Fārābī on the Future Contingent Propositions and God’s Knowledge of Them by Dr Mohammad Saleh Zarepour

Dr Zarepour demonstrated Fārābī’s interpretation of Aristotle’s work  on logical fallibilism. He showed how Fārābī’s views differs from  Aristotle on logical and theological fatalism. To reject these types of  fatalism, Fārābī argues that the truth values of future contingent  propositions are already distributed but this distribution is  indefinite. As a result, that a contingent proposition is now true does  not make it necessary in itself. Formalising Fārābī’s solutions to the  problems of logical and theological fatalism in the language of  contemporary modal logic, Dr Zarepour discussed its strength and  weakness. He also showed that although Fārābī defends these solutions,  there can be found passages in his commentary which signal that he is  not totally satisfied with them. These passages can be taken as a sign  for his implicit inclination towards a specific sort of open theism  which was later explicitly defended by some important figures of Arabic  philosophy.