Welcome to the Once CA Podcast.
Please welcome Gonul Tol, the founding director of the Middle East Institute's Center for Turkish Studies, who discusses Turkey and Turkish relations in the region.
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Transcript
00:01:29 SPEAKER_00
What Turkey is trying to do in Syria today is curbing the influence of the Syrian Kurds and that has become in fact the backbone of not only Turkey's Syria strategy but Turkey's regional strategy.
00:02:06 SPEAKER_04
This is John McElligot, your host for this episode of the 1CA podcast. We're joined today by Gunal Tol. She's the founding director of the Middle East Institute's Center for Turkish Studies. She's also an adjunct professor at George Washington University's Institute for Middle East Studies. After three years of field research in Germany and the Netherlands, she wrote her dissertation on the radicalization of the Turkish Islamist movement Miliskurus in Western Europe. She was also an adjunct professor at the College of International Security Studies at the National Defense University. She has taught courses on Islamist movements in Western Europe, Turkey, world politics, and the Middle East. She has written extensively on Turkey -U .S. relations, Turkish domestic politics, and foreign policy in the Kurdish issue. She's also a frequent media contributor. Ma 'am, thank you very much for being here.
00:02:58 SPEAKER_00
Thanks for having me.
00:02:59 SPEAKER_04
We wanted to talk about what you're focusing on these days. What are you writing about?
00:03:04 SPEAKER_00
Well, mostly about Turkey and what Turkey is doing in Syria. Recently, Turkey launched a military incursion into the northwestern Kurdish enclave. It's called Afrin. And it's a major concern, especially for the U .S. and the U .S. military, because the U .S. is there working with the Syrian Kurdish militia, and that's called the YPG, and Turkey at the moment is attacking the YPG forces in Afrin. And recently, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened to move into Manbij. Manbij is another northern Syrian town that is under the control of U .S.-backed Kurdish forces. And there are also around 2 ,000 U .S. Special Operations Forces in Manbij. So if Erdogan delivers on his threat and moves into Manbij, that could potentially... There is a high risk of a clash between the US and Turkey, so that's what we mostly focus on these days.
00:04:09 SPEAKER_04
Why do you think the average American should care about what's happening in Turkey right now?
00:04:13 SPEAKER_00
I think mainly because what the United States is trying to do in Syria is it's trying to confront the radical Islamic State in Syria. And it's working with the Kurdish militia there. And what Turkey is doing in Syria, the Syria policy that Turkey pursues,
00:04:32 SPEAKER_01
is doing in Syria, the Syria policy that
00:04:37 SPEAKER_00
has a direct impact on what the U .S. is trying to do in Syria. So what Turkey is doing in Syria is important for the U .S. national security interest.
00:04:48 SPEAKER_04
I've read a lot about that the last couple of years. And the Syrian civil war has been going on now for quite a while. What do you think would be the turning point over the next six months or year, considering other players like Russia as well?
00:05:03 SPEAKER_00
Well, it's very difficult. In 2011, when the uprising started, many experts as well as intelligence organizations, they thought that Assad only had six months because he didn't have the backing of the majority of the population. He was only backed by the Alevi minority. So people thought that he could not survive longer than six months, and that hasn't really happened. So it's really difficult to predict what will happen next in Syria. But what I see is because of Russian involvement in Syria,
00:05:42 SPEAKER_00
of Russian involvement in Syria, as you know, Russia militarily involved in Syria in 2015. And since then, I think it turned the tide in the Syrian conflict. So the regime gained a lot of territory, captured territory from the Islamic State and from the opposition. So the regime at the moment, the Assad regime, is quite confident that it will control all the territory that it used to control before the Syrian conflict started. So I think at this point, I'm not... hopeful that the Syrian opposition can put up a real fight. So that means probably with Russian backing and the backing of Iran and the Shia militias there, the regime is going to win. Again, they now, they captured a lot of territory and through diplomatic means as well, not just through military means. They have European countries, I think the majority of the international community now resign themselves to the fact that Assad will not go. So he is here to stay. And the main priority of international actors is to contain the Islamic State. And that's why toppling the regime is not a priority anymore. So when you combine that with the fact... that the regime is gaining military on the ground, I think the picture gets clearer that the regime will not be toppled. And also we have to talk about the state of the Syrian opposition. They were in a better place a few years ago now. Their international backers are not supporting them. They are not providing them logistical aid, financial aid anymore.
00:07:33 SPEAKER_01
financial aid
00:07:36 SPEAKER_00
They are very divided and the international community has their own suspicions because there are many radical groups inside the Free Syrian Army. So all these factors make it very difficult for the Syrian opposition to put up a real fight against the Assad regime. So that's why if I had to predict, I would say that the regime would probably win this war.
00:08:04 SPEAKER_04
It's connected to something you presented in 2015. You spoke at an MEI event and discussed Turkey's two objectives in Syria. The first was toppling Assad regime, which you've mentioned is unlikely now. And the second was preventing a Kurdish corridor along Turkey's southern border by marginalizing the Syrian Kurds. Could you talk about the background of the group Syria? Who are the Syrian Kurds and what's the connection to Turkey?
00:08:33 SPEAKER_00
Well, as you know, the Kurds are actually the biggest minority that do not have a state. There are around 30 million Kurds in the region, and they are spread across different countries, Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. And they are a marginalized group because in the countries that they live in, they are suppressed. In Turkey, for instance, 20 % of the population is of Kurdish origin. And yet they are still struggling. In fact, they've been waging a war against the Turkish state since the 1980s.
00:08:40 SPEAKER_01
are around
00:09:05 SPEAKER_00
So they want more political, social, economic rights. The Kurds in Syria, they are at a better place because since the first Gulf War, thanks to the no -fly zone established by the United States and the international community, they have an autonomous region. What started as a de facto autonomous region became a real autonomous region after the second Gulf War. So they have their own military, they have their own parliament, they have their own resources. So they are the ones, the Iraqi Kurds are the ones who have come closest to becoming a state. And in fact... They held a referendum in September 2017, an independence referendum. Unfortunately, it failed because all international actors, including Turkey and the United States, were opposed to the referendum. So they have become very fragile. Their project for independence is quite fragile at the moment. And the Syrian Kurds, again, they are oppressed by the regime. And until the Syrian conflict started, they did not even have ID cards. So if you do not have an ID card, you can't benefit from the services that the state is offering. So they have been very marginalized as well. And in Iran too, there is a sizable Kurdish minority. And in all these countries, in Turkey for instance, there is an organization that is considered a terrorist organization by Turkey. the US and the European Union, that is called the PKK. And it has its sister organizations in Syria, in Iraq, and in Iran. Their headquarters are in Iraq. So Turkey has been waging a war against the PKK. And it considers the YPG. The YPG is the group that the United States is working with, cooperating. They have become... an important ally in the fight against the Islamic State. So the United States considers the PKK as a terrorist organization, but technically the YPG, which is the PKK's Syrian offshoot, is not considered a terrorist organization by the United States. So that loophole created a lot of tension between Turkey and the United States. And Turkey thinks that there is no difference between the YPG and the PKK. What do you think?
00:11:43 SPEAKER_04
do you think?
00:11:44 SPEAKER_00
Well, I think they are the exact same organization. They share the same ideology. It's a Marxist -Leninist ideology. And they have the same leadership. And in terms of micromanaging daily affairs. The YPG might have some autonomy from the PKK, but I think they are the exact same organization. So that's why Turkey has been quite concerned about the fact that after the Syrian conflict started, the YPG started establishing this autonomous region in northern Syria. So that's why... Turkey's number one priority in Syria has become not toppling the Assad regime, but confronting the YPG and curbing its influence in Syria. So why does Turkey even care about the YPG?
00:12:40 SPEAKER_04
why does Turkey even care about the YPG? Do they hold strategically significant land or could? Economic interests? Why couldn't Turkey just forget about it, leave them alone? It's a very good question.
00:12:52 SPEAKER_00
leave them alone? It's a very good question. And you know, in Washington, D .C., we... talk about all different other things, but we don't actually ask this question. So it's a very important question. I personally believe that the YPG does not pose a threat to Turkey. The PKK does, obviously. The PKK is a terrorist organization and has been waging a war against Turkey since 1980s, but not the YPG. But Turkey considers it as a national security threat because the YPG started So in 2011, and that was when the Syrian conflict started, at the time Turkey had very close ties to the Assad regime. President Erdogan was friends with President Assad. They even vacationed together and Turkey had invested heavily in Syria. Visa restrictions were lifted. The two countries held joint cabinet meetings. Turkey, there were many Turkish companies, construction companies operating in Syria and Syria became Turkey's gateway to the rest of the region. So Turkey had very close ties, cultivated close ties to Syria. So that's why when the Syrian conflict started, Turkey did not immediately join the anti -Assad camp, thinking that Erdogan had leverage over Assad and Erdogan thought that he could in fact force Assad to carry out reforms. But of course that did not happen. So after a few months, Turkey came to terms with the fact that Assad was not going to leave and joined the anti -Assad camp. And when that happened, and Turkey did not only join the anti -Assad camp, but it became an organizational hub for the Syrian opposition. So in retaliation, the Assad regime allowed all the PKK leadership. who have been living in exile in Europe to come back to the country and basically gave a free hand to establish an autonomous region in northern Syria. And that's when Turkey's threat perception was heightened. Turkey thought that Assad is going to allow the Kurds to establish a continuous autonomous region which might link... to the Iraqi Kurdish region, so the Kurds will have access to the Mediterranean. And that's a major threat for Turkey because they think that if there is a continuous Kurdish autonomous region that has access to the Mediterranean right there, right on my southern border, then maybe my own Kurdish community will want similar things. So that's why Turkey is... turned its attention to the Kurds in Syria. So initially Turkey's number one focus in Syria was toppling the regime. Now it's become a secondary and maybe it's not even on Turkey's agenda anymore. So what Turkey is trying to do in Syria today is curbing the influence of the Syrian Kurds and that has become in fact the backbone of not only Turkey's Syria strategy but Turkey's regional strategy. Turkey is trying to do that in Iraq with the Iraqi Kurds. And that has shaped Turkey's relations with Russia. That's the main reason for the Turkey -Russia rapprochement. That's the main reason for Turkey -Iran rapprochement. That's the main reason for the problematic relationship between Turkey and the US. So that fear of Kurdish separatism has become the backbone of Turkey's foreign policy.
00:16:39 SPEAKER_04
It's interesting you talk about the connection there with Russia as well, because I wanted to ask you the regional power plays. And I was reading Peter Zeihan's predictions for Turkey and focused on three areas. One was conquer or ally with Romania and Bulgaria. Two, secure oil from Kurdish Iraq or Azerbaijan. Three, show interest in possibly retaking the Crimean Peninsula to the effect of being recognized by Russia as a regional power in that lower Danube area. and securing national gas exports. So there's the southern border that Turkey is focusing on heavily. But what else do you see going on with its neighbors? And where else is drawing, what other areas are drawing Turkey's focus right now? Well,
00:17:27 SPEAKER_00
again, I think the fear of Kurdish separatism is number one on Turkey's foreign policy agenda. And that's driving its relations with Russia. with Iran, with Baghdad, with Syria, and it's even creating tensions with the Gulf countries, and Turkey had close ties with, especially with Saudi Arabia. So currently with Russia, I think Turkey was so frustrated with the United States that the US chose to work with the YPG that it turned to Russia in Syria, because it was obvious. For a long time, the expectation in Turkey was that it was the Obama administration decision. So a few folks within the Obama administration made that decision. But once Obama is out of the picture, President Trump would have a different policy and would have a more favorable policy. So that was the expectation in Turkey. But the opposite has happened. Trump, in fact, took a major step and decided that the Pentagon would directly arm the YPG. So that was a step that Obama was reluctan