Freedom of Intellectual Expression: A Critique on the Legacy of “Books of Misguidance” by Dr Haidar Hobballah

Freedom of intellectual expression has become a central topic in the modern era, being thoroughly examined within religious discourses and tackled by jurists under the heading ‘books of misguidance’ (kutub al-ḍalāl). An examination of the jurisprudential literature will lead us to the following observations:

1. The concept of misguidance is extremely ambiguous and was frequently utilised as a means of character assassination. Apart from a few examples, no one coined for this concept a clear and precise meaning through which it’s instances could be understood. Are books of blasphemy and other religions books of misguidance? What about books of certain denominations? Or books of mockery and poems against religion? Or books that oppose Truth? If so, which truth is intended? Is it all truths within religion or a specific part of a doctrine? Some jurists even consider books that are true to be books of misguidance if they lead to the misguidance of people, such as the books of mystics! More problematic than this is the lack of differentiation between the right of ijtihād and ingenuity in religious thought, and the concept of misguidance and innovation.

2. It becomes clear that the Qur’an does not speak directly about this issue. Rather it refers to generic concepts, such as the prohibition of misguiding people or the prohibition on helping others in sin. However, the jurists have attempted to apply these generic concepts on specific instances and as a result of this many errors and confusion have been made. What is quite shocking is that no primary textual evidence, with the exception of four traditions, three of them which are weak, can be found from the Prophetic traditions. Even these traditions that exist don’t support the idea of removing individual freedom. In addition, opposing evidences can be found within the hadith and historic literature that strengthen the notion that the state should not interfere in silencing different opinions.

3. Rational proofs have been the main type of evidence used by jurists. These were then employed contextually to help deal with deviant thought. There is no religious command found in the scripture that specifies a specific method of how to tackle falsehood. This gives us the space to come to a reasonable solution that does not result in taking away intellectual freedom.

A comprehensive reading on this subject concludes that whilst the law gives importance on protecting religious values it has not described for us specific measures that we can use in countering devious thought. This entails that we have been left free to employ measures that are rational and in accordance with the changes of time and place.