The Battle of the Eastern Solomons

The month of August 1942 has had its ups and downs so far as the campaign for Guadalcanal is concerned. The invasion of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, Tanambogo and other outlying islands in the area initially went very well. Marines occupied the islands rather quickly and eliminated Japanese resistance to a man in most places.  On August 21, Marines from the 1st Marine Regiment utterly destroyed the first major Japanese counter strike on land at the Tenaru River.  On land, the campaign was succeeding.  At sea, however, it was not. The debacle at Savo Island, the worst defeat in US Navy history, left a bitter taste in the mouths of every person in and around the seas of Guadalcanal that wore an American or allied uniform.  

Because of the defeat at Savo, among other reasons, Admiral Fletcher pulled his precious carriers away from the immediate vicinity of Guadalcanal to preserve their ever so valuable flight decks.  However, because of the Tenaru battle, Fletcher was compelled to reverse course and send his flattops back to the waters of Guadalcanal to protect and support the Marines against any further Japanese efforts ashore.   

Unbeknownst to Fletcher, the Japanese had deployed a strong naval force under the command of Chuichi Nagumo, of Midway fame, to support Japanese land efforts and destroy any US ships in the area.  Over the next few days, that being August 24, 1942, the US fleet and the Japanese fleet groped for each other, and eventually became entangled in the third carrier battle of 1942, what history would call, the Battle of the Eastern Solomons.

Talking Points:

Japanese Intentions:

• For the most part, Japanese counteroffensives ashore at Guadalcanal, were almost always tag-teamed with a naval supporting operation.  This is the first “significant” Japanese effort to eliminate the Marines ashore and the USN offshore by a combined arms operation.
• The Japanese had sent another troop convoy under Admiral Tanaka towards Guadalcanal with the remainder of Colonel Ichiki’s 2nd echelon.  We will hear from them again at Edson’s Ridge…
• The deployed Japanese fleet would both protect the convoy and destroy any American shipping in the area.

• Yamamoto knew that US carriers were in the area supporting the Guadalcanal landings, he did not know specifically where they were, but he figured that they had to be in the area.

• As a result, he deployed the two fleet carriers at his disposal, Pearl Harbor and Coral sea veterans Shokaku and Zuikaku as well as a light carrier Ryujo.
• Aside from the CVs, which were the long ranged striking arm, the fleet that was deployed consisted of two other task forces.
• The Advanced Force under Admiral Nobutake Kondo had 5 CAs, 1 CL, 8 DDs and 1 BB.
• The Vanguard Force under Admiral Hiroaki Abe consisted of 2 BBs, 3 CAs, 1 CL, and 6 DDs.
• The Japanese actually sent Ryujo ahead of the main striking force as a screen.  

• Yamamoto’s plan called for the destruction of the American CVs that he figured to be in the region thereby allowing the Japanese naval forces the ability to destroy any other US and Allied shipping in the area and isolate and destroy the Marines ashore.

• Again, like at Midway and Coral Sea, the Japanese divided their forces thereby spreading their AA capabilities, which were not that great anyway, thin.

• The advantage of spreading their forces, at least here, is that as we shall see, not all of the coveted targets were sighted or attacked by American aircraft.

• The Japanese forces were laid out as such:

• Japanese transports were supposed to land reinforcements on August 24

US disposition:

• To counter any Japanese move in the area, the US had at its disposal, essentially, the same force that it had at the outset of WATCHTOWER, minus the cruisers sunk at Savo of course.
• Just before the battle, the US had 3 CVs at sea.  CV6, CV3, and CV7.
• On August 23, Fletcher detached USS Wasp, as she was critically low on fuel , and because of this, she missed the battle

• The US forces were split into two Task Forces, all under Fletcher’s command.

• TF11 centered around CV3 and included an escort of 2 CAs and 5 DDs.

• TF16, under the command of Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, centered around CV6 with an escort consisting of 1 CA, 1 CL (AA CL Atlanta), and 6 DDs.

• A conspicuous presence amongst this TF was the new fast battleship USS North Carolina (BB-55)
• This was the first time a fast battleship would operate with US CVs in a battle, and as such would also be the first time one of the new fast battleships would unleash their vast array of anti-aircraft weaponry, which would go on to play a vital role in the upcoming battle.

August 24

• Beginning on August 22, both US and Japanese forces started sending out search aircraft in order to locate one another.
• USN PBY Catalinas had reported on incoming Japanese warships, and spotted the incoming light carrier Ryujo  

• By morning, Fletcher was getting itchy.  He was aware that Japanese forces were in the area, but as yet, had not spotted them himself having relied on PBY contacts.  

• Around 1240, CV6 launched 22 sets of scouts in a fan shaped pattern that covered a 180 degree area north of Fletcher’s flattops to visually sight Ryujo and the other fleet carriers Fletcher knew would be there as well

• One of those pilots was a gentleman named Birney Strong.
• Strong was an SBD pilot from VS5 aboard CV6 and was scheduled to scout the area 320-340 degrees from Big E.
• Like most Naval aviators, Birney Strong was confident in his abilities.  As he reached the flight deck, he told his rear seat gunner, “It’s our job to find the japs, and I know exactly where they are. We are going to get there, circle them, and report on their position before they find us.”
• Strong was a VS5 vet, having flown from CV5 in the hit and run raids as well as Coral Sea

• Fletcher, keenly aware of his mistake at Coral Sea, when he sent a deckload strike from 2 CVs at Shoho, decided to hold CV3’s deckload until the distance closed and the location of the enemy was fixed.

• Thinking he had been sighted by the numerous Japanese snoopers that had been shot down all day (he had not), he finally elected to launch CV3 strike at 1340, despite not knowing a fixed position on Ryujo, or knowing if more Japanese CVs were present.

• CDR Don Felt aboard CV3 was launched at 1340, however, on the last known sighting of the only Japanese CV spotted thus far, Ryujo.
• His strike was 29 SBDs, 8 TBFs, and no fighter escort
• The fighters were being held back as CAP against a possible Japanese strike.

• Enterprise searchers had been groping for the target for over an hour when at 1440 hours, just as he had predicted, Birney Strong visually sighted the carrier Ryujo in the 330-340 degree sector of the search grid.

• Strong approached to within five miles of Ryujo and ordered his contact report sent.  It was an agonizing six minutes before Enterprise acknowledged the sighting, leaving Strong and his wingman to circle the enemy that entire time.
• Curiously, he neglected to attack the enemy ship

• At 1510, another CV6 scout, piloted by Yogi Jorgenson of VS5 spotted Ryujo again, elected to attack but were driven off by Japanese CAP.  
• As the Americans departed the area, they ran into CV3’s strike group under CDR Felt and radioed them their newest, hottest location on Ryujo.

• Finally, around 1500, a VB6 scout piloted by CO Ray Davis spotted the fleet carrier Shokaku.  Radioing its position, he and his wingman elected to attack the big flattop below.
• Both he and his wingman, Robert Shaw, missed their target by a mere 30 feet as Shokaku was twisting and turning violently to avoid them.
• Davis’ contact report was never heard as there apparently reception was poor this day.
• Thus, the strike from CV6 that Fletcher had been saving for just this moment, was wasted.

• What neither pilot knew was that Shokaku had just launched a deckload strike at the last location of Enterprise, having just learned of her location. 

Ryujo

• Felt’s group closed to within visual range of Ryujo and coordinated their attack at 1536

• The poor radio reception that plagued the CV6 airmen all day also plagued Felt, as he did not hear the radio report of Shokaku’s sighting just minutes before.

• Coral Sea all over again
• Felt sent 21 SBDs to hit Ryujo along with the 8 TBFs that were also a part of the strike.
• The first fist full of SBDs missed the rapidly turning carrier, but a 1,000 pounder dropped by Jim Sauer hit her on the stern.
• Syd Bottomly, of Midway fame, noticed that Ryujo seemed to be getting away and redirected his strike back towards the carrier.
• Bottomly, among the last group to dive on Ryujo chased the ship to almost suicidal low altitude before he dropped his bomb
• His bomb, hit dead center of Ryujo’s deck and exploded…a killing blow.
• Roy Isaman, another Midway vet hit her again, as did CDR Felt.

• Ryujo was afire and smoking from under her flight deck when VT-8 approached in their TBFs.
• Bert Earnest, also a Midway veteran, approached Ryujo from her starboard side with 3 other TBFs and dropped his fish under intense AAA fire
• No one knows exactly who hit Ryujo, but Japanese records state that one torpedo hit and exploded on the starboard side, and one passed under the starboard stern and failed to explode.
• The one that did hit, wrecked her engine room and steering and essentially killed the carrier.
• Last seen by American eyes, she had drifted to a stop, was afire from stem to stern and had a 25 degree list to starboard.
• She was the sixth Japanese CV sunk in 42, and would be the last sunk until 1944

Task Force 16

• At 1632 radar aboard CV3 reports, “Many bogies range 88 miles bearing 320”
• CV6 and CV3 launch every fighter available to repel the attack they know is inbound
• 55 F4F Wildcats are aloft to repel the attack, that now appears to be heading directly for the Big E.  
• CV6 is also screened by 2 cruisers, 6 DDs and BB-55

• At 1700 hours the bogies are now bandits and are headed for CV6
• CAP attempts to intercept, but AGAIN, radio issues force them to scatter
• FDOs have too many contact reports and the fighter pilots are chattering wildly, thus blocking the FDO from issuing vector orders 

• Despite having an overwhelming CAP, most of them do not engage, but what CAP does engage, absolutely wreck the Japanese
• As the Vals from Shokaku arrived over CV6, they are engaged by VF6 CAP that chase them down through their dives
• VF6 pilot Don Runyan attacked and downed 3 Vals and a Zero, chased another 2 Vals away and damaged another, in mere minutes.
• CAP claims 44 kills against 5 losses.  Actual numbers are 25 shot down
• A 43% loss rate

• As CV6’s CAP engages, the Japanese do slip some Vals through the fighter umbrella and they approach CV6 and her escorts
• It is at this time that the value of the fast battleships that will be arriving soon comes into view…
• Gliding along at the rear of the formation is North Carolina.  She is making 27 knots and grinding for anything extra she can get.  The massive ship is kicking up a rooster tail as she pours on the power to keep up with CV6 that is hauling ass at 30 knots.
• When the Japanese strike force appears overhead, North Carolina prepares to fire…
• Her AA power is awesome.  No other word can describe it.
• LCDR John Kirkpatrick is the AA gunnery officer and at his fingertips are:
• 40 50 cal machine guns
• 40 20mm Oerlikons
• 4 quad 1.1 inch mounts
• 20 5 inch dual purpose mounts

• As the Japanese line up over CV6, BB-55 cuts loose…
• At Kirkpatrick’s order to commence firing, all AAA mounts aboard BB-55 open fire simultaneously
• The noise, smoke, flame and sheer chaos unleashed actually rattles the gunnery officer who briefly thought his guns had set his ship afire
• TF16 CO Admiral Kinkaid radioed North Carolina to ask, “Are you afire?”
• The volume of AAA fire by “The Showboat” rattles the Japanese as they line up on CV6 shooting down a great number, and causing many to miss in their dives

• Despite the CAP and the screening vessels AAA fire, Vals appeared over CV6 and broke into their dives
• Vals came down on CV6 at 7 second intervals
• Captain Arthur Davis maneuvered his ship brilliantly, causing many bombs to splash into the sea behind the great ship
• At 1714 a 500 pound bomb crashed through Enterprise’s flight deck near her after elevator
• It punched through five decks before exploding, killing 35 men immediately
• 30 seconds later, another bomb hit Enterprise, only 15 feet from the first strike, exploding in the starboard 5 inch gun gallery wiping out the crewmen stationed there, burning them to a cinder at their gun positions, killing all 38 men in a blinding flash
• Enterprise, like her sister Yorktown, was a tough girl allowing CAPT Davis to continue to maneuver her at high speed despite the 2 heavy hits she had taken and throwing up an impressive AA screen of her own
• Some 14,000 rounds of ammunition were fired by Enterprise in that strike alone
• 2 minutes after the first two bombs hit, a third hit the Big E up forward, doing minimal damage.

• Enterprise is hurt, but far from dead
• She retires to Pearl for damage repairs and buries her dead, some 78 KIA and a further 90 wounded
• We will see the Big in the seas around Guadalcanal again

End of day/end of battle

• By the end of the day, after word finally reached Fletcher of the whereabouts of Shokaku, it is too late to launch a strike, especially with CV6 hurt.

• The Japanese think (naturally) that they have heavily damaged or sunk 2 US CVs, when they only attacked 1

• Aware of their high casualties from attacking the US fleet, and the loss of Ryujo, compels the Japanese under Nagumo to retire

• The incoming troop convoy under Tanaka is seemingly left to its own devices and it comes under heavy air attack from Henderson Field the following day

• 1 DD is sunk, another is damaged, a cruiser is heavily damaged, a transport is sunk and another (or 2) are damaged forcing Tanaka to turn his convoy around and NOT reinforce the island

• Because of this action, and the fact that the Ryujo was sunk at no US shipping losses, Eastern Solomons is seen as a US strategic and tactical victory.

• Though a victory, it had little in terms of long reaching effects on the Guadalcanal campaign, which is why it is probably the least known carrier battle of 1942