The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War

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• The fight the night before, 13-14 November had beaten both naval forces down.  
• US forces had been beaten to a bloody pulp, as had the Japanese.  Yet despite the beating, the Japanese still held a significant numerical advantage.
• As Jon said last episode, the Japanese still held 3-4 BBs in reserve and had yet to commit them to the fight around Guadalcanal, for who knows what reasons.
• The US on the other hand, quite literally were scraping the bottom of the barrel.  That’s not to say that the battleships sent to IBS were scows, not at all, but Halsey was hesitant to commit his battleships to the close waters off Savo, but honest to God had no choice at this time BUT to commit them.
• Let’s talk about Halsey’s decision to send the battleships to IBS.
• BB56 was designed to be a long range sniper, not a close range brawler.  
• She was designed in the 1930’s with limitations on armor and gunnery.
• The USN decided in the 1930’s to throw out their previous slow battleship designs, heavy on armor, heavy on firepower and low on speed, for more modern designs that emphasized gunnery, speed and cruising range.
• The culmination of this decision was the North Carolina class battleship, of which BB56 was the last of two.  She was fast by BB standards, capable of bending on upwards of 28-30 knots with a breeze behind her, but did not have the armor to withstand hits from weapons of her own size, that being 16 inch rifles.
• Washington’s companion, the USS South Dakota BB57, carried the same rifles, but carried more armor, had a smidgen less speed, but had negligible torpedo protection in order to pack on more armor to withstand the hits from 16 inch rifles like she packed herself.
• All that being said, the decision to send his 2 BBs, literally all he had left, to deal with another heavy Japanese surface force in the claustrophobic, torpedo infested waters of IBS was incredibly ballsy…but did he really have a choice?

Ching

• The man who was in command of the battleships was quite honestly the perfect choice to be in that slot.  
• Naval Academy Class of 1908, his fondness of asian culture and desire to serve in the asiatic theater earned him the nickname “Ching”.
• Ching was an avid shooter.  He absolutely loved firearms of all sorts, even building a few of his own from scratch.  
• He joined and shot on the Naval Academy rifle team multiple times, eventually competing in the 1920 Summer Olympics.
• In those games, Lee earned 5 (!) gold medals, 1 silver and 1 bronze in team events, consistently shooting in the top three in every event.  His record of 7 medals for the olympics would not be topped until 1980.  
• The majority of his early service was in BBs, Cruisers, including command of USS Concord, and a destroyer division command.   In 1942 he was promoted to rear admiral.
• In the interwar years, Lee served on many Bureau of Ordnance boards, practicing naval gunnery, experimenting with powder calculations, windage, fire control systems theory and practical usage of heavy naval rifles.  To say that he was an expert marksman and an expert regarding naval gunnery would be an understatement.  In 1942, Lee was considered the US Navy’s foremost expert on anything regarding gunnery and accuracy. 
• A fanatic for anything that aided in gunnery, Lee was a quick advocate and an even quicker study on the new radar sets entering USN service in the late 30’s early 40’s. 
• He advocated that the Navy should start a new school for the instruction of radar and also was a very vocal advocate for the new technology’s installation aboard BBs, CA, and CLs.
• His subordinates absolutely adored him, and in a statement you will probably never hear again, so did Admiral King.  Admiral Nimitz, upon sending him to Guadalcanal stated, “Now we’ll see what a real fighter can do.”
• Initially taking BB57 as his flagship, Lee was forced to transfer to what would become his “home” for the majority of the war, USS Washington when SoDak ran aground almost as soon as she got into theater.  The move to “Big Wash” would be fortuitous for all the reasons we are about to see.

USS Washington

• BB56 had a core crew that would have made any ship blush in envy.  Her skipper Glenn Davis was absolutely loved by the crew, he was genteel, caring and whip smart.  With him he had a core of officers that turned 56 into an absolute machine of efficiency.
• LCDR Edwin Hooper, a graduate of MIT, was the ship’s fire control officer and assistant gunnery officer.  Like Lee, he was an advocate of superior marksmanship, dove head first into ballistics and trajectory of heavy rifles, and was a firm believer in radar’s abilities.  He and ADM Lee got along like a pair of long lost cousins.
• The gunnery officer, CDR Harvey Walsh, LCDR Harry Seeley, main battery spotting officer, CAPT Jonas PLatt, secondary battery officer and even LCDR Ed Schanze, navigator and radar officer all routinely met with and discussed gunnery and radar with ADM Lee aboard BB56.  The “Gun Club” as it was dubbed, was probably the foremost grouping of gunnery minded individuals in the US Navy, let alone on one ship.
• BB56, under Davis and at the direction of Hooper and Walsh, had rigorously trained their main battery crews to an efficiency level that had not been seen before aboard an American battleship.  Walsh relentlessly trained his gunnery crews to be as fast as possible when loading the 16 inch rifles.  Normal 16 inch rifles could be loaded in a time span between 25-30 seconds.  Washington’s gun crews had the practice down to 15.  
• Absolutely devastating, earth shaking firepower ability in literally the perfect hands. 
• Washington took delivery of her SG radar system when ADM Lee was aboard.  Lee personally supervised the installation of the interior monitoring sets and laid them out in a compartment next to the flag bridge so he could monitor it all the time, using the new technology to plot fall of shot when training.
• Talk about Lloyd Mustin and Atlanta taking fire from BB56 in training
• Lee had Walsh and Hooper calibrate 56’s guns to such a degree that when she fired in Atlanta’s wake from 35,000 yards, 56’s shells all landed in Atlanta’s wake, not over or short, but directly on target.  
• Mustin said, “Those 2700 pound armor piercing projectiles were going to be very bad news for anybody they were ever aimed at.”

The Fight draws near

• Japanese ships, 14 in number, were assigned to bombard Henderson Field yet again on the night of 14-15 November under the direction of ADM Kondo.
• 1 BB Kirishima
• 2 CAs Takao, and Atago
• 2 CLs Nagara, Sendai
• 9 DDs
• The US force, designated Task Force 64 was under the command of ADM Lee and consisted of:
• 2 BBs, Washington and South Dakota
• 4 DDs, Walke, Preston, Benham and Gwin
• It should be noted that the 2 BBs had only operated together for a very short time, and had never operated with these specific DDs before.
• The DDs were chosen from different divisions based on their fuel status only.
• TF64 aligned itself in column formation, with the DDs in the lead, followed by BB56 and BB57 bringing up the rear.
• At around 1300, Lee received a message from Halsey that, essentially, gave Lee a free hand to do whatever he needed to do, gave him complete freedom of action for his “excursion”.
• At 1600, Lee received a sighting report from submarine USS Trout that identified the Japanese bombardment force and mentioned a Japanese BB in that same force.  Knowing that the Japanese force would not reach the Savo area until around 2300, Lee waited before making his approach into the patrol area.
• Moments after getting the report, he gave it to CAPT Davis who got on the ship’s pa system and stated, “We are going into an action area.  We have no great certainty what forces we will encounter.  we may be ambushed.  A disaster of some sort may come upon us.  But whatever it is we are going into, I hope to bring all of you back alive.  Good luck to all of us.”
• The men aboard the big battlewagons, aware that they were going to tangle with the Japanese, were beginning to get a bit edgy.
• The previous night, Japanese cruisers had bombarded Henderson relentlessly, ADM Kondo, for whatever reason, was sure that Henderson would be silenced and he would have little to worry about in the waters offshore.  He was wrong.
• The night, unlike the Friday the 13th battle, was clear and moonlit by a quarter moon, enough to see visually, but also enough darkness to hide if need be.
• As the battleships eased into the sound, radio watch picked up a transmission that has now become famous:
• Unknown voice aboard a US PT Boat confirmed they were tracking a target in the sound…
• TF 64: “This is Lee.”
• PT: “Who is Lee?”
• At this, ADM Lee grabbed the handset and broadcast himself in the clear: “Cactus, this is Lee.  Tell your big boss Ching Lee is here and wants the latest information.”
• PT Boat Skipper: “There go two big ones, but I don’t know whose they are.”
• Lee: “Refer your big boss about Ching Lee, Chinese, catchee? Call off your boys.”
• PT: “Identity established.  We are not after you.”
• Lee: “Peter Tare, this is Lee.  Stand clear, we are coming through.”

Well, stand by, Glenn, here they come

• Aboard BB56, the radar picture began to take shape as Kondo’s force entered the sound.
• At around 2230 hours on November 14, the SG radar system aboard the Washington indicated targets north-northwest making 21 knots in two columns at a range of 18,000 yards.
• As the news was relayed to Lee, he smiled, looked at CAPT Davis and said, “Well, stand by, Glenn, here they come.”
• Such coolness under fire, and a supreme confidence in his and his crew’s abilities…
• Davis gave the order to load the main battery, and aboard both 56 and 57, the weapons were loaded and trained to starboard as the radar tracked the incoming targets…
• Kondo had arranged his ships in 3 groups actually
• Kirishima, Atago and Takao were the center group
• Nagara and 6 DDs were the screening force
• Sendai and 3 DDs were the sweeping force ordered to sweep the sound for any US ships
• It was this third group that 56 was tracking at this time…
• At 2313 hours, the waiting ended. When the enemy was visually sighted from the Washington at a range of 11,000 yards, Admiral Lee called South Dakota’s Captain Gatch over the radio and gave him permission to fire. Lee put the radio down, turned to Davis and ordered, “Open fire when ready.”
• When the indicator lights in main battery plot flashed green, Harvey Walsh gave the order, “Open Fire.”
• Both 56 and 57 opened fire within seconds of each other.
• 56’s first salvo was an over, less than 30 seconds later her next salvo was a straddle, her third salvo showed a flicker on the radar scope, indicating a hit which actually did not occur on Sendai.
• The Japanese, aware of the presence of American ships, but unaware of the presence of American battleships seemed to panic at the sight of enormous geysers of water sprouting around Sendai.  
• SoDak’s radio snoopers heard “Japanese voices, excited and very numerous.”
• Sendai and her escorts, put about and got the hell out of there…
• At 2322 hours, the American van of DDs engaged Japanese DDs and Nagara of the screening force.
• Within 10 minutes, both Walke and Preston are hit by accurate Japanese gunfire, and of course, torpedoes.
• Preston may have also been a victim of BB56’s secondary battery fusillade
• DD Benham has her bow blown off by a Long Lance and sinks later the next day.
• DD Gwin is hit in her engine spaces and retires from the fight
• ADM Lee orders all of his remaining DDs to retire at 2348, leaving the 2 US BBs as the only opposition.
• Japanese DD Ayanami is taken under fire by BB56’s secondary battery and is repeatedly hit and eventually sinks
• Credit for her sinking goes to BB56 and her secondary battery, although she actually shares credit with DD Gwin

South Dakota in a world of trouble

• At roughly the same time that all this is happening, SoDak goes dark.
• SoDak’s after turret had just fired when all of a sudden, power went out across ship.
• The ship’s chief engineer had tied down the circuit breakers, against regulations, and when the main battery went off, the concussion was such that it tripped the breakers in series, knocking power out throughout the ship.
• At this time, BB56 turns to avoid running through the scattered remnants of her DD escort, and when she does she passes behind the burning wrecks, keeping out of the Japanese eye.
• As she does, her crewmen on deck throw life rafts and life jackets to the Americans bobbing in the water.
• Supposedly a 56 sailor hears a survivor holler, “Get after em Washington!” as she passes through the debris at 26 knots…
• The blind SoDak turns as well to avoid the wrecks, but she turns to the outside of the burning hulks and when she does, the burning US DDs silouhette her for all of the world to see.
• 3 minutes after SoDaks power failed, it was restored.  It is said that the confusion aboard caused Gatch’s ship to become a tactical punching bag, but who knows…
• The Japanese execute a series of confusing maneuvers, both in response to the attack on the US DDs and the  report of US BBs in the sound by visual detection.
• In the ensuing maneuvers, Kondo’s screening and sweeping force both move out of effective range for the fight, leaving Kirishima and the two CAs alone
• Kirishima turns on her searchlight and illuminates SoDak.  When this happens, SoDak immediately takes heavy enemy fire, especially from Takao and Atago, as they pour 8 inch fire into her upper-works setting her afire from 5,000 yards.
• At the same time, Kirishima finally opens fire (announcing her presence) and hits SoDak in her after turret essentially knocking it out as it doesn’t respond any longer.
• Her main battery out of commission again because of another power failure, her secondaries bark in local control and do score hits on Atago but do little damage.
• SoDak eventually does restore power again and unleashes her main battery at Kirishima.  It is unknown, but unlikely, that she hit her.
• In the pounding, SoDak takes at least 26 hits, mostly 8, 6 and smaller caliber hits in her upper works that started many fires and threatened her secondary powder magazine.
• She also suffers 1 14 inch hit in her after turret.  
• Having taken a beating and on fire, Gatch orders SoDak to come about and retreat from the area. He does this without telling Lee by the way.

Washington slays the giant

• As all of the previous mentioned action is happening, BB56’s radar had steadily been tracking a large target off her starboard beam.
• Lee was aware that SoDak was blacked out and he was concerned that the target might actually be SoDak as 56’s radar had lost track of her because of poor placement aboard ship.
• When Kirishima switched her searchlights on, the target was confirmed visually as hostile.
• At a range of only 8,400 yards BB56 emerged from the cover of her burning DD escort and unleashed  a full nine gun broadside at Kirishima
• Shell splashes in the water caused Hank Seeley to believe they had missed the target. 
• AAR stated that the first salvo missed, but 2019 underwater surveillance confirmed that Kirishima suffered several below the waterline hits, including the recorded “miss” from 56’s first salvo.
• Because of his supposed “miss”, Seeley nudges the main battery up a smidge and 56’s second salvo, which was fired less than 20 seconds after the first, slammed into Kirishima’s superstructure, obliterating her third level bridge and everyone in it.
• Washington’s third salvo was deadly accurate. Five of Washington’s shells struck Kirishima amidships, with one shell penetrating below her waterline, causing massive flooding. The five amidships hits blew open bulkheads, penetrated well inside the ship, and exploded in close proximity to Kirishima’s secondary battery-ammunition magazine, causing ship-threatening fires and leaving 30-foot holes in the deck near the casemates.
• Another salvo from Washington scores more hits.  
• Another below the water line blast causes more internal flooding, and yet more below water line hits occur.
• Another hit penetrates the steering room causing severe damage inside, and yet another detonates through her stern and helps to jam the rudder.
• As the distance continues to close, 56’s secondaries join in on the beating and pour 5 inch shell fire into Kirishima’s superstructure, even scoring 2 hits on her hull that do little to no damage.  
• No one knows amount of damage done by the secondaries, but it had to have been frightful.
• Kirishima manages to return fire at Washington, but misses, her 14 inch shells passing through 56’s rigging, tearing down some of her signal flags and nothing more.  
• An inch is as good as a mile…
• Kirishima spotters say they hit BB56 at least 10 times with the main battery, yet don’t touch her in reality.
• Through the melee of noise, smoke, and fire, ADM Lee said, “If you can see anything to shoot at, go ahead.” 
• The leviathan’s 16-inch guns opened up again, striking Kirishima at a range of 7,850 yards. Two shells struck the forward 14-inch turret of Kirishima at the same time, destroying the weapon. More shells found their mark up forward as even more shells struck farther aft, the coup de grace a 16-inch shell exploding under Kirishima’s keel, permanently jamming her rudder 80 degrees to starboard and eliminating all control of the vessel as Kirishima tries to retire and shows her stern to Washington.
• Utterly beaten to a bloody pulp, Kirishima begins to circle helplessly, still taking hits from Washington’s guns.
• Post war wreck analysis confirmed at least 21 16 inch shell hits on Kirishima’s hull and what could be seen of her upper-works (which isn’t much).
• Kirishima slides down by the bow as she is scuttled and detonates under her forward barbettes absolutely destroying the forward part of the ship.
• Kondo orders a withdrawal  as BB56 tracks a cruiser with her forward turrets and a DD with her after turret.  Lee, still not knowing the location of SoDak does not allow the main battery to open fire.
• Kondo orders a torpedo attack as his ships withdraw, torpedoes pass close to BB56, but all miss her.
• At 0033 Lee orders a retirement still observing torpedoes in her wake.
• By 0110 the Japanese were gone…

End of battle…

• SoDak suffers 38 men KIA, and a further 60 wounded.
• Washington suffers 1 punctured eardrum and 1 hand abrasion
• The US DDs suffer losses in excess of 200 KIA.
• Japanese casualties are unclear, but were excessive.
• Had Lee not shot the Japanese to pieces, they would have bombarded Henderson and the troop convoy inbound would have likely unloaded relatively unmolested.
• Regardless, Tanaka orders his convoy to continue south, where they eventually run aground, those that survive the coming aerial onslaught the following day.
• Implications on the rest of the campaign…

The hectic and high stakes month of October 1942 has finally wound down and passed into history.  And with it, the lives of nearly 400 Americans at The Battles of Henderson Field and Santa Cruz and an astonishing figure of nearly 3,500 Japanese lives at those same events.  The Japanese have thrown their very best efforts at Guadalcanal in October, both ashore and off shore, and have come up short.  The devastating defeat ashore was followed by a tactical victory, but strategic defeat off shore and has left the Japanese in no better position than they were in August…just thousands of lives shorter.

As November dawns, Guadalcanal is still a hot bed of activity.  Fighting on the ground has eased off in intensity, but is still a fairly constant struggle, although nowhere near as bad as the previous several months have been, but the Japanese aren’t done yet.  At sea, however, the Japanese are also not through with their efforts to both smash the American fleet and destroy Henderson Field.   The Japanese will try several more times this month, specifically twice in back-to-back nights.

The first of these epic naval clashes occurs on, of all dates, Friday the 13th.  The confused and chaotic melee that follows will be known as the Bar Room Brawl.

Talking Points:

The Set Up

• The Imperial Army had planned to reinforce Guadalcanal yet again with a large troop convoy that consisted of nearly 7,000 well trained troops, 31,500 artillery shells, and food for 30,00 men for 20 days.
• The convoy was made up of 11 transport ships under reliable ADM Tanaka with a heavy escort of 12 DDs.
• Before the planned troop landing which theoretically would occur on November 14, the Japanese would send 2 fast BBs (Hiei and Kirishima) to shell Henderson with special frag shells that would destroy aircraft and supplies as well as men.
• The Japanese bombardment unit was commanded by ADM Abe and consisted of:
• 2 BB’s Kirishima and Hiei
• 1 CL
• 11 DDs
• These ships were timed to sail on November 12 and arrive off Lunga Point just after midnight on Friday the 13th
• Ironically enough, at the same time, the Americans were also preparing a reinforcement convoy bound for Guadalcanal.
• 2 separate convoys were to bring over 5,000 troops and much needed supplies to Guadalcanal, they were to be heavily escorted by American cruisers and destroyers.
• Thanks to intel, the US knew that the Japanese were preparing another reinforcement convoy and deployed this heavily escorted convoy to do 2 things.
• Deliver troops
• Disrupt the Japanese planned troop delivery with the surface ships assigned as convoy escort
• Kelly Turner was in command of the convoy and the 2 separate escorts were commanded by ADM Daniel Callaghan aboard USS San Francisco, and Cape Esperance victor ADM Norman Scott aboard USS Atlanta.
• The American convoy reached Guadalcanal on the morning of the 12th and unloaded the precious cargo and supplies.
• A Japanese scout named LCDR Mitzi observed the convoy unloading and sent a message to combined fleet HQ that also noted a surface force of  3 BBs, 3 CAs, 11 DDs off Lunga.
• Japanese ADM Ugaki surmised that the surface force would probably try and intercept the Japanese the following night, however in a staff meeting it was stated that the Americans would “go away as usual” and Abe’s force was not notified of the American’s presence.
• Despite this lack of warning, Japanese air assets decided to strike the Americans, sending 16 torpedo armed Bettys, and 30 Zeros to hit the force
• Warned by coast watchers ahead of time, Turner got his ships underway as 20 F4Fs and 8 P39s scrambled to meet the Japanese inbound
• In the ensuing air battle, the Betty’s missed their targets and were ravaged by the F4Fs who claimed 17 bombers and 6 fighters while actually downing 11 Betty’s and 1 Zero to the loss of 3 F4Fs and 1 P39.
• Turner was later rewarded with a very accurate sighting report of Abe’s force to which he decided to shred his transports of any sizeable escort and order these same escorts to intercept and attack Abe’s extremely powerful force
• Turner assigned Daniel Callaghan as Task Force Commander, despite the fact that Scott had over 6 weeks sea time in these very waters and had won a night time naval fight. 
• He assigned Callaghan because he was 15 days (!) senior to Scott.
• The stage was set.  An American force that consisted of:
• 2 CAs
• 3 CLs 
• 7 DDs
• Would intercept Abe’s bombardment force under the command of an Admiral who had virtually no experience in combat at all on board a CA that still fielded inadequate radar (USS SF)
• Let’s talk about the radar again here, Scott should have been in charge, but at the very least, Callaghan should have embarked aboard Helena with her SG radar and not Frisco.

Collision in the Dark

• The night was moonless, black in complete and total darkness…which dam sure didn’t help with ship ID in the fight that would come.
• The American battle line was laid out such:
• Cushing, Laffey, Sterett, O’Bannon, Atlanta, Frisco, Portland, Helena, Juneau, Aaron Ward, Barton, Monssen, Fletcher
• Callaghan laid his forces out much like Scott did at Cape Esperance, mainly for maneuvering in the confined waters more than anything else.
• Whereas, he should have laid his forces out with Fletch, O’Bannon, Helena, Juneau and Portland in the van because of the new SG radar systems aboard.

The Japanese had split their forces into two separate groups, due mainly to horrible weather that caused some of his units to lose visibility and become detached and spread out.

• ADM Abe, believing he would not encounter American vessels, ordered his ships to load their weapons for a surface bombardment.
• BBs Hiei and Kirishima loaded, what amounted to frag shells in their 14 inch rifles, not AP.
• At around 0130 aboard Helena, her SG radar showed two distinct formations of enemy ships some 27,100 yards distant.
• Helena relayed this information to Callaghan, who generally seemed to ignore it, instead relying on Cushing’s potential visual contact.
• Tremendous mistake here.  This goes back to what we have said in the past that certain CO’s, ADMs and the like did not put any faith in the new technology and in some cases, specifically this one, it would cost them their lives.
• Back aboard Helena, CAPT Gilbert Hoover was beginning to get highly irritated at the fact that Callaghan was ignoring the electronic picture his ship was presenting.  Cape Esperance all over again.
• The range to target rapidly decreased from 10,000 yards to 5,000 to 4,000 as both forces literally steamed right at one another.  
• At 0140 Cushing reported to Callaghan that a “ship is crossing bow from port to starboard, range 4,000 yards maximum.”  Then another passed, and another and so on.  Still Callaghan held fire.
• Range fell to 2,000 yards and Cushing asked via TBS, “Should I let them have a couple of fish?” Callaghan denied the request, which was followed by another from Laffey, which he too denied. Instead saying, “Stand by to open fire.”
• By 0147 Callaghan’s formation was falling apart as individual skippers were veering out of formation so as to avoid collision with vessels visually identified as Japanese by the van.

“Open Fire!”

• A Japanese searchlight, probably from Hiei, pierced the night and focused directly on Helena.  Just ahead another searchlight from a Japanese DD, probably Akatsuki, focused on Atlanta.
• Aboard Atlanta, CAPT Jenkins gave the pre-war order to “counter illuminate” the target.  His gunnery officer LCDR William Nickerson heard this, and shouted into his headset, “Fuck that! Open Fire!”  
• Guns visually ranged in on the enemy DD and opened fire at a range estimated to be between 600-1,000 yards.
• When Atlanta opens fire…everything goes to hell, everybody opens fire.  
• As the first to fire, Atlanta comes under fire from several Japanese ships and is hit in her torpedo director.  Lloyd Mustin Asst Gunnery Officer, is visually watching his shells splash just short of the Japanese DD.  He orders visual corrections and watches through his binocs as the rounds start tearing into the Japanese at a range of under 600 yards.
• Akatsuki is the target and she is absolutely smeared by gunfire from Atlanta, Frisco and Helena. 
• The following Japanese DDs fired their torpedoes at Atlanta just before Ikazuchi was hit by 8 inch gunfire, probably from Frisco.  She doesn’t sink and retires.
• Atlanta is hit by several ships, and at least 1 torpedo and drifts into the field of fire of USS San Francisco.
• Completely out of touch with the situation unfolding before him, Callaghan gives his infamous order, “Odd ships commence fire to starboard, even to port.”  
• This order throws several ships, who were either tracking or firing at targets, to disengage and swing turrets to different targets.
• Hindsight is always 20/20, but its abundantly clear that Callaghan was out of his element.
• Cushing, still in the lead, is rapidly engaging targets when she is blasted by shell fire from a number of enemy ships.  As she is hit, BB Hiei passes close to starboard.  Cushing flashes a voice warning of the enemy BB over TBS and is then blasted by Hiei’s secondaries, drifting to a halt and eventually going down.
• Laffey is now in the lead, if there actually is a lead, and passes Hiei so close that her superstructure towers over her as if you were on the ground looking at a skyscraper, less than 1,000 yards away.
• Laffey opens fire with her 5 inchers.  Despite Hiei’s belt armor, the 5 inchers are so close that they actually penetrate and explode within.
• Individual AA gunners aboard Laffey opened fire with 20mm Oerlikon mounts and poured their fire into Hiei’s portholes and riddled her upperworks with automatic weapons fire, hitting and killing Japanese sailors topside.
• ADM Abe took shrapnel to his face from American gunfire
• As Laffey passes Hiei and avoids collision, she is taken under fire from Kirishima, who smacks her with 14 inch shellfire.  At the same time, she is hit by a torpedo on the stern which cripples her.
• Sterett sights in on a Japanese DD, opens fire and watches her stern catch fire and begin to slow.  Almost immediately, Sterett is caught in a cross fire from several Japanese ships, including Hiei.  She takes numerous hits, slows and retires.  She winds up taking a total of 11 hits, all on the port side, all in her upperworks.

Friendly Fire, and Cruisers versus Hiei

• As Atlanta drifted, having been struck by Japanese gunfire and 2 torpedoes, she moved directly into Frisco’s line of fire.  
• From a range of about 3500 yards, San Francisco fired at least two full broadsides at Atlanta, while she was attempting to fire at a Japanese vessel just beyond her.  The 8 inch shell hits were absolutely devastating, shredding Atlanta’s superstructure and killing Admiral Norman Scott.
• Blame can’t really be put on Frisco for this.  The battle had devolved into a melee, a chaotic mess in which even radar could not pick enemies from freindlies.  
• The chaos gave the battle its nickname, when in an AAR an officer likened it afterwards to "a barroom brawl after the lights had been shot out.”
• It can be assumed that Callaghan witnessed Atlanta take fire from Frisco, as he immediately ordered “Cease Fire Own Ships!”
• After Callaghan’s order, which most ships ignored by the way, Helena was tracking targets via radar, large targets, and requested permission to fire.
• Helena opens fire on Hiei, aiming at her superstructure, letting her 6 inch weapons loose on automatic continuous mode, the “machine gun cruiser” pours over 200 rounds a minute into Hiei’s superstructure, setting it ablaze.
• Callaghan and Frisco now open flank speed and slides right by Hiei at 2200 yards away on her starboard beam and Kirishima 3000 yards distant on the starboard bow.
• Frisco unleashes a broadside at Hiei which answers in kind.  Hiei’s shells strike just short of Frisco, her bombardment shells exploding on contact with the water.
• The only way to save Frisco’s life is to pour it into Hiei, which is exactly what she does.  Pouring salvo after salvo into the battlewagon’s hull and superstructure.
• By pounding Hiei, Frisco now has the full attention of the 2 Japanese BBs.
• She takes a frightful beating from the Japanese, suffering over 45 shell hits, 12 of them 14 inch hits.
• Frisco avoids Davey jones’ Locker due to the fact that the Japanese BBs are firing incendiary and HE rounds designated for bombardment as opposed to AP rounds.
• Still, she takes an absolute pounding.
• Hiei’s 3rd salvo strikes Frisco’s bridge, utterly obliterating nearly everyone inside of it, including Callaghan and CAPT Cassin Young.
• LCDR Bruce McCandless, senior officer in the bridge is the only survivor.  He is instructed by senior DC officer CDR Schonland to command the ship as Schonland is too busy fighting flooding and stability issues aboard ship.
• Frisco survives because of Schonland and McCandless, who both receive the MOH.
• Juneau enters the fray, sighting the burning Hiei, passing close aboard and pouring 5 inch and automatic weapons fire into the flaming battleship.
• Shortly after opening fire, Juneau engages Harusame with gunfire and gets hit, almost dead amidships, by her torpedo which fractures her keel.  She then limps away...we will hear more from her later...

The Battle Over

• At 0226, CAPT Gilbert Hoover of Helena, now Senior Officer Afloat, orders his forces to retire.  At almost the same time, Abe does the same.  After 40 minutes of the most confused, chaotic fireworks show in history, the battle ends as both forces limp away.
• Abe, unaware that only 2 US ships, Helena and Fletcher, could offer any type of realistic resistance decides to turn away and not bombard Henderson.  
• His force has been shot to pieces but is still powerful as Kirishima is relatively undamaged as are at least 5 other ships.  
• Still, due to heavy damage suffered aboard his own ship, Hiei, he decides to retire.
• He is crucified for this decision by Yamamoto, who relieves him of command.
• At 0344 Yamamoto orders the convoy to turn around and go back to the Shortlands.
• As the sun rises, so do American aircraft from Henderson Field.
• SBDs and TBFs roar in to finish off the crippled Hiei, just north of Savo at a distance of about 14 miles.
• 56 sorties from SBDs and TBFs, as well as 14 B17s attacked Hiei and other cripples in Iron Bottom Sound.
• As the attacks increased throughout the day, Abe ordered Hiei scuttled as she was listing heavily from the torpedoes dropped by the TBFs.
• The final tally is frightful:
• Japanese:
• 1 BB and 2 DDs sunk
• 4 DDs damaged
• Between 5-800 men KIA
• US:
• 2 CLs and 4 DDs sunk
• 2 CAs damaged, 2 DDs damaged
• 1439 men KIA
• Despite the disparity in ships sunk and men lost, the battle is considered a US victory because of the failure of the Japanese to complete their mission objective.

Juneau

• Juneau and Gilbert Hoover’s decision to steam on…

This week Bill and I have a special guest with us, he’s been here before and we always love to have him, he’s the one, the only, my good buddy, Jon Parshall.

This week we are going to take a step back from the battlefront, into the backwaters if you will, to discuss some of the leaders of WATCHTOWER, the men who made the decisions, for better or worse, that propelled, and sometimes didn’t propel the all-encompassing campaign.

Talking Points

Ghormley

1. Nimitz nominates Ghormley as COMSOPAC for future operations in April 1942
2. Ghormley had previously acted as a special naval observer in Britain and desired to stay in the European theater.
3. Highly intelligent and a savy negotiator, he had almost zero tactical command experience.
4. He had never held an operational post despite being a Vice Admiral
5. Ghormley was in over his head as COMSOPAC
6. Ghormley receives word to prepare for what would become WATCHTOWER and immediately greets it with pessimism.
7.  Nimitz showed a lot of confidence in Ghormley initially.  Essentially granting him free reign to establish himself and his operations to prepare for the offensive.
8. The very next day, Nimitz received a copy of a letter from Ghormley to King that stated that the timeline for the operation was “unrealistic” and that both Ghormley and MacArthur were doubtful as to the success of the operation and had the “gravest doubts” about the plan.
9. This had to have shaken Nimitz’s confidence in Ghormley as a leader.
10. Regarding the July pre-invasion meeting: the sheer fact that Ghormley declined to attend this incredibly important meeting personally should have been a red flag.
11. Despite being told by Nimitz to command “in person” Ghormley sends Callaghan.
12. This pattern of non-personal leadership causes issues right away…
13. The issue of Turner and Fletcher going after one another in the July meeting over how long the CVs should remain in the area is one example of how things turned to shit quickly.
14. Ghormley “suggested” to Fletcher to leave 2 VF Squadrons on Henderson if the field is ready. BUT…if enemy CVs appear then they are the priority.  
15. As a result of this confusing memo, Fletcher thought he had the approval to maneuver independently and Turner thought that COMSOPAC had assured him that Fletcher would cover the landings until Henderson was operational.  Had Ghormley been present, his intentions would have become known by his own voice.  But alas, that was not to be…
16. After Savo, which you could technically throw blame on Ghormley, Ghormley acted scared and ordered his surface forces all the way back to Noumea, 1000 miles away.
17. He told Nimitz he could not protect the sea lanes requested air support.
18. In truth, Ghormley had no fucking clue what was going on…
19. In messages to Nimitz, Ghormley constantly pleaded for reinforcements, always stating that the forces on Guadalcanal were just barely hanging on…
20. Consistently, Nimitz urged Ghormley to be more active…yet he sat on the Argonne and roasted in his hot quarters
21. Most of his message stank of anxiety and near desperation, and he never seemed to know what was going on.
22. Had he gone to Guadalcanal, maybe just once, he would have had a better understanding
23. Nimitz decided to visit Ghormley on September 25 he arrived 3 days later to find the logistics situation a complete mess.
24. When Nimitz met with Ghormley, the latter’s physical state shocked Nimitz.
25. He was pale, and gaunt, he had dental problems, lived aboard an old, cramped ship with no air circulation and refused to acquire land space for his HQ because of the French not wanting to give the land over to him.
26. Nimitz flew to Guadalcanal the next day, returned to Noumea and told Ghormley how optimistic the men were, and urged him to be more assertive.
27. When Nimitz got back to Pearl he asked some of his staff if Ghormley should be relieved. They all agreed.
28. Halsey was preparing to reclaim his old position aboard CV6, when Nimitz nominated him to King to replace Ghormley.  King replied with one word.  Approved.
29. Nimitz ultimately believed that Ghormley was too timid and out of touch.  Not to say he was physically scared, but he was too timid to commit forces that were needed when they were needed at the right place.

Halsey

1. Halsey takes command on October 18.  He reads the directive from Nimitz twice to make sure he is reading it right and then exclaims, “Jesus Christ and General Jackson.  This is the hottest potato they’ve ever given me!”
2. Morale amongst the fighting men ashore and at sea immediately goes through the roof once word gets out that Halsey is in command.
3. Halsey enters the fray at the most critical time of the entire campaign.  His leadership, fighting spirit and bull-headedness are exactly what the doctor ordered.
4. Almost immediately, Halsey asserted himself.  
5. He seized land ashore and set up a permanent base of operations, which pissed off the French.
6. Then, two weeks after he took command, he got in a plane and flew to Guadalcanal.
7. The Marines ashore ate it up.
8. Before his Guadalcanal vacation, however, his forces became engaged in what would become Santa Cruz.

This week Bill and I have a special guest with us, he’s been here before and we always love to have him, he’s the one, the only, my good buddy, Jon Parshall.

If you’ve been listening to the podcast as of late, you are well aware that we are making our way through the slug fest that was the Guadalcanal campaign.  While the fighting ashore has raged on and off between pitched engagements, the seas around the Canal have been anything but quiet.  Savo Island in August was a debacle for the US Navy, the carrier forces under Admiral fletcher landed some fairly significant blows on the Japanese carrier force at Eastern Solomons, and Admiral Norman Scott finally exacted some revenge for Savo at the Battle of Cape Esperance.  The US Navy has seen it’s share of victories, as well as defeats in these bloody waters.  And while the fighting has been significant at sea…it ain’t over.  Not even close.  

The calendar now sits in October 1942, October 26 exactly.  And ashore, the Japanese have launched a massive offensive to finally push the Marines and Army off Guadalcanal.  The October offensive and the fighting that takes place ashore will be remembered as the Battle of Henderson Field.  The fighting at sea that takes place only a day later, all coinciding with the offensive ashore, will be called the Battle of Santa Cruz.

Talking Points:

Japanese Preparations and Plans Pre-Battle:

• The combined fleet sorties from Truk on October 11.  The force is very large, the largest Japanese force that has put to sea since Midway and consists of 4 CVs and 1 light CV
• 3 Fleet CVs
• 1 Light CV
• 4 BBs
• 8 CAs
• 2 CLs
• 24 DDs
• The Japanese had planned that the naval force that was now at sea would not necessarily support the operation ashore, but would directly benefit from the success of the ground offensive
• That being said, once Hyakutake’s infantry had captured Henderson, the Japanese combined fleet would then be free from any attack from land based air.
• The pre-sailing plans called for the Japanese so-called Support Force to make a high-speed run into the Guadalcanal area to intercept and destroy any American fleet units that would come to the rescue of the infantry following the Japanese land-based offensive’s success.
• This is part of the reason why Kongo and Haruna blasted the shit out of Henderson on October 14-15.  Both to soften the defenses, destroy the airfield and also, hopefully draw the Americans out to fight.
• Japanese intel, which we have not talked about very much, had deduced via traffic patterns that at least 1 US CV was in the Canal area.
• Based on traffic patterns, the Japanese had seen a large flurry of messages go out to a “powerful unit” south of Guadalcanal that would receive the messages and maintain radio silence.
• This of course is CV8
• Again, based on traffic patterns, the Japanese had deduced that another major fleet unit had sailed from Pearl Harbor on or about Oct 15.
• This is the newly repaired CV6
• The Japanese estimated that this task force was headed south as well to join up with the other “ghost” force
• Japanese. Intel also read US newspapers and listened to the news, as US officials ignorantly declared on October 20 that US Naval forces off Guadalcanal were preparing for a “sea clash”

The Land influences the Sea

• Delays ashore from the Japanese 17th Army (future Henderson Field offensive force) caused Y-Day to be pushed from October 19 to the 22nd.  
• Incidentally, Hiyo suffers a fire in her engineering spaces that causes her to return to port and not take part in the planned upcoming action.
• 17th Army again delays the offensive until the 24th further irritating the IJN.
• The delay by the Army forced the Navy to delay its attack which allowed CV6 to rejoin the American forces off Guadalcanal on October 24 and thus restoring some parity to any upcoming carrier battle.

US Forces for battle

• US forces are under the overall command of ADM Thomas Kinkaid 
• TF 16 under Kinkaid has:
• CV6
• 1 CA
• 1 CL 
• 8 DDs 
• 1 BB (SoDak)
• TF 17 under ADM George Murray has:
• CV8
• 2 CAs
• 2 CLs 
• 6 DDs

• Previous to CV6 returning from Pearl, CV8 was the only US CV in the area.
• CV8 was still, despite having been at Midway, an unexperienced CV.
• That being said, her aircrew was a mix of veterans and newbies.
• VS-8 skipper Gus Widhelm 
• Veteran of Coral Sea and hit and run raids with VS-5
• Fantastic leader
• VB-8 SBD pilot Clayton Fisher
• Veteran of the Flight to Nowhere, June 4 afternoon raid and Mogami/Mikuma raid on June 6, but otherwise relatively fresh

• CV6 had just returned to the fleet after having been patched up after Eastern Solomons
• CV6 still retained her well-trained deck crews, DC parties and the like.  Battle tested, CV6 would need all the help she could get in the upcoming fight
• While a veteran carrier, she deployed a brand-new air group, AG 10.
• Air Group 10, although new, is rife with veterans of different engagements
• VF-10, better known as the Grim Reapers, is led by the legendary Jimmy Flatley and hosts names like:
• Jack Leppla
• Don Flash Gordon
• Whitey Feightner and most importantly, 
• Swede Vejtasa
• Bucky Lee led VS-10, not so much a veteran, but an incredible leader.  He had with him names that were both familiar and would become familiar
• Birney Strong
• Martin “Red” Carmody
• Again, technically a new air group, Air Group 10 would prove to be, arguably, the finest Air Group put to sea in 1942, and maybe the war

The Battle draws near

• Night of October 24-25 the Japanese send out searches to find the suspected US CVs but do not find them.  They do detect ADM Willis Lee’s BB56 but do not attack due to extreme range
• Around noon on October 25 US PBYs spot 2 Japanese CVs
• Monitoring the radio intercepts in Noumea, Halsey reads the sightings and messages Kinkaid “STRIKE! REPEAT STRIKE!”
• Amplifying reports allowed Kinkaid to launch at 1430 and again at 1520 his main strike
• The Japanese turned north, but radio silence does not allow Kinkaid to recall his strikers. This ends up, not so well, in that the majority of the strike gets lost and is, thankfully, shepherded back to CV6 by Swede Vejtasa who recalls that CV6 has an oil leak, spots the leak and follows it, at wave-top height, back to CV6 with the majority of the strike…at night.

The Carrier Battle (Morning)

• Both sides readied search planes for a first light search pattern
• During the night of 25-26, US PBYs spotted, and attacked, the Japanese including Zuikaku.  The PBYs missed, and their contact reports essentially went unheard.
• The Japanese got scouts off first, between 0415 and 0445.
• CV6 launched her own scouts around 0445 as well.  
• Kinkaid finally received the PBYs sighting report at 0512 but deemed the information old (which it was) and considered it to be inaccurate.
• One of CV6s scouts saw and approached one of Nagumo’s Kate scout planes, only 85 miles away from CV6, confirming the presence of Japanese CVs in the area.

First Blood

• Bucky Lee, skipper of VS-10 spotted Nagumo’s CVs at 0650 and climbed to attack altitude, but were driven off by CAP
• Lee’s scouting report alerted every SBD in the area, and drove them towards the Japanese like flies to honey
• Radioman Clarence Garlow heard Lee’s report, jotted it down and reported the contact to his pilot, Birney Strong.
• Birney and Eastern Solomons, pressure from Crommelin to attack and a bruise on his pride
• Strong diligently plotted the contact report, adjusted his fuel mixture for maximum distance and headed in the direction of the sighting.
• Showing off his supreme navigational skills, Strong found the enemy 20 minutes later as 2 of the 3 CVs in the area emerged from cloud cover.
• At the same time that Strong and his wingman Irvine approached, 2 other SBDs, one piloted by Red Carmody were being harassed by CAP Zeros, leaving Strong and Irvine wide open for a clear attack.
• Diving from 14,000 feet, at 0740, Strong popped in and out of clouds for the 30 seconds he dove.  At 1,500 feet the clouds parted and directly beneath him was the flight deck of Zuiho.
• Both Strong and Irvine planted their 500 pounders into the flight deck of Zuiho. 
• The hits were not fatal, but did force her withdrawal.
• At 0658, Japanese scouts spot the Hornet
• Despite the fact that the US spotted the Japanese first, it is the IJN that gets their strike off first (no surprise here)
• At 0725 Shokaku and Zuikaku launches their strikes, 62 aircraft led by Murata
• Talk about Murata
• Composition of the strike
• As the Japanese strike is on its way to Hornet, CV8 and a small CV6 strike passes them in the air.
• Let’s talk about how the US strikes during this entire battle are very piecemeal, unorganized and generally unprepared
• As the Hornet strikers pass the Japanese, Zeros from Zuiho break off and attack the CV6 formation
• The TBFs are hit hard as their fighter protection was in the process of making S turns to keep up with the slow TBFs and were on the outward leg of the turn during the attack
• At 0850 Hornet’s strike spotted Shokaku.  As the SBDs home in, they are hit again by Zuiho CAP, as well as Shokaku CAP
• Gus Widhelm, strike leader, is shot down but later rescued.
• At the tail end of the formation is Clay Fisher
• Talk about Clay’s experience
• Hornet’s strike, despite taking heavy casualties, is successful in hitting Shokaku
• John describe Shokaku damage 4-06 hits from 1000 pounders

Hornet Under Attack

• Hornet receives word of the inbound strike from her outbound strike
• Poor coordination from CV6 and CV8 FDOs do not allow the CAP to engage in sufficient numbers to deter the incoming attack (Like Eastern Solomons)
• Japanese sight Hornet at 0855, but do not see CV6 as she dives into a rain squall
• Hornet prepares for the attack, turns NE and dials up 31 knots
• CAP engages at 15 miles but Vals break through and commence the attack at 0910
• First two Vals miss 
• At 0912 Hornet is hit by three bombs within minutes
• 1st bomb hits the flight deck and kills 60 men as it explodes 3 decks down
• Moments later another bomb struck the flight deck, this time exploding on the deck itself. The explosion blew an 11-foot hole in the deck, and the flying shrapnel killed another 30 of Hornet’s crew. Still the rain of bombs came. Hornet suffered yet another hit when another 550-pound bomb penetrated three decks below and exploded there, causing severe damage but no loss of life. Seconds later, a damaged “Val” dive-bomber, hit by Hornet’s own antiaircraft fire, plunged into the carrier’s stack, glancing off of the port leading edge of the stack and smacking into the flight deck, the engine and propeller embedded firmly into the sea-blue stained Douglas fir flight deck. 
• All of the hits suffered by Hornet thus far had occurred in a blinding fast span of just over two minutes. 
• As Hornet reels from the Val attack, the Kates come into view
• Describe the Kate attack led by Murata
• Hammer and anvil attack
• 0915 Hornet is struck by 2 torpedoes starboard
• 1 Val, having already dropped its load, swerves around Hornet from astern, passes the bridge and makes a wingtip vertical turn to crash into her port bow
• At 0925 the attack is over and Hornet is dead in the water and listing
• Fires were under control by 10, and she is being prepared for a two by Northampton

The Big E under attack

• Japanese Vals spot CV6 at 1000. They commence their attack at about 1015, led by Seki
• LT Keiichi Arima, who had hit the Big E at Eastern Solomons, again dives on CV6 and scores yet another hit on the ship.  Dead center near the bow.  The bomb flew through the flight deck and exploded in the water, showering CV6 with shrapnel and starting fires in the focsle
• Minutes later another bomb hits CV6, near the after portion of the forward elevator exploding in the hangar deck killing 40 men
• William Pinckney
• African American of slight build- carried wounded up the ladders to safety before he himself passed out, both wounded and with 3rd degree burns.  Navy Cross
• A third bomb was a tooth rattling near miss that opened hull plates and 2 empty fuel bunkers
• By 1020, the attack was over.
• At 1035 the Kates arrived.  One of the CAP pilots to engage was Swede Vejtasa
• During the attack on Hornet, Swede engaged and shot down one of the Vals that was about to dive on CV8, as well as one of the Vals that attacked CV6.
• Still aloft and with the majority of his ammunition still available, Swede switched off his two outboard weapons so as to conserve ammo, climbed above the Kate’s altitude, dove into them and began picking them off one by one, dropping five of the bandits in about 15 seconds.
• His last target, another Kate, was riddled by Swede’s guns, but flew on.  The aircraft piloted by Takei Kiyomi, dropped down, flew over SoDak and deliberately crashed into USS Smith.  The dead aircraft slid off the ship but the torpedo cooked off, setting the destroyer ablaze.
• Smith, under the command of LCDR Hunter Wood, steered directly into the boiling wake of SoDak.  The enormous wake thrown up by the battleship sliding along at 27 knots extinguished the flames, allowing the plucky little DD to resume station and resume firing.
• Vejtasa is credited with downing 7 Japanese aircraft in that one CAP mission, a record that still stands today. He would be recommended for the MOH, but instead would receive his 3rd (!) Navy Cross
• CV6 dodges a total of 9 Japanese torpedoes, throughout her ordeal USS South Dakota (BB-57) keeps station, a scant 1,000 yards astern, matching every move she makes so as to provide AAA support with her new 40mm bofors guns.
• SoDak claims 26 kills, an unlikely mark, but nevertheless, her guns and her adroit maneuvering certainly helped keep the Big E afloat.
• The returning Japanese (what few manage to return) get back to their CVs and speak of the tremendous amounts of American AA.  Some of those who returned were visibly shaken and could not speak due to shock.

The Battle Over

• At 1135 with CV8 out of action and CV6 heavily damaged, Kinkaid withdraws, leaving CV8 under tow by Northampton and a few screeners.
• At 1235 CV6 resumes landing ops and recovers the remaining aircraft aloft with only one operable elevator.  LSO Robin Lindsey, performs his legendary “virtuoso” 
• He receives word from the bridge to stop landing aircraft as the deck is clogged.  Knowing that the majority of the remaining aircraft are SBDs, he elects to literally pull the plug from his headset, ignore orders and bring the boys down.  
• Lindsey landed so many planes that he was landing the last batch on the last arresting wire, unfazed. 
• Last to land was Swede catching the #1 wire, with 56 other aircraft jammed ahead of him on the deck.
• At 1520, with the majority of US forces leaving the field of battle, Hornet is attacked again.  She is struck by 1 torpedo from Junyo. 
• At this point, the remaining crew abandons ship and she is ordered to be scuttled.
• 2 US DDs fire over 400 rounds into CV8 as well as torpedoes, but she refuses to sink.  (Harder than woodpecker lips)
• Knowing the IJN is closing, the DDs beat feet and get the hell out of the area, leaving CV8 to her enemy. 2 Japanese DDs finally finish Hornet off.

Implications on the Campaign

• Clearly Santa Cruz is a US defeat, although we claimed victory.  
• We leave the field of battle to the enemy and suffer more damage…clear defeat…in one way, a victory in another although unseen at that time.
• Japanese air losses have now reached a critical level.  Through attrition at Coral Sea, Midway, eastern Solomons, and especially Santa Cruz, more than half of the elite aviators who started the war are now dead.  
• Japanese pilot training and replacement systems problems
• Final Tally:
• US- 1 CV sunk, 1 DD sunk, 1 CV heavily damaged.  1 BB lightly damaged, 1 CL and 2 DDs damaged.
• 81 aircraft lost
• 266 men KIA
• Japanese- 1 CV heavily damaged, 1light CV damaged, 1 CA damaged, 1 DD damaged
• 99 aircraft lost
• 400-500 men KIA
• 18% of Zero pilots killed 
• 50% of Val crews killed
• 31% of Kate crews killed
• Horrendous aircrew losses
• US AA, with the introduction of the 40mm account for roughly half of these losses!

This week we would like to welcome back Dave Holland.  Dave is a former United States Marine, owns and runs the facebook and youtube channel called Guadalcanal: Walking a battlefield, a Solomon islands battlefield guide, and most importantly, a Guadalcanal expert.  Welcome back, Dave.

We’ve been building up to this specific event for some time now, and so have the Japanese.  As you will recall, the last several months on Guadalcanal have seen steadily larger Japanese assaults hit that Marines with intents on grabbing Henderson Field.  The Japanese have tried and failed at Tenaru in August, tried and came very close at Edson’s Ridge in September, tried a few smaller attacks here and there the next several weeks, all failures.  

Now we sit in late October and the Japanese have finally built enough forces on Guadalcanal for their almighty “decisive battle”.  All the Japanese thrusts, both ashore and at sea, have led to this operation.  This is the all or nothing, the decisive battle that the Japanese have clamored for and the Americans have been preparing for. This is the tipping point for better or worse. 

Talking Points:

Preparations:

• The Japanese had been steadily sending troops and supplies, more troops than supplies, to Guadalcanal for several weeks in anticipation of this specific offensive.

• The IJN fully supported the operation in just about any way that they could.

• On October 14, two battleships, Kongo and Haruna, along with screening vessels shelled Henderson Field in what was easily, the worst bombardment of the entire campaign.
• For nearly an hour and a half the two battleships fired over 900 rounds of 14 inch ammunition into the Lunga perimeter to knock out both airfields and destroy the Cactus Air Force’s aircraft.
• The shelling, known as “the Bombardment” by the Marines and soldiers ashore destroyed about half of the Cactus Air Force, and heavily damaged the two airfields, although one was back in operation in a few hours.
• This bombardment, as well as others in between, were all in conjunction with the large-scale offensive, all with plans to soften the defenses of the Americans.

• The Japanese had begun steadily moving troops into the attack area for many days, through the jungle (again), with the date of the main assault set for October 22, but would actually take place two days later.  

• To distract the Americans attention from the main location of the attack, the Japanese set up a series of diversionary infantry assaults.

• The Japanese were under the assumption that only 10,000 Americans were ashore, when in actuality the number was over 23,000.

• The Americans, aware that a large scale assault was eventually coming, had been preparing their defensive perimeter for weeks.
• The addition of the Army’s 164th Infantry Regiment gave Vandegrift a total of 13 infantry battalions to defend the perimeter in an almost continuous line.

Prelude to the main event:

• The Japanese had been moving their main assault force through the jungle, along a trail blazed by their engineers, for days…completely undetected by American forces.

• At dusk on October 23, one of the diversion attacks under COL Nakaguma, alomng with 9 tanks, attacked Marine defenses at the mouth of the Matinikau river.

• The Japanese tanks advanced near the river under the cover of an artillery barrage, however, the Japanese tanks were either disabled or destroyed by Marine anti-tank weapons on the opposite side of the river.  

• In response to the Japanese assault, and the Japanese artillery, 4 battalions of Marine artillery fired over 6,000 rounds at the Japanese inflicting heavy casualties and essentially stopping the assault at the river.

• In between the artillery detonations, Marines on the line could audibly hear Japanese screaming and moaning in pain.  The artillery, yet again, was devastating.
• It should be mentioned that while this was happening, Vandegrift was in Noumea at the bidding of newly appointed head banana, Admiral Halsey.

• We’ll get to Haley’s installation as main man in another episode when we discuss the leadership, both good and bad, of the Guadalcanal campaign with buddy and friend of the show Jon Parshall. 

The Main Event October 24:

• At first light on October 24, Marines along the Matinikau caught sight of a long column of Japanese infantry  on a ridge to the left rear of the American lines.  
• COL Hanneken’s 2/7 redeployed to the rear and loosely tied in with the Marines of 3/7, albeit with a gap in the line.

• With the departure of Hanneken’s people, Chesty Puller was forced to stretch his single battalion over a regimental front.
• Only 700 men guarded an area designed for the protection from over 2,000.
• Puller, ever vigilant, personally walked the line inspecting each area, and each emplacement ordering improvements or movements as he saw fit in each area.

• As the Japanese under GEN Maruyama approached the area thought to be the correct position for attack, they began to get bogged down again by the jungle and now, also, heavy rain.
• The original kick off time for the attack, 1900, came and went as the Japanese continued to grope towards American lines.

• Finally, around 2200, elements of COL Shoji’s people stumbled into the leading elements of puller’s defenses.
• The fighting was short but fierce as Puller’s men eventually drove off the attackers, making no progress and gaining no ground.
• Oddly enough, the Japanese sent a message back to 2nd Division HQ that stated that Japanese infantry were moving into the grassy area at the edge of the airfield, when in reality, they were nowhere near the airfield and had certainly not broken through any lines.  

• COL Matsumoto called and stated that the airfield was now completely in Japanese hands. The 17th Army signaled “2300 Banzai-a little before 2300 the right wing captured the airfield.”

• This odd transmission is even stranger when one considers that the “right wing” had marginal, at best, participation in the event at all.

• Meanwhile, the left wing of the Japanese assault decidedly did attack.
• 3rd Battalion 29th Infantry 11th Company under CAPT Katsumata reconned American lines in the area, found a soft spot between 2 MG emplacements and began a low crawl advance towards the American gap in the lines that was threaded with barbed wire.

• Japanese engineers began snipping the wire, unbeknownst to Americans, as the infantry low crawled through the grass to spring a surprise assault.
• Either due to delirium from the long march, fear, excitement or a combination of all 3, one lone Japanese let out a war cry that was soon picked up by many others alerting the Americans of their presence.  

• Almost instantly American machine gun fire erupted as did mortars. The Japanese now knowing the surprise was gone, leapt up and charged.  They began to get entangled in the barbed wire and were summarily annihilated by the Marines holding that area, which was Puller’s A Company at about 0100.

• Shortly thereafter, Japanese of the 9th Company moved to the left in the wake of the now dead 11thCompany and prepared to attack.
• After giving a great Banzai, the men of the 9th Company charged Marine lines, running straight through the prepared machine gun position firing lanes of Puller’s C Company.

• Within 5 minutes, the 9th Company was wiped out.

• John Basilone

• After the majority of the infantry were killed, American artillery began dropping, killing what was left of the Japanese.

• Puller was now aware that he was under attack from a large and well-seasoned Japanese force. 
• He immediately fed 3 platoons from 3/164th into his lines to beef up the defenses.
• The National Guardsmen were led, sometimes by hand, through the torrential rain into the raging battle and fed piecemeal into the Marine lines, mixing with Marine units and holding their own in the fight.

• The only real success of the initial assaults came in the form of COL Furimaya’s assault at dawn. 
• Realizing he had little to work with, Furimaya assembled what he could and personally led an assault that partially pierced the American lines.
• About 100 Japanese broke through and held a salient in the Marine lines that was eradicated in the morning.

The Main Event October 25:

• By mid-morning, it was obvious that the Japanese were not through with their assault.  As a result, Marines and Army troops began to reshuffle their defenses and prepare for another night time assault.  
• For over an hour after 2000, the Japanese fired artillery into the positions of Puller’s 1/7 and LCOL Robert Hall’s 164th IR.  
• The majority of the assault fell on the soldiers of the 164th who held their ground again, all night long.  With the main push coming through an artery between the 2nd and 3rd BTLN 164th.  
• However, that artery was manned by a couple of Marine 37mm guns that were firing canister into the charging Japanese.
• A few Japanese parties broke the lines, but those were hunted down and killed by soldiers and Marines within hours.

• The return of Col Oka…
• His attacks concentrate on the area held by Hanneken’s 2/7
• Just before midnight, the Japanese surged forward against the Marine positions, finally culminating in an all out assault at 0300.
• Company F bore the brunt of this assault…
• Mitch Paige
• Despite Paige’s heroics, Japanese scaled the slopes in front of F Company and ejected them from their positions
• MAJ Odell Conoley led a group of Marines that counterattacked and eliminated the Japanese in the former positions of F Company.

The Battle Over:

• Rough US casualties run about 90 KIA

• Japanese casualties are unknown in exact figures but estimates range in the neighborhood of 2,200 but probably more than that.

• The Japanese blamed the terrain, the march through the jungle, no air support, poor physical condition of the troops, inadequate supplies, faulty intel, etc, etc…all of which were accurate.

• While this isn’t the last land battle on Guadalcanal, it certainly was the most crucial to the Japanese, and the most decisive for the Americans.  For all intents and purposes, the land campaign, in terms of Japanese all-out assaults and large-scale operations, was over.  While there were plans for yet another assault in November, as we shall see, this does not end well for the Japanese.

On the night of October 11, 1942, the Japanese sent two separate task forces heading in the direction of Guadalcanal.  The first task force was yet another troop/resupply convoy, the second task force, separate from the first yet in the same area at the same time, was a bombardment group assigned to shell Henderson field.  

The Japanese, at this time, rulers of the seas around Guadalcanal, at least at night anyway, did not believe that an American task force would be in the area.  Latest intel told them that the Americans were off to the north and not near the beaches.  The intelligence was wrong. 

Set Up:

• The Japanese have been making steady resupply runs, at night, to their forces on Guadalcanal since Edson’s Ridge.  
• These supply runs are the buildup for the eventual “showdown” that is scheduled to take place in mid to late October, October 20 to be exact.
• Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, of Savo fame, was in overall command of the operation set for the night of October 11-12.
• His field commander if you will, is Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto
• Goto is in command of the bombardment force which consists of:
• 3 CAs and 2 DDs

• American intel has picked up on the Japanese plans to build forces for an all-out assault on the airfield.  Realizing that the Marines would be hard-pressed to hold out against another massive assault, Army General Millard Harmon, CO of US Army in the South Pacific, convinces Admiral Ghormley, whom we shall discuss at a later date, that the Marines need the Army’s help.
• Ghormley agrees and sends the Army’s 164th Infantry Regiment of the Americal Division to Guadalcanal to reinforce the Gyrenes.
• The date for the reinforcement is set for October 8 
• To protect the convoy carrying the soldiers, Ghormley assigns a cruiser/destroyer group under the command of Admiral Norman Scott to protect them.
• Scott’s forces include:
• 2 CAs, 2 CLs, 5 DDs
• Scott’s orders are to protect the convoy and once the Army is delivered, patrol the waters off Guadalcanal , intercept and then destroy anything that attempts to move in
• ADM Scott knew that his mission carried with it, two tasks aside from the destruction of any Japanese force
• Develop night surface doctrine
• Revenge
• As far as doctrine was concerned, Scott was aware that he and his units, lacked any real experience or training in night actions.  Therefore, his plan for action, should it be needed, was simple:
• Steam in a column with DDs ahead in the van, followed by the cruisers
• DDs would illuminate targets after radar contact, fire torpedoes and allow the CAs to concentrate on the enemy heavies

• Scott chose the USS San Francisco (CA-38) as his flagship, when he should have probably chosen either Helena or Boise
• Helena and Boise were both equipped with new SG radar units, as opposed to the SC aboard Frisco
• Faulty intel said that the Japanese had sets that could track American radar and as a result he ordered that the radar on Frisco be turned off (!!)

The Fight:

• On October 9 and 10th Scott was patrolling the area just north of Renell island, out of range of Japanese search planes
• Each night he entered Savo sound but turned back because of no reported Japanese activity
• On the 11th, search planes from Guadalcanal sighted the incoming Japanese troop reinforcement convoy and reported it as 2 CAs and 6DDs.
• Scott receives this intel and prepares to maneuver his ships into the Savo island area to do battle that night

• At sundown, Scott orders his ship to GQ, determined to not be surprised by the Japanese like at Savo on August 8

• Prior to action, Scott wisely decided to launch most of his scout planes and send them to Guadalcanal.
• This was a clear lesson learned at Savo as a result of the avgas fires that stared aboard the US cruisers and illuminated them for the Japanese to see

• What couple of scout planes he still had, he launched around 2200 to scout ahead of his task force.

• The night was clear and cloudless, but there was no moon to add ambient light to the battlefield, thus making visibility poor.
• Scott set his formation for battle as follows:
• DDs Farenholt, Duncan and Laffey leading:
• CA San Francisco, CL Boise, CA Salt Lake City, and CL Helena followed by:
• DDs Buchanan and McCalla

• The Japanese were completely unaware that an American force was closing on them.
• In actuality Japanese submarine I-26 was on the surface and sighted the force, but did not report it as she chose to dive and make an attack (which she ultimately didn’t do anyway)

• At 2250 SF’s float plane reported “1 large, 2 small vessels 16 miles from Guadalcanal”

• Based on this report, Scott executed a turn in order to cross the Japanese’s T
• Explain crossing the T

• The Japanese formation was led by CA Aoba, Furataka, and Kinugasa
• DD Fubuki and Hatsuyuki held screen

• Around 2332 hours, Helena’s radar picked up the Japanese ships, Boise and Salt Lake City also picked up the Japanese on radar
• Scott was confused by the radar reports and initially didn’t trust them
• This is huge and will come in to play in November as well.  This generation of US CO’s did not have experience in radar, nor did they trust the abilities of the new technology.  There were only a handful of officers who did trust radar, and again, that would come to play in the next month.

• 2345 hours SF picks up the enemy on radar and finally Scott believes what he is being told
• Japanese are only 5,000 yards away
• Lookouts on Helena spot the enemy visually at the same time

• An Ensign in radar plot in Helena impatiently asked the ship’s navigator, “What the hell are we going to do?  Board them?”
• CAPT Gilbert Hoover of Helena wasted no time and without orders from Scott decided to open fire at 2346
• Helena let loose with all 15 of her 6 inch guns at one time…

• The Japanese under ADM Goto finally sighted the American formation at a range of 10,000 yards.  He was concerned that the ships may be friendly so he ordered a turn and a flash of recognition signals
• As the Japanese signalmen aboard Aoba flashed the message, Helena’s shells tore into her superstructure.

• Back aboard Helena, all her guns were firing, but not in salvo.  Each turret was operating almost independently in what was called “automatic-continuous mode”.  The result was unreal…
• The Helena’s gun crews had their weapons loaded and fired in such rapidity that the Japanese later believed that the Americans had a cruiser with automatic weapons.  The Japanese suspected the Americans of having “Machine gun cruisers.”
•  
• Aboard Salt Lake City, her 8 inch guns opened fire on Aoba from 4,000 yards away, her second salvo smashed Aoba and SLC’s directors reported, “No splashes, all hits.” 

• SF opened fire on a DD from 4,500 yards away.  At this time, the entire American column was engaged in a gun fight
• Salvo fire was almost non existent as each gun and their gun crews worked independently and each ship fired in a staccato cadence that made the night look like a low hanging lightning storm had enveloped the American column.
• The rate of fire and the accuracy of hit both stunned and devastated the Japanese column.

• Despite Scott’s initial mistrust of radar, he ordered ships to fire using the technology due to the fact that the fire was so heavy that he could not monitor the battle visually, and within minutes, all American ships were doing just that, adjusting their fire with radar and walking the shells into their targets with sniper like accuracy.

• Aboard McCalla, an Ensign Weems watched the fight and later wrote, “I felt wildly exultant joy  in watching us let them have so much at such murderous range. If you stop and think, 2500-3000 yards is point blank for big guns.  You can hardly miss even if you wanted to.”

• 4 minutes after opening fire Boise had expended 300 rounds from her main battery!
• 3 Japanese ship were afire at this time

• Japanese cruiser Aoba had been hit at least 24 times and was afire, 2 main battery turrets were destroyed, her main director was destroyed, searchlights, catapults and several boilers.

• The firing was so severe that Scott lost control of the events.  Despite his orders to cease fire (WHY???) the ships never did.  They could see their targets and continued to pour it into them.

• Japanese cruiser Furataka took several heavy hits, more than likely from SF and SLC.  Her turrets were hit and at least 1 was destroyed, and she took hits in her torpedo tubes, which set the Long Lances afire, making her a perfect target.
• SLC radar set swept the area and detected all enemy targets “afire”

Battle Finished

• By 0245 the battle was over.  The Americans had beaten the hell out of a Japanese cruiser and destroyer force, eventually sending the cruiser Furataka and destroyer Fubuki to the bottom.  Aoba was heavily damaged as well, but limped away.
• Japanese casualties are estimated to have been 450 men killed and another 100 or so captured the next morning.

• US losses amounted to the destroyer Duncan being sunk, the cruiser Boise being heavily damaged, Salt Lake City lightly damaged, and destroyer Farenholt heavily damaged. 
• US KIAs are set at 163 men killed.

• While the battle was clearly an American victory as the Japanese were denied their mission to bombard Henderson the long ranging effects on the campaign were actually minimal.
• Because of Scott’s (rightly) focus on the Japanese bombardment force, the troop and supply convoy was successful in unloading its cargo and escaped before morning.

Nevertheless, the victory provided a much needed boost in morale to the US Navy and its force of cruisers and destroyers.  The general feeling was that Savo had been avenged.

This week we will be talking about the early actions that occurred along the Matinikau river.  Now, as opposed to the land battles we have discussed before, Tenaru and Edson’s Ridge which each only happened one time, the Matinikau actions occurred several times from September through November 1942.  Today, we will be focusing on the September and October actions.  

Following the battle at Edson’s Ridge, what remained of the Japanese force under General Kawaguchi, pulled back through the jungle and attempted to regroup, as well as refit, on the western side of the Matinikau river.  Marine general Archer Vandegrift was aware that the Japanese had done this very thing and planned to eliminate whatever was left of the force that had slammed against the ridge on two consecutive nights in September.

Vandegrift was determined to mop up what was left of the Japanese so as to deny them the opportunity to consolidate their forces and resume their offensive.  Vandegrift chose his freshest troops for this action, the recently arrived 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines under a Lieutenant Colonel whose name was and still is synonymous with the Corps.  Lewis B Chesty Puller.

Talking Points:

The 7th Marines Arrive:

• On September 18, the Marines on Guadalcanal finally received some much needed reinforcements, to the tune of 4157 men of the 7th Marine Regiment
• Fresh from garrison duty in Samoa, these Marines were both fresh and eager to go.
• Their arrival allowed Vandegrift to finally establish a full defensive perimeter around the Lunga Point area
• Learning from the lessons earlier in the campaign, the 7th Marines were disgorged on the beach early in the morning, and by 1800 that same day the cargo ships, now properly loaded, spit out a further 
• 137 trucks
• 4323 barrels of fuel
• 60% of the tentage and equipment needed by the 7th
• The remainder would be unloaded in short order

Lewis B “Chesty” Puller 

• 44 years old at this time
• Joined the Marines in 1918
• By 42 he had served 24 years in the Corps
• A veteran of Haiti, Nicaragua, better known as the banana wars, Puller had loads of combat experience before he ever got to the Canal
• Described as the prototypical Marine officer, Puller had a chin like “bulldozer blade”, a barrel chest and seemingly always had a pipe stuck in his teeth.  
• Highly decorated for service in Haiti and Nicaragua and grounded in the fundamentals of infantry combat and what it took to both be an infantryman, and how to survive as an infantryman, his men absolutely adored him.

Mission:

• Puller was to advance astride Mount Austen, cross the river and examine the area between Mount Austen and Kokumbona
• Clearly just an exploratory mission

• 900 men under Puller moved out on September 23
• On the afternoon of the next day, the lead elements of Puller’s force ran into a Japanese bivouac area on the NW slope of Mount Austen
• In the ensuing fight, the Marines drove the Japanese off just before dark, but took significant casualties
• 7 KIA 25 WIA

• The next day 2/5 was sent to reinforce Puller and allow his wounded to be brought to the rear

• At the same time, the Japanese had established a defensive area around the position known as “One Log Bridge” along the river
• The Japanese 12th Company, at the bridge, and Puller’s units hit each repeatedly with neither side gaining, or losing, any ground

• Because of the defense at one log bridge, Puller continued downstream, headed towards the mouth of the river and attempted a crossing.
• He was met with fierce Japanese defensive fire and mortars that handily checked the Marine advance and forced them to hold on the friendly side of the river

• Vandegrift sent the 1st Raiders to join Puller and at this point, Edson took command
• Edson and Puller devised a plan to have C Company of Puller’s Battalion move up the east side of the river, cross one log bridge and attack Matinikau village from the south
• 2/5 would hold the line near the mouth of the river to deny any attempt by the Japanese to flank Puller’s group

Attack:

• At first light on the 27th, the Raiders moved up to cross the one log bridge
• As they did so, they came under intense fire from well entrenched Japanese on the east bank of the river
• This was completely unexpected as far as the Marines were concerned
• Well placed Japanese mortar fire began to take effect on the Raiders
• Kenneth Bailey, leading the attack is killed here

• After Bailey is killed, LCOL Griffith, who had been wounded in the fight, tried to slip 2 companies around the entrenched Japanese in order to flank them, but they too were pinned down by heavy Japanese fire

• Back at the mouth of the river, the Japanese 9th Company continuously hurled back 2/5’s attacks across the river 

Pt Cruz:

• In an attempt to cut the Japanese off, Companies A, B and D of 1/7 landed near Point Cruz and began to push inland.
• It must be noted that the this action would not have occurred had it been known by Vandegrift that Puller’s and the Raider’s attack had not succeeded as yet.
• Garbled radio transmissions from Griffith did not make it clear that the action was successful
•  
• Almost immediately, the Marines came under heavy fire as COL Oka deployed several units to attack the recently landed Marines
• Mortar rounds killed Major Rogers, and wounded another Company commander, leaving Captain Charles Kelly to assume command of the operation
• Within a short amount of time, the Japanese had moved behind the marines (coast side) and cut them off from any route of escape
• Realizing their predicament, Kelly ordered to radio for help…but no radios had been brought to the area by the Marines.
• Using t-shirts, the Marines spelled out HELP on the ground, a signal that was seen by an SBD pilot from VMSB231 named Dale Leslie.
• Leslie relayed the Marines’ desperate message which was picked up by Puller
• Meanwhile, Edson’s attack was still underway when he too received the message of distress from Kelly.
• Edson halted his attack despite Puller’s heated argument that halting the attack would allow the Japanese to send more men to attack and eventually annihilate Kelly.

• Fearing for his men, Puller hauled ass back to Kukum where he boarded the destroyer USS Monssen 
• Gathering landing craft, Puller, Monssen, and a flock of 10 landing craft headed towards Point Cruz in the area the Marines had initially landed
• Once arriving, the landing craft were greeted by furious fire from the Japanese who had by this time, pushed the Marines back, cut them off and were preparing to mount an assault to destroy them
• Puller was able to establish comms with Kelly ashore by use of semaphore and directed him to make his way to the coast NOW
• As the Marines attempted to fight their way out, the destroyer Monssen provided direct artillery support with every available weapon aboard ship for 30 minutes and helped blast a path for the withdrawing Marines
• By 1630, those who could, had made it to the beach as the landing craft were heading to rescue them
• Realizing the Marines were trying to escape, the Japanese poured fire into them and tried to reestablish the encirclement

Douglas Munro

• Munro ordered his Higgins landing craft towards the shore as he and the other boats in his formation came under intense fire.
• Manning a Lewis machine gun, Munro returned fire at the Japanese and ordered for his boat to move closer to the beach so as to shield the Marines that were attempting to embark on the other landing craft.
• As his boat moved into position, Munro noticed a grounded landing craft, again moving his boat to shield the Marines attempting to free the craft, Munro purposely exposed himself and his boat to withering enemy fire.  
• Holding station for several minutes, Munro poured fire back at the Japanese and eventually directed his boat to withdraw after the previously grounded landing craft had been freed and loaded with Marines.  As Munro’s craft withdrew he was struck by a Japanese bullet at the base of his skull.
• Rushing back to Lunga point, his best friend Raymond Evans cradled Munro in his arms. Munro regained consciousness, looked at Evans and asked, “Did they get off?” Evans replied in the affirmative, and Munro died.
• Munro was the first, and so far, the only Coast Guardsman to receive the MOH
• The ill-fated Marine action resulted in 70 KIA and a further 100 WIA

October 6-9 actions

• On October 3 LTGEN Maruyama was landed along with fresh troops.  His mission was to set up artillery positions on the opposite side of the Matinkiau with which to shell Marine positions in preparation for the late October offensive that was on the horizon
• Over the next few days, the Japanese proceeded to do just that as well as set up further defensive postions along the banks of the river.

• Vandegrift, again aware that the Japanese were preparing positions as well as preparing for an offensive

• Daily Marine patrols ran into Japanese and confirmed both the arrival of fresh troops and the preparations for offensive

• As a result of this knowledge, Vandegrift once again planned an offensive against the Matinikau positions to eliminate the threat before it came to him
• His plan was to strike and seize the area near Kokumbona to deny Japanese access to the trails that lead to the upper portion of the Lunga area.
• The 5th Marines, minus 1/5 would advance along the coast and force a crossing of the river.
• The Whaling Group, as well as the 7th Marines, would cross the river further south at one log bridge.
• Once across the Whaling Group and the 7th would attack down the ridges and hopefully trap a large number of Japanese in the process.

The fighting:

• October 7 the attack kicked off, with 3/5 reaching the river and running into fierce resistance
• 3/5 used 75mm artillery pieces mounted in half-tracks to pour direct fire into the Japanese positions.  Slowly, the Japanese gave ground.
• By nightfall, the Marines held the mouth of the river and the Whaling Group and the 7th had crossed the river easily at one log bridge

• The following afternoon, H Company 5th Marines under Captain Rigaud mistakenly entered a valley between two Japanese units

• The enemy holding the high ground poured fire into H Company.  Marines started to panic, and began to run.  Rigaud stood up in the middle of the fight, challenged his men, shamed them, cajoled them and made them retake their positions and eventually withdrew in order.
• Fighting died down on the 7th and the assault waited until the following day to complete the encirclement
• On the 8th, Vandegrift received intel that the Japanese were preparing an all out offensive to recapture the island.  As a result, he cancelled the operation for the next day and ordered his units to return to the American perimeter to prepare a defense following this day’s actions. 
• The Whaling Group and 2/7 reached the beach as Puller’s group topped a ridgeline to find an entire Japanese battalion in the ravine below him.
• Puller called in artillery and mortars and watched as the artillery did its work, calling them machines for extermination.
• The Japanese tried to escape by climbing up the ravine side and were taken under direct machine gun and rifle fire from Puller’s men.
• Only after Puller’s men had expended all of their mortar ammunition did he order cease fire, moving out to rejoin Whaling and Hanneken ahead of him.
• This concluded the second battle around the Matinikau which resulted in:
• 65 KIA and 125 WIA
• The Japanese lost around 700 men in the three day engagement

Effects on the campaign:

Because of the loss of the Matinikau, the Japanese were forced to eventually march their men through the jungle (again) before the major assault around Henderson Field in late October .  This march, like Kawaguchi’s the month before, exhausted the attackers to the point where their efficiency in the attack that came was severely diminished. 

This week we would like to welcome back Dave Holland.  Dave is a former United States Marine, owns and runs the facebook and youtube channel called Guadalcanal: Walking a battlefield, a Solomon islands battlefield guide, and most importantly, a Guadalcanal expert.  Welcome back, Dave.

It’s been over a month since the Marines landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo.  August has passed and with it, the lives of over 1,200 allied sailors and airmen at the battles of Savo island and Eastern Solomons, as well as the lives of over 200 US Marines ashore.  The Japanese have lost over 1700 men ashore on the aforementioned islands, including nearly 800 at the Tenaru river on August 21 as well as nearly 300 lost at sea.  

Operation WATCHTOWER was never assumed to be a quick in and out operation, it was never thought of, at least by the United States, as a quick trip. The Americans knew it would be a slugfest, how much of a slugfest was anyone’s guess however.  As September dawned and the first week passed, the slugfest ashore abruptly turned into a meatgrinder.  A bloody, drawn-out campaign of attrition was something that the Japanese could not withstand.  The Japanese were sick of the Marines on Guadalcanal, and wanted them out and wanted them out now.  

Beginning in the first week of September, over 5,000 Japanese troops under the command of General Kawaguchi landed on Guadalcanal with their sole mission being to “rout and annihilate the enemy in the vicinity of the Guadalcanal Island airfield.”  The focus of their initial assaults on the Marines would center on an area south of Henderson Field, near three small hills and an, as yet, unnamed ridge.  The unnamed ridge would soon receive several names from the Marines who defended it.  History would call it, Edson’s Ridge.

Talking Points

Lead up to the Battle:

• As early as August 18, Imperial Japanese Army orders stated that the main body of the 35th Infantry Brigade under GEN Kawaguchi prepare to move to Guadalcanal.
• By late August, Kawaguchi had formed a plan to move his unit to the Canal from Shortland by barges.  American day time air power shut that idea down, so as to force the Japanese to move Kawaguchi’s people to the island by means of fast DDs.
• This was one of the first operations of the infamous Tokyo Express

• Kawaguchi was completely ignorant as to the number of Marines in and around the defense perimeter.  
• Estimates told him that no more than 2,000 Marines held the lines, albeit with aircraft to help them.
• This estimate allowed Kawaguchi to believe that he could easily break through Marine lines with his force (sound familiar Ichiki?)

• By September 7, Kawaguchi had over 5,000 men encamped around Taivu Point
• This did not include Colonel Oka’s men, some 1,000 strong, that were separate and slated to hit the SW quadrant of the American lines.

• Kawaguchi then split his forces further, breaking his units into groups of about 650 men each and put them on 3 separate avenues of advance, through the jungle, to eventually strike the Marine lines all at once.

• A further avenue of attack was designated to come from the SE, and this would contain the newly christened “Kuma” BTLN, which was consisted of Ichiki’s 2nd echelon.  
• Artillery would theoretically support the assaults, as would naval gunfire in the form of bombardments of Marine positions on September 9 and 10

• Kawaguchi picked the night of September 12 as the night of the assault
• By September 8, Kawaguchi had moved his assault units from Taivu to Koli Point and set off on foot through the jungle on September 9.

The Tasimboko Raid:

• Word reached Vandegrift (via native scouts) that fresh Japanese units had landed and that a group of 2-300 were in and around the village of Tasimboko
• The commander of the 1st Raider Battalion, Merritt Edson, jumped on the news and hatched a plan to land a portion of his Raider Battalion some 3,000 yards behind Tasimboko and take the Japanese by surprise

• Merritt A Edson 
• Known as “Red Mike” for his fiery red hair
• Generally was a quiet and reserved man
• Spoke with a low, quiet, raspy voice that was hard to hear
• Former aviator, but he was an expert in infantry tactics
• Like all good commanders, he possessed an innate ability to instantly recognize good or poor performance in his subordinates
• On September 8, the Raiders landed at Taivu Point
• Immediately found signs of enemy landings in the form of half-eaten food, abandoned packs, shoes, life preservers and some weapons

• Edson’s men were met by heavy defensive fire as they moved inland towards Tasimboko

• Kawaguchi ordered artillery support and detached an infantry company to lend a hand to the defenders
• The rest of kawaguchi’s people kept on towards the airfield
• P-400’s and SBDs from Henderson Field rendered aerial support as Edson’s men pushed forward
• Company A of the 1st Raiders burst out of the jungle and annihilated what Japanese had not fled the area of Tasimboko
• The Marines entered Tasimboko to find it essentially deserted of people but filled with valuable intel and supplies
• Marines bayoneted the Japanese tins of beef and crab
• They found 75mm guns, a radio outpost, medical supplies, boats, ammunition by the crate full
• Correspondent Richard Tregaskis filled a blanket with papers, maps and other documents
• Because of some of the intel gathered at Tasimboko, the Marines were able to somewhat prep for what was coming…

Eve of battle

• Due to the intel gathered by Edson, he was able to inform Vandegrift that defenses should be placed along the ridge as it seemed the most likely avenue of approach for an attack that may contain as many as 4,000 Japanese

• During the trek to the ridge, Kawaguchi’s forces were essentially assaulted by the jungle in which they travelled

• Marine patrols began running into elements of Kawaguchi’s people on the 10th

• Native scouts brought word that the Japanese were on the move allowing the Marine’s just enough time to dig some foxholes and clear fields of fire

• Edson’s Raiders were strung out in a thin line often intersected by lagoons and seemingly impenetrable jungle

• A single string of barbed wire was at the front, flanked by supporting strongpoints with mutually supporting fire lanes
• Edson was convinced a major Japanese force was in front of him and continued his patrols the next day (12 Sept)
• Firefights sprang up through the late night of September 12 and early September 13, with intermittent Japanese naval bombardments in between

• The Japanese had wanted a coordinated attack but because of the jungle and some units simply getting lost, this was not to be on the night of the 12/13

• Japanese units were late in assembling, if at all, and when they attacked, sometimes 2-3 hours after they were supposed to, they missed the ridge almost entirely and got into fights with C Co and B Co Raiders in the swamps.

• Kawaguchi lost control due to the mixed units and late arrivals and the attack fell apart before it really began

• The following morning (13 Sept) Edson sat eating his breakfast and told his officers, “They were testing, just testing.  They’ll be back.”

September 13/14 Edson’s Ridge

• Edson pulled his line back in the morning and prepared fresh positions to confuse the Japanese attackers that would come that night
• Despite this, the defenses were still inadequate.   Small combat groups of about 100 men each were at positions spread across and around the ridge

• Around 1830 the first attacks came, pushing B and D Companies off their positions and up the ridge
• Japanese surged through the gap in the lines but Marine artillery brought them to a halt for a short while
• Edson estimated that around 2200 hours, the B Company and two small groups of Paramarines (300 ish men) were facing 2 full battalions of Japanese

• Paramarines on the flank were assaulted around 2230 by mortars then a wave of infantry who came bursting out of the nearby jungle, straight at them.

• The Marines were being assaulted from the front and also flanked.  Harry Torgerson of Raggedy Assed Gavutu fame, helped pull the paras back about 150 yards to a small knoll where they reassembled

• The main thrust of the attack now fell on B Co Raiders under John Sweeney
• Only 60 men
• Edson pulled these men back to from a line with C Co and A Co of the Paras
• As the Marines pulled back, it is thought that someone mentioned the word “withdraw”, having heard this many of the Marines started heading for the airfield moving significantly faster than a walking pace

• At the same time the Marines were withdrawing, Kawaguchi’s reserve slammed into those very men, forcing the withdrawal damn near into a rout

• Kenneth Bailey

• All the while the Marines were withdrawing to a better position, the artillery was eating the Japanese alive
• Tregaskis heard over the radio “Drop it five zero and walk it back and forth across the ridge”
• Edson sent a runner saying “It’s knocking the hell out of them.”
• Artillery probably saved the day to be honest

• The Japanese were so close that at the division command post, the men were under direct Japanese rifle fire
• At this time, about 300 Marines held a knoll in a horseshoe shaped line, the last defense before Henderson Field
• Torgerson led a counterattack of the Paras that forced the Japanese back and extended Marine lines
• All throughout this action, Edson kept calling the arty even closer to his position, but still the Japanese came on, undeterred

• The fighting got so close that Marines could hear the Japanese steeling themselves for another attack and in response the marines rolled grenades down the ridge into the Japanese clusters of men

• Attacks continued through the night, with the Marines literally clinging to victory as the sun rose

• As soon as was feasible, P400’s arose and lit into what was left of the Japanese in the open

• Several more Japanese attacks hit Marine lines in different places over the next couple days, but none were serious and none threatened the airfield

Assessment:

• The Marines barely, just barely hung on
• Artillery was the savior
• Artillery is estimated to have killed no less than 2/3 the Japanese killed on the ridge and no more than ¾

• Air support and the harassment of Japanese units BEFORE the battle by air also contributed heavily to the victory

• Regardless of the support, the battle would have been lost had it not been for the men pulling triggers
• Edson was awarded the MOH and was extremely deserving of the award, having been the main inspirational leader and an excellent tactician during the defense

• By far, the Ridge battle was the closest fight yet.  Had the Japanese been able to commit their entire force as planned, the airfield, more than likely, would have been captured.

• Hundreds more Japanese died during the withdrawal from the area (back through the jungle) due to wounds and starvation, thereby eliminating virtually all of Kawaguchi’s command

• Due to the shocking defeat of Kawaguchi, the Japanese were now more committed than ever before to force a showdown on Guadalcanal by committing decisive force

• This will be seen several times in the month of October

The month of August 1942 has had its ups and downs so far as the campaign for Guadalcanal is concerned. The invasion of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, Tanambogo and other outlying islands in the area initially went very well. Marines occupied the islands rather quickly and eliminated Japanese resistance to a man in most places.  On August 21, Marines from the 1st Marine Regiment utterly destroyed the first major Japanese counter strike on land at the Tenaru River.  On land, the campaign was succeeding.  At sea, however, it was not. The debacle at Savo Island, the worst defeat in US Navy history, left a bitter taste in the mouths of every person in and around the seas of Guadalcanal that wore an American or allied uniform.  

Because of the defeat at Savo, among other reasons, Admiral Fletcher pulled his precious carriers away from the immediate vicinity of Guadalcanal to preserve their ever so valuable flight decks.  However, because of the Tenaru battle, Fletcher was compelled to reverse course and send his flattops back to the waters of Guadalcanal to protect and support the Marines against any further Japanese efforts ashore.   

Unbeknownst to Fletcher, the Japanese had deployed a strong naval force under the command of Chuichi Nagumo, of Midway fame, to support Japanese land efforts and destroy any US ships in the area.  Over the next few days, that being August 24, 1942, the US fleet and the Japanese fleet groped for each other, and eventually became entangled in the third carrier battle of 1942, what history would call, the Battle of the Eastern Solomons.

Talking Points:

Japanese Intentions:

• For the most part, Japanese counteroffensives ashore at Guadalcanal, were almost always tag-teamed with a naval supporting operation.  This is the first “significant” Japanese effort to eliminate the Marines ashore and the USN offshore by a combined arms operation.
• The Japanese had sent another troop convoy under Admiral Tanaka towards Guadalcanal with the remainder of Colonel Ichiki’s 2nd echelon.  We will hear from them again at Edson’s Ridge…
• The deployed Japanese fleet would both protect the convoy and destroy any American shipping in the area.

• Yamamoto knew that US carriers were in the area supporting the Guadalcanal landings, he did not know specifically where they were, but he figured that they had to be in the area.

• As a result, he deployed the two fleet carriers at his disposal, Pearl Harbor and Coral sea veterans Shokaku and Zuikaku as well as a light carrier Ryujo.
• Aside from the CVs, which were the long ranged striking arm, the fleet that was deployed consisted of two other task forces.
• The Advanced Force under Admiral Nobutake Kondo had 5 CAs, 1 CL, 8 DDs and 1 BB.
• The Vanguard Force under Admiral Hiroaki Abe consisted of 2 BBs, 3 CAs, 1 CL, and 6 DDs.
• The Japanese actually sent Ryujo ahead of the main striking force as a screen.  

• Yamamoto’s plan called for the destruction of the American CVs that he figured to be in the region thereby allowing the Japanese naval forces the ability to destroy any other US and Allied shipping in the area and isolate and destroy the Marines ashore.

• Again, like at Midway and Coral Sea, the Japanese divided their forces thereby spreading their AA capabilities, which were not that great anyway, thin.

• The advantage of spreading their forces, at least here, is that as we shall see, not all of the coveted targets were sighted or attacked by American aircraft.

• The Japanese forces were laid out as such:

• Japanese transports were supposed to land reinforcements on August 24

US disposition:

• To counter any Japanese move in the area, the US had at its disposal, essentially, the same force that it had at the outset of WATCHTOWER, minus the cruisers sunk at Savo of course.
• Just before the battle, the US had 3 CVs at sea.  CV6, CV3, and CV7.
• On August 23, Fletcher detached USS Wasp, as she was critically low on fuel , and because of this, she missed the battle

• The US forces were split into two Task Forces, all under Fletcher’s command.

• TF11 centered around CV3 and included an escort of 2 CAs and 5 DDs.

• TF16, under the command of Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, centered around CV6 with an escort consisting of 1 CA, 1 CL (AA CL Atlanta), and 6 DDs.

• A conspicuous presence amongst this TF was the new fast battleship USS North Carolina (BB-55)
• This was the first time a fast battleship would operate with US CVs in a battle, and as such would also be the first time one of the new fast battleships would unleash their vast array of anti-aircraft weaponry, which would go on to play a vital role in the upcoming battle.

August 24

• Beginning on August 22, both US and Japanese forces started sending out search aircraft in order to locate one another.
• USN PBY Catalinas had reported on incoming Japanese warships, and spotted the incoming light carrier Ryujo  

• By morning, Fletcher was getting itchy.  He was aware that Japanese forces were in the area, but as yet, had not spotted them himself having relied on PBY contacts.  

• Around 1240, CV6 launched 22 sets of scouts in a fan shaped pattern that covered a 180 degree area north of Fletcher’s flattops to visually sight Ryujo and the other fleet carriers Fletcher knew would be there as well

• One of those pilots was a gentleman named Birney Strong.
• Strong was an SBD pilot from VS5 aboard CV6 and was scheduled to scout the area 320-340 degrees from Big E.
• Like most Naval aviators, Birney Strong was confident in his abilities.  As he reached the flight deck, he told his rear seat gunner, “It’s our job to find the japs, and I know exactly where they are. We are going to get there, circle them, and report on their position before they find us.”
• Strong was a VS5 vet, having flown from CV5 in the hit and run raids as well as Coral Sea

• Fletcher, keenly aware of his mistake at Coral Sea, when he sent a deckload strike from 2 CVs at Shoho, decided to hold CV3’s deckload until the distance closed and the location of the enemy was fixed.

• Thinking he had been sighted by the numerous Japanese snoopers that had been shot down all day (he had not), he finally elected to launch CV3 strike at 1340, despite not knowing a fixed position on Ryujo, or knowing if more Japanese CVs were present.

• CDR Don Felt aboard CV3 was launched at 1340, however, on the last known sighting of the only Japanese CV spotted thus far, Ryujo.
• His strike was 29 SBDs, 8 TBFs, and no fighter escort
• The fighters were being held back as CAP against a possible Japanese strike.

• Enterprise searchers had been groping for the target for over an hour when at 1440 hours, just as he had predicted, Birney Strong visually sighted the carrier Ryujo in the 330-340 degree sector of the search grid.

• Strong approached to within five miles of Ryujo and ordered his contact report sent.  It was an agonizing six minutes before Enterprise acknowledged the sighting, leaving Strong and his wingman to circle the enemy that entire time.
• Curiously, he neglected to attack the enemy ship

• At 1510, another CV6 scout, piloted by Yogi Jorgenson of VS5 spotted Ryujo again, elected to attack but were driven off by Japanese CAP.  
• As the Americans departed the area, they ran into CV3’s strike group under CDR Felt and radioed them their newest, hottest location on Ryujo.

• Finally, around 1500, a VB6 scout piloted by CO Ray Davis spotted the fleet carrier Shokaku.  Radioing its position, he and his wingman elected to attack the big flattop below.
• Both he and his wingman, Robert Shaw, missed their target by a mere 30 feet as Shokaku was twisting and turning violently to avoid them.
• Davis’ contact report was never heard as there apparently reception was poor this day.
• Thus, the strike from CV6 that Fletcher had been saving for just this moment, was wasted.

• What neither pilot knew was that Shokaku had just launched a deckload strike at the last location of Enterprise, having just learned of her location. 

Ryujo

• Felt’s group closed to within visual range of Ryujo and coordinated their attack at 1536

• The poor radio reception that plagued the CV6 airmen all day also plagued Felt, as he did not hear the radio report of Shokaku’s sighting just minutes before.

• Coral Sea all over again
• Felt sent 21 SBDs to hit Ryujo along with the 8 TBFs that were also a part of the strike.
• The first fist full of SBDs missed the rapidly turning carrier, but a 1,000 pounder dropped by Jim Sauer hit her on the stern.
• Syd Bottomly, of Midway fame, noticed that Ryujo seemed to be getting away and redirected his strike back towards the carrier.
• Bottomly, among the last group to dive on Ryujo chased the ship to almost suicidal low altitude before he dropped his bomb
• His bomb, hit dead center of Ryujo’s deck and exploded…a killing blow.
• Roy Isaman, another Midway vet hit her again, as did CDR Felt.

• Ryujo was afire and smoking from under her flight deck when VT-8 approached in their TBFs.
• Bert Earnest, also a Midway veteran, approached Ryujo from her starboard side with 3 other TBFs and dropped his fish under intense AAA fire
• No one knows exactly who hit Ryujo, but Japanese records state that one torpedo hit and exploded on the starboard side, and one passed under the starboard stern and failed to explode.
• The one that did hit, wrecked her engine room and steering and essentially killed the carrier.
• Last seen by American eyes, she had drifted to a stop, was afire from stem to stern and had a 25 degree list to starboard.
• She was the sixth Japanese CV sunk in 42, and would be the last sunk until 1944

Task Force 16

• At 1632 radar aboard CV3 reports, “Many bogies range 88 miles bearing 320”
• CV6 and CV3 launch every fighter available to repel the attack they know is inbound
• 55 F4F Wildcats are aloft to repel the attack, that now appears to be heading directly for the Big E.  
• CV6 is also screened by 2 cruisers, 6 DDs and BB-55

• At 1700 hours the bogies are now bandits and are headed for CV6
• CAP attempts to intercept, but AGAIN, radio issues force them to scatter
• FDOs have too many contact reports and the fighter pilots are chattering wildly, thus blocking the FDO from issuing vector orders 

• Despite having an overwhelming CAP, most of them do not engage, but what CAP does engage, absolutely wreck the Japanese
• As the Vals from Shokaku arrived over CV6, they are engaged by VF6 CAP that chase them down through their dives
• VF6 pilot Don Runyan attacked and downed 3 Vals and a Zero, chased another 2 Vals away and damaged another, in mere minutes.
• CAP claims 44 kills against 5 losses.  Actual numbers are 25 shot down
• A 43% loss rate

• As CV6’s CAP engages, the Japanese do slip some Vals through the fighter umbrella and they approach CV6 and her escorts
• It is at this time that the value of the fast battleships that will be arriving soon comes into view…
• Gliding along at the rear of the formation is North Carolina.  She is making 27 knots and grinding for anything extra she can get.  The massive ship is kicking up a rooster tail as she pours on the power to keep up with CV6 that is hauling ass at 30 knots.
• When the Japanese strike force appears overhead, North Carolina prepares to fire…
• Her AA power is awesome.  No other word can describe it.
• LCDR John Kirkpatrick is the AA gunnery officer and at his fingertips are:
• 40 50 cal machine guns
• 40 20mm Oerlikons
• 4 quad 1.1 inch mounts
• 20 5 inch dual purpose mounts

• As the Japanese line up over CV6, BB-55 cuts loose…
• At Kirkpatrick’s order to commence firing, all AAA mounts aboard BB-55 open fire simultaneously
• The noise, smoke, flame and sheer chaos unleashed actually rattles the gunnery officer who briefly thought his guns had set his ship afire
• TF16 CO Admiral Kinkaid radioed North Carolina to ask, “Are you afire?”
• The volume of AAA fire by “The Showboat” rattles the Japanese as they line up on CV6 shooting down a great number, and causing many to miss in their dives

• Despite the CAP and the screening vessels AAA fire, Vals appeared over CV6 and broke into their dives
• Vals came down on CV6 at 7 second intervals
• Captain Arthur Davis maneuvered his ship brilliantly, causing many bombs to splash into the sea behind the great ship
• At 1714 a 500 pound bomb crashed through Enterprise’s flight deck near her after elevator
• It punched through five decks before exploding, killing 35 men immediately
• 30 seconds later, another bomb hit Enterprise, only 15 feet from the first strike, exploding in the starboard 5 inch gun gallery wiping out the crewmen stationed there, burning them to a cinder at their gun positions, killing all 38 men in a blinding flash
• Enterprise, like her sister Yorktown, was a tough girl allowing CAPT Davis to continue to maneuver her at high speed despite the 2 heavy hits she had taken and throwing up an impressive AA screen of her own
• Some 14,000 rounds of ammunition were fired by Enterprise in that strike alone
• 2 minutes after the first two bombs hit, a third hit the Big E up forward, doing minimal damage.

• Enterprise is hurt, but far from dead
• She retires to Pearl for damage repairs and buries her dead, some 78 KIA and a further 90 wounded
• We will see the Big in the seas around Guadalcanal again

End of day/end of battle

• By the end of the day, after word finally reached Fletcher of the whereabouts of Shokaku, it is too late to launch a strike, especially with CV6 hurt.

• The Japanese think (naturally) that they have heavily damaged or sunk 2 US CVs, when they only attacked 1

• Aware of their high casualties from attacking the US fleet, and the loss of Ryujo, compels the Japanese under Nagumo to retire

• The incoming troop convoy under Tanaka is seemingly left to its own devices and it comes under heavy air attack from Henderson Field the following day

• 1 DD is sunk, another is damaged, a cruiser is heavily damaged, a transport is sunk and another (or 2) are damaged forcing Tanaka to turn his convoy around and NOT reinforce the island

• Because of this action, and the fact that the Ryujo was sunk at no US shipping losses, Eastern Solomons is seen as a US strategic and tactical victory.

• Though a victory, it had little in terms of long reaching effects on the Guadalcanal campaign, which is why it is probably the least known carrier battle of 1942

Prewar US Navy and IJN surface doctrine

• US Navy surface battle doctrine assumed, and planned for any major surface action against an enemy, specifically the Japanese, would be fought in broad daylight, in perfect weather, near the Philippines and at extreme range of the rifles of the US Navy’s battleship, battle line.  
• While night training did occur for the USN, it was not something that was practiced regularly, nor was it something that was hammered into the sailor’s heads. 
• For example, the USS Vincennes, a heavy cruiser that took an unfortunate part in Savo, last practiced night firing in February 1941.

• The prewar doctrine was based on arrogance.  Arrogance in that it was just presumed that the hapless and half-witted Japanese would openly present their own battle fleet, which was thought to be heavily outnumbered by US battleships, for extreme destruction because…well…that’s what they were supposed to do.

• The Japanese on the other hand, were extremely well trained in night fighting.     
• Sailors were selected for scouting positions aboard ships because of their night vision abilities.
• While the Japanese also believed in the decisive battle theory, they differed in that they intended to whittle the US fleet down before the big showdown ever came to fruit.
• Subs, DDs and CAs were expected to make slashing, surprise night attacks to whittle the US fleet down.
• Great emphasis was put on torpedoes within the IJN, as opposed to the USN.       
• It was expected that torpedo attacks, at night, would be the major ship killers before the BBs would finish off what was left.
• The IJN already had great success in nocturnal torpedo attacks before WWII.  During the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-06, the IJN employed nighttime torpedo attacks successfully.
•  

Advances in weaponry and technology

• Due to the emphasis within the IJN on night time torpedo attacks, the development of ship killing torpedoes was of utter importance.
• The Type 93 Long Lance torpedo was developed in the early 30’s
• Nearly wakeless
• Oxygen fueled
• 1,090 pound warhead with a range of 22,000 yards and a speed of 49 knots
• Superior night optics as well as flash less powder were also a Japanese superiority
• The USN preferred the naval rifle over the torpedo and as such, did not sufficiently develop a torpedo and they placed more emphasis on movement and range placement of ships for gun fire purposes as opposed to torpedo attacks.

The Japanese respond to the American landings

• The first major Japanese response to the landings at Tulagi and Guadalcanal was launched by Admiral Mikawa at 0830 on August 7.

• His orders were to assemble his cruiser division (CruDiv 6) and prepare for a night attack on the American fleet now known to be off Guadalcanal.
• Mikawa’s orders to his force were intercepted by American analysts but the message was not decoded until August 23.
• By around 1100 hours on August 8, Mikawa’s force had been assembled and was at sea, bound for Guadalcanal
• He launched scout planes to determine the Allied strength before he got into the area
• One of Aoba’s scout planes found the US fleet off Gcanal and Tulagi and reported it as:
• 4 CAs, 7 DDs, and 1 phantom BB off Lunga Point
• 2 CAs, 12 DDs and 3 transports off Tulagi
• With this information Mikawa knew that his enemy was divided in strength
• Mikawa’s plan was to penetrate the sound south of Savo, torpedo the US ships there and then engage the Tulagi force with gunfire and torpedoes after which he would withdraw northwards

Allied preparation

• American air searches located Mikawa’s force as it was moving south
• First found by B-17s raiding Rabaul and ID’d as 4 CAs and 1 DD heading west
• Seen again by another B-17 and reported as 6 unidentified ships heading SE
• US Sub S-38 reported DDs passing overhead at very high speed and 3 CAs on a course of 140 degrees
• S-38’s report carried the most weight but was dismissed by Richmond Kelly Turner under the assumption that a large enemy surface force would be seen by search planes first.
• Search planes (PBYs) did not pick up the forcer on the 8th  as they slipped through the aerial net.
• Fletcher requested another aerial search but McCain and his staff failed to comply
• Sighting reports by Lockheed Hudsons of Mikawa’s force, and then plotted by Turner allowed Turner to assume that the Japanese ships spotted (which were erroneously stated as being sea plane tenders) made Turner assume that tenders could not reach the area in time to render any sort of attack.  
• The second sighting report stated that the Japanese ships were making 15 knots and could not arrive in time for a night battle.
• Turner believed the Japanese were setting up another sea plane base at Rekata Bay, notcoming south at flank speed to kick his ass.

• British Admiral Crutchley, the senior Allied officer afloat off GCanal, decided to split his forces for defense.  
• He reasoned that there were two areas that enemy ships could slip into the sound without being detected, and by splitting his forces, one was bound to intercept a force moving in at night.
• The southern group consisted of the CAs Australia, Canberra, and Chicago along with DDs Bagley and Patterson
• The northern group consisted of CAs Vincennes, Quincy, Astoria with DDs Helm and Wilson.
• A picket line consisting of 2 DDs, Talbot and Blue were to utilize radar to detect any incoming ships

• Crutchley’s plan for defense had several gaping holes, including a lack of clear orders for a night time defense and an assumption that everybody knew what everyone else was doing, when in fact, no one did.

• Also, there were no flag officers aboard any of the US ships in the northern group
• A Captain can’t fight his ship and command a TF at the same time…

The battle begins (South of Savo)

• At 2312 Mikawa sent cruiser search planes aloft to illuminate the shipping with flares.
• Float planes reported 3 CAs off Savo
• 2400 Mikawa formed his ships and increased speed to 26 knots
• At 0050 Savo was sighted and 3 minutes later Mikawa’s lookouts sighted the picket DD Blue and evaded her
• Mikawa’s entire force slipped past the picket DDs without being seen 
• Lookouts aboard the CA Chokai sighted 3 CAs off the starboard bow
• Mikawa ordered his ships to “independently fire”
• At 0138 4 long lances were launched at the same time lookouts spotted Vincennes visually at a range of 18,000 yards
• At 0143Chokai opened fire with her main battery on the HMAS Canberra
• Shortly before Chokai opened fire, Canberra’s lookouts spotted the enemy at 4500 yards dead ahead
• Canberra was put into a turn as to allow her main battery to fire, but before her main battery was even manned, she was hit by over 24 8 inch shells fired from 4 Japanese heavy cruisers.
• By 0150 Canberra slowed to a stop and was burning amidships

• Aboard USS Chicago, flashes were seen as torpedoes were launched as well as aircraft flares and Canberra swinging out of line to presumably open fire
• Astoundingly, none of this was put together as an enemy threat
• Chicago’s CO Bode reached the bridge shortly before his ship was struck by a torpedo.
• Seemingly blind to the gunfire erupting around him, Bode could not find anything to shoot at initially
• Her secondary battery opened fire and hit at least one ship, Tenryu
• Bode immediately withdrew westwards, leaving the transports he was assigned to protect wide open to any enemy attack.
• Worse yet, he neglected to report his contact with the enemy
• This is inexcusable and without doubt, caused the deaths of hundreds of Americans and resulted in the sinking of another 3 CAs

• The one bright spot, if there is one here, is that the DD Patterson, whose skipper, CDR Frank Walker was keenly aware of Japanese ships in the area, fought like a lion.
• Patterson tried to warn Canberra and Chicago of the Japanese ships by blinker light but it apparently went unseen
• Walker himself issued warnings over TBS but they were either ignored or unheard
• Patterson engaged in a gun duel with Tenryu and Yubari, illuminating them and zig zagging to avoid their fire.
• Patterson took a hit that disabled her after 5 inch guns, but returned to the fight hitting a Japanese CA.  
• Finally receiving orders to withdraw and cover the transports, only then did Patterson give up the fight

The Northern debacle

• Mikawa turns north and heads for the northern group of heavy cruisers after destroying the southern group in a span of 7 minutes
• Astonishingly, the Northern group STILL does not know that the enemy is closing

• USS Vincennes under the command of CAPT Riefkohl is leading the group
• Riefkohl has his ship at condition 2, not GQ, he himself is asleep as are all of the CAPT aboard the CAs
• Riefkohl supposedly believed that the Japanese would attack that night but failed to share his thoughts with the other CAPTs.  
• As CO of the Northern Group, he is at fault for this lack of preparedness

• At 0144, watches aboard all CAs felt underwater explosions (Japanese torpedoes exploding on Southern Group), but assumed them to be anti-sub ops
• At 0145 watches saw gunfire and flares from the south but failed to put two and two together

• Riefkohl is summoned to the bridge but due to rain and mist, could not see the southern group or what was happening
• No contact reports were given to him
• At 0150 searchlights illuminated his 3 CAs
• He thought this was the southern group and did nothing to counter
• At 0151 the Japanese opened fire on Astoria, followed by Vincennes and Quincy, which was the first ship hit.    

• Aboard Astoria, the ship was not at GQ, but the gunnery officer, after having witnessed shell fire and flashes, ordered the main battery to commence firing.
• CAPT Greenman arrived on the bridge, ordered cease fire and then resumed fire.  Astoria was quickly hit in the hangar and the fire that started made her a beacon for Japanese gunfire
• For ten (ish) minutes, Astoria was the focus of Aoba, Kinugasa, and Chokai’s main battery
• Most of Asty’s guns were disabled, her comms was wiped out and fires were all over the ship
• Asty fired one last salvo that knocked out Chokai’s forward main battery turret
• Astoria then she slid to a halt afire from stem to stern

• Aboard Quincy fires were seen to the south, gunfire was heard and her radr picked up Japanese ships.  CAPT Moore ordered the main battery to open fire, but they were not ready
• Hit by several shells, Quincy was afire due to her SOC airplanes and avgas in her hangar.
• As a result, she was bracketed and caught in a crossfire and veered out of line
• At 0204 she was hit by 2 torpedoes on the port side
• At 0216, with her CAPT dead and most of her bridge crew dead, she was hit by another torpedo and began to sink

• Aboard Vincennes, Riefkohl, now finally alert to the situation, ordered open fire, but his ship was hit in the hangar, and it too like her sisters served as a flaming beacon for Japanese gunners
• Vincennes was hit by a torpedo, then another and a third, killing everyone in the #1 fireroom and opening the ship’s bottom up

The battle ends

• By 0216 Mikawa’s victory was complete, and fear of American airpower caused Mikawa to turn tail and leave the area without engaging (and destroying) the transports nearby

• ADM Turner stopped unloading the transports at 0145, but stayed another day (WITHOUT AIR COVER) to finish what he could before he had to withdraw the transports

• Turner requested air cover from Fletcher who was still running away at 0641 and received his answer in a roundabout way when he intercepted a message from Fletcher to Ghormley essentially saying that Fletcher was out and Turner was now the force commander around GCanal.
• Pitiful
  
   
• Mikawa had utterly destroyed the Allied fleet in a stunning and aggressive action
• His victory was flawed in that had he attacked and sank the transports, which he easily could have, the Guadalcanal campaign would have been OVER right then.
• What could have been…

• 1,077 Allied sailors were killed, a further 700 were wounded with the loss of 4 heavy cruisers
• Japanese casualties were 129 killed, and 85 wounded, no sinkings
  
   
• The US concealed the defeat from the public until October

Implications on the campign…

H-Hour Guadalcanal

• American intel assumed that the bulk of the Japanese were on Guadalcanal, specifically along Lunga Point
• Estimated 5,000 men
• 5th Marines secured the beachhead, 1st Marines passed through them and headed for “Grassy Knoll”
• It was assumed there would be heavy defensive fire on the beaches
• The landing on Guadalcanal could not have gone any better, as virtually no opposition was encountered
• The beach head was a jumbled mess of supplies as there were not enough marines nearby, or sailors, to unload the supplies.
• Marines pressed inland and encountered the jungle for the first time

Tulagi

• About 2 miles long ½ mile wide.  
• Japanese garrison was the 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force, about 350 men
• Marines that assaulted Tulagi, Florida, Gavutu/Tanambogo were:
• 1st Raiders
• 1/2
• 2/5
• 1st Parachute Btln.
• The first boots on the ground belonged to 1/2 who landed at Florida island.

• Initially, resistance was nill until the Raiders hit phase line A where they ran into stiff defenses.

• Japanese embedded themselves in caves
• Harbinger of future defensive efforts throughout the Pacific
• The night of August 7-8, the Japanese counterattacked on Tulagi, breaking marine lines in one point.
• By morning, those Japanese had all been killed

• Good personal stories of the Raiders?

Gavutu/Tanambogo

• Assigned to the 1st Parachute Battalion, numbering some 397 men
• Facing the Paras were over 500 Japanese
• Heavy Japanese resistance caused many casualties among the Paras
• By nightfall, neither island had been secured and Marine casualties had been very heavy
• Paras requested reinforcements for morning assault
• Reinforcements sent in, but the landing was a failure because of enemy fire
• Landed near the causeway instead
• Like on Tulagi, the Japanese holed up in caves and had to be blasted out
• Talk about Angus Goss (An explosion was the sweetest music conceivable)
• Talk about Harry Torgerson
• Blew up caves using dynamite
• One blast was so close that it blew the majority of his pants off of his body, exposing most of his ass surrounded by shredded pants.
• Hence the name “Raggedy Assed Marines”
• The conversation supposedly went, “Captain you done tore your pants!”  “Screw the pants!  Get me more dynamite!”
• Awarded a Silver Star for this action
• The islands were finally captured, most Japanese were killed at the loss of 70 KIA and 87 WIA
• Total casualties for Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo were 122 KIA for USMC and 863 KIA for the Japanese

Air Raid

• Once the landings were revealed to be an invasion and not a raid, Yamamoto ordered a “decisive counterattack”
• While the IJN would respond off Savo within 24 hours, the first “decisive counterattack” came by air
• 53 aircraft were involved in the initial air attack
• Mixture of Betty’s, Zeroes and Vals
• Only 12 F4Fs were aloft to intercept the incoming raiders
• Saburo Sakai
• Attacked SBDs from CV6
• Got creased in the head from a rear seat gunner in one of the SBDs
• The wound left Sakai blind in his right eye, his left side was paralyzed, and his Zero was shot to pieces
• Sakai losing blood quickly, fought off death by punching himself in his wound to stay conscious, and managed to steer his crippled airplane the 565 miles back to Rabaul

• The raid achieved nothing in terms of stopping the landing, but it did deprive the Americans of most of their fighter contingent from the CVs, thus compelling Fletcher to pull his CVs back away from Canal as he did not have the fighter capability to withstand another attack by torpedo carrying Betty’s (or so he thought anyway) 
• Pulling his CVs back put them out of reach for proper patrols the next day, which could have spotted Mikawa’s force coming south to destroy the Allied force in what would be Savo Island

Tenaru

• By the time the Tenaru battle unfolded, the Marines had been ashore for 3 weeks
• No serious Japanese counterattacks had yet been made against Canal
• On August 10, plans had been drawn up to send forces to Guadalcanal to expel the invaders
• One of the units selected was the 28th Infantry Regiment, under COL Kiyoano Ichiki
• Due to poor intel, a lack of Allied naval activity or aerial presence on Guadalcanal, the Japanese thought that the majority of Americans had been withdrawn from Guadalcanal
• Who was Ichiki?
• Known expert in infantry tactics
• Commanded rifle units in China
• His actions are said to have started the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937, often marked as the beginning of WWII
• Very headstrong, was slated to land at Midway
• Believed that the sword and night tactics of traditional Japanese infantry could and would best any defensive positions he may encounter

• Ichiki Detachment numbered some 900 men

The Battle begins

• 2/1 had set up their positions in the days before the attack 
• Myth says that they set up their positions only hours before the attack because of Jacob Vouza’s warning
• Dispel the myth of Vouza here

• Dug in MG positions manned by H/2/1 and rifle positions manned by G/2/1 stretched from the ocean front down “stream” on the west bank of the river

• Marines had 1917 water cooled MGs, some 50 caliber weapons, and several 37mm anti-tank weapons, at least two of which were supplied with canister shot

• Ichiki’s plan was to essentially march down the beach, and assault the Marine positions, eventually capturing the airfield and a further position around Lunga

Attack and Annihilation

• Initial contact was made shortly after midnight, with scattered rifle shots between Marine Ops and Ichiki’s van

• Around 0200 the first wave of Japanese troops came crashing across the sand bar

• This wave was met by strong defensive fire from MGs, 37s, and artillery
• Wave was essentially wiped out after a few broke through into Marine lines and engaged in hand to hand
• At least three more waves of attackers hit the Marine lines only to be slaughtered by withering fire
• Johnny Rivers, Diamond and Al Schmid
• Frank Pomroy

• Marine artillery walked itself down the Japanese side of the river and collected in a grove where it presumably broke up another potential assault.
• Following this, the Japanese holed up on their side of the river and a firefight ensued all night long
• The following morning, elements of 1/1 crossed the river and flanked what was left of Ichiki’s unit
• Slowly, the Marines closed the trap around Ichiki, forcing the survivors to dart across the coconut grove or into the sea where they were killed by riflemen

• M3 tanks under the command of Lt Leo Case crossed the sand bar and turned into the coconut grove eliminating what was left of the enemy

• Over 777 dead Japanese littered the field of battle

• 1 surrendered, and 12 wounded were taken prisoner
•  
• Marine losses were around 44 KIA and 71 WIA

Implications on the Campaign

• Japanese refusal to surrender informed the Marines how the war would be fought from here on 
• Wounded Japanese tried to kill those attempting to help them
• Rather die than surrender

CLOSER:

1st Mar Div report of Tulagi Operation:

“The combat assumed the nature of a storming operation from the outset, a soldier’s battle, unremitting and relentless, to be decided only by the extermination of one or the other of the adversaries engaged.” 

A Rush to Action the beginnings of a “plan”

• On July 3, just after WATCHTOWER is approved (but not by the Joint Chiefs) King flies to Frisco to brief Nimitz
• Richmond Kelly Turner was told that 3 CVs would support the operation (CV3, CV6 and CV7)
• The name Guadalcanal had not yet been added to the operation list as a target as of July 3
• On June 27, to follow King’s initial order to prepare to seize Tulagi, Nimitz ordered Tulagi to be captured and the “seizure of an airfield” adjacent to Tulagi as well…but specified no exact location.
• On July 5 it was reported that the Japanese had landed airfield construction troops and equipment on Guadalcanal, only then was Guadalcanal added as a target.
• Also on July 5, the new target received its code name…Cactus

• Why Guadalcanal and Tulagi?
• Once the Japanese established a seaplane base at Tulagi in May, that base could disrupt the sealanes between the US, HI, Fiji, Samoa and most importantly, Australia
• It was feared that the establishment of a larger airfield on neighboring islands (Canal) would further inhibit shipping and cede control of those waterways to the Japanese.

Questionable from the start:

• Admiral Robert L Ghormley had just recently assumed duties as COMSOPAC and as such, WATCHTOWER would fall under his purview.
• Those under his command would be: 1st Mar Div, 3 CV groups under the command of Vice ADM Frank Jack Fletcher, as well as South Pacific Amphib Forces under Rear Adm Richmond Kelly Turner.
• All of these forces would be (theoretically) supported by land-based air under RADM McCain, Allied Air Forces SWPAC under MacArthur and GEN Kenney
• Upon receiving orders to seize “Tulagi and adjacent positions” Ghormley immediately showed what would be his calling card…pessimism.

• Ghormley immediately concluded that he and his people were nowhere near ready to tackle such an operation
• In a way, he was correct.  He had exactly 1 Marine on his staff that had any experience in amphibious operations, and he had very, very little.
• Comms to and from Ghormley’s staff and HQ were hours and sometimes DAYS late in arriving or being sent
• Intel on the area was virtually NILL.
• Charts of the GCanal and Tulagi area were woefully outdated.
• Any actual intel, of which there was essentially none, came from coastwatchers or aerial photos
• Maps of Guadalcanal were from 1910 charts that were “corrected” by aerial photography

• Air Power, or lack thereof, was a major concern before the operation even began
• There were no land bases close to the target area from which air support missions could be flown and the aircraft on hand were too old and too few in reality
• ADM McCain’s considerable number of aircraft on hand (282) was deceiving
• Most of the aircraft were obsolete, and even if they weren’t, such as the case with the F4Fs, P39s and P400s under his command, they did not have the range to support an operation over 590 and 715 miles from the only US bases in the area Espirtu Santo and Efate, respectively that had decently sized airfields.

• On July 8, Ghormley flew to Melbourne and spoke with MacArthur.  The problems outlined by the GEN and the ADM were:
• Gaining and maintaining air superiority over the islands, the beaches and assault ships
• In a surprising moment of clarity and truthfulness, MacArthur admitted that his air forces probably could not interdict incoming Japanese air raids from Rabaul
• The protection of the islands and beaches and the like would fall upon Nimitz’s CVs
• This could/would be problematic in that the CVs could and would be pulled out due to any threat that may arise, therefore leaving the transport group and the beachhead itself totally without air support

• The basics of any amphibious operation were already less than stellar before the operation ever launched.
• The US would have air cover only as long as the CVs were present
• And that depended on the situation which would be very, very fluid

• There would be no US land-based air cover until a unit, or units, could be deployed to Guadalcanal, and who knew how long that would take

• The allied naval force would more than likely have to fight off a Japanese counterattack, probably at night, when the allied forces had little to no night fighting experience

• The assault troops would have to be properly trained for not only an opposed amphibious landing, but a sustained occupation and defense with the prospect of little to no reinforcement immediately coming

• Intelligence on enemy troops ashore, their number and strength was severely lacking.

• Intel on enemy air power as well as naval units was also severely lacking

• For all intents and purposes, the US and her allies were going into the operation blind and with one, or damn near both, hands tied behind their back.

The Old Breed

• Assault troops would be the 1st Marine Division
• Under the command of a brand-new MAJ GEN, Alexander Archer Vandegrift.
• 57 Years Old, 34 years a Marine
• Wickedly smart and intuitive, could grasp a situation and its necessities within seconds and make the right call
• Excellent judge of character and men, much like Nimitz, he was a quiet leader who always seemed to be optimistic about everything.

• 1st Mar Div was a brand-new unit, just recently formed, the division would be hamstrung by only having 2 of its 3 infantry regiments available for the initial assault
• 1st and 5th Marines.  The 7th Marines were garrisoning Samoa at the time.

• On May 1, five days after the 7th sailed for Samoa, the 1st Mar Div was ordered to New Zealand to prepare to be the Landing Force of the SoPac Amphib Force
• Vandegrift’s regiments were NOT ready for action.
• 5th Marines had been stripped of cadre and experienced men during the constitution of the 1st Raider BTLN.
• 1st Marines were even less prepared although they had strong BTLN level leadership
• The bright spot for 1st Mar Div was the divisional artillery, the 11th Marines.
• Highly proficient, the 11th Marines fielded a wide variety of the newest artillery available…they would be needed…many many times over

• The vast majority of Marines assigned to the 1st Mar Div were young, very young.
• Average age was 19 years old
• Post Pearl Harbor enlistees who believed in the Corps’ motto of First to Fight

• The division got the name Old Breed due to its cadre, which admittedly was small, but legendary
• Some WWI combat vets, recruiters, veterans of the banana wars, China Marines

• The division arrived in New Zealand on June 14
• On June 26, Vandegrift was told by Ghormley that his division would assault Tulagi and Guadalcanal on August 1

• Due to a longshoreman’s strike in Wellington, the 1st Mar Div had to combat load their ships themselves, a task for which they were not skilled, nor had the proper time to complete.
• This would be HUGE later on…

The Plan

• D-Day was set for August 1, for a variety of reasons D-Day would actually be August 7
• 1st and 5th Marines would assault Guadalcanal, while at the same time 4 rifle battalions, most Raiders, would assault and capture Tulagi
• D-Day objective for Guadalcanal was the airfield and the “grassy knoll” (Mt Austen)
• The Navy would supply:
• Combat Group:
• 3 CVs
• 1 fast BB (BB55)
• 9 CAs
• 2 AA CLs
• 31 DDs
• 2 Royal Australian CAs and 1 CL
• Amphib Group
• 13 transports
• 6 cargo ships
• 4 APDs
• 5 Oilers

The Japanese

• After the defeat at Midway, the Japanese realized that strengthening their outer ring of defenses was now imperative.
• On May 28, several Japanese landed on Guadalcanal to inspect the area
• Shortly after that, and after Midway, the Japanese authorized Operation SN, which was to strengthen their outer perimeter of their advance by constructing airfields at key strategic points in Papua, the Louisades and the Solomons.

• On June 13, the Naval General Staff selected Guadalcanal as an air base
• On July 6, the first Japanese construction forces landed, and on the 20th, work began on the airfield

• The Japanese did not believe that the Allies could or would mount an offensive until 1943 at the earliest
• Japanese ADM Mikawa believed that the US would assault and occupy Guadalcanal before the Japanese could complete the airfield.
• His ideas were scoffed at

• Focus for the IJA and IJN lay on Port Moresby and the assault over the Owen Stanley Mountains, not the Canal
• Focus shifted back to Guadalcanal on July 31, when for a week, B-17s bombed Guadalcanal almost daily suggesting a pre-invasion bombardment

• Japanese did not believe, as a group, that Guadalcanal would be attacked.
• Their defensive forces were meager:
• Only 3457 men were on both Tulagi and Guadalcanal
• 2571 were on Guadalcanal
• They were almost as unprepared as was the US in terms of a ground attack or defense
• The IJN was significantly more prepared however
• Because of Rabaul and its distance from Canal, the Japanese could and would attack the island and the ships offshore with long range medium bombers (Bettys) and Zero fighters

The kickoff

• On July 26, the fleet rendezvoused off Koro in the Fijis
• That afternoon McCain, Turner, Crutchley and Vandegrift all met aboard CV3
• Conspicuously absent was the overall CO, Ghormley who elected to not go to the meeting and therefore was deprived of any real operational plans of the overall operation until SEPTEMBER
• Fletcher led the meeting
• Vandegrift stated later that Fletcher seemed nervous, and was also “disconcertingly uninformed” about the landing plans

• Fletcher stated to all his subordinates that he felt that the plan would fail and blamed Turner who Fletcher said had no combat experience and as a result would hinder the operation to the extent of failure.

• Fletcher asked Turner how long it would take to unload the transports to which he replied 5 days.  Fletcher abruptly stated that he would pull his CVs after 2 days. He later said 3 days.

• After being given the context of the “meeting” by his aide Daniel Callahan, Ghormley essentially ignored the warnings that Fletcher seemed “scared” and proposed a faulty air support op from Efate that would never work and never was tried.

• Regardless of the inauspicious start, plans, intel, etc the operation was underway.

CLOSER: Official USMC history states regarding the beginnings of WATCHTOWER, “Seldom has an operation been begun under more disadvantageous circumstances.”

Fleet Admiral Ernest King was Commander-in-Chief Fleet, or COMINCH, during most of World War II, and in 1942 assigned to also serve as Chief of Naval Operations or CNO.  As CNO he managed the Navy Staff, called OPNAV then (and still is), which allowed him to manage, among other things, all Navy investments in ships and aircraft, as well as all senior Navy officer assignments. 

A funny aside before we jump in.  For some inexplicable reason, prior to King’s appointment, the Commander-in-Chief, US Fleet acronym was CinC-US, pronounced “sink-us.”  When King was appointed he thought the sink-us title was stupid, so he changed the acronym to COMINCH for Commander-in-Chief.   Although that acronym was better, President Franklin Roosevelt actually tried to talk King out of calling himself a “commander-in-chief,” saying the constitution only provided for one commander-in-chief and that was the president.  King said if he was ordered to change the title he would, but Roosevelt was reluctant to make a change like this as we were just entering the war.  So the commander-in-chief title stuck for Navy commanders, that is until Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld finally killed it in 2002 during the George W. Bush administration.  

But getting back to World War II, it was King’s CNO job, not his COMINCH job, that gave him the authority, for example, over Navy administrative matters, such as the assignment of Admirals Spruance and Halsey to command 5th and 3rd Fleets respectively.  The CNO job also gave him a seat at the table with the Joint Chiefs of Staff or JCS, along with Generals Marshall, Arnold, and Admiral Stark, as well as the Combined Chiefs of Staff with our British allies.   The JCS was the body that approved the initiation of campaigns such as Guadalcanal.

But it was the COMINCH job and not the CNO job that allowed King to actually command Navy and Marine forces during campaigns in the Atlantic and Pacific, with Admiral Chester Nimitz as his surrogate as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

King was noteworthy for some personality traits as well.  One he was famous for was his legendary temper.

General Eisenhower, for example, mostly known as an even-tempered man, once said, “Admiral King is an arbitrary, stubborn type with too much brain and a tendency toward bullying his juniors! But I think he wants to fight, which is vastly encouraging.”  

But King was also known as someone who was not a fan of Great Britain.  Once President Roosevelt adopted a “Europe-First” policy, it was King’s job to divert naval forces preferentially to Eisenhower’s theater of operations.  But as King perceived the United Kingdom as dragging its feet in offensive operations in Europe, King took every opportunity to divert naval forces to the Pacific theater.  After all, in King’s mind it was Japan that attacked the US, and he realized that the longer we waited to neutralize the Japanese threat in the Pacific, the more entrenched and difficult to defeat they would become.  And so, the very first major amphibious landing in World War II was not North Africa as many people think, but Guadalcanal in the Pacific.  And that campaign was King’s idea.

But King’s intransigence when it came to Europe led to another famous Eisenhower quote, where he says: “One thing that might help win this war is to get someone to shoot King. He's the antithesis of cooperation — a deliberately rude person —which means he's a mental bully.”

Even King’s own daughter joined the chorus of opinion about her father.  When asked about King’s unpredictable personality, she said, “He is the most even tempered person in the United States Navy. He is always in a rage.”

But personality foibles aside, in my view King gets a bad rap.  He was the main strategist for the Pacific war, and with Nimitz, for the island-hopping campaign that eventually won the war against Japan.  In that regard, at least when it comes to the Pacific theater of Operations, as we say in the title of this episode, history has shown that King was right about almost everything.

Seth, we don’t want to do a biography here, but maybe a few things about King’s background:

• As did everyone, went to Annapolis
• Was a surface officer
• Inauspicious career early on
• Part of the Asiatic fleet as a Lieutenant
• Returned to his ship the Cincinnati one day drunk & disorderly, his captain recorded it in his personnel record.  The Asiatic fleet commander at one time was Admiral Charles B. McVay, Jr, the father of the man who would become the skipper of USS Indianapolis cruiser during World War II.  But King’s behavior problems in the Asiatic are what led to the untrue rumor that King had a vendetta against Admiral McVay, that would cause him decades later to want to court-martial Captain McVay after the Indy was sunk, all despite the fact that when King got in trouble it was actually Admiral Henry Wilson in command of the fleet.  
• He went to submarine school as a captain in a class full of ensigns.  Nevertheless, unlike Chester Nimitz, King never finished his submarine qualification hence was never eligible to wear the highly sought after submarine dolphin insignia.
• At the age of 49, King later goes to flight training because he wants to understand this new device the airplane.  “Aviation is the coming thing in Navy.”  Pilots who went through late career flight training were referred to as “Johnny come lately’s” by aviators who spent their entire career in aviation.  Earned his wings, but then never again piloted an airplane alone.  But King does eventually command an aircraft carrier, the Lexington.
• “The damnest party man in the place.”

Jumping to the war:

• Had been Atlantic fleet
• Named COMINCH right after Pearl Harbor attack
• Named CNO in March 1942
• With Nimitz, author of the island-hopping campaign
• When Briton dragged feet on North Africa landing, diverted naval forces to land in Guadalcanal, first major amphibious landing of the war
• Coral Sea and Guadalcanal personally selected by him to neutralize Japan’s thrust south
• King would select strategic objectives, and initially King would get involved at the operational level “how to do it.”  
• Nimitz was selected by Roosevelt not King.  King didn’t trust him—referred to him as a “fixer”—until after Midway.
• After Midway, he would generally leave Nimitz to do the campaign and battle plans.  Nimitz would often bound the plan off of King before the plan was putting into effect. 
• King’s responsibility spanned both Atlantic and Pacific, so it was a good thing when he decided he could trust Nimitz
• King had the notion that each successive thrust need to move the US closer and closer to mainland Japan, with engagements aimed at Japanese centers of gravity.  To that end, he supported an attack against Japanese forces in Formosa (Taiwan), not Philippines, because Taiwan enabled more direct strikes at the Japanese mainland and would shorten the path to victory.  The only reason to go back to Philippines was emotional—MacArthur’s “I shall return” declaration.
• MacArthur won the argument partly through a veiled threat that Roosevelt’s electability might suffer if he failed to retake the Philippines.  In any case, history has likely proven King to be right.
• Triple objectives: neutralize Japanese Navy through carrier warfare, isolate and strangle mainland Japan through submarine warfare, and seize islands that would enable the strategic bombing campaign to put pressure on mainland Japan.
• The island-hopping campaign eventually worked.  

• What was King wrong about?
• He supported Forrestal’s decision to court-martial Charles B. McVay.  This was a grave error that would haunt the Navy for 50+ years.

• Briefly describe the actions of June 6

• Discuss the attempted salvage and eventual sinking of Yorktown
•     -How does this sinking lay on the future plans for the war

• -Discuss why the perception exists that Spruance won the battle when Fletcher was the commander.

• Let’s talk about Mitscher and his cover up…

• -Discuss the Army’s claims and propaganda that they won the battle 

• -Discuss King’s reluctance to play the Navy’s story up

• -Let's talk about the overall implications of the battle:
•     -What does Midway actually allow the US to do now?

• -What does the loss of the battle mean to the Japanese in terms of plans and future strategy?

• -What does the defeat do to Yamamoto personally and professionally?

• -Why is Midway NOT the turning point of the war?

• Aboard the Japanese CVs
• What is the morning looking like at this point aboard the CVs?
• What are the Japanese briefed about?
• When do they launch?
• Who is the strike leader?
• Talk about the flight into Midway…
• Aboard the American CVs
• Reveille for US aircrews is at 0300, breakfast at 0400, ready rooms shortly after that
• Talk about the anticipation in the ready rooms
• Nervous energy

• Aboard Midway island
• Search planes take off around 0415
• Americans prepare for the battle they know is coming today
• Planes fueled and armed
• Bert Earnest and his two dollar bill

• At 0545 a search plane sees the incoming strike and radios “Many Planes Heading Midway”

• PBY search planes sight Japanese CVs at 0552

• Because of incoming aircraft and CV sighting, Midway scrambles damn near everything with wings by 0600

• Japanese Midway strike
• Give us the run-down of the Japanese attack on the island and the aerial encounters with the American fighters
• Bill Brooks and his Brewster engage Japanese as they come into the island around 0616
• What are the effects of the Japanese strike on the island?
• Who decides another strike is needed?
• Why?
• When does Nagumo get word of another strike being needed?
• Take us through his decision making here

• Aboard the American CVs
• 0645 Pilots Man Your Planes!
• Dusty Kleiss
• Don Hoff
• Spruance on orders from Fletcher decides to launch at 0700
• CV6 launches and orbits the TF awaiting CV5 and her birds
• US CV strike launch is discombobulated and unorganized 
• (clusterfuck is a good term but we shouldn’t say that)
• “Proceed on mission assigned” flashed to McClusky
• Hornet’s strike
• Stanhope Ring versus John Waldron

• As the American CVs strike is being launched, the first attackers from Midway see the Japanese CVs…
• Bert Earnest and Harry Ferrier in 8-T-1 attack Hiryu
• The B26s attack Akagi at almost the same time
• Talk about the near miss by the B26 on Akagi’s bridge
• 0800 VMSB-241 attacks Japanese fleet
• Japanese CAP proves to be incredibly deadly to these attacks

• While the Midway based aircraft are attacking the fleet, the Japanese are also attacked by a submarine 
• Talk about the effects that the Nautilus attack on the fleet have as far as timing is concerned, and what do the Japanese do 
• Nautilus’ attack, while not successful, is HUGE when it comes to the events that soon follow
• Arashi…

• Around 0840 the American attacks cease
• Talk about Nagumo’s timetable…
• What does it look like inside the hangar decks of the Japanese CVs right now?
• US VT attacks on Kido Butai
• VT8 and VT6 shortly afterwards

• Let’s once and for all dispel the George Gay myth…

• The Flight to Nowhere
• Where the hell is HAG?
• What happens to them?
• Could they have helped?
• Tease the cover up by Mitscher for Ring to be discussed at length in the next episode

• EAG flight and McClusky’s decision
• Talk about what is happening in the air right now 
• What is McClusky thinking
• What is happening to the SBD formation?
• McClusky’s decision to continue the search
• Seeing Arashi…
• Set up the attack of EAG on Kaga and Akagi from Japanese and US sides
• What is going on aboard the Japanese CVs right now?
• PLANES ON THE FLIGHT DECKS MYTH!
• Flash warning to Kaga
• McClusky breaks doctrine and attacks Kaga

• Attack on Kaga and Akagi
• Earl Gallaher
• Dusty Kleiss
• Don Hoff
• Aboard Kaga
• Briefly discuss attacks on Soryu
• Talk about the damage done to Kaga, Akagi and Soryu
• Just how bad is it?

• Discuss the Hiryu strikes on CV5

• Afternoon strike on Hiryu
• Lots of AAA this time and CAP
• Dusty Kleiss
• Don Hoff

• Wrap up June 4 and tease the next episode
• Japanese losses
• US losses

Talking Points:

• Sit Rep late May 1942
• What does the Pacific War look like right now?
• Any major changes?
• Doolittle Raid
• What is the reasoning behind the raid?
• What happens (briefly)
• What effects does the Doolittle Raid have…
• On the targets (actual combat results of the raid)
• On US plans and ops
• US CVs high-tail it after launch to get back to Pearl
• On Japanese plans and ops…

• Japanese Plans
• Because of the Doolittle Raid and the CV raids of Feb and March, what are the Japanese thinking at this time?
• What is Yamamoto’s conceived plan for the Midway Operation?
• What is the reasoning behind the plan…the ultimate goal
• Why is the plan so complex and so reliant on timing
• Literally everything had to go exactly according to plan for the Japanese plan to work as Yamamoto had it in his head
• Do you think that at this time the Japanese had brushed off the US as a second or even third-rate adversary?
• Was there a situational arrogance on the part of the Japanese?
• Why? Why not?
• Aside from Shokaku and Zuikaku not being able to take part in Midway, did Coral Sea and the efforts of the US CV pilots not kick off a light bulb in the collective Japanese heads in regard to the USN Nav Av prowess and abilities?

• Code Breaking
• We have already done an episode on HYPO, but this period is really where they shine…
• Intel effects on Coral Sea
• “AF” and HYPO’s role in figuring out the target is indeed Midway
• Let’s talk briefly on the whole AF water condenser myth, the reality, of course, was to convince DC, not the Japanese.
• King is barely convinced and allows Nimitz to do what he needs/wants to do

• US Preparations for battle
• Nimitz throws everything but the kitchen sink at Midway
• What units are on Midway
• What forces does Nimitz send to Midway?
• Nimitz pays the atoll a visit before the battle
• While Midway’s defenses are, on paper, strong…are they really?
• Why not?
• What are the aces up Nimitz’s sleeve?
• CV6, CV5, and CV8
• Talk about the combat experience of Enterprise Air Group, Yorktown Air Group and Hornet Air Group
• Who are the CAGs for each AG?
• McClusky
• Leslie
• Ring
• One of Nimitz’s Aces, CV5, is damaged…
• The 72 hour repair myth

• Japanese Preparations for battle
• What forces do the Japanese plan to send to the fight?
• Who are the aviators aboard the CVs?
• Just how good are these people?
• Japanese attack on the Aleutians
• The myth is that this was supposed to be a diversion…
• Of course it was not…but what exactly was it and why was it executed at this time?
• What were the goals of the Aleutians Op?

• US Plans for the Ambush 
• What does the intel from HYPO and Layton tell Nimitz?
• What does he want to do?
• Point Luck
• How will he and the US CVs go about ambushing Kido Butai?
• Midway’s role…
• The US CVs depart Pearl…
• Before CV6 leaves, Nimitz attends an awards ceremony on May 27 aboard The Big E.  He hands out decorations for Pearl Harbor and the carrier raids
• In handing a DFC to VF-6 pilot Roger Mehle, Nimitz tells him “I think you’ll have a chance to win yourself another medal in the next several days.”
• That very day, May 27, Nimitz executed OpPlan 29-42 which declared a state of “Fleet opposed Invasion”
• Nimitz’s OpPlan was devastatingly accurate
• A testament to HYPO and Layton’s diligence

• Night of June 3 
• Aboard Midway
• Last minute preparations
• Bill Brooks
• Bert Earnest
• Leon Williamson
• Aboard the US CVs
• Sleepless night
• Dusty Kleiss
• Bud Merrill
• Fred Bergeron
• Don Hoff

While the hit and run carrier raids of February and March tested American carrier doctrine to an extent, and the Pearl Harbor raid as well as Indian Ocean raids tested Imperial Navy doctrine also to an extent, this is the very first time that both navies tested each other’s way of doing things, and in the process found things that worked, and things that well…didn’t work.  Let’s dig into it…

Talking Points:

• What sets off the battle of Coral Sea?

o Outline Japanese plans for Operation MO

 Japanese wanted to seize Port Moresby and all of New Guinea.  By doing this, it would provide Japan with both a way to isolate Australia as well as New Zealand from allied supply lines, specifically American supply lines.  

• Why Rabaul (Opeation R) wasn’t good enough

 This was to be prefaced by the Japanese capture of Tulagi, which is an island we will hear a lot about in the near future.  By capturing Tulagi, in the Solomons, the Japanese could patrol the area and the sea lanes to Port Moresby so as to allow their invasion force a free hand.

 As part of the Port Moresby invasion attempt, the invasion group was to be covered by two separate carrier groups, one which centered around the light carrier Shoho, and another which centered around the fleet carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku.

o US intel at Station HYPO and fleet radio unit Melbourne, or FRUMEL decrypt Japanese messages to an extent, and in turn believe that the Japanese will strike the area of Port Moresby, or the northern coast of Australia on or about the first week of May.

 As a result of this intel, Nimitz deploys the only two carrier task forces at his disposal at this time, those centered around USS Lexington, and USS Yorktown, TF 11 and TF 17 respectively, to stand by the area of the Coral Sea with designs to intercept and destroy the incoming Japanese invasion and support fleets.

• On May 1 the two US CV TFs unite under the command of ADM Fletcher

o May 4, Fletcher detaches CV5 to attack recent Japanese positions on Tulagi

 CV5’s attacks are relatively successful, with damage inflicted on enemy positions and shipping in and around the harbor of Tulagi

• US losses are minimal

• By May 6, Fletcher is aware that Japanese CVs are in the area, and the Japanese invasion fleet is not far behind.  As a result, he detaches ADM Crace’s cruisers WITHOUT air cover to block the invasion force.

o This is potentially a critical blunder by Fletcher.  Crace’s CAs could have been blown out of the water by Japanese CVs, as it was, they were attacked three times by Japanese aircraft and once by MacArthur’s B17s.  

 Japanese reports stated that they had sunk a BB, damaged a second BB and a CA.  Japanese sent no further attacks towards Crace.  His vessels survived due to poor Japanese (and American) accuracy as well as his skillful maneuvering.  

 The sighting of the supposed BBs by the Japanese informed the invasion fleet to reverse course

 Still a horrible decision by Fletcher

• First day of the carrier battle May 7

• Early on the morning of the 7th, Japanese launch searches to find US CVs

o Japanese scout planes from Shokaku find US ships and radio ADM Tagaki of 1 CV, 1 CA, and 3 DD.

 What the Japanese actually sight is the detached oiler Neosho and her escort DD Sims.  

• How did the Japanese pilot screw this up this bad?

• Japanese arrive over oiler and DD, realize their mistake and continue their search, they return and attack and sink Sims and force Neosho to be abandonned

• At 0815 a CV5 SBD piloted by John Nielsen finds the Japanese screening force under ADM Goto, which includes light carrier Shoho.  

o An error in Nielsen’s coding made the message read 2 Japanese CVs instead of 1.

• Fletcher loses his mind on Nielsen when he lands and clarifies his message

 Believing this to be the main Japanese CV force, Fletcher launches everything he has.  

• 93 aircraft are flung at Shoho

o 18 F4Fs, 53 SBDs, 22 TBDs from CV2 and CV5

• Lexington Air Group, under Bill Ault arrive over Shoho first

o The SBDs attack first, and score at least 2 bomb hits and the TBDs score 5 torpedo hits

 This is the only real successful TBD attack of WW2

• Lex AG executes a hammer and anvil attack and leave Shoho a wreck

 Talk about Walt Nelson and Ted Wiebe

• Yorktown Air Group arrive next and continue to pummel Shoho.

o Estimated 11 bombs and 2 more torpedoes

o She is barely afloat as US aircraft leave and is gone by 1135

• Lexington VB2 CO, Bob Dixon sent a prearranged radio signal back to Fletcher that simply said, “Scratch One Flattop”

• Second day of the carrier battle May 8

• Both Japanese and US locate each other almost simultaneously

o US launch first at 0900, Japanese at 0915

 Opposing forces actually pass each other on the way to their targets

• US attack Japanese first

o The well-coordinated attack of May 7 gives way to the mess of May 8

 US aircraft have trouble finding the targets due to squally weather

• When they do find them, they can’t coordinate their attacks as the previous day

 Yorktown aircraft under Bill Burch find and attack Shokaku.

• The ship is moving radically but is still hit with 2 1,000 pound bombs which puts her flight deck out of action.

• Lex Air Group attacks and half of her SBDs find Shokaku and attack, hitting her once, the other half of the attackers from Lex can’t find the ship.

• All TBD torpedo attacks by both Air Groups miss their targets or the weapons fail to explode

• Japanese attack on US fleet

• Enemy is picked up 68 nautical miles away by US radar

o Poorly executed fighter direction operations positioned the US CAP too low to intercept the incoming enemy strike.

• One of the stranger aspects of Coral Sea is that SBDs were utilized as anti-torpedo plane CAP

o The assumption was that the Japanese Kate was as slow and sluggish as the TBD, which was obviously false

 One of the anti-VT pilots was Swede Vejtasa

• Talk about Swede’s dogfight against Zuikaku aircraft

• Despite the best efforts of the US CAP, the Japanese break through

o The Kates attack CV5 and miss, yet a hammer and anvil attack against CV2 succeeds

 CV2 turned like a whale and could not evade the torpedoes.  

• She takes two on her port side, one ruptures her avgas tanks, which eventually seal her fate

o The Vals attack Lex and hit her twice

o The Vals attack Yorktown and hit her severely damaging her as well

• Lexington goes down

o Avgas fumes spread throughout the ship, it is thought that a spark from a DC powered motor ignited the fumes which eviscerated the internals of the ship, starting uncontrollable fires.

 The first major explosion kills Lex’s main DC party

 IF WE HAVE THE TIME, LET’S GO THROUGH LEX’S DEATH

• Outcome

o Coral sea is technically a draw

 Seen as US strategic victory in that it is the first time the Japanese are stopped

• Port Moresby is not invaded, and the Japanese expansion, at least for now, is checked

 Tactical defeat for the US Navy

• Losing Lex in exchange for Shoho is not acceptable in any way

o Poor FDO operations stationing CAP too low and out of place contributed to losing Lex

o Poor design (prewar design) heavily contributed to Lex’s loss

o Poor US coordination on the morning attack against Shokaku and Zuikaku allowed both to escape the battle

 Sho and Zui would be unavailable for the Midway operation

• Sho due to damage and Zui due to heavy aircrew losses

o What lessons do we learn regarding future operations?

If Seth and I were to define the two main thrusts of our podcast “The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War,” it would be (1) to correct some of the mythology that has emerged over decades, and (2) to see what lessons might be gleaned that could be important were war to break out in the Pacific again.

In my view, our subject for today falls into the second category, because it’s about the impact of strategic alignment and chains of command on operational success.

Station Hypo was one of three main stations the Navy used to listen to and break Japanese naval codes.  Hypo was the phonetic word for the letter “H,” which stood for Hawaii since Station Hypo was the code breaking office located in the basement of the Hawaii Naval District commander’s building in Pearl Harbor.  As an aside, I visited those rooms when I was commodore in Pearl, and they were being used to store furniture for the Pearl Harbor shipyard headquarters building, but we will leave that for another potential future discussion on what’s happened to all these historic sites over the decades.

But germane to this conversation, in the early months of the war the Naval District Hawaii commander reported, not to Admiral Nimitz, but to Admiral King directly.  That would be corrected in the coming months, but since Station Hypo supported combat operations in the Pacific, Admiral Nimitz certainly thought of it as one of his assets, while Admiral King’s staff in Washington saw it as solely and completely theirs, to include Station Hypo’s brilliant leader, Commander Joe Rochefort.

This led to a chain of command problem that would ultimately lead to Rochefort’s dismissal as head of Station Hypo, even after his incredible success leading to our victory at Midway.

To help us unpack all of this, to include how Station Hypo fed both King’s and Nimitz’s strategic picture, we are proud to host the chief historian of the Navy and Director of Naval History and Heritage Command, retired Rear Admiral Sam Cox.

Admiral Cox, welcome.

Station HYPO:

• What was HYPO?
• Initially known as Fleet Radio Unit Pacific, or FRUPAC
• Hawaii location for the Navy’s cryptanalysts who monitored radio intel of the Japanese.
• HYPO was one of two major stations for Allied radio intel, the other being in Melbourne, Australia.
• Under the command of DC, not Nimitz, or Kimmel for that matter.
• Conspiracy theory that HYPO never had a PURPLE machine, and therefore was unable to read Japanese traffic pre-Pearl Harbor.
• NOT TRUE.  Purple was the diplomatic code, not the Naval code so HYPO had no reason to have the PURPLE machine in the first place.  It would not have helped them in any way.

• HYPO’s mission after Pearl Harbor, was to decipher the Japanese JN-25 code. 
• Prior to Pearl, HYPO was to decipher flag officer’s code and weather codes
• Washington worked on JN25 initially
• How much of the code was readable? 
• Prior to Pearl, they had successfully broken a part of the code, only 10% before the attack.
•  

• Who was HYPO’s CO and what kind of a man was he?
• Joseph Rochefort was a Naval enlistee, who never graduated high school.  He enlisted in 1918, lied about his age and was later commissioned an Ensign in 1919.  Spent several years at sea as well as a year in Tokyo as a language officer.
• He began work in Cryptanalysis in 1926
• Rochefort was assigned as head of HYPO in March 1941 by Intel officer Laurance Safford.
• Brilliant man who had a knack for solving crossword puzzles and figuring out different types of word puzzles.
• WAS NOT an eccentric as has been shown in movies.
• YES, he wore a smoking jacket while at work, only because it had pockets for his pipe and tobacco
• YES, he wore slippers at work because the concrete floors of the “dungeon” hurt his feet while he paced around trying to figure out messages.
• HYPO was different than most Naval assignments of the era…how so?
• Many of the staff of codebreakers were handpicked men by Rochefort
• Not much in the way of military discipline
• There was no real system of work, the men were allowed to play their hunches in order to decrypt the information and if that included throwing false messages around to confirm something so be it.
• There was quite a bit of guesswork involved.
• Men worked round the clock.  Rochefort himself rarely went home, often slept on a cot in his office.  Most men worked 12 hour shifts, 7 days a week.

• How was the JN25 code eventually “broken” what was the process?
• There were over 50,000 five-digit numeral groups to decipher
• Codebreakers didn’t necessarily break the code as they actually started to see patterns in the messages and began to plug and play if you will, the different patterns together until something began to take shape.
• LCDR Thomas Dyer had an uncanny knack for seeing patterns in messages, he said, “if you observe something long enough, you’ll see something peculiar. If you can’t see something peculiar, if ou stare at it long enough, that in itself is peculiar.  And then you try to explain the peculiarity.”

• Traffic analysis           
• Traffic analysis played a large part in the “codebreaking”
• Reading and noticing a pick up Japanese traffic in certain areas of the Pacific would help determine where and how large of an enemy activity was planned or taking shape.
• This very trick allowed the Hit and Run Raids on the Marshalls on Feb 1 to take place
• Cryptanalysts got to where they could tell which Japanese radioman sent which message, and in turn could decipher which ship, or station had sent the message, thereby allowing the intel group to piece together the information that could lead to Rochefort’s team saying whether or not a carrier group was deploying under which admiral and from where.

• Was the information provided trusted?
• Initially, no.  Admirals like King, specifically King, did not initially trust cryptanalysis.
• Most of the info they were providing seemed to be guesswork
• Admiral Nimitz, however, DID trust the intel, and specifically trusted Rochefort and Edwin Layton.
• This of course, proved very fruitful…

Sit Rep PTO late December 1941-January 1942

• Japanese are on the offensive everywhere
• Philippines are already on the way out
• Wake Island, despite a gallant defense by the Marines has been captured and the planned relief had been called off December 22.
• The fact that Wake Island had been abandoned by Admiral Pye lit a fire under Nimitz to strike back.
• Morale was extremely low in the fleet due to the fact that Wake had been abandoned.  
• Capt McMorris, Pye’s Chief of staff, said that retreating from Wake would be “unduly cautious” and a retreat would “destroy service and public confidence.  It is an opportunity unlikely to come again soon.  We are in great need of a victory.”
• Talk about the effect of Pye’s retreat order on the Carrier Force
• Aubrey Fitch withdrew to his cabin so he would not hear the mutinous talk on the bridge.
• Fliers on Saratoga threatened to ignore the order and launch anyway.
• Intel officer Edwin Layton said, “To lose to an enemy that fought you and you fought well was one thing.  But to lose because your own Admiral was a nervous Nellie was another.”
•  January 1942 was probably the worst month of the war in the Pacific as far as public knowledge and morale went.

• Admiral King wants to strike back
• In a cable dated January 2, 1942 King told Nimitz that he was not pleased with the “half-hearted” deployment of the CVs.
• He desired “Hit and Run” raids in the Marshalls and Gilberts.
• Talk about surprise raids to hit the outlying Japanese bases.
• Even though King wants to strike back, Nimitz’s advisers say don’t do it

• What can Nimitz strike back with?
• Talk about the carriers and their availability
• CV experience or lack thereof

• What are the risks of utilizing the CVs at this juncture?
• Who is expressing doubt?
• Admiral Bloch 14th Naval District responsible for defending Hawaii
• What were the arguments against a raid or raids?
• Bloch said that deploying the CVs on raids would leave Hawai’i dangerously exposed to further Jap assaults or invasion
• Intelligence on the Marshalls and Gilberts was scarce
• Little was known about the targets
• Didn’t think it was worth the risk
• Why take the risk?
• CVs were all we had
• Why raid in the first place and why the outer ring?
• Morale boost
• Japan focused on going south. – this would hit them in their “rear area”
• “Turning Movement” not the same as flank attack
• Possibly may divert Japanese attention from Australia and the Coral Sea
• Hitting the outer ring of islands was easier as there would be less of a threat from heavy Jap fleet units
• Would also protect Samoa and Australia by weakening the Jap airfields there

• The Marshall and Gilbert Islands Raid
• Nimitz confers with Admiral Halsey about the upcoming strike.
• Halsey is enthusiastic (no surprise here)
• Says that CVs should strike like General Nathan Bedford Forrest said about cavalry, “get to the other fellow first with everything you have and as fast as you can and dump it on him.”
• Halsey says he will take Enterprise to the Marshalls himself
• What strike isn’t with risk?
• Halsey says it’s important for the Navy’s self-respect
• Nimitz pulls the trigger
• Cryptanalysts state to Nimitz that radio traffic indicated a large Japanese fleet movement south, thereby putting the proposed targets out of range of major enemy fleet units
• Set for Feb 1
• Will comprise Task Force 8 built around Halsey and CV6 and TF 17 under Fletcher and CV5.         
• TF8 will strike the Marshalls in the am and if possible strike again that afternoon with targets on Kwajalein, Wotje and Taroa (Moelap)
• TF17 will strike the Gilberts area with targets on Mili, Makin and Jaluit

• Task Force 8
• Due to radio intercepts, Nimitz ordered Halsey to strike deep into the Marshalls at Kwajalein and hit the targets as much and as often as practical.
• Halsey told his pilots on CV6 that they would stay all day and “raise a little hell in the Marshalls”.  
• Pilots were elated
• First combat for Halsey & Spruance
• Weather was clear, moon was high, no wind, no rain…perfect for flying
• Aircrews awakened at 0300
• Takeoff at 0445
• CV6 launches 37 SBDs and 9 TBDs armed with bombs
• VS6 to attack airfield
• VB6 to freelance and attack targets of opportunity
• As VS6 approached Roi island, Japs scramble fighters, Type 96 Claudes and AAA starts sprouting up as the SBDs go into their glide bombing runs
• VS6 CO Halstead Hopping’s SBD is jumped by Claudes and is hit by AAA.  He drives directly into the drink.
• Emergence of Earl Gallaher and Dusty Kleiss. Wade McCluskey & Dick Best
• John Snowden gets an aerial kill on the Claude that shot down Hopping
• VS6 makes secondary runs on targets on the island with good success
• VB6
• They were held up and told to attack any shipping in the area
• Attacked several ships, mostly cargo ships and hit several of them, including a minelayer.
• Second attack of VS6
• They gain altitude and circle to come around on the shipping initially hit by VB6
• Instead of glide bombing as they did on the airfield, the scouts come in high and dive in 70-degree dives on the shipping
• Dusty drops his 500 pounder on a large vessel thought to be a cruiser
• Drills the cruiser dead center (the beginnings of an Dauntless dive-bomber deadeye)
• Roars across Kwajalein strafing the airfield as he goes, Snowden blasting away from the rear cockpit
• Other aircraft hit many of the ships in the harbor including a sub tender and a sub
• VT6 attacks
• First TBD attack of the war, some success
• Harbinger of things to come
• Second attack of EAG
• Big E only 95 miles from Taroa, left her exposed to retaliatory strikes from Japs
• The attack on Taroa was hotly contested by Japanese fighters and AAA
• Very heavy AAA, although not accurate and fighters who were all over the SBDs
• Halsey launches a 3rd attack
• Third attack is met by more Japanese fighters, many of the SBDs get shot up.
• Dusty Kleiss scores a hit on a hangar and is jumped by fighters on his way out.
• SBD gets shot up but he manages to force the fighters to disengage
• Stands up in his cockpit to wipe the oil from his windscreen.  SBD leaking fuel from his wing tanks.
• 4th attack
• Wotje is hit by EAG SBDs and TBDs
• Hit a ship in the harbor and other installations
• Halsey advised to “Get the hell out of here”
• As CV6 is pulling away at flank speed she is attacked by Japanese Nell level bombers
• Big E’s AAA guns start to bark at the incoming bombers
• CAP engaged but made no discernable impact
• Japs release ordnance from around 3000 feet and Captain George Murray handles the Big E like a speedboat, expertly dodging the incoming ordnance
• One last Nell, damaged by Enterprise AAA, turns around and heads back towards the ship. Pilot Lieutenant Kazuo Nakai intends on crashing his Nell into the Big E.
• Bruno Gaido
• Bomber cuts the tail off of Gaido’s SBD as it falls into the sea

• Combat Results
• 1 sunken transport, the Bordeaux Maru
• Auxiliary sub chaser No 2 Shonan Maru sinking
• Sub I-23 damaged
• Sub tender Yasukuni Maru damaged
• 5 other ships damaged to varying degrees
• 5 SBDs lost and 2 F4Fs

• Psychological Results
• Admiral Ugaki furious “we’re worse than the Americans—they didn’t have warning we did”. Made us look ridiculous.
• Yamamoto: “They have come after us after all”. (We were supposed to negotiate a peace.)
• Historians downplay significance. 
• Reinforce their forces everywhere
• Morale within the fleet skyrockets…finally a tangible retaliation to Pearl Harbor.
• Dawn February 5, Enterprise and Task Force 8 enter Pearl harbor to a hero’s welcome
• Halsey had Enterprise’s crew man their battle stations in whites
• Big E pulls into Pearl flying her battle colors
• Horns blowing, sailors waving, bands playing
• Nimitz comes aboard CV6 via bosun’s chair and congratulates Halsey, who breaks down in tears.
• The man truly loved his ship, his crew and his Navy
• The actual results of the Feb 1 raid were not much in terms of actual damage, but the pysch results were undeniable.
• True battle tested pilots in EAG

• Japanese Results
• Ugaki, Yammamoto’s Chief of Staff says, “They have come after all.”
• Forces Shokaku and Zuikaku to detach from Kido Butai and patrol Japanese home island waters for fear of a strike on the home land.
• Japanese move bombers closer to the outlying islands
• Diverted Japanese strength
• Planted the seeds for Yamamoto’s Midway operation

• Other Raids
• While EAG hits the Marshalls on Feb 1, CV5 and Task Force 17 hit Jaluit in the Gilberts the same day.
• Feb 24 EAG hits Wake
• March 4 EAG hits Marcus
• March 10 TF 17 hits Lae and Salamau

• Wrap up
• Overall importance

• Nimitz Pre War
• Who was he and where did he come from?
• Texas Hill Country, Fredericksburg
• Too poor to go to college, worked his tail off to go to Naval Academy
• Spent time in Japan before the war
• Nimitz was a submarine officer in his early years
• Commanded a DD in the Philippines
• Commanded a cruiser division and battleship division
• XO of SC, CO Chicago
• Highly experienced in the realm of command

• Nimitz Upon Assignment as CINCPAC
• 56 Years Old currently occupying the office of the Bureau of Navigation
• Whose decision was it to promote Nimitz to the position?
• FDR
• He had been offered the job before December 41 and turned it down for fear of upsetting senior officers.
• He was junior to some 50 other Admirals
• He feared that taking the job and leapfrogging them would have created resentment and made it more difficult to do the job.

• Nimitz the Leader
• What kind leadership style did Nimitz utilize?
• He was a people person
• Never cussed, raised his voice or dressed men down in public
• He gave his subordinates a lot of autonomy and assumed they knew their jobs until they proved they did not
• If that occurred, he spoke in low tones, was blunt but not rude or insulting
• Always looked after his men and took care of them

• Nimitz the Executive
• Juggled personalities of subordinates and his boss extremely well
• Dealings with King
• Dealings with subordinates
• Turner
• GEN Smith
• Halsey
• Towers
• JO Richardson
• MacArthur
• Spruance and Nimitz relationship
• Nimitz handled the various personalities in the Pacific in check much as Ike did in the ETO. 
• Was very similar to Ike in terms of Supreme Commander, even though, Nimitz was no Supreme Commander

• What did Nimitz inherit in December 41 and how did he go about fixing the problems?
• Inherited a shattered command
• Devastated morale
• Staff, fleet and populace
• Fear of a Japanese invasion
• When he landed in Pearl on Xmas Day he asked about the relief of Wake
• When told it fell and was abandoned, he fell silent
• Didn’t take command immediately. Worked with Admiral Pye to get the lay of the land, latest issues and intel.
• Took command on December 31, 1941 aboard USS Grayling (SS-209) fittingly

• Nimitz’s Strategy 1941-42
• Be cautious, yet forceful and hit them where they least expect it
• Strike  back was essential
• (Set the stage for next episode about the Hit and Run Raids)

• Nimitz’s biggest gamble
• Midway
• Recognized the role of intel and believed in it, believed in his people and their skills
• Nimitz’s Legacy
• Developed and implemented the island hopping strategy that won the war.
• Inherited a shattered fleet, trusted his subordinates, built his leadership teams and won when it was absolutely necessary.

As you know, the nation is going through a process of reviewing Confederate leaders through a clearer lens, clearing away the mythology around them that emerged to justify their actions after the end of the Civil War.  I see this as right and appropriate.

But I also think it’s time to contemplate General MacArthur through a clearer lens.  And if we do this, we realize:

• He was an unabashed liar, regularly committing what we would refer at Annapolis as honor violations of the type that would have gotten any other military officer fired.
• He was a narcissist of the degree to which made George Patton look like a humble man.
• He was self-delusional about his military prowess, believing that he and he alone had the ability to win this war in a largely naval theater, when in fact his actions likely extended it.
• He was a known pedophile who at the age of 50 took in a 16-year-old girl as his live-in concubine
• As Army Chief of Staff he used Army mounted cavalry and tanks against protesting World War I veterans in an event referred to as the Bonus March demonstrations.
• In my view, rather than being a military genius, for his part in the execution of questionable campaigns that contributed to the deaths of thousands of Americans, I see him as the worst American general since another General Mac— George McClellan. 
• About the only good thing I can say about him is he performed admirably in World War I when he far less responsibility and in his leadership of occupied Japan.

A lot of this is going to sound like 20-20 hindsight, but in the military we have this thing called the After Action Report or AAR that is 100% 20-20 hindsight.  The whole purpose of the AAR is to overcome the fog of war and look back on what really happened so that we can learn from it.

• Why did the Japanese invade the Philippines in the first place?

• Why after so much warning, especially after the attack on Pearl Harbor, were the American forces so unprepared to meet a Japanese attack? 

• Why were the aircraft not dispersed?
• Why was there so little American air defense?
• Mac’s belief that Japanese suffered a defeat at Pearl?  Excuse for not acting more aggressively?

-We’ve harangued the Army Air Corps, as they were called then, enough I guess, lets focus on other commands.  What about the Navy?  Where was the Asiatic Fleet?  

-What was MacArthur’s plan to meet the invaders?  What did he want to do?  

-Why would that simply not work?

-Talk about the US tanks that ran out of gas trying to get to Lingayen?  Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics.

-Mac’s change in strategy from War Plan Orange to “defend the beaches, hit ‘em where they ain’t” was ludicrous.  

-He had nowhere near the resources to do this.  Ironically, it was the Japanese that succeeded in “hitting ’em where they ain’t.”

-Needs to be said: Gen Short pilloried for loss of Hawaii with no warning.  Mac had warning and received Medal of Honor.

-Once the Japanese landed on Luzon in their main assault on December 22, they advanced rapidly, running over most resistance they came across.   The largest amphibious invasion in history, to that point, was wildly successful.  Another large landing occurred and now the Japanese had two armies advancing on Manila.  

-With such numbers on the American and Filipino side, why did this happen?

-Admiral Hart was one of the first leaders to publicly say that the Philippines were indefensible. 

Why was this a surprisingly common thought?

- ADM Hart was Annapolis classmate & friend of Mac’s older brother.  Knew Mac well, called him Douglas.  Said “Douglas is certain about a lot of stuff that just ain’t so, and is an effective talker, which leads to danger.”   Maybe hint at our MacArthur episode?

-Let’s talk about the ineffectiveness of the Cavite submarines that were sortied by Hart

-Staring defeat in the face, what did Mac Arthur do next?

-How did the American forces do in the defense of the Bataan Peninsula?

-Despite their very good showing and heavy casualties inflicted on the Japanese, did they actually have any hope of rescue?

-March 11, MacArthur leaves.  By May, the Philippines are surrendered to the Japanese.  Over 90,000 Americans and Filipinos are captured.  

-How is this news reacted to in the US?  

-What does this do to American morale, both in the military and at home?

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-Historians often cite Japanese expansionism, imperialism, what have you, for their desire to attack Pearl Harbor.  Others say it the United States’ embargos that led to the attack.  Which was it?  And could there have been another alternative to Kido Butai flinging airplanes at the sleeping American Pacific fleet?

-There were many warnings about the impending attack before the first aircraft dropped their ordnance.  What were some of those warnings?  What, if any, actions could of/should have been taken?

-After the attack, the US government needed scapegoats.  They had to pin the blame on their overall intelligence failure on anybody but themselves, and so they harpooned both Army General Walter Short, and Navy Admiral Husband Kimmel.  Who were these guys, what were their respective roles and were they actually to blame for the entire attack?  Were they to blame for anything?  What should they have done prior to the attack?  Were they aware of any real threat?

-The actual attack on Pearl Harbor was a military feat in its own right.  Who was the planner?  Why was attacking PH such a risk militarily?    

-Let’s talk about the opposing forces…Japanese planning, skill and execution versus American response…

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This is just the trailer.