This Means War

Surrounded by three potential adversaries, hampered by a history that prevents deep alliances with neighbours, and a below-optimal command integration arrangement with the US, Japan took stock and realised it needed a reset in defence and security. Peter is joined by Japan specialist Dr John Hemmings from Hawaii to talk through some of the detail and intricacies of Japan’s national security strategy, hard power spending, constitutional changes, collective warfighting capabilities in the Pacific.

For decades, politics, security and economics in the Middle East has been inextricably linked to the USA. Today, however, Washington increasingly views the Middle East as a fly-over region – one that is largely absent from US policy. The space where America is now absent has been occupied by both China and Russia: the former having successfully negotiated a new era of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia (not an unsubstantial achievement). Peter talks to Mike Stephens about what we might have missed in the Gulf, and why – despite inherent instabilities – there is cause for hope.

After 20 Shangri La dialogues, it is not difficult to say that the world has changed – certainly in the Indo Pacific. In 2002, scholars and global leaders were talking about the ‘Peaceful Rise’ more than the ‘China Dream’. They were wrong, but so too might the predictions of economists forecasting an economic uber-power in China that completely overshadowed the rest of the world. Yet the CCP and the PLA are not backing down. If anything, the rhetoric – and the actions – of Chinese politicians and military forces continue to raise the temperature. In this episode Peter talks to grand strategist Dr Peter Layton about what this feels like from Australia – somewhat closer to the action than London. And it’s not just about China and Taiwan: Beijing’s influence in DPRK and Pakistan complicates matters considerably. Especially when there are nuclear weapons on the table.

The price of military equipment and people means that many militaries are having to make decisions about trade-offs between force elements. Taking a ‘capability holiday’ might not be fashionable language anymore, but it does reflect the reality – even with the significant promises in defence budgets. In France, a Euro413Bn spending promise over 5 years can’t deliver much when the price of equipment, people and a nuclear programme recapitalisation are already on the cards. It means, as explained by scholar Michael Shurkin, that the philosophy of manoeuvre, technology, a light footprint, perfect logistics and engineering, independence of thought, and French military elan remain central to French force design. Accompanied, foremost perhaps, by the interests of the French defence industrial base. In this conversation we examine the reasons why traditional European military powers adapt in the way they do (or don’t).

The Black Sea has been called a Russian lake before. Perhaps it was again after 2008: Russia used the Black Sea for its invasion of Georgia, as a key avenue for attack during the annextion of Crimea (2014), for actions in Syria (2015 onwards), and for the latest attacks on Ukraine (starting in 2022). Yet despite a burgeoning military presence, the Black Sea is now a leading stage for competition between regional powers - not just Russia and Ukraine, but also Turkey, Georgia, Bulgaria and Romania too. Indeed, Turkey plays a really significant role both at sea and ashore, able to act as a regulator on Russian military activities at sea - but this is best done in concert with NATO and the EU. Natia Seskuria, founder and executive director of the Regional Institiute for Security Studies, talks to Peter about Russia's aspirations in the Black Sea, and is still able to "walk and chew gum" in the region. Natia talks about what sort of 'grey zone' activity Moscow continues to engage in, how effective it is, and what measures could be taken to counter Russia - if the West really wanted to.

Poland is an outlier in Europe: a state that has been willing to resource the national security statements of political leaders made in 2022, and cognisant of observations about high intensity combat being seen in Ukraine after the latest Russian invasion. Unlike other European capitals, Warsaw has funded a recapitalisation of its military based on a philosophy that puts aside a promsied future of military nirvana, replacing it with a pragmatic approach towards the good enough. Sound contracting for specific items, mainly from the US and South Korea, has ordered an impressive list of equipment, with additional equipment being lined up - all with a keen eye on the soverign benefit of onshoring production. And the contrast to the modest plans of Germany, France or the UK is stark.

Yesterday I had the pleasure to talk to Jakub Knopp, a young researcher who has recently published an excellent article on this topic. Jakub was also cautious in his assessment of the costs of these acquisitions over the next decade. It was a pragmatic and revealing insight into the differences between Poland and their geographic neighbour, Germany.

One year on from starting the podcast, the production team persuaded me to answer some of the most popular questions that get sent into the show. In this episode we cover the three top issues posed to us: (1) What havent we covered that is important and why? (2) Are the latest set of Defence Reviews any good? (3) what are Western states learning from Ukraine? and (4) What is exciting over the coming months? Do keep sending your questions in to us by text, email or @TMWpodcasts

Even as Russia rebuilds its way of fighting and combat power over the next 3-5 years, those forces should be easily overmatched by NATO (on paper at least) in combat operations provided Russian air and missile defences can be destroyed. The package to do that, according to Professor Justin Bronk of RUSI, is quite within European states ability to deliver: allowing them to then fight the air-to-air battle, and deliver decisive combat power on the ground. Yet it is quite hard to detect any urgency in various capitals to take this task in hand – to buy the munitions needed, and make time for the training to do the most challenging of tasks in the air power handbook: SEAD and DEAD. The alternative, a dispersal concept of operations, simply isn’t affordable for most European powers based on the aircraft they operate and (more importantly) the support systems they don’t possess in sufficient quantities to make workable. There are difficult decisions to be made about what the priorities are with limited resources - and there is a sense they are being fudged. We all probably need to question whether those decisions are being made or simply deferred – again and again – in favour of focusing on something decidedly more photogenic.

Even planning a non-combatant evacuation operation is politically and diplomatically fraught – the signals it sends to a host country are rarely desirable. Yet somehow embassy staff around the world build contingencies for the unexpected. And they are – sometimes – needed, as we have seen over the past two weeks in Sudan. Peter Talks to Ewan Lawson, a former NEO planner for the British military and Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI, about the realities of this type of operation, about the decision-making and trust placed in people, and about the unsung heroes who rarely get recognised.

China’s agreements on strip mining and rare earth mineral extraction opened the door to significant engagement between foreign governments and the Taliban in Kabul. Yet behind the scenes, the ISKP have been building a base of support from various groups across the North, East and West of the country. Anant Mishra, soldier-scholar and researcher of the region, talks to Peter about the potential for a new civil war in Afghanistan.

If you are interested in military pods, try out sister show called 'How to Train a Military'. It does what the title says.....

When you read the words ‘inventory management’ most military people turn the page. Don’t. This conversation about logistics (and that doesn’t include HR, Catering, Admin, or movement), pushes the boundaries of discussion by cheerleading for some process and business-as-usual, as well as experts and proper use of data in making decisions. At the heart of the matter sits in lethality and effectiveness, not innovation and efficiency: yet the culture in many militaries today demonises the people, skills, tools and industrial behaviours in favour of a chaotic mix of random strategies and meaningless speeches that result in internal fratricide across the defence community. Peter talks to Joann Robertson in a remarkably candid and revealing exchange.

Western political and military leaders seem to be doing a lot of hard talking about military capability these days, yet people and talent issues seem to be rather lower on their agenda than the excitement over technological 'silver bullets'. Poor recruiting and retention rates make planned force designs look increasingly untenable, something which no amount of technology is going to solve in the short to medium term. One might wonder, then, why militaries seem rather agnostic about  recruiting from only a small minority of the population when some simple changes could radically alter that dynamic. Is it a lack of will or just an ambivalence to the issues?

Special Forces in contemporary warfare will be expected to conduct operations ‘By, with and through’: enabling local partners to fight against common foes. Back in 2015, elements of the UAE Presidential Guard deployed to Aden in Yemen in an attempt to forestall and turn back a seemingly inevitable Houthi annexation. It could have been the decisive moment in a campaign that had seen the Houthi rebels take over control of almost the entire country. On 13 April 2015, 8 operators were helicast off shore and hours later were deep in a battle that was to last well into June. It was not a one-sided action by any means: there were several serious tactical failures and defeats of local forces by the Houthis, any of which could have spelled the end of the mission. Yet UAE leadership doggedly doubled down each time and the results speak for themselves. Peter talks to Dr Michael Knights about the battle, the decision-making, and the logistics of this important battle. A case study in the realities of SF ‘By, With and Through’ missions.

All wars have elements of attrition in them – like it or not. Battles of attrition are not linear either, they depend – to a large extent – on battlespace geometry. Peter is joined by Dr Jack Watling for one of their monthly chats – this time about attrition, from the 19th Century to today. Their conversation turns covers themes of people, leadership, logistics, casualties, ideation, and time, and how each of these relate to the realities of combat attrition, wars of attrition, and strategies of attrition. And as always, they remind us that the enemy gets a vote too.

Why is winning a war so hard? According to Dr Mike Martin, realism seems to be missing in the formation of strategy to fight wars. Evidence to support this abounds from Russia and the West over the past 25 years, and there is an interesting conversation to be had about why that is. Peter talks to Mike about the other intangibles of war so often overlooked – particularly logistics, morale and training. As a prelude and insight into Mike’s new book “How to Fight a War”, this episode is bound to elicit some comment: it is designed to stimulate some of those important conversations.

Peter talks to Professor Katarzyna Zysk from IFS in Oslo about Russian military AI development, from the core reasons it is being pursued to the implementation plans and their maturity index of outputs. Most worrying perhaps is the discussion on ethical limitations (or lack thereof) being imposed on developers in Russia, whether in the realm of Lethal Autonomous Weapons or in experimentation with humans outside the decision loops. While many commentators have written off the Russian military following their performance in Ukraine over the past 12 months, this might well be premature. The inevitable recapitalisation of Russia’s military will place AI and Emerging and Disruptive Technologies at the core of a new Russian force design. Taking that into account now is essential in de-risking Western decisions about the future.

Peter talks to the inimitable Whit Mason, a strategic communications guru, about why the Ukrainian information operations campaign has been so successful over the past year during Russia’s invasion of their country. They talk about the strengths and weaknesses of President Zelenskyy’s communications campaign, and where the opportunities and threats lie for the next phase of the war. What emerges from this conversation is not just how good the Ukrainian team have been at strategic communications but also how fortunate they have been to have such an incompetent adversary in the Kremlin.

How have cyber conflicts played out between Russia and Ukraine? Over the last decade the idea of cyber war had been widely hailed as a horse/tank moment in warfare, perhaps more even: speeches were made about the cyber domain would have the ability to determine the future of battlefields, and to make armies, air forces and navies irrelevant. And Russia has always been noted to be be a Tier One cyber state, whereas Ukraine wasn't - certainly in February 2022. Peter talks to Rob Black at Wilton Park about how the cyber war played out over the first year of Russia's war on Ukraine - and why it failed to deliver what the cyber acolites promised. While political and military leaders have placed huge emphasis on the silver bullets that were supposed to be cyber weapons, the reality in Ukraine seems to have demonstrated something very different. The Gartner Hype curve of technology seems to have some home to roost.

Meeting the challenges of both conventional and irregular warfare requires mutually exclusive forces specialised in acting against each one. Peter talks to Dr Jack Watling, Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI in London, about why a military force designed for conventional warfare is ineffective at irregular warfare; the verso also applies. There are a myriad of reasons - from embedded culture to training requirements - why this is the case, from formations and skills of Special Forces but also for signals, communication, command, aviation, and logistics. People and their approaches, as well as their networks, is the key factor however. Given that future adversaries are likely to employ both means (unconventional and conventional) to challenge the status quo, nations will need to either construct forces for each strategic approach they face, or specialise in one. Alternatively, states can try to do both with a single force structure and probably - judging on historical evidence, and some contemporary examples too - fail. In times increasing global tensions when autocracies are leaning towards the use of military force as a key lever of power, the decision facing political leaders is whether to fund their militaries or rely on the doctrine of hopeless optimism.

Peter talks to Ankit Panda from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace about all things North Korea, but specifically their nuclear missile programme. After a busy 2022, it appears as though Kim Jong-un’s hermit kingdom will continue a similar pace of testing and developments over the next 12 months – increasing further the risk of a clash on the peninsula. Add to that the changing nature of the relationships between Pyongyang, Moscow and Beijing, and you will start to appreciate why the incoherence of the US policy dilemma for DPRK needs addressing.

According to some we are living in both a Post Islamist Age, as well as a Post Liberalist one. And if you read the media, terrorism doesn’t appear any more. But it hasn’t disappeared. How can we better understand Islamist and Islamic violent extremism better, giving us a better chance to successfully build strategies and policies to combat radicalisation and counter terrorism? Peter talks to Dr Adil Rasheed to understand some of this better. Expect theology, philosophy and some spiritual references as they try to divine some I+W about global terrosit trends for the next decade.

This year Turkey celebrates its 100th anniversary; 2023 will also bring a summer with elections that could see (according to some polls) President Recep Erdogan replaced. Yet, according to Ziya Meral, don't expect to see a huge change in foreign policies no matter who takes power. Like other Western states, Turkey has been balancing interests and values since the creation of the republic by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Since that founding Turkey has been rarely from the headlines – most recently in relation to migrants to Europe, shooting down foreign war planes that intrude into their airspace, buying Russian surface to air missile systems, or manufacturing drones for militaries round the world, Turkey remains is fiercely independent in its actions. The country’s leaders have, over generations, sought to walk a tightrope between placating Western demands and acknowledging the differences it has as a state, a culture and a people from those in Europe. Nor have they been afraid to make difficult decisions that upset the balance, and the expectations of Western diplomats – as well as those from further abroad. So what will 2023 bring? 

Since 1991 space has become an intrinsic part of warfare: from the liberation of Kuwait to Allied experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, militaries have become increasingly reliant on access to space systems for navigation, communication, surveillance, and the use of sophisticated weapons. Facing a leading space power, and without a sovereign space capability of their own, Ukraine has turned to a commercial platform to even the scales as part of combat operations against Russia’s invaders. But outside of war, societies have also become reliant on space for day-to-day functions. Peter talks to Juliana Suess, a leading researcher into space and warfare (and host of the excellent ‘War in Space’ podcast) about what this all means for societies, governments, militaries, industry, and alliances.

What did the Ukrainian forces learned from their experiences fighting the Russian military during 2022? Peter talks to Dr Jack Watling about how the Ukrainian military have been learning lessons, and what they have learned. As well as a wider discussion on combat in the rest of the world during 2022.

The shock and surprise expressed by Western politicians after Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine heralded reviews of defence policies across Europe. The UK was amongst those states that committed to refresh their policies in light of Russian actions – a process that is underway and due to produce recommendations sometime in early 2023. Ben Barry talks to Peter about some of the inconvenient truths that have got to be addressed, and what needs to change. While the discussion is largely UK centric, the same considerations are valid in many European capitals.

The Chinese military has come a long way since 2008. In size, professionalism, deployability, operational experience, and capability development. One might be awe struck with the rapidity of their growth and capacity for production but Beijing will be observing the Russian and Ukrainian experiences from that war in 2022 with a view to overcoming some of their own core issues. Understanding the history of Chinese military evolution through the prism of the Russo-China military relationship provides some interesting insights. Dr Sarah Kirchberger talks to Peter about unrestricted warfare, Chinese views on military conventions, corruption, equipment and industrial capacity.

Big contracts are being let for new aviation systems. From the B21 and FLAA in the US, to FCAS and Tempest in Europe, 6th generation air platforms are all the rage in government investment decisions at the moment. Dr Justin Bronk wonders whether these can make a difference to a much more challenging environment than has been assumed in Western capitals. The airspace over Ukraine is a deadly environment. The air defence capabilities on both sides makes flying a precarious proposition for anyone who enters the realm of mutual denied airspace. This has significant implications for everyone from force designers and military planners, to infantry companies and cartographers. If stealth, penetration, and survivability have become the key facets to air power in high intensity conflict then – according to Justin – we can do more with older platforms provided we start to buy back some of the risk that has accumulated in air forces across Europe since the peace dividend was taken.

A really capable combined arms force can have a disproportionate impact on a small war. It can have much less effect in a large one. Discussing his article on Wars in a Fishbowl, Amos Fox talks to Peter about why Battalion Tactical Groups from the Russian army have had little success in Ukraine when all their experiences over the previous two decades had told them that BTGs were the sure-fire route to success. How you learn lessons, and understanding that rarely do lessons have permanent residence across every conflict, seems to be as important as identifying them in the first place if you want to design a force with greatest utilty across conflicts. It's not just evident in how Russia learns lessons though.

When Svechen and Hamley were writing about the operational level of war, it is doubtful they envisaged the number of staff and headquarters that would result from their musings. Their reason to exist is often purported to be scale, complexity, or pace in war today but this might all be just hype from academics and their acolytes. Remove the operational level staffs and processes, says Wilf Owen, and militaries can become leaner, smarter and less bureaucratic. He might just have a point.

The use of missiles – of every variety – around the world has been increasing over the past 5 years. Whether targeting critical national critical infrastructure, economic targets, military bases and units, capital ships, or for signalling intent, missiles seem to be playing a greater role than previously (and not just in Ukraine). Peter talks to Tom Karako, Director of the Missile Defence Project and a senior fellow at CSIS, about the latest trends, lessons, policy and challenges in all things missile related. The whole thing seems to hinge on production rates – and increasing those isn’t just as easy as turning the handle. More to come on this topic in future episodes.

Peter is joined by Dr John Hemmings, a Senior Director at the Pacific Forum in Hawaii, to talk about what might have been missed in the Indo-Pacific while we have been busy watching Russia get whooped in Ukraine. It looks and feels more like a Cold War in the Pacific (between China and the USA), than simply a state of non-peace. Beyond the furious diplomatic negotiations to prevent sway states from aligning with either side, there is a darker side to China's attempts at alliance building and covert coercion happening on Pacific Islands and around the parliaments of smaller states. Building a coalition to contain China’s interpretation of their ‘manifest destiny’ may no longer be possible, but deterring Chairman Xi still might be. So, with an inability for American to fight two major campaigns on different sides of the world simultaneously before 2040, others will have to step up if they want their societies to continue to operate in a way their populations have become used to.

Peter talks to Professor Alessio Patalano about whether the naval aspects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine offer anything new to navies as lessons or tactics for the future. Given the experiences of Pacific navies with PLA(N) coercive activities in the past 20 years, the different interpretations of Maritime Security to Europeans and their counterparts elsewhere in the world have become rather stark. Indeed, even in force design terms non-European maritime forces have tended to retain a Balanced Fleet (of capabilities) whereas those in Europe have cut and divested themselves of military capabilities viewed as having no utility today. It could be a decision they come to regret.

According to the report of a conference of great strategic brains during October 2022, the world will look pretty ugly in 2035 - in national security terms, let alone across societal evolution. Between Chinese exceptionalism, what-remains-of-Russia’s military and Moscow's unbridled imperialist ambition, a North Korea with strategic reach, a meddling and strategically important Iran, and the extraordinary climate change effects across Africa and South Asia, military forces are likely to broken by the sheer scale of commitments they face - certainly in their predicted forms. Between now and then, there might be just enough time to make some critical corrections and place democracies in a state where they can at least face the tasks yet - as Professor Julian Lindley French explains – an absence of political leadership, ambition, strategy and vision will be our undoing. In having to decide between health security, economic security, and national security far too few political leaders across Europe, America and like-minded democracies seem to ready to make the difficult decisions.

Whilst the battles in Ukraine have evidenced the tenacity and stamina of Ukrainian forces, their success in defence and offense is determined by the Ukrainian General Staff. As a team steeped in Soviet fighting doctrine, they have executed the whole spectrum of military planning and execution (termed ‘operational art’) that few could replicate: certainly not the Russian generals who seem to have forgotten their own way of war and how to fight well. Underpinned by a trust in Ukrainian tactical leaders, their soldiers, as well as a deep insight of their adversary, how this team have commanded should be a salutary reminder to other commanders about what it takes to fight, and to win. Peter talks to soldier-scholar Mick Ryan about what will be worrying them next, and what observations we can make now about operational art for the future.

Despite a shared ideology loosely based around communism, and perhaps a similarly hopeful interpretation of Mackinder’s Rimland theory, China and Russia don’t have much in common. Even their equal desire to see the USA undermined by weakening the linkages to Europe comes apart in vying for control of Central Asia. As Theresa Fallon explains to Peter, the reality of a ‘No Limits’ relationship is starting to hit home in Beijing as the invasion of Ukraine becomes a much more drawn out affair than was promised by Vladimir Putin. From rewriting history, to a death by numbers, the conversation covers elite capture and the competition for influence that each of the parties is trying to gain. Fascinating, if a little confusing!

Ships being sunk by sea mines, undersea pipelines blown up, and a fragile maritime infrastructure are all underplayed risks to the Wests' daily business: yet they are also very contemporary events. Peter talks to Rob Wilson about who is responsible, how they did it, and how this might all play out in the longer term. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to understand that these vulnerabilities are clear attack vectors for adversaries but the question is whether governments will make the necessary decisions to mitigate the implications of such threats, or will they continue to ignore the risks and leave their states open to catastrophic failures in our supply, communications, and data exchange protocols? The era of Sea Denial may be returning: it doesn't feel like we are prepared for the consequences.

Is China preparing to invade Taiwan? It is certainly a matter of CCP policy that Taiwan will be reintegrated into mainland China – by diplomacy or force – at some stage before the centenary of the People’s Republic of China in 2049. Peter talks to Dr Peter Layton, Visiting fellow at Griffin Asia Institute, about this, as well as the most recent Taiwan crisis, PLA doctrine and fighting capability, and the Chinese need to be respected. As a primer to forthcoming episodes on China’s military ambitions, preparations for war, and the evolution of their military, this episode also examines what lessons Beijing, Nanjing and Hainan might be learning from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: turns out these might not be so different from the lessons that Allied nations might also want to learn (spoiler: reinforcement of their own latest doctrine might not be real lessons however).

It has only taken one year from the Western withdrawal out of Afghanistan for that country to descend once more into a fractured society – 90% of who live below the poverty line – with a plethora of factions fighting for power, and an equally numerous set of foreign states vying for influence and resources in an all too familiar game of one-upmanship. Violence has also returned with frightening predictability. What is actually going on in Afghanistan today, specifically with regard to India, China, Pakistan, and Iran? Peter is joined by Indian soldier-scholar Anant Mishra to try and make sense of it all. Don’t expect simplicity or clarity.

Deciding to go to war, to support a war, or even which war to engage with should not be an easy decision. It should be complex: informed and debated. That wasn’t the case for the majority of countries which have been overtly supporting Ukraine in 2022, but it might well have been in the Kremlin. That doesn't make either party right. Peter talks to veteran diplomat, soldier, politician, traveller, adventurer and aid worker Rory Stewart about why some wars garner political interest (and others don’t); about why chance, narratives and strong voices in the Cabinet room culminate in moments that make investment in conflict happen; about why strategy, signalling and diplomacy are absent in preventing wars from starting in the first place; and, about how ending wars is such a difficult conversation to have.

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) has matured considerably since the early 2000s. More data sources, better data bases, lower costs, increasing automation and processing all provide a wealth of data for analysts to get hold of. But exploiting all those sources requires a skilled team of tenacious people to provide the answers that are being sought, but also in checking that the veracity of the data. Peter talks to James Byrne, Director of the Open Source Intelligence and Analysis (OSIA) Research Group about constructing teams for OSINT work, the technicalities of OSINT, dealing with data overload, spoofing and fooling OSINT systems, and the future of Open Source Intelligence.

Professor Michael Clarke joins Peter to talk about the 10 day old Ukrainian counter offensives against Russia. In proving they can do more than "just not losing a war slowly", the Ukrainian actions in Kherson (a strategic counter offensive), Kharkiv and Izyum (both smaller but important tactical pushes) are posing significant challenges for the Russian military and their political leadership. And this means that the deployment of the Russian Third Army Corps sometime early in 2023 might have to look very different from what Moscow had been planning.

Nick Reynolds has just returned from Ukraine again and talks to Peter about his experiences and insights after 6 months of war with Russia. From the implications of electronic warfare, the training for combined arms manoeuvre (in order to conduct the politically-necessary but militarily-viable offensive), to kill chains, passive drone operations, and information operations, the lessons from this war also cover more traditional – but critically important – facets of conventional combat power: sniping, dismounted close combat skills, and land mine usage. Predictions on the use of biological and chemical weapons by Russian forces in this theatre round out a wide ranging conversation on the trajectory of the war.

Supporting a war conducted by others shouldn’t be measured on financial aid committed. A better metric would actually be the percentage of the requirement actually fulfilled; on that measure, the report card for Western leaders supporting Ukraine is not good. As Ukraine talks up the idea of offensive operations against Russia, Peter talks to Lt Gen (rtd) Ben Hodges about what a counter offensive might look like, whether Western support will endure, and what lessons we should start to be thinking about from the on-going war in Ukraine.

If you look at Russian actions in different regions of the world, their strategies differ considerably. This covers economic policies as well as foreign policy activities and military ones. From Africa to the Rimland, Moscow signals their intentions clearly, watches for reactions and then executes pretty nuanced plans. Nowhere is this clearer than in the different approaches Russia has been taking in the Arctic and Ukraine over the past 15 years. In this episode Peter is joined by Professor Katarzyna Zysk, from Norway’s Institute for Defense Studies in Oslo, to talk about duality, rationality, logic, and pragmatism in Russia’s national security decision-making. While there is an idea of muddling through in the Kremlin there is more depth at the organisational level than Western analysts give credit for. This has significant implications for discussions on things like regime change and ceasefires. Don’t expect Moscow to stop behaving like Russia anytime soon; with or without Vladimir Putin at the helm.

Between 2004 and 2014, NATO armies coerced the militaries and special forces of Georgia and Ukraine into a doctrine and design built around Counter Insurgency and Counter Terrorist operations. When this met the Russians in 2008 and 2014 respectively, these forces failed. Dramatically. Today, Ukraine’s special forces are performing with dogged determination and expertise – in spite of what the West taught them. Dr Sandor Fabian argues that if today’s special forces want to learn about how to conduct successful operations against a larger conventional military power, they need to look to the Taliban, ISIS, Hezbollah, North Korea and Iran for inspiration: Western militaries have been teaching SF from smaller states the wrong stuff, and forcing them into a shape and form that simply won’t work for them. He and Peter discuss the differences in force design that states require, in everything from equipment and training, to education and doctrine.

A now frozen but forgotten conflict in Georgia dating from 2008 was the result of a Russian invasion and occupation of two large regions: it was a stark warning of Moscow’s imperial plans that went ignored by Western leaders. Fourteen years after the ceasefire was established, Russia continues to wage war on Georgia with tools other than uniformed troops and high explosives. Peter talks to Natia Suskuria from the RISS in Tbilisi about what it feels like to live under the threat of renewed invasion from Russian military forces, and what lessons Georgia has learned from recent events in Ukraine. The greatest risk seems to be not from Russia but rather, once again, by Western powers failing to recognise the opportunities and risks of their own actions.

Even though Western militaries systemically underinvest in their own logistics and engineering capabilities, it is incredible that the Russian army is still operating on processes and with equipment from almost a century ago. Their reliance on people as the key to logistical resupply has hamstrung their ability to advance and win ground in Ukraine. Peter talks to Trent Telenko about how long-range, precision rocket systems being delivered to Ukrainian forces are now shaping military planning by both sets of combatants. From railroads to truck tyres, and the differences in Chinese military logistics machines, the lessons from Ukraine since February 2022 are beguiling.

As the Iranian proxy in Yemen, the Houthi’s have evolved from a guerrilla organisation to one capable of facing down a first-world military and becoming adept with ballistic missiles, maritime warfare, and influence operations in Western capitals. In this episode, Peter talks to Dr Michael Knights about what an effective – if morally dubious – ‘train and assist’ mission looks like when conducted by an adversary. It’s not just about what you weapons you fight with, it’s about how you fight and who (and how) they support you, ending with the lesson that military power is no absolute; it is only relative to the enemy.

Peter talks to Prof John Spencer, doyen of Urban Warfare at West Point, after his recent trip to Ukraine. They cover the Battle of Kyiv, urban terrain as a warfare discipline, the peri-urban, phone-a-friend intelligence, the precision paradox, the failures of John Boyd's theories, and the admirable ability of the Russian army to break contact and retreat under fire. As both parties in this Ukrainian-Russian war prepare for the next phase of violent action, Peter and John try to deternmine what will be critical in the outcome of the campaign: momentum and resistance being key facets to any material capability.

Dr Jack Watling talks to Peter as he returns from his most recent trip to Ukraine. As both Ukrainian and Russian forces reorganise for the next phase, the conflict is poised at a critical moment: one dependent on stockpiles, logistics, resupply, people, leadership and styles of fighting. Whilst Jack brings his latest insights to the listeners, he and Peter have a discussion over the information war and debunk some of the myths and fallacies around the public face of the war. Jack also highlights some of the lessons emerging from the conflict that are likely to endure and apply across other wars. Sobering stuff.

Peter talks to Ewan Lawson, a Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI, about the context of wars and why this is important in drawing lessons from them. Analysis of contemporary wars has led to some knee-jerk reactions in terms of force designing Western militaries for the future: think about the hype over 'hybrid' or 'grey-zone' warfare and how European militaries tilted towards this as the pace-setting threat for the future, only to be surprised by the visibility of conventional warfare in Ukraine in 2022. Is this all a broader failure to appreciate context - of the war, each states own situation (political, economic as well as military), and - perhaps most importantly - the adversary?

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has stimulated a considerable outpouring of emotion, passion and commentary – not to mention the death and destruction that always accompanies war. The same level of interest by the general publics of Europe, America and Australasia was not present for wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, across sub Saharan Africa or during the bloody civil wars and engagements fought elsewhere around the globe in the last decade or so. And whilst the border clashes between China and India could have started something much more catasophic than what started in Ukraine earlier this year, it received little attention in terms of debate and discussion in diplomatic, economic, political or military circles. Let alone failing to capture the imagination of the international public. I want to explore why this is – and talking to people in the profession of arms and wider community – I understand they are curious too.