The Bar Room Brawl-November 13, 1942 with special guest Jon Parshall

The hectic and high stakes month of October 1942 has finally wound down and passed into history.  And with it, the lives of nearly 400 Americans at The Battles of Henderson Field and Santa Cruz and an astonishing figure of nearly 3,500 Japanese lives at those same events.  The Japanese have thrown their very best efforts at Guadalcanal in October, both ashore and off shore, and have come up short.  The devastating defeat ashore was followed by a tactical victory, but strategic defeat off shore and has left the Japanese in no better position than they were in August…just thousands of lives shorter.

As November dawns, Guadalcanal is still a hot bed of activity.  Fighting on the ground has eased off in intensity, but is still a fairly constant struggle, although nowhere near as bad as the previous several months have been, but the Japanese aren’t done yet.  At sea, however, the Japanese are also not through with their efforts to both smash the American fleet and destroy Henderson Field.   The Japanese will try several more times this month, specifically twice in back-to-back nights.

The first of these epic naval clashes occurs on, of all dates, Friday the 13th.  The confused and chaotic melee that follows will be known as the Bar Room Brawl.

Talking Points:

The Set Up

• The Imperial Army had planned to reinforce Guadalcanal yet again with a large troop convoy that consisted of nearly 7,000 well trained troops, 31,500 artillery shells, and food for 30,00 men for 20 days.
• The convoy was made up of 11 transport ships under reliable ADM Tanaka with a heavy escort of 12 DDs.
• Before the planned troop landing which theoretically would occur on November 14, the Japanese would send 2 fast BBs (Hiei and Kirishima) to shell Henderson with special frag shells that would destroy aircraft and supplies as well as men.
• The Japanese bombardment unit was commanded by ADM Abe and consisted of:
• 2 BB’s Kirishima and Hiei
• 1 CL
• 11 DDs
• These ships were timed to sail on November 12 and arrive off Lunga Point just after midnight on Friday the 13th
• Ironically enough, at the same time, the Americans were also preparing a reinforcement convoy bound for Guadalcanal.
• 2 separate convoys were to bring over 5,000 troops and much needed supplies to Guadalcanal, they were to be heavily escorted by American cruisers and destroyers.
• Thanks to intel, the US knew that the Japanese were preparing another reinforcement convoy and deployed this heavily escorted convoy to do 2 things.
• Deliver troops
• Disrupt the Japanese planned troop delivery with the surface ships assigned as convoy escort
• Kelly Turner was in command of the convoy and the 2 separate escorts were commanded by ADM Daniel Callaghan aboard USS San Francisco, and Cape Esperance victor ADM Norman Scott aboard USS Atlanta.
• The American convoy reached Guadalcanal on the morning of the 12th and unloaded the precious cargo and supplies.
• A Japanese scout named LCDR Mitzi observed the convoy unloading and sent a message to combined fleet HQ that also noted a surface force of  3 BBs, 3 CAs, 11 DDs off Lunga.
• Japanese ADM Ugaki surmised that the surface force would probably try and intercept the Japanese the following night, however in a staff meeting it was stated that the Americans would “go away as usual” and Abe’s force was not notified of the American’s presence.
• Despite this lack of warning, Japanese air assets decided to strike the Americans, sending 16 torpedo armed Bettys, and 30 Zeros to hit the force
• Warned by coast watchers ahead of time, Turner got his ships underway as 20 F4Fs and 8 P39s scrambled to meet the Japanese inbound
• In the ensuing air battle, the Betty’s missed their targets and were ravaged by the F4Fs who claimed 17 bombers and 6 fighters while actually downing 11 Betty’s and 1 Zero to the loss of 3 F4Fs and 1 P39.
• Turner was later rewarded with a very accurate sighting report of Abe’s force to which he decided to shred his transports of any sizeable escort and order these same escorts to intercept and attack Abe’s extremely powerful force
• Turner assigned Daniel Callaghan as Task Force Commander, despite the fact that Scott had over 6 weeks sea time in these very waters and had won a night time naval fight. 
• He assigned Callaghan because he was 15 days (!) senior to Scott.
• The stage was set.  An American force that consisted of:
• 2 CAs
• 3 CLs 
• 7 DDs
• Would intercept Abe’s bombardment force under the command of an Admiral who had virtually no experience in combat at all on board a CA that still fielded inadequate radar (USS SF)
• Let’s talk about the radar again here, Scott should have been in charge, but at the very least, Callaghan should have embarked aboard Helena with her SG radar and not Frisco.

Collision in the Dark

• The night was moonless, black in complete and total darkness…which dam sure didn’t help with ship ID in the fight that would come.
• The American battle line was laid out such:
• Cushing, Laffey, Sterett, O’Bannon, Atlanta, Frisco, Portland, Helena, Juneau, Aaron Ward, Barton, Monssen, Fletcher
• Callaghan laid his forces out much like Scott did at Cape Esperance, mainly for maneuvering in the confined waters more than anything else.
• Whereas, he should have laid his forces out with Fletch, O’Bannon, Helena, Juneau and Portland in the van because of the new SG radar systems aboard.

The Japanese had split their forces into two separate groups, due mainly to horrible weather that caused some of his units to lose visibility and become detached and spread out.

• ADM Abe, believing he would not encounter American vessels, ordered his ships to load their weapons for a surface bombardment.
• BBs Hiei and Kirishima loaded, what amounted to frag shells in their 14 inch rifles, not AP.
• At around 0130 aboard Helena, her SG radar showed two distinct formations of enemy ships some 27,100 yards distant.
• Helena relayed this information to Callaghan, who generally seemed to ignore it, instead relying on Cushing’s potential visual contact.
• Tremendous mistake here.  This goes back to what we have said in the past that certain CO’s, ADMs and the like did not put any faith in the new technology and in some cases, specifically this one, it would cost them their lives.
• Back aboard Helena, CAPT Gilbert Hoover was beginning to get highly irritated at the fact that Callaghan was ignoring the electronic picture his ship was presenting.  Cape Esperance all over again.
• The range to target rapidly decreased from 10,000 yards to 5,000 to 4,000 as both forces literally steamed right at one another.  
• At 0140 Cushing reported to Callaghan that a “ship is crossing bow from port to starboard, range 4,000 yards maximum.”  Then another passed, and another and so on.  Still Callaghan held fire.
• Range fell to 2,000 yards and Cushing asked via TBS, “Should I let them have a couple of fish?” Callaghan denied the request, which was followed by another from Laffey, which he too denied. Instead saying, “Stand by to open fire.”
• By 0147 Callaghan’s formation was falling apart as individual skippers were veering out of formation so as to avoid collision with vessels visually identified as Japanese by the van.

“Open Fire!”

• A Japanese searchlight, probably from Hiei, pierced the night and focused directly on Helena.  Just ahead another searchlight from a Japanese DD, probably Akatsuki, focused on Atlanta.
• Aboard Atlanta, CAPT Jenkins gave the pre-war order to “counter illuminate” the target.  His gunnery officer LCDR William Nickerson heard this, and shouted into his headset, “Fuck that! Open Fire!”  
• Guns visually ranged in on the enemy DD and opened fire at a range estimated to be between 600-1,000 yards.
• When Atlanta opens fire…everything goes to hell, everybody opens fire.  
• As the first to fire, Atlanta comes under fire from several Japanese ships and is hit in her torpedo director.  Lloyd Mustin Asst Gunnery Officer, is visually watching his shells splash just short of the Japanese DD.  He orders visual corrections and watches through his binocs as the rounds start tearing into the Japanese at a range of under 600 yards.
• Akatsuki is the target and she is absolutely smeared by gunfire from Atlanta, Frisco and Helena. 
• The following Japanese DDs fired their torpedoes at Atlanta just before Ikazuchi was hit by 8 inch gunfire, probably from Frisco.  She doesn’t sink and retires.
• Atlanta is hit by several ships, and at least 1 torpedo and drifts into the field of fire of USS San Francisco.
• Completely out of touch with the situation unfolding before him, Callaghan gives his infamous order, “Odd ships commence fire to starboard, even to port.”  
• This order throws several ships, who were either tracking or firing at targets, to disengage and swing turrets to different targets.
• Hindsight is always 20/20, but its abundantly clear that Callaghan was out of his element.
• Cushing, still in the lead, is rapidly engaging targets when she is blasted by shell fire from a number of enemy ships.  As she is hit, BB Hiei passes close to starboard.  Cushing flashes a voice warning of the enemy BB over TBS and is then blasted by Hiei’s secondaries, drifting to a halt and eventually going down.
• Laffey is now in the lead, if there actually is a lead, and passes Hiei so close that her superstructure towers over her as if you were on the ground looking at a skyscraper, less than 1,000 yards away.
• Laffey opens fire with her 5 inchers.  Despite Hiei’s belt armor, the 5 inchers are so close that they actually penetrate and explode within.
• Individual AA gunners aboard Laffey opened fire with 20mm Oerlikon mounts and poured their fire into Hiei’s portholes and riddled her upperworks with automatic weapons fire, hitting and killing Japanese sailors topside.
• ADM Abe took shrapnel to his face from American gunfire
• As Laffey passes Hiei and avoids collision, she is taken under fire from Kirishima, who smacks her with 14 inch shellfire.  At the same time, she is hit by a torpedo on the stern which cripples her.
• Sterett sights in on a Japanese DD, opens fire and watches her stern catch fire and begin to slow.  Almost immediately, Sterett is caught in a cross fire from several Japanese ships, including Hiei.  She takes numerous hits, slows and retires.  She winds up taking a total of 11 hits, all on the port side, all in her upperworks.

Friendly Fire, and Cruisers versus Hiei

• As Atlanta drifted, having been struck by Japanese gunfire and 2 torpedoes, she moved directly into Frisco’s line of fire.  
• From a range of about 3500 yards, San Francisco fired at least two full broadsides at Atlanta, while she was attempting to fire at a Japanese vessel just beyond her.  The 8 inch shell hits were absolutely devastating, shredding Atlanta’s superstructure and killing Admiral Norman Scott.
• Blame can’t really be put on Frisco for this.  The battle had devolved into a melee, a chaotic mess in which even radar could not pick enemies from freindlies.  
• The chaos gave the battle its nickname, when in an AAR an officer likened it afterwards to "a barroom brawl after the lights had been shot out.”
• It can be assumed that Callaghan witnessed Atlanta take fire from Frisco, as he immediately ordered “Cease Fire Own Ships!”
• After Callaghan’s order, which most ships ignored by the way, Helena was tracking targets via radar, large targets, and requested permission to fire.
• Helena opens fire on Hiei, aiming at her superstructure, letting her 6 inch weapons loose on automatic continuous mode, the “machine gun cruiser” pours over 200 rounds a minute into Hiei’s superstructure, setting it ablaze.
• Callaghan and Frisco now open flank speed and slides right by Hiei at 2200 yards away on her starboard beam and Kirishima 3000 yards distant on the starboard bow.
• Frisco unleashes a broadside at Hiei which answers in kind.  Hiei’s shells strike just short of Frisco, her bombardment shells exploding on contact with the water.
• The only way to save Frisco’s life is to pour it into Hiei, which is exactly what she does.  Pouring salvo after salvo into the battlewagon’s hull and superstructure.
• By pounding Hiei, Frisco now has the full attention of the 2 Japanese BBs.
• She takes a frightful beating from the Japanese, suffering over 45 shell hits, 12 of them 14 inch hits.
• Frisco avoids Davey jones’ Locker due to the fact that the Japanese BBs are firing incendiary and HE rounds designated for bombardment as opposed to AP rounds.
• Still, she takes an absolute pounding.
• Hiei’s 3rd salvo strikes Frisco’s bridge, utterly obliterating nearly everyone inside of it, including Callaghan and CAPT Cassin Young.
• LCDR Bruce McCandless, senior officer in the bridge is the only survivor.  He is instructed by senior DC officer CDR Schonland to command the ship as Schonland is too busy fighting flooding and stability issues aboard ship.
• Frisco survives because of Schonland and McCandless, who both receive the MOH.
• Juneau enters the fray, sighting the burning Hiei, passing close aboard and pouring 5 inch and automatic weapons fire into the flaming battleship.
• Shortly after opening fire, Juneau engages Harusame with gunfire and gets hit, almost dead amidships, by her torpedo which fractures her keel.  She then limps away...we will hear more from her later...

The Battle Over

• At 0226, CAPT Gilbert Hoover of Helena, now Senior Officer Afloat, orders his forces to retire.  At almost the same time, Abe does the same.  After 40 minutes of the most confused, chaotic fireworks show in history, the battle ends as both forces limp away.
• Abe, unaware that only 2 US ships, Helena and Fletcher, could offer any type of realistic resistance decides to turn away and not bombard Henderson.  
• His force has been shot to pieces but is still powerful as Kirishima is relatively undamaged as are at least 5 other ships.  
• Still, due to heavy damage suffered aboard his own ship, Hiei, he decides to retire.
• He is crucified for this decision by Yamamoto, who relieves him of command.
• At 0344 Yamamoto orders the convoy to turn around and go back to the Shortlands.
• As the sun rises, so do American aircraft from Henderson Field.
• SBDs and TBFs roar in to finish off the crippled Hiei, just north of Savo at a distance of about 14 miles.
• 56 sorties from SBDs and TBFs, as well as 14 B17s attacked Hiei and other cripples in Iron Bottom Sound.
• As the attacks increased throughout the day, Abe ordered Hiei scuttled as she was listing heavily from the torpedoes dropped by the TBFs.
• The final tally is frightful:
• Japanese:
• 1 BB and 2 DDs sunk
• 4 DDs damaged
• Between 5-800 men KIA
• US:
• 2 CLs and 4 DDs sunk
• 2 CAs damaged, 2 DDs damaged
• 1439 men KIA
• Despite the disparity in ships sunk and men lost, the battle is considered a US victory because of the failure of the Japanese to complete their mission objective.

Juneau

• Juneau and Gilbert Hoover’s decision to steam on…