really fast. And I sort of felt like some things seemed to be coming together, where the progress seems to be palpable. Whatever was ever happening with the GDP numbers or productivity numbers, there seemed to be things happening in the larger world that said to me that something's taking off here. And I want it to continue again. If we're in an age of progress, I think that feeling is palpable and noticeable to people.
Yeah, I hope so. But facts don't interpret themselves, and people can look at the same facts and come to very different conclusions. So ultimately, I think we need not only the continued progress to show people that continued progress is possible, but we also need the voices who are pointing this out and explaining it. Because the fact is that even in the greatest possible era, there will be some curmudgeon who says that, "This is the end. And none of the stuff is very good anyway."
And even in eras where not very much progress was happening at all, like the age of Francis Bacon, Bacon and some of his contemporaries could look around at just a few scattered examples of inventions and discovery—like the new continents that were being discovered, and gunpowder, and the compass, and the printing press—and they could extrapolate from that to essentially the Industrial Revolution, which is an amazing act of vision. So in any era, no matter how well or badly things are going, there will be some people who see it or don't see it. And so, ultimately, that's why we need more popular treatment of this stuff. We need to tell the story of progress and make it accessible to the general public. That's what I'm working on.
If we're talking in 10 years and things really don't seem to have gotten a lot better, what do you think probably went wrong?
You said 10 years. At a very deep level, I think this is a generational project. I think changing people's attitudes at this fundamental of a level is the sort of thing that really you speak to the young. And you get through to people when they're still open to changing their minds and are still thinking deeply about the world. And hopefully in the next generation you know you can have a shift.
You’ve said that every high school in America should have a curriculum of progress. What are the stories that would be in that curriculum? What would people be learning? Would it be a class or would it just be kind of in everything—it would be in science class, it would be in history class?
I think it could be certainly be integrated into some of those classes. I think it falls most squarely in history. I think it certainly could be a class on its own or incorporated into the general curriculum. Now, I actually created a high school-level progress course, a course in the history of technology, essentially. It was commissioned by a private high school and is still being taught by them, I believe.
That's outstanding.
There's a virtual option, so even if you're not enrolled, you can take it online. And we cover a number of major topics. The major topics are agriculture, materials and manufacturing, energy, transportation, information, medicine, and safety. And then we do a little bit about looking forward to the future. But we cover what were the major developments in each of those.
So in agriculture, we'll go into things like mechanization of agriculture and the invention of the reaper and the combine harvester. We'll take a look at soil fertility and how fertilizer was understood and developed. We'll look at things like food preservation and refrigeration and freezing and so forth. And so we just kind of dive into some of the major developments that took us from, in agriculture, a world where half the workforce had to be farmers and yet we still had periodic famines and also people had not very varied diets and not very fresh food. And then today we have this world where a small percent of the workforce can provide everybody with a robust, reliable food supply of fresh, varied food. That complete transformation of the food world. And we look at what created that. And then we do the same thing in transportation and energy and manufacturing and so forth. And when you're done with all those modules, all of that adds up to a really dramatic picture of how the entire world was transformed and life was transformed in every dimension.
Jason, thanks for coming on the podcast.
Yes, it's been great.
Ali Hajimiri is the Bren Professor of Electrical Engineering and Medical Engineering at the California Institute of Technology. He is also co-director of the Space Solar Power Project, which is developing technology capable of generating solar power in space and beaming it back to Earth. Hajimiri and colleagues are designing solar arrays composed of hundreds of small photovoltaic tiles that would be linked together to form larger modules, and then those modules — flying together in formation like a school of fish — would form a hexagonal power station in space. These flexible arrays would be rolled up when launched and unfurl at their orbital destination.
In this inaugural episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, Ali tells me about how space-based solar works, what problem it solves, and how long we’ll have to wait before we see orbiting power stations in the sky. For more, check out my recent 5QQ chat with Ali. Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation.
Pethokoukis: Space-based solar — putting solar panels in space and beaming the energy to Earth — seems like a beautiful, elegant solution. Why is it a good idea? What problem is it solving?
Hajimiri: So the primary problem that it solves is being able to get around the days and nights, the cycles of the weather, the cloudy days, and all those things — and having dispatchable power where you need it, when you need it, and as much as you need.
An advantage over ground-based solar?
Correct. And the other benefit of it is that essentially you can have these systems in space for a long time, and you can route it the way you want. You can actually distribute the power; you can break it up into smaller pieces. You can say, “I want to send 20 percent to New York, 30 percent to LA, and 40 percent to, I don't know, Seattle.”
Wouldn’t these panels sometimes be in the darkness, on the night side of the Earth? So how would they work?
It depends on which orbit you put it in. If you put them in geosynchronous orbit (or something near geosynchronous) you are basically in the sun for most of the time, except for 20 minutes on the equinoxes. Most of the time you're not eclipsed, because you're so far away that the shadow of Earth is so small. And because of the inclination of the Earth, because it's at an angle, you would get eclipsed for 20 minutes on each one of those.
And as it’s transferring power down, it doesn't have to be directly over the collection station, right? It can be at an angle?
It doesn't. That's the beauty of it. Because it's a very large array, it redirects the energy. You can electronically steer it. It does not even need mechanical steering. So you can actually create a focal point of energy where you need, where your recovery of energy occurs. And you can move that very rapidly — on the scales of nanoseconds, extremely fast — from one place to another.
Does it require new technology to distribute that power? Or is that basically using current technology?
On the ground, we have what we call “rectennas,” which is basically rectifying antennas. These are another array of antennas that are very plain, very flat. I mean, if this were not radio, I would've had demonstrations of these things to show you how they look. But these are like thin sheets of material, like printed circuit boards that go in your computers and things of that sort, that sit on the ground. They collect the energy, they convert it to DC power, and then that's converted to AC. And then at that point, you can plug it in to connect to your network — essentially to your distribution line, the same power distribution line that you use. You can even envision putting this next to photovoltaic solar [panels] that are out there, or any other kind of power plant. It could be any kind of power plant, and you just connect to it and add and augment the power that you generate with these.
So you can basically bolt this onto the existing power system?
Yes. I mean, once you are on the ground station, once you go get past the rectenna and the conversion to AC, then that's basically compatible with all the other AC network.
Solar power is becoming cheaper, and the land area we would need to cover with solar panels to power the whole Earth is smaller than you'd think. But traditional solar relies on storage at night when the sun isn't shining. But what you're suggesting wouldn't be reliant on batteries. Is that right?
What we do allows you to send the power where you need at the time you need — and you can even break it up into different proportions. But the other thing that it does is that, since you have it 24/7, pretty much you don't need the storage, which is a big challenge.
The other thing is that there are places that don't have the power infrastructure. A good analogy to this is cell phones versus landlines. Thirty years ago, there were places in Africa that didn't have landlines. In Sub-Saharan Africa today, there are these same places that still don’t have landlines, but there they have leapfrogged to cell phones.
So this way, you can actually get to places that don't have power. You can think about the Arctic Circle — you can think about a lot of places, remote islands and things of that sort — that may not have power infrastructure. And this way you can enable it when you need to have the power over there.
This is not a new idea. It's an idea from about 80 years ago that you're attempting to turn into reality. I wonder if you could spend a minute or two talking about what you're doing.
It is an idea that I think the earliest rendition, that I know of, is in a short story by Asimov, as many ideas are. But you know, what’s different is that the technology didn't exist for doing these kinds of things in space. I mean, it sounds like a good idea, but it's also a very challenging idea in many different ways. One is that, when you put things in space, things are expensive — you pay dollars per gram. That's extremely expensive for things that you put in orbit. So one of the key parts of making this happen is to make it lightweight.
The other thing is that these array elements, making it with large arrays, were not very practical up until the point where we are in integrated circuits — the same chips that go into our computers and phones. The same technology is now what we are using to make these incredibly large arrays that are very lightweight, because these are very small and lightweight.
And then now, on top of it, we are making them flexible, because the way to deploy something that's of that magnitude is to roll it, then deploy it, and then unroll it. You can think about this like a sheet. These are like sails that you open up in space. Now, the technology to enable that integrated circuit, the packaging and all those things, did not really exist until recently. And that's why we came up with a new architecture for doing it, and that allows us to do the original renditions of this idea.
The thinking was that we have the solar panels, and we aggregate all of the power. We have this giant antenna that points to Earth and then sends it. And in that case, you would be pointing to one direction, and you couldn't move it around because it was mechanically pointed. And if you wanted to reorient it, you have to mechanically reorient that antenna and point it in a different direction. We are doing it all electronically. So we have this very thin, very flat sheet that transmits the energy. Because of the coherent addition of all these billions and billions of sources — it's like an army of ants.
So a swarm? A solar swarm?
Exactly, exactly. So we've gone from the old mindset, which was what I describe as a big elephant, as opposed to an army of ants. I mean, each one of them is capable of doing different things, but because of the swarm nature, you can actually make it very lightweight and spread out.
How old is the project that you're working on at Caltech?
We've been working on this for close to eight years now — seven or eight years actively. We've been working on the power transfer part of it — the part that I'd been working on even before this project, which is what led to this project — for like 10 or 12 years. Wireless power transfer for both terrestrial, as well as space-based applications.
And the powerless transfer is converted from sunlight into lasers? Microwaves? What?
It’s microwaves. It’s radio frequencies, essentially microwaves. Then you transmit it, and then you recover that on the ground.
Whenever I hear about any space project, I always think, “Well, was this possible before SpaceX? And is the reason we're talking about it because of that decline in launch costs?” Does your project depend on that, or is it just a fantastic enabler of it?
I would say it's one of the four or five enablers that converged to make this closer to something that can actually be done. Definitely, SpaceX is a catalyst in lowering the barrier for space enterprises — anything that you want to do, non-governmental stuff, smaller projects — SpaceX and alike. I mean, there are other places like Blue Origin, things like that.
So people are trying to do that. They are trying to level the playing field so that more entrepreneurs can get into it. Now it can be in academia, industry, or anywhere else. And that plays a role. And again, there are all these other technologies and architectural changes that also enable us. So I would say that's definitely one of the four or five catalysts that had to come together to make this happen.
I've seen a video of you describing how there are small wafers that add up into bigger panels which are arranged into this giant array. Each one would be like a power plant in space. How big would each of those be?
Yeah, that's a good way to think about it. Each one of these power plants, you can think about them on the order of a kilometer by kilometer, or about a mile by a mile. So that is like a square mile or square kilometer. Something in that range. It depends on the orbit you choose and the size of the ground station. There's a little bit of a tradeoff. You can make it larger in space and smaller on the ground, or smaller in space and larger on the ground. So there's that trade off you can play with. But yeah, it's about a square kilometer or square mile in space, each one of them.
And how much power could that theoretically generate back on Earth?
So somewhere between like several hundred megawatts to a gigawatt, depending on the angles and things like that. It's a substantial amount of power.
How would that compare to a nuclear reactor?
It would be comparable. And it can be even higher than that in some cases, depending. The other interesting thing I should say about comparing to these other kinds of generators is that, since it's a modular system — this is actually a formation flying of satellites; each one of the modules is about 20 to 60 meters, depending on different designs for different orbits; they are formation flying in close proximity to each other — and this means that if one of them fails, you can actually replace it without having to replace the whole thing. So it's very modular. You can actually have robustness because of that.
I think when they had to repair the Hubble Space Telescope, it was a pretty big deal.
Yes.
And I'd hate to think it would be as involved with fixing each of these panels. All we’d be doing is space walks.
Exactly. That's an excellent point because the way we've designed them, one of the key elements is the cost structure of these modules. It has to be economical at the end of the day, because we are using the same silicon technology that's used for all these electronics — and all the other stuff we're making at low cost. So the idea here is: For that component, we just decommission it, let it burn in the atmosphere and just put a new one in there. We don't have to replace components. It's just like a new satellite that’s put in the orbit, and the other one is just decommissioned. And the cost structure allows for that.
Would you envision this as just one arrow in the quiver? Or do you view this as something where we could get substantially all our power from space? What are sort of the potential and limitations?
I think, like any other technology, if it's successful, it'll be phased in. You can't really do it all at once. Now, as more and more of these stations are going to be put in space, then you can see how this will respond to the system. But my anticipation is that it would definitely be filling in the gaps in the baseline.
So, for example, if you look at the load line that the power generation has today on the Earth, it has changed because of the photovoltaics, quite interestingly. They had this duck — they call it the duck curve — because in the middle of the day, there's lower demand. The way it changes in the early afternoon, it goes up, peaks, and then comes back down and kind of looks like a duck.
But the interesting thing is, now photovoltaics have kind of brought up the middle of the duck. So they've brought up this middle gap that they had. And then now it's gotten to a point that, at some points, the bulk price of power is actually negative during the day. And what this does is it allows you to fill in the gaps where you need it. So for example, you could have most of your power being transmitted to New York in the afternoon, but three hours later, you can shift that power to LA, for example.
I think one thing people might say is, “We're already worried about too many Starlink satellites in orbit. These are much, much bigger! I mean, you would be able to see these from the Earth.” What do you make of that concern?
So, there are different aspects to this. Is it mostly a concern about, for example, space junk and getting crowded and all those things?
There’s the space junk concern. There are also just these sort of astronomical concerns, that it would be hard to do astronomy. And more sort of aesthetic concerns.
The aesthetic aspect, I can't talk to. I guess the beauty is in the eyes of the beholder. But the astronomy aspects: Again, there are obviously going to be windows, and there are going to be the times that this system passes overhead. But just to think about things, the area that is out there at 36,000 kilometers, which is the geosync, is actually 36 times larger than the area of the entire surface of the planet, including all of the water and all the oceans and everything. If you take that area, it's a much bigger sphere. So there's a lot more room, if anything, out there compared to other things that we make. So I'm not too concerned about that.
There are also people who think about, “Is it going to cause interference?” and all those things. And those are the kinds of things that we've learned how to deal with in radio systems. We have many different radio systems working concurrently and seamlessly, and we don't seem to have problems with that — like Wi-Fi and 5G and this and that. And you have Bluetooth, and all of these things seem to be working together. And the main reason is that we've learned how to do it in that respect.
There's also another set of concerns some people raise. “It's a health concern. Is it going to fry birds flying overhead?” And the answer to that is actually interesting, because the answer is that the energy density that anything, even in that beam spot, will get is comparable to what you get from standing out in the sun — except for the fact that it's what we call non-ionizing radiation as opposed to the sun, because it has UV and all those things that can actually change the molecules and the chemistry. So they can cause cancer (UV does), but radio frequencies don't. All they can do is generate heat. The benefit of this thing is that with that power level, you'd recover probably close to three times, three to three-and-a-half times, more than what you recover from photovoltaics. And you can have it during the day or night.
I was recently reading a big report from Citigroup about the space economy, and they went into some detail about space-based solar. That's the first time I remember reading Wall Street research about that technology. At this point, is it still so early that you're not getting much private sector interest?
First of all, I can tell you that there has been a tremendous amount of interest. I mean, especially recently, over the last couple of years, we've seen a lot more. And partly I think it’s because of the fact that the technology … I mean, 10-20 years ago, it was not really realistic because of the cost structure, the complexity of tech technologies, and all those things. But now people are starting to see the pathway. So we've had a lot of interest from various places. And it's kind of growing exponentially in a way, recently.
So I'm anticipating seeing a lot more of that investment. In fact, we've been approached by several investors in this regard, too. But it'll take time. It's not a short-term project. It's not an app that we can start today and have a first prototype working in a few weeks or months. We've been working on this for quite a while, and it has to continue on. We, in fact, are going to have a launch sometime soon, to have a first demonstration of some of the key components of the technologies that we are launching.
The Chinese seem pretty interested in this technology.
They are. And it's interesting. A lot of this thing has happened in part because of these new technologies that have been developed at Caltech and at other places that made it possible. So people are taking another look at it. There was this old kind of mindset about it, and this new mindset has renewed interest in it, because of these things. Yeah, the Chinese are interested. The United Kingdom is very interested in this. The Japanese are very interested in this. There are a lot of other efforts in other places — India is actually even interested in it. So we've actually seen a lot of interest all over the world, in this area.
Is there something you need government to do or to stop doing at this stage in the development of the technology?
A great question. One is, in terms of investment, definitely. These are the kind of things that, to get started, you need a big entity like government to put investment in it — in terms of research and development — because the barrier to entry is pretty large, regarding the amount of initial investment. Of course, the return eventually is going to be large, too.
That's important also from a regulatory perspective. It's important for government in general — about the technologies related to wireless power transfer, both terrestrial and space — I think the government needs to be more proactive in terms of allowing it to flourish and not getting in the way. With everything new that comes in, there of course needs to be a thoughtful discourse about it. But if it gets to a point of becoming too much of an impediment to innovation and progress, then that would not be a good thing.
So I think allowing these technologies to flourish — in terms of spectral allocations and other things of that sort — would be a good thing to continue to do.
Are there key, deal-breaking technological challenges that you still need to solve?
There are. I mean, it is fair to say that not all the technical challenges have been solved, but the pathway has become more clear over the last several years in terms of at least how we go about solving them. It's sometimes the unknown unknowns that get you at the end of the day. But we have more of the things that we know that we need to figure out. And I think we have a clear pathway.
But in general, nobody has built a coherent structure of this magnitude anywhere — not even on Earth, let alone in space. So for example, that analogy that I used earlier: If you have an army of ants, you want the ants, that are like a mile apart, to be synchronized within a few picoseconds (and a picosecond is one-trillionth of a second).
So the timing accuracy of that — that kind of thing … We have solutions; we are working on things. It's a combination of various advanced technologies that allows us to get this kind of timing synchronization. But those are the kind of challenges that we're trying to overcome and solve when you go to this scale. And it is something that has emerged because we've solved the other problems. Now we are at the point to say, “Okay, well, now we are scaling it up. How do we do these things?” And we need to solve these problems.
How long until space-based solar arrives? Are we talking the 2030s? The 2040s?
I'm more on the optimistic side, I guess. I think probably by the end of the 2020s, you will have some demonstration, some power transfer demo. We are going to have to show it soon. We are going to have some technology demonstrations.
But if you want to have a substantial amount of power transferred, probably before the end of this decade. It would probably not provide a whole lot of our power at that point. That takes another decade or two to get to that point — if this pathway turns out to be the right pathway to go down.
Ali, thanks for coming on the podcast.
No problem. It's my pleasure.
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