Guadalcanal-- Edson's Ridge with special guest Dave Holland

This week we would like to welcome back Dave Holland.  Dave is a former United States Marine, owns and runs the facebook and youtube channel called Guadalcanal: Walking a battlefield, a Solomon islands battlefield guide, and most importantly, a Guadalcanal expert.  Welcome back, Dave.

It’s been over a month since the Marines landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo.  August has passed and with it, the lives of over 1,200 allied sailors and airmen at the battles of Savo island and Eastern Solomons, as well as the lives of over 200 US Marines ashore.  The Japanese have lost over 1700 men ashore on the aforementioned islands, including nearly 800 at the Tenaru river on August 21 as well as nearly 300 lost at sea.  

Operation WATCHTOWER was never assumed to be a quick in and out operation, it was never thought of, at least by the United States, as a quick trip. The Americans knew it would be a slugfest, how much of a slugfest was anyone’s guess however.  As September dawned and the first week passed, the slugfest ashore abruptly turned into a meatgrinder.  A bloody, drawn-out campaign of attrition was something that the Japanese could not withstand.  The Japanese were sick of the Marines on Guadalcanal, and wanted them out and wanted them out now.  

Beginning in the first week of September, over 5,000 Japanese troops under the command of General Kawaguchi landed on Guadalcanal with their sole mission being to “rout and annihilate the enemy in the vicinity of the Guadalcanal Island airfield.”  The focus of their initial assaults on the Marines would center on an area south of Henderson Field, near three small hills and an, as yet, unnamed ridge.  The unnamed ridge would soon receive several names from the Marines who defended it.  History would call it, Edson’s Ridge.

Talking Points

Lead up to the Battle:

• As early as August 18, Imperial Japanese Army orders stated that the main body of the 35th Infantry Brigade under GEN Kawaguchi prepare to move to Guadalcanal.
• By late August, Kawaguchi had formed a plan to move his unit to the Canal from Shortland by barges.  American day time air power shut that idea down, so as to force the Japanese to move Kawaguchi’s people to the island by means of fast DDs.
• This was one of the first operations of the infamous Tokyo Express

• Kawaguchi was completely ignorant as to the number of Marines in and around the defense perimeter.  
• Estimates told him that no more than 2,000 Marines held the lines, albeit with aircraft to help them.
• This estimate allowed Kawaguchi to believe that he could easily break through Marine lines with his force (sound familiar Ichiki?)

• By September 7, Kawaguchi had over 5,000 men encamped around Taivu Point
• This did not include Colonel Oka’s men, some 1,000 strong, that were separate and slated to hit the SW quadrant of the American lines.

• Kawaguchi then split his forces further, breaking his units into groups of about 650 men each and put them on 3 separate avenues of advance, through the jungle, to eventually strike the Marine lines all at once.

• A further avenue of attack was designated to come from the SE, and this would contain the newly christened “Kuma” BTLN, which was consisted of Ichiki’s 2nd echelon.  
• Artillery would theoretically support the assaults, as would naval gunfire in the form of bombardments of Marine positions on September 9 and 10

• Kawaguchi picked the night of September 12 as the night of the assault
• By September 8, Kawaguchi had moved his assault units from Taivu to Koli Point and set off on foot through the jungle on September 9.

The Tasimboko Raid:

• Word reached Vandegrift (via native scouts) that fresh Japanese units had landed and that a group of 2-300 were in and around the village of Tasimboko
• The commander of the 1st Raider Battalion, Merritt Edson, jumped on the news and hatched a plan to land a portion of his Raider Battalion some 3,000 yards behind Tasimboko and take the Japanese by surprise

• Merritt A Edson 
• Known as “Red Mike” for his fiery red hair
• Generally was a quiet and reserved man
• Spoke with a low, quiet, raspy voice that was hard to hear
• Former aviator, but he was an expert in infantry tactics
• Like all good commanders, he possessed an innate ability to instantly recognize good or poor performance in his subordinates
• On September 8, the Raiders landed at Taivu Point
• Immediately found signs of enemy landings in the form of half-eaten food, abandoned packs, shoes, life preservers and some weapons

• Edson’s men were met by heavy defensive fire as they moved inland towards Tasimboko

• Kawaguchi ordered artillery support and detached an infantry company to lend a hand to the defenders
• The rest of kawaguchi’s people kept on towards the airfield
• P-400’s and SBDs from Henderson Field rendered aerial support as Edson’s men pushed forward
• Company A of the 1st Raiders burst out of the jungle and annihilated what Japanese had not fled the area of Tasimboko
• The Marines entered Tasimboko to find it essentially deserted of people but filled with valuable intel and supplies
• Marines bayoneted the Japanese tins of beef and crab
• They found 75mm guns, a radio outpost, medical supplies, boats, ammunition by the crate full
• Correspondent Richard Tregaskis filled a blanket with papers, maps and other documents
• Because of some of the intel gathered at Tasimboko, the Marines were able to somewhat prep for what was coming…

Eve of battle

• Due to the intel gathered by Edson, he was able to inform Vandegrift that defenses should be placed along the ridge as it seemed the most likely avenue of approach for an attack that may contain as many as 4,000 Japanese

• During the trek to the ridge, Kawaguchi’s forces were essentially assaulted by the jungle in which they travelled

• Marine patrols began running into elements of Kawaguchi’s people on the 10th

• Native scouts brought word that the Japanese were on the move allowing the Marine’s just enough time to dig some foxholes and clear fields of fire

• Edson’s Raiders were strung out in a thin line often intersected by lagoons and seemingly impenetrable jungle

• A single string of barbed wire was at the front, flanked by supporting strongpoints with mutually supporting fire lanes
• Edson was convinced a major Japanese force was in front of him and continued his patrols the next day (12 Sept)
• Firefights sprang up through the late night of September 12 and early September 13, with intermittent Japanese naval bombardments in between

• The Japanese had wanted a coordinated attack but because of the jungle and some units simply getting lost, this was not to be on the night of the 12/13

• Japanese units were late in assembling, if at all, and when they attacked, sometimes 2-3 hours after they were supposed to, they missed the ridge almost entirely and got into fights with C Co and B Co Raiders in the swamps.

• Kawaguchi lost control due to the mixed units and late arrivals and the attack fell apart before it really began

• The following morning (13 Sept) Edson sat eating his breakfast and told his officers, “They were testing, just testing.  They’ll be back.”

September 13/14 Edson’s Ridge

• Edson pulled his line back in the morning and prepared fresh positions to confuse the Japanese attackers that would come that night
• Despite this, the defenses were still inadequate.   Small combat groups of about 100 men each were at positions spread across and around the ridge

• Around 1830 the first attacks came, pushing B and D Companies off their positions and up the ridge
• Japanese surged through the gap in the lines but Marine artillery brought them to a halt for a short while
• Edson estimated that around 2200 hours, the B Company and two small groups of Paramarines (300 ish men) were facing 2 full battalions of Japanese

• Paramarines on the flank were assaulted around 2230 by mortars then a wave of infantry who came bursting out of the nearby jungle, straight at them.

• The Marines were being assaulted from the front and also flanked.  Harry Torgerson of Raggedy Assed Gavutu fame, helped pull the paras back about 150 yards to a small knoll where they reassembled

• The main thrust of the attack now fell on B Co Raiders under John Sweeney
• Only 60 men
• Edson pulled these men back to from a line with C Co and A Co of the Paras
• As the Marines pulled back, it is thought that someone mentioned the word “withdraw”, having heard this many of the Marines started heading for the airfield moving significantly faster than a walking pace

• At the same time the Marines were withdrawing, Kawaguchi’s reserve slammed into those very men, forcing the withdrawal damn near into a rout

• Kenneth Bailey

• All the while the Marines were withdrawing to a better position, the artillery was eating the Japanese alive
• Tregaskis heard over the radio “Drop it five zero and walk it back and forth across the ridge”
• Edson sent a runner saying “It’s knocking the hell out of them.”
• Artillery probably saved the day to be honest

• The Japanese were so close that at the division command post, the men were under direct Japanese rifle fire
• At this time, about 300 Marines held a knoll in a horseshoe shaped line, the last defense before Henderson Field
• Torgerson led a counterattack of the Paras that forced the Japanese back and extended Marine lines
• All throughout this action, Edson kept calling the arty even closer to his position, but still the Japanese came on, undeterred

• The fighting got so close that Marines could hear the Japanese steeling themselves for another attack and in response the marines rolled grenades down the ridge into the Japanese clusters of men

• Attacks continued through the night, with the Marines literally clinging to victory as the sun rose

• As soon as was feasible, P400’s arose and lit into what was left of the Japanese in the open

• Several more Japanese attacks hit Marine lines in different places over the next couple days, but none were serious and none threatened the airfield

Assessment:

• The Marines barely, just barely hung on
• Artillery was the savior
• Artillery is estimated to have killed no less than 2/3 the Japanese killed on the ridge and no more than ¾

• Air support and the harassment of Japanese units BEFORE the battle by air also contributed heavily to the victory

• Regardless of the support, the battle would have been lost had it not been for the men pulling triggers
• Edson was awarded the MOH and was extremely deserving of the award, having been the main inspirational leader and an excellent tactician during the defense

• By far, the Ridge battle was the closest fight yet.  Had the Japanese been able to commit their entire force as planned, the airfield, more than likely, would have been captured.

• Hundreds more Japanese died during the withdrawal from the area (back through the jungle) due to wounds and starvation, thereby eliminating virtually all of Kawaguchi’s command

• Due to the shocking defeat of Kawaguchi, the Japanese were now more committed than ever before to force a showdown on Guadalcanal by committing decisive force

• This will be seen several times in the month of October