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Historia • Kurser • Utbildning
The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War Podcast is the creation of Seth Paridon and Bill Toti. Seth is a World War II historian with over 20 years experience who’s many roles also was serving as a chief historian for The National WWII Museum for 15 years. Bill is not a historian, but is a retired submarine commodore and military planner with a special interest in the Pacific War. Bill has a unique perspective to offer as one who spent more than a decade sailing those same waters where the action in “The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War” took place.
Each week, Bill and Seth dive deep into topics pertaining to the Pacific War during World War II. We dissect the battles, tactics, strategies, and personalities that drove the United States’ victory on the largest battlefront in human history.
Seth and Bill bring out the hard facts about the war that resonates deeply today, some 80 years after the war was fought.
New episodes are released on this channel every Tuesday, and the audio versions of each episode are released at the same time everywhere you receive your podcasts. Make sure you subscribe to get notifications of every fresh upload and new show!
If you prefer an audio-only version of “The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War,” it can be heard here:
And for those of you interested in the transition from active duty to industry, Bill’s book “From CO to CEO: A Practical Guide for Transitioning from Military to Industry Leadership” is available in hardback at Amazon and other resellers, in eBook format on Kindle and Apple, and in audiobook format on Audible.
The podcast The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War is created by Seth Paridon, William Toti. The podcast and the artwork on this page are embedded on this page using the public podcast feed (RSS).
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Ching
USS Washington
The Fight draws near
Well, stand by, Glenn, here they come
South Dakota in a world of trouble
Washington slays the giant
End of battle…
The hectic and high stakes month of October 1942 has finally wound down and passed into history. And with it, the lives of nearly 400 Americans at The Battles of Henderson Field and Santa Cruz and an astonishing figure of nearly 3,500 Japanese lives at those same events. The Japanese have thrown their very best efforts at Guadalcanal in October, both ashore and off shore, and have come up short. The devastating defeat ashore was followed by a tactical victory, but strategic defeat off shore and has left the Japanese in no better position than they were in August…just thousands of lives shorter.
As November dawns, Guadalcanal is still a hot bed of activity. Fighting on the ground has eased off in intensity, but is still a fairly constant struggle, although nowhere near as bad as the previous several months have been, but the Japanese aren’t done yet. At sea, however, the Japanese are also not through with their efforts to both smash the American fleet and destroy Henderson Field. The Japanese will try several more times this month, specifically twice in back-to-back nights.
The first of these epic naval clashes occurs on, of all dates, Friday the 13th. The confused and chaotic melee that follows will be known as the Bar Room Brawl.
Talking Points:
The Set Up
Collision in the Dark
The Japanese had split their forces into two separate groups, due mainly to horrible weather that caused some of his units to lose visibility and become detached and spread out.
“Open Fire!”
Friendly Fire, and Cruisers versus Hiei
The Battle Over
Juneau
This week Bill and I have a special guest with us, he’s been here before and we always love to have him, he’s the one, the only, my good buddy, Jon Parshall.
This week we are going to take a step back from the battlefront, into the backwaters if you will, to discuss some of the leaders of WATCHTOWER, the men who made the decisions, for better or worse, that propelled, and sometimes didn’t propel the all-encompassing campaign.
Talking Points
Ghormley
Halsey
This week Bill and I have a special guest with us, he’s been here before and we always love to have him, he’s the one, the only, my good buddy, Jon Parshall.
If you’ve been listening to the podcast as of late, you are well aware that we are making our way through the slug fest that was the Guadalcanal campaign. While the fighting ashore has raged on and off between pitched engagements, the seas around the Canal have been anything but quiet. Savo Island in August was a debacle for the US Navy, the carrier forces under Admiral fletcher landed some fairly significant blows on the Japanese carrier force at Eastern Solomons, and Admiral Norman Scott finally exacted some revenge for Savo at the Battle of Cape Esperance. The US Navy has seen it’s share of victories, as well as defeats in these bloody waters. And while the fighting has been significant at sea…it ain’t over. Not even close.
The calendar now sits in October 1942, October 26 exactly. And ashore, the Japanese have launched a massive offensive to finally push the Marines and Army off Guadalcanal. The October offensive and the fighting that takes place ashore will be remembered as the Battle of Henderson Field. The fighting at sea that takes place only a day later, all coinciding with the offensive ashore, will be called the Battle of Santa Cruz.
Talking Points:
Japanese Preparations and Plans Pre-Battle:
The Land influences the Sea
US Forces for battle
The Battle draws near
The Carrier Battle (Morning)
First Blood
Hornet Under Attack
The Big E under attack
The Battle Over
Implications on the Campaign
This week we would like to welcome back Dave Holland. Dave is a former United States Marine, owns and runs the facebook and youtube channel called Guadalcanal: Walking a battlefield, a Solomon islands battlefield guide, and most importantly, a Guadalcanal expert. Welcome back, Dave.
We’ve been building up to this specific event for some time now, and so have the Japanese. As you will recall, the last several months on Guadalcanal have seen steadily larger Japanese assaults hit that Marines with intents on grabbing Henderson Field. The Japanese have tried and failed at Tenaru in August, tried and came very close at Edson’s Ridge in September, tried a few smaller attacks here and there the next several weeks, all failures.
Now we sit in late October and the Japanese have finally built enough forces on Guadalcanal for their almighty “decisive battle”. All the Japanese thrusts, both ashore and at sea, have led to this operation. This is the all or nothing, the decisive battle that the Japanese have clamored for and the Americans have been preparing for. This is the tipping point for better or worse.
Talking Points:
Preparations:
Prelude to the main event:
The Main Event October 24:
The Main Event October 25:
The Battle Over:
On the night of October 11, 1942, the Japanese sent two separate task forces heading in the direction of Guadalcanal. The first task force was yet another troop/resupply convoy, the second task force, separate from the first yet in the same area at the same time, was a bombardment group assigned to shell Henderson field.
The Japanese, at this time, rulers of the seas around Guadalcanal, at least at night anyway, did not believe that an American task force would be in the area. Latest intel told them that the Americans were off to the north and not near the beaches. The intelligence was wrong.
Set Up:
The Fight:
Battle Finished
Nevertheless, the victory provided a much needed boost in morale to the US Navy and its force of cruisers and destroyers. The general feeling was that Savo had been avenged.
This week we will be talking about the early actions that occurred along the Matinikau river. Now, as opposed to the land battles we have discussed before, Tenaru and Edson’s Ridge which each only happened one time, the Matinikau actions occurred several times from September through November 1942. Today, we will be focusing on the September and October actions.
Following the battle at Edson’s Ridge, what remained of the Japanese force under General Kawaguchi, pulled back through the jungle and attempted to regroup, as well as refit, on the western side of the Matinikau river. Marine general Archer Vandegrift was aware that the Japanese had done this very thing and planned to eliminate whatever was left of the force that had slammed against the ridge on two consecutive nights in September.
Vandegrift was determined to mop up what was left of the Japanese so as to deny them the opportunity to consolidate their forces and resume their offensive. Vandegrift chose his freshest troops for this action, the recently arrived 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines under a Lieutenant Colonel whose name was and still is synonymous with the Corps. Lewis B Chesty Puller.
Talking Points:
The 7th Marines Arrive:
Lewis B “Chesty” Puller
Mission:
Attack:
Pt Cruz:
Douglas Munro
October 6-9 actions
The fighting:
Effects on the campaign:
Because of the loss of the Matinikau, the Japanese were forced to eventually march their men through the jungle (again) before the major assault around Henderson Field in late October . This march, like Kawaguchi’s the month before, exhausted the attackers to the point where their efficiency in the attack that came was severely diminished.
This week we would like to welcome back Dave Holland. Dave is a former United States Marine, owns and runs the facebook and youtube channel called Guadalcanal: Walking a battlefield, a Solomon islands battlefield guide, and most importantly, a Guadalcanal expert. Welcome back, Dave.
It’s been over a month since the Marines landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo. August has passed and with it, the lives of over 1,200 allied sailors and airmen at the battles of Savo island and Eastern Solomons, as well as the lives of over 200 US Marines ashore. The Japanese have lost over 1700 men ashore on the aforementioned islands, including nearly 800 at the Tenaru river on August 21 as well as nearly 300 lost at sea.
Operation WATCHTOWER was never assumed to be a quick in and out operation, it was never thought of, at least by the United States, as a quick trip. The Americans knew it would be a slugfest, how much of a slugfest was anyone’s guess however. As September dawned and the first week passed, the slugfest ashore abruptly turned into a meatgrinder. A bloody, drawn-out campaign of attrition was something that the Japanese could not withstand. The Japanese were sick of the Marines on Guadalcanal, and wanted them out and wanted them out now.
Beginning in the first week of September, over 5,000 Japanese troops under the command of General Kawaguchi landed on Guadalcanal with their sole mission being to “rout and annihilate the enemy in the vicinity of the Guadalcanal Island airfield.” The focus of their initial assaults on the Marines would center on an area south of Henderson Field, near three small hills and an, as yet, unnamed ridge. The unnamed ridge would soon receive several names from the Marines who defended it. History would call it, Edson’s Ridge.
Talking Points
Lead up to the Battle:
The Tasimboko Raid:
Eve of battle
September 13/14 Edson’s Ridge
Assessment:
The month of August 1942 has had its ups and downs so far as the campaign for Guadalcanal is concerned. The invasion of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, Tanambogo and other outlying islands in the area initially went very well. Marines occupied the islands rather quickly and eliminated Japanese resistance to a man in most places. On August 21, Marines from the 1st Marine Regiment utterly destroyed the first major Japanese counter strike on land at the Tenaru River. On land, the campaign was succeeding. At sea, however, it was not. The debacle at Savo Island, the worst defeat in US Navy history, left a bitter taste in the mouths of every person in and around the seas of Guadalcanal that wore an American or allied uniform.
Because of the defeat at Savo, among other reasons, Admiral Fletcher pulled his precious carriers away from the immediate vicinity of Guadalcanal to preserve their ever so valuable flight decks. However, because of the Tenaru battle, Fletcher was compelled to reverse course and send his flattops back to the waters of Guadalcanal to protect and support the Marines against any further Japanese efforts ashore.
Unbeknownst to Fletcher, the Japanese had deployed a strong naval force under the command of Chuichi Nagumo, of Midway fame, to support Japanese land efforts and destroy any US ships in the area. Over the next few days, that being August 24, 1942, the US fleet and the Japanese fleet groped for each other, and eventually became entangled in the third carrier battle of 1942, what history would call, the Battle of the Eastern Solomons.
Talking Points:
Japanese Intentions:
US disposition:
August 24
Ryujo
Task Force 16
End of day/end of battle
Prewar US Navy and IJN surface doctrine
Advances in weaponry and technology
The Japanese respond to the American landings
Allied preparation
The battle begins (South of Savo)
The Northern debacle
The battle ends
Implications on the campign…
H-Hour Guadalcanal
Tulagi
Gavutu/Tanambogo
Air Raid
Tenaru
The Battle begins
Attack and Annihilation
Implications on the Campaign
CLOSER:
1st Mar Div report of Tulagi Operation:
“The combat assumed the nature of a storming operation from the outset, a soldier’s battle, unremitting and relentless, to be decided only by the extermination of one or the other of the adversaries engaged.”
A Rush to Action the beginnings of a “plan”
Questionable from the start:
The Old Breed
The Plan
The Japanese
The kickoff
CLOSER: Official USMC history states regarding the beginnings of WATCHTOWER, “Seldom has an operation been begun under more disadvantageous circumstances.”
Fleet Admiral Ernest King was Commander-in-Chief Fleet, or COMINCH, during most of World War II, and in 1942 assigned to also serve as Chief of Naval Operations or CNO. As CNO he managed the Navy Staff, called OPNAV then (and still is), which allowed him to manage, among other things, all Navy investments in ships and aircraft, as well as all senior Navy officer assignments.
A funny aside before we jump in. For some inexplicable reason, prior to King’s appointment, the Commander-in-Chief, US Fleet acronym was CinC-US, pronounced “sink-us.” When King was appointed he thought the sink-us title was stupid, so he changed the acronym to COMINCH for Commander-in-Chief. Although that acronym was better, President Franklin Roosevelt actually tried to talk King out of calling himself a “commander-in-chief,” saying the constitution only provided for one commander-in-chief and that was the president. King said if he was ordered to change the title he would, but Roosevelt was reluctant to make a change like this as we were just entering the war. So the commander-in-chief title stuck for Navy commanders, that is until Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld finally killed it in 2002 during the George W. Bush administration.
But getting back to World War II, it was King’s CNO job, not his COMINCH job, that gave him the authority, for example, over Navy administrative matters, such as the assignment of Admirals Spruance and Halsey to command 5th and 3rd Fleets respectively. The CNO job also gave him a seat at the table with the Joint Chiefs of Staff or JCS, along with Generals Marshall, Arnold, and Admiral Stark, as well as the Combined Chiefs of Staff with our British allies. The JCS was the body that approved the initiation of campaigns such as Guadalcanal.
But it was the COMINCH job and not the CNO job that allowed King to actually command Navy and Marine forces during campaigns in the Atlantic and Pacific, with Admiral Chester Nimitz as his surrogate as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
King was noteworthy for some personality traits as well. One he was famous for was his legendary temper.
General Eisenhower, for example, mostly known as an even-tempered man, once said, “Admiral King is an arbitrary, stubborn type with too much brain and a tendency toward bullying his juniors! But I think he wants to fight, which is vastly encouraging.”
But King was also known as someone who was not a fan of Great Britain. Once President Roosevelt adopted a “Europe-First” policy, it was King’s job to divert naval forces preferentially to Eisenhower’s theater of operations. But as King perceived the United Kingdom as dragging its feet in offensive operations in Europe, King took every opportunity to divert naval forces to the Pacific theater. After all, in King’s mind it was Japan that attacked the US, and he realized that the longer we waited to neutralize the Japanese threat in the Pacific, the more entrenched and difficult to defeat they would become. And so, the very first major amphibious landing in World War II was not North Africa as many people think, but Guadalcanal in the Pacific. And that campaign was King’s idea.
But King’s intransigence when it came to Europe led to another famous Eisenhower quote, where he says: “One thing that might help win this war is to get someone to shoot King. He's the antithesis of cooperation — a deliberately rude person —which means he's a mental bully.”
Even King’s own daughter joined the chorus of opinion about her father. When asked about King’s unpredictable personality, she said, “He is the most even tempered person in the United States Navy. He is always in a rage.”
But personality foibles aside, in my view King gets a bad rap. He was the main strategist for the Pacific war, and with Nimitz, for the island-hopping campaign that eventually won the war against Japan. In that regard, at least when it comes to the Pacific theater of Operations, as we say in the title of this episode, history has shown that King was right about almost everything.
Seth, we don’t want to do a biography here, but maybe a few things about King’s background:
Jumping to the war:
Talking Points:
While the hit and run carrier raids of February and March tested American carrier doctrine to an extent, and the Pearl Harbor raid as well as Indian Ocean raids tested Imperial Navy doctrine also to an extent, this is the very first time that both navies tested each other’s way of doing things, and in the process found things that worked, and things that well…didn’t work. Let’s dig into it…
Talking Points:
• What sets off the battle of Coral Sea?
o Outline Japanese plans for Operation MO
Japanese wanted to seize Port Moresby and all of New Guinea. By doing this, it would provide Japan with both a way to isolate Australia as well as New Zealand from allied supply lines, specifically American supply lines.
• Why Rabaul (Opeation R) wasn’t good enough
This was to be prefaced by the Japanese capture of Tulagi, which is an island we will hear a lot about in the near future. By capturing Tulagi, in the Solomons, the Japanese could patrol the area and the sea lanes to Port Moresby so as to allow their invasion force a free hand.
As part of the Port Moresby invasion attempt, the invasion group was to be covered by two separate carrier groups, one which centered around the light carrier Shoho, and another which centered around the fleet carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku.
o US intel at Station HYPO and fleet radio unit Melbourne, or FRUMEL decrypt Japanese messages to an extent, and in turn believe that the Japanese will strike the area of Port Moresby, or the northern coast of Australia on or about the first week of May.
As a result of this intel, Nimitz deploys the only two carrier task forces at his disposal at this time, those centered around USS Lexington, and USS Yorktown, TF 11 and TF 17 respectively, to stand by the area of the Coral Sea with designs to intercept and destroy the incoming Japanese invasion and support fleets.
• On May 1 the two US CV TFs unite under the command of ADM Fletcher
o May 4, Fletcher detaches CV5 to attack recent Japanese positions on Tulagi
CV5’s attacks are relatively successful, with damage inflicted on enemy positions and shipping in and around the harbor of Tulagi
• US losses are minimal
• By May 6, Fletcher is aware that Japanese CVs are in the area, and the Japanese invasion fleet is not far behind. As a result, he detaches ADM Crace’s cruisers WITHOUT air cover to block the invasion force.
o This is potentially a critical blunder by Fletcher. Crace’s CAs could have been blown out of the water by Japanese CVs, as it was, they were attacked three times by Japanese aircraft and once by MacArthur’s B17s.
Japanese reports stated that they had sunk a BB, damaged a second BB and a CA. Japanese sent no further attacks towards Crace. His vessels survived due to poor Japanese (and American) accuracy as well as his skillful maneuvering.
The sighting of the supposed BBs by the Japanese informed the invasion fleet to reverse course
Still a horrible decision by Fletcher
• First day of the carrier battle May 7
• Early on the morning of the 7th, Japanese launch searches to find US CVs
o Japanese scout planes from Shokaku find US ships and radio ADM Tagaki of 1 CV, 1 CA, and 3 DD.
What the Japanese actually sight is the detached oiler Neosho and her escort DD Sims.
• How did the Japanese pilot screw this up this bad?
• Japanese arrive over oiler and DD, realize their mistake and continue their search, they return and attack and sink Sims and force Neosho to be abandonned
• At 0815 a CV5 SBD piloted by John Nielsen finds the Japanese screening force under ADM Goto, which includes light carrier Shoho.
o An error in Nielsen’s coding made the message read 2 Japanese CVs instead of 1.
• Fletcher loses his mind on Nielsen when he lands and clarifies his message
Believing this to be the main Japanese CV force, Fletcher launches everything he has.
• 93 aircraft are flung at Shoho
o 18 F4Fs, 53 SBDs, 22 TBDs from CV2 and CV5
• Lexington Air Group, under Bill Ault arrive over Shoho first
o The SBDs attack first, and score at least 2 bomb hits and the TBDs score 5 torpedo hits
This is the only real successful TBD attack of WW2
• Lex AG executes a hammer and anvil attack and leave Shoho a wreck
Talk about Walt Nelson and Ted Wiebe
• Yorktown Air Group arrive next and continue to pummel Shoho.
o Estimated 11 bombs and 2 more torpedoes
o She is barely afloat as US aircraft leave and is gone by 1135
• Lexington VB2 CO, Bob Dixon sent a prearranged radio signal back to Fletcher that simply said, “Scratch One Flattop”
• Second day of the carrier battle May 8
• Both Japanese and US locate each other almost simultaneously
o US launch first at 0900, Japanese at 0915
Opposing forces actually pass each other on the way to their targets
• US attack Japanese first
o The well-coordinated attack of May 7 gives way to the mess of May 8
US aircraft have trouble finding the targets due to squally weather
• When they do find them, they can’t coordinate their attacks as the previous day
Yorktown aircraft under Bill Burch find and attack Shokaku.
• The ship is moving radically but is still hit with 2 1,000 pound bombs which puts her flight deck out of action.
• Lex Air Group attacks and half of her SBDs find Shokaku and attack, hitting her once, the other half of the attackers from Lex can’t find the ship.
• All TBD torpedo attacks by both Air Groups miss their targets or the weapons fail to explode
• Japanese attack on US fleet
• Enemy is picked up 68 nautical miles away by US radar
o Poorly executed fighter direction operations positioned the US CAP too low to intercept the incoming enemy strike.
• One of the stranger aspects of Coral Sea is that SBDs were utilized as anti-torpedo plane CAP
o The assumption was that the Japanese Kate was as slow and sluggish as the TBD, which was obviously false
One of the anti-VT pilots was Swede Vejtasa
• Talk about Swede’s dogfight against Zuikaku aircraft
• Despite the best efforts of the US CAP, the Japanese break through
o The Kates attack CV5 and miss, yet a hammer and anvil attack against CV2 succeeds
CV2 turned like a whale and could not evade the torpedoes.
• She takes two on her port side, one ruptures her avgas tanks, which eventually seal her fate
o The Vals attack Lex and hit her twice
o The Vals attack Yorktown and hit her severely damaging her as well
• Lexington goes down
o Avgas fumes spread throughout the ship, it is thought that a spark from a DC powered motor ignited the fumes which eviscerated the internals of the ship, starting uncontrollable fires.
The first major explosion kills Lex’s main DC party
IF WE HAVE THE TIME, LET’S GO THROUGH LEX’S DEATH
• Outcome
o Coral sea is technically a draw
Seen as US strategic victory in that it is the first time the Japanese are stopped
• Port Moresby is not invaded, and the Japanese expansion, at least for now, is checked
Tactical defeat for the US Navy
• Losing Lex in exchange for Shoho is not acceptable in any way
o Poor FDO operations stationing CAP too low and out of place contributed to losing Lex
o Poor design (prewar design) heavily contributed to Lex’s loss
o Poor US coordination on the morning attack against Shokaku and Zuikaku allowed both to escape the battle
Sho and Zui would be unavailable for the Midway operation
• Sho due to damage and Zui due to heavy aircrew losses
o What lessons do we learn regarding future operations?
If Seth and I were to define the two main thrusts of our podcast “The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War,” it would be (1) to correct some of the mythology that has emerged over decades, and (2) to see what lessons might be gleaned that could be important were war to break out in the Pacific again.
In my view, our subject for today falls into the second category, because it’s about the impact of strategic alignment and chains of command on operational success.
Station Hypo was one of three main stations the Navy used to listen to and break Japanese naval codes. Hypo was the phonetic word for the letter “H,” which stood for Hawaii since Station Hypo was the code breaking office located in the basement of the Hawaii Naval District commander’s building in Pearl Harbor. As an aside, I visited those rooms when I was commodore in Pearl, and they were being used to store furniture for the Pearl Harbor shipyard headquarters building, but we will leave that for another potential future discussion on what’s happened to all these historic sites over the decades.
But germane to this conversation, in the early months of the war the Naval District Hawaii commander reported, not to Admiral Nimitz, but to Admiral King directly. That would be corrected in the coming months, but since Station Hypo supported combat operations in the Pacific, Admiral Nimitz certainly thought of it as one of his assets, while Admiral King’s staff in Washington saw it as solely and completely theirs, to include Station Hypo’s brilliant leader, Commander Joe Rochefort.
This led to a chain of command problem that would ultimately lead to Rochefort’s dismissal as head of Station Hypo, even after his incredible success leading to our victory at Midway.
To help us unpack all of this, to include how Station Hypo fed both King’s and Nimitz’s strategic picture, we are proud to host the chief historian of the Navy and Director of Naval History and Heritage Command, retired Rear Admiral Sam Cox.
Admiral Cox, welcome.
Station HYPO:
Sit Rep PTO late December 1941-January 1942
As you know, the nation is going through a process of reviewing Confederate leaders through a clearer lens, clearing away the mythology around them that emerged to justify their actions after the end of the Civil War. I see this as right and appropriate.
But I also think it’s time to contemplate General MacArthur through a clearer lens. And if we do this, we realize:
A lot of this is going to sound like 20-20 hindsight, but in the military we have this thing called the After Action Report or AAR that is 100% 20-20 hindsight. The whole purpose of the AAR is to overcome the fog of war and look back on what really happened so that we can learn from it.
-We’ve harangued the Army Air Corps, as they were called then, enough I guess, lets focus on other commands. What about the Navy? Where was the Asiatic Fleet?
-What was MacArthur’s plan to meet the invaders? What did he want to do?
-Why would that simply not work?
-Talk about the US tanks that ran out of gas trying to get to Lingayen? Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics.
-Mac’s change in strategy from War Plan Orange to “defend the beaches, hit ‘em where they ain’t” was ludicrous.
-He had nowhere near the resources to do this. Ironically, it was the Japanese that succeeded in “hitting ’em where they ain’t.”
-Needs to be said: Gen Short pilloried for loss of Hawaii with no warning. Mac had warning and received Medal of Honor.
-Once the Japanese landed on Luzon in their main assault on December 22, they advanced rapidly, running over most resistance they came across. The largest amphibious invasion in history, to that point, was wildly successful. Another large landing occurred and now the Japanese had two armies advancing on Manila.
-With such numbers on the American and Filipino side, why did this happen?
-Admiral Hart was one of the first leaders to publicly say that the Philippines were indefensible.
Why was this a surprisingly common thought?
- ADM Hart was Annapolis classmate & friend of Mac’s older brother. Knew Mac well, called him Douglas. Said “Douglas is certain about a lot of stuff that just ain’t so, and is an effective talker, which leads to danger.” Maybe hint at our MacArthur episode?
-Let’s talk about the ineffectiveness of the Cavite submarines that were sortied by Hart
-Staring defeat in the face, what did Mac Arthur do next?
-How did the American forces do in the defense of the Bataan Peninsula?
-Despite their very good showing and heavy casualties inflicted on the Japanese, did they actually have any hope of rescue?
-March 11, MacArthur leaves. By May, the Philippines are surrendered to the Japanese. Over 90,000 Americans and Filipinos are captured.
-How is this news reacted to in the US?
-What does this do to American morale, both in the military and at home?
https://williamtoti.com
-Historians often cite Japanese expansionism, imperialism, what have you, for their desire to attack Pearl Harbor. Others say it the United States’ embargos that led to the attack. Which was it? And could there have been another alternative to Kido Butai flinging airplanes at the sleeping American Pacific fleet?
-There were many warnings about the impending attack before the first aircraft dropped their ordnance. What were some of those warnings? What, if any, actions could of/should have been taken?
-After the attack, the US government needed scapegoats. They had to pin the blame on their overall intelligence failure on anybody but themselves, and so they harpooned both Army General Walter Short, and Navy Admiral Husband Kimmel. Who were these guys, what were their respective roles and were they actually to blame for the entire attack? Were they to blame for anything? What should they have done prior to the attack? Were they aware of any real threat?
-The actual attack on Pearl Harbor was a military feat in its own right. Who was the planner? Why was attacking PH such a risk militarily?
-Let’s talk about the opposing forces…Japanese planning, skill and execution versus American response…
https://williamtoti.com
This is just the trailer.
En liten tjänst av I'm With Friends. Finns även på engelska.