Crossing the "T" - The Battle of Cape Esperance

On the night of October 11, 1942, the Japanese sent two separate task forces heading in the direction of Guadalcanal.  The first task force was yet another troop/resupply convoy, the second task force, separate from the first yet in the same area at the same time, was a bombardment group assigned to shell Henderson field.  

The Japanese, at this time, rulers of the seas around Guadalcanal, at least at night anyway, did not believe that an American task force would be in the area.  Latest intel told them that the Americans were off to the north and not near the beaches.  The intelligence was wrong. 

Set Up:

• The Japanese have been making steady resupply runs, at night, to their forces on Guadalcanal since Edson’s Ridge.  
• These supply runs are the buildup for the eventual “showdown” that is scheduled to take place in mid to late October, October 20 to be exact.
• Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, of Savo fame, was in overall command of the operation set for the night of October 11-12.
• His field commander if you will, is Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto
• Goto is in command of the bombardment force which consists of:
• 3 CAs and 2 DDs

• American intel has picked up on the Japanese plans to build forces for an all-out assault on the airfield.  Realizing that the Marines would be hard-pressed to hold out against another massive assault, Army General Millard Harmon, CO of US Army in the South Pacific, convinces Admiral Ghormley, whom we shall discuss at a later date, that the Marines need the Army’s help.
• Ghormley agrees and sends the Army’s 164th Infantry Regiment of the Americal Division to Guadalcanal to reinforce the Gyrenes.
• The date for the reinforcement is set for October 8 
• To protect the convoy carrying the soldiers, Ghormley assigns a cruiser/destroyer group under the command of Admiral Norman Scott to protect them.
• Scott’s forces include:
• 2 CAs, 2 CLs, 5 DDs
• Scott’s orders are to protect the convoy and once the Army is delivered, patrol the waters off Guadalcanal , intercept and then destroy anything that attempts to move in
• ADM Scott knew that his mission carried with it, two tasks aside from the destruction of any Japanese force
• Develop night surface doctrine
• Revenge
• As far as doctrine was concerned, Scott was aware that he and his units, lacked any real experience or training in night actions.  Therefore, his plan for action, should it be needed, was simple:
• Steam in a column with DDs ahead in the van, followed by the cruisers
• DDs would illuminate targets after radar contact, fire torpedoes and allow the CAs to concentrate on the enemy heavies

• Scott chose the USS San Francisco (CA-38) as his flagship, when he should have probably chosen either Helena or Boise
• Helena and Boise were both equipped with new SG radar units, as opposed to the SC aboard Frisco
• Faulty intel said that the Japanese had sets that could track American radar and as a result he ordered that the radar on Frisco be turned off (!!)

The Fight:

• On October 9 and 10th Scott was patrolling the area just north of Renell island, out of range of Japanese search planes
• Each night he entered Savo sound but turned back because of no reported Japanese activity
• On the 11th, search planes from Guadalcanal sighted the incoming Japanese troop reinforcement convoy and reported it as 2 CAs and 6DDs.
• Scott receives this intel and prepares to maneuver his ships into the Savo island area to do battle that night

• At sundown, Scott orders his ship to GQ, determined to not be surprised by the Japanese like at Savo on August 8

• Prior to action, Scott wisely decided to launch most of his scout planes and send them to Guadalcanal.
• This was a clear lesson learned at Savo as a result of the avgas fires that stared aboard the US cruisers and illuminated them for the Japanese to see

• What couple of scout planes he still had, he launched around 2200 to scout ahead of his task force.

• The night was clear and cloudless, but there was no moon to add ambient light to the battlefield, thus making visibility poor.
• Scott set his formation for battle as follows:
• DDs Farenholt, Duncan and Laffey leading:
• CA San Francisco, CL Boise, CA Salt Lake City, and CL Helena followed by:
• DDs Buchanan and McCalla

• The Japanese were completely unaware that an American force was closing on them.
• In actuality Japanese submarine I-26 was on the surface and sighted the force, but did not report it as she chose to dive and make an attack (which she ultimately didn’t do anyway)

• At 2250 SF’s float plane reported “1 large, 2 small vessels 16 miles from Guadalcanal”

• Based on this report, Scott executed a turn in order to cross the Japanese’s T
• Explain crossing the T

• The Japanese formation was led by CA Aoba, Furataka, and Kinugasa
• DD Fubuki and Hatsuyuki held screen

• Around 2332 hours, Helena’s radar picked up the Japanese ships, Boise and Salt Lake City also picked up the Japanese on radar
• Scott was confused by the radar reports and initially didn’t trust them
• This is huge and will come in to play in November as well.  This generation of US CO’s did not have experience in radar, nor did they trust the abilities of the new technology.  There were only a handful of officers who did trust radar, and again, that would come to play in the next month.

• 2345 hours SF picks up the enemy on radar and finally Scott believes what he is being told
• Japanese are only 5,000 yards away
• Lookouts on Helena spot the enemy visually at the same time

• An Ensign in radar plot in Helena impatiently asked the ship’s navigator, “What the hell are we going to do?  Board them?”
• CAPT Gilbert Hoover of Helena wasted no time and without orders from Scott decided to open fire at 2346
• Helena let loose with all 15 of her 6 inch guns at one time…

• The Japanese under ADM Goto finally sighted the American formation at a range of 10,000 yards.  He was concerned that the ships may be friendly so he ordered a turn and a flash of recognition signals
• As the Japanese signalmen aboard Aoba flashed the message, Helena’s shells tore into her superstructure.

• Back aboard Helena, all her guns were firing, but not in salvo.  Each turret was operating almost independently in what was called “automatic-continuous mode”.  The result was unreal…
• The Helena’s gun crews had their weapons loaded and fired in such rapidity that the Japanese later believed that the Americans had a cruiser with automatic weapons.  The Japanese suspected the Americans of having “Machine gun cruisers.”
•  
• Aboard Salt Lake City, her 8 inch guns opened fire on Aoba from 4,000 yards away, her second salvo smashed Aoba and SLC’s directors reported, “No splashes, all hits.” 

• SF opened fire on a DD from 4,500 yards away.  At this time, the entire American column was engaged in a gun fight
• Salvo fire was almost non existent as each gun and their gun crews worked independently and each ship fired in a staccato cadence that made the night look like a low hanging lightning storm had enveloped the American column.
• The rate of fire and the accuracy of hit both stunned and devastated the Japanese column.

• Despite Scott’s initial mistrust of radar, he ordered ships to fire using the technology due to the fact that the fire was so heavy that he could not monitor the battle visually, and within minutes, all American ships were doing just that, adjusting their fire with radar and walking the shells into their targets with sniper like accuracy.

• Aboard McCalla, an Ensign Weems watched the fight and later wrote, “I felt wildly exultant joy  in watching us let them have so much at such murderous range. If you stop and think, 2500-3000 yards is point blank for big guns.  You can hardly miss even if you wanted to.”

• 4 minutes after opening fire Boise had expended 300 rounds from her main battery!
• 3 Japanese ship were afire at this time

• Japanese cruiser Aoba had been hit at least 24 times and was afire, 2 main battery turrets were destroyed, her main director was destroyed, searchlights, catapults and several boilers.

• The firing was so severe that Scott lost control of the events.  Despite his orders to cease fire (WHY???) the ships never did.  They could see their targets and continued to pour it into them.

• Japanese cruiser Furataka took several heavy hits, more than likely from SF and SLC.  Her turrets were hit and at least 1 was destroyed, and she took hits in her torpedo tubes, which set the Long Lances afire, making her a perfect target.
• SLC radar set swept the area and detected all enemy targets “afire”

Battle Finished

• By 0245 the battle was over.  The Americans had beaten the hell out of a Japanese cruiser and destroyer force, eventually sending the cruiser Furataka and destroyer Fubuki to the bottom.  Aoba was heavily damaged as well, but limped away.
• Japanese casualties are estimated to have been 450 men killed and another 100 or so captured the next morning.

• US losses amounted to the destroyer Duncan being sunk, the cruiser Boise being heavily damaged, Salt Lake City lightly damaged, and destroyer Farenholt heavily damaged. 
• US KIAs are set at 163 men killed.

• While the battle was clearly an American victory as the Japanese were denied their mission to bombard Henderson the long ranging effects on the campaign were actually minimal.
• Because of Scott’s (rightly) focus on the Japanese bombardment force, the troop and supply convoy was successful in unloading its cargo and escaped before morning.

Nevertheless, the victory provided a much needed boost in morale to the US Navy and its force of cruisers and destroyers.  The general feeling was that Savo had been avenged.